Problem: Although efficacy studies of opioid maintenance treatment (OMT) have shown evidence of treatment benefits, there is still need for studies on its effectiveness in natural clinical processes. This study investigates the development in health, substance use and social conditions of those who applied for OMT, including those denied access or discharged.
Method: First, persons assessed for admittance in 2005–2011 (n?=?127) were categorized into four trajectory groups based on whether they were admitted or denied (n?=?19), discharged (n?=?31), readmitted (n?=?21) or had been undergoing OMT without interruption (n?=?56). Second, 99 of these, the analytical sample, were interviewed at follow-up using (a) the Addiction Severity Index (ASI) for seven problem-areas and housing, and (b) self-rated change in 11 problem areas. The ASI was compared to baseline interviews after 55 months (mean). Third, outcomes within groups was studied in relation to alternative interventions.
Results: Within the analytical sample, those denied OMT showed no improvements at group level, those discharged had some improvements, more if readmitted than if not and those with uninterrupted OMT showed the most comprehensive improvements. Those outside OMT, denied and discharged, had considerable mortality risks related to ongoing drug use, especially in lack of well-planned alternative interventions.
Conclusion: Improvements strongly relate to access to OMT. This study underscores that access to OMT improves the situation in all areas investigated and decreases the risk for drug-related death. It underscores the importance of two major risk situations, i.e. being denied OMT and being discharged. 相似文献
David Marr's three-level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between Marr and reductionism than is usually acknowledged. I argue that Marr was correct in his criticism of the reductionists of his time—they were only describing (cellular activity), not explaining (cognitive functions). But a careful metascientific account of reductionistic neuroscience over the past two decades reveals that Marr's criticisms no longer have force. Contemporary neuroscience now explains cognition directly, although in a fashion—causal-mechanistically—quite different than Marr recommended. So while Marr was correct to reject the reductionism of his day and offer an alternative method for genuinely explaining cognition, contemporary cognitive scientists now owe us a new defense of Marr's famous method and the advantages of its explanations over the type now pursued successfully in current reductionist neuroscience. There are familiar reasons for thinking that this debt will not be paid easily. 相似文献
