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药品安全监管的动态博弈分析
引用本文:方宇,李良,杨世民,冯变玲.药品安全监管的动态博弈分析[J].中国药房,2010(25):2324-2325.
作者姓名:方宇  李良  杨世民  冯变玲
作者单位:西安交通大学医学院药学系药事管理教研室,西安市710061
摘    要:目的:研究药品安全监管中监管主体与监管对象的动态博弈关系。方法:采用博弈论模型进行分析。结果与结论:药品安全投入不足会对药品安全产生负面影响。对于监管者,需完善药品安全监管法律法规,总体应加大监管力度,且应对各种被监管者进行分类监管;对于被监管者,其在逐利过程中应严格遵守法律法规,更应注重长期利益。

关 键 词:药品安全  监管  博弈论

Dynamic Game Analysis on the Drug Safety Supervision
FANG Yu,LI Liang,YANG Shi-min,FENG Bian-ling.Dynamic Game Analysis on the Drug Safety Supervision[J].China Pharmacy,2010(25):2324-2325.
Authors:FANG Yu  LI Liang  YANG Shi-min  FENG Bian-ling
Institution:(Pharmaceutical Management Teaching and Research Section,Pharmacy Department of Medical College,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710061,China)
Abstract:OBJECTIVE:To conduct the dynamic game analysis on the relationship of monitoring subject and monitoring object in drug safety supervision.METHODS:Game theory model was used for dynamic game analysis.RESULTS CONCLUSIONS:For monitoring subject,the defect of drug safety supervision had negative impact on drug safety.Laws and regulations for drug supervision should be improved to enforce drug safety supervision.Monitoring subject should be supervised based on their category.Monitoring object should abide by laws and regulations and focus more on the long-term interest in the process of pursuing interests.
Keywords:Drug safety  Supervision  Game theory
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