日本健康保险制度演变历程及启示

对日本医疗保险制度实现全民覆盖的历程以及现状进行分析,发现日本的健康保险制度演变有以下特点：以法律为依据,逐步实现全民覆盖;建立了健康保险基金的合理分担机制;不同保健制度覆盖人群的服务包逐渐趋同、补偿水平逐渐统一;不同保险方案之间建立了风险分担和资金转移机制;加强对供方的约束力,控制医药费用快速上涨。最后针对日本健康保险制度的演变特点给出我国医疗保险制度改革的政策建议：健全医疗保险的法律法规;调整筹资机制,逐步提高个人筹资责任;推进不同医保制度覆盖人群保障待遇的统筹和统一;建立不同健康保险制度之间的风险分担机制;积极探索支付方式改革,控制医药费用快速上涨。     

国际经验对我国建立长期照护保险制度的启示

目的:通过介绍几种国际上常用的长期照护保险制度,对我国建立适合我国国情的长期照护保险提供参考和借鉴。方法:主要通过搜索国外关于长期照护保险制度的文献资料,对其内容进行提取和总结,对我国的制度建设提供建议和借鉴。结果:文章总结国际上通用的长期照护保险制度有四种模式:私营长期照护社会保险,例如荷兰;公营长期照护社会保险,例如德国,日本;长期照护商业保险,例如美国;以及国家负责长期照护保险,例如英国。我国可以借鉴各种模式的优点,形成我们的制度。结论:荷兰、德国、日本以及美国的长期照护保险制度都有值得借鉴的地方,但是也有弊端,在扬长避短的基础上,形成我国合理的长期照护保险制度。     

日本医疗保险制度及介护保险制度介绍

日本是社会保障制度发育比较成熟的国家之一。1922年,日本制定了《健康保险法》,1961年实现了国民皆保险,其医疗保险制度的内容一直延续至今。在此,我们对日本的医疗保险制度和介护保险制度进行了介绍,希望能对读者及中国的医疗保障制度改革有所裨益。1日本的医疗保险制度1.1医疗保险制度的主要内容日本的医疗保险从大的方面划分为被用者保险、国民保险及以二者为基础的老人医疗。1.1.1被用者保险。包括政府掌管健康保险(面对中小企业,由政府运营)、组合掌管健康保险(由大企业运营)、船员保险、各种共济组合(国家公务员、地方公务员、私立学…     

中国台湾地区创新医疗技术支付进展及经验

从中国台湾地区二代全民健康保险制度、“卫生福利部健康保险署”对新医疗服务项目的管理流程、全民健康保险按疾病诊断相关分组支付制度下的新增全新功能类别医疗技术因应方案三方面,介绍了中国台湾地区全民健康保险对创新医疗技术支付的做法和经验。在此基础上为我国创新医疗技术支付政策改革提供参考和借鉴,包括构建多渠道的筹资体系、引入第三方评估机制、推进疾病诊断相关分组付费制度下的医疗保险支付改革。     

荷兰医改及对我国构建整合型健康服务体系的启示

本文介绍了荷兰卫生服务体系概况,重点阐述了荷兰新医改后的全科医生首诊制度、"有管理的竞争模型"健康保险体系、长期照护体系典型政策范例。借鉴荷兰改革经验,提出推进我国卫生服务体系整合实践的策略。建议:以提高全科医生职业吸引力作为改革起点,全科医生队伍建设先行,筑牢改革根基;立法先行、以市场机制作为改革抓手,搭建公共政策规制与市场激励相容的改革框架,形成一套富有管理的、有竞争性、有活力的中国健康保险体系;在积极健康老龄化背景下,以整合理念建设适合我国国情的老年人长期照护体系;承接我国移动互联领域的资源基础,依托智慧治理破解医改难题。     

欧洲四国法定医疗保险竞争现状的比较

该文探讨了比利时、德国、荷兰和瑞士等欧洲四国提供法定医疗保险机构面对竞争时所拟定的改革目标和采取的措施.从理论上讲,只要人们能自由选择,保险公司是会影响到医疗服务的质量和成本的,其行业竞争可以帮助提高健康管理和卫生保健效率.但是在实际中,这四个国家在实行改革中并非总是效率至上.政策目标的不同不能完全解释实施中产生的差异.除了为校正风险所做的重大投资,还存在着风险投资,并且由于人口流动性消费者的分布并不平均.好的风险校正方式使年长者和亚健康人群便于更换保险公司.尤其在自愿投保广泛覆盖的区域,政策制定者可更多地致力于防止保险公司将法定和自愿健康保险捆绑式销售.在比利时、德国和瑞士,保险双方的协商行为限制了保险公司能力,进一步影响了医疗服务质量,提高了成本.荷兰保险公司保障效率的方式则较好.以上经验给其他国家以提示：提高卫生服务效率并非简单地任由医疗保险业自由竞争.     

从分散到统一:荷兰基本医疗保险制度改革对我国的启示

2006年1月1日,荷兰基本医疗保险制度进行了大刀阔斧地改革,将3个分散计划(疾病基金保险计划、私人商业医疗保险和公务员医疗保险计划)合并为一个统一的基本医疗保险制度。荷兰改革的根源在于原有医疗保险制度存在分散化带来的不公平性、垄断带来的效率低下等诸多弊端。我国目前的医疗卫生状况与荷兰改革前非常相似,基本医疗保险制度也针对不同人群实施了不同计划(城镇职工基本医疗保险、城镇居民基本医疗保险、公费医疗保险和新型农村合作医疗保险)。荷兰的改革经验对我国基本医疗保险制度改革和医疗卫生体制的构筑具有一定的启示和借鉴意义。     

荷兰的健康保险系统

荷兰的健康保险系统由长期保健、基本健康保险和私人健康保险3部分组成,其显著特点是公共筹资与私人筹资相融合,私人提供的卫生服务占主导地位.改革当前健康保险系统中筹资严重分割、费用增长过快和服务之间缺乏协作的现状,建立统一的、内容广泛的保健体制是荷兰卫生改革的发展趋势.     

荷兰的健康保险系统

荷兰的健康保险系统由长期保健，基本健康保险和私人健康保险3部分组成，其显著特点是公共等与私人筹资相融合，私人提供的卫生服务占主导地位，改革当前健康保险系统中筹资严重分割，费用增长过快和服务之间缺乏协作的现状，建立统一的，内容广泛的保健体制是荷兰卫生改革的发展趋势。     

荷兰医保独树一帜

<正>荷兰全民医保模式在世界范围内独树一帜。它既不同于英国的国民健康保险,也不同于美国自由的商业医疗保险模式,而是兼具双方优点的"管理型市场竞争"模式。它历经3次改革,最终于2006年创新性地实现了强制投保、自由选择、有序竞争、全科医生守门、三方相互制衡的管理型竞争模式。这一改革,也促使荷兰医疗体系在连续多年的欧洲健康消费指数(EHCI)评比中,成为自2005年以来,唯一的一直能保持前三名     

Preferences and choices for care and health insurance

Legislation that came into effect in 2006 has dramatically altered the health insurance system in the Netherlands, placing greater emphasis on consumer choice and competition among insurers. The potential for such competition depends largely on consumer preferences for price and quality of service by insurers and quality of affiliated providers. This study provides initial evidence on the preferences of Dutch consumers and how they view trade-offs between various aspects of health insurance product design. A key feature of the analysis is that we compare the responses of high and low risk individuals, where risk is defined by the presence of a costly chronic condition. This contrast is critically important for understanding incentives facing insurers and for identifying potential unanticipated consequences of market competition. The results from our conjoint analysis suggest that not only high risk but also low risk individuals are willing to pay substantially more for insurance products that can be shown to provide better health outcomes. This suggests that insurance products that are more expensive and provide better quality of care may also attract low risk individuals. Therefore, development and dissemination of good, reliable and understandable health plan performance indicators may effectively reduce the problem of adverse selection.     

Universal mandatory health insurance in the Netherlands: a model for the United States?

Policy analysts consider the Netherlands health system a possible model for the United States. Since 2006 all Dutch citizens have to buy standardized individual health insurance coverage from a private insurer. Consumers have an annual choice among insurers, and insurers can selectively contract or integrate with health care providers. Subsidies make health insurance affordable for everyone. A Risk Equalization Fund compensates insurers for enrollees with predictably high medical expenses. The reform is a work in progress. So far the emphasis has been on the health insurance market. The challenge is now to successfully reform the market for the provision of health care.     

Gender equity and health sector reform in Colombia: Mixed state-market model yields mixed results

In 1993, Colombia carried out a sweeping health reform that sought to dramatically increase health insurance coverage and reduce state involvement in health provision by creating a unitary state-supervised health system in which private entities are the main insurers and health service providers. Using a quantitative comparison of household survey data and an analysis of the content of the reforms, we evaluate the effects of Colombia's health reforms on gender equity. We find that several aspects of these reforms hold promise for greater gender equity, such as the resulting increase in women's health insurance coverage. However, the reforms have not achieved gender equity due to the persistence of fees which discriminate against women and the introduction of a two-tier health system in which women heads of household and the poor are concentrated in a lower quality health system.     

Trust in times of health reform

Trust is seen as an important condition for the smooth functioning of institutions, such as the health care system. In this article we describe the trust relationships between the three main actors in the Dutch health care system: patients/insured, healthcare providers and insurers. We used data from different surveys between 2006 and 2016. 2006 was the year of the introduction of an insurance reform in the Netherlands towards regulated competition.In the triangle of trust relationships between the three actors we found strong and mutual trust relationships between patients and healthcare providers and weak trust relationships between healthcare providers and insurers as well as between insured and insurance organisations. This hampers the intended role of insurers as selective purchasers of health care on the basis of quality and price.     

Should administrative costs in health insurance be included in the risk-equalization? An analysis of five countries

Most countries that apply risk-equalization in their health insurance market(s) perform risk-equalization on medical claims but do not include other components of the insurance premium, such as administrative costs. Using fixed effects panel regressions from individual insurers in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the US, we find evidence that health insurers with a high morbidity population on average have higher administrative costs. We argue that administrative costs should also be included in risk-equalization and we show that such equalization results in additional equalization payments nontrivial in size. Using examples from Germany and the US, we show how in practice policymakers can include administrative costs in risk-equalization. We are skeptical about applying risk-equalization to other components of the insurance premium, such as profits or costs related to solvency requirements of insurers.

     

Workable competition in health care: prospects for the Dutch design.

Since 1989 a gradual restructuring of the Dutch health care system is taking place to realize a multiple choice social health insurance system with workable competition among insurers and among health care providers. This paper investigates whether the structural change will induce the intended competition. An examination of the characteristics of the market for health insurance, physician services and hospital services in the Netherlands points out that the scope for competition is limited. If competition is to work, rather extensive government regulation to monitor the conduct of both providers and insurers is needed. Without an effective antitrust policy a high degree of concentration and collusion is likely.     

Medical care use and selection in a social health insurance with an equalization fund: evidence from Colombia

This paper studies the relationship between health status and insurance participation, and between insurance status and medical use in the context of a social health insurance with an equalization fund (SHIEF). Under this system, revenues from a mandatory payroll tax are collected into a single pool (equalization fund) that reimburses for-profit insurance companies according to a capitated formula. Although competition should induce insurers to control costs without reducing the quality of service necessary to attract consumers, limitations in the capitation formula might induce insurers to select against bad risks, and limitations in the contribution system might induce more healthy individuals to evade enrollment. A three-equation model having social health insurance, private health insurance, and using medical services is estimated using a 1997 Colombian household survey. Consistent with similar studies, participation in SHIEF increases medical care use. On the other hand, the evidence on selection is somewhat mixed: individuals who report good health status are more likely to participate in SHIEF, while those without a chronic condition are less likely to participate in SHIEF.     

Overpaying morbidity adjusters in risk equalization models

Most competitive social health insurance markets include risk equalization to compensate insurers for predictable variation in healthcare expenses. Empirical literature shows that even the most sophisticated risk equalization models—with advanced morbidity adjusters—substantially undercompensate insurers for selected groups of high-risk individuals. In the presence of premium regulation, these undercompensations confront consumers and insurers with incentives for risk selection. An important reason for the undercompensations is that not all information with predictive value regarding healthcare expenses is appropriate for use as a morbidity adjuster. To reduce incentives for selection regarding specific groups we propose overpaying morbidity adjusters that are already included in the risk equalization model. This paper illustrates the idea of overpaying by merging data on morbidity adjusters and healthcare expenses with health survey information, and derives three preconditions for meaningful application. Given these preconditions, we think overpaying may be particularly useful for pharmacy-based cost groups.