The killing of severely disabled newborns: the spectre behind the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia

Arguments made by those in favour of the legalisation of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and euthanasia often rely upon the idea of the quality of life. This idea states that an individual's life is not valuable as an intrinsic good, but is only good based upon the things which it allows us to do. It thus allows the argument that it is morally permissible to kill individuals whose lives have fallen below an acceptable 'quality of life.' However, this concept may require that one accept the killing of individuals who have not expressly request to be killed such as severely disabled newborns. This paper will examine the issue of whether those who utilise a quality of life approach to justify the legalisation of PAS and euthanasia must logically accept the policy of killing severely disabled newborn children. First, there will be an examination of the concept of quality of life and its importance in the arguments for the legalisation of PAS or euthanasia. This paper will then consider how notions of personhood interact with the concept of quality of life in order to create the problem faced by those who favour the legalisation of PAS or euthanasia. Finally, this paper will consider how the notion of autonomy may be used as a way to avoid this difficulty created by the quality of life approach.