Mental models and human reasoning |
| |
Authors: | Johnson-Laird Philip N |
| |
Affiliation: | Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA. phil@princeton.edu |
| |
Abstract: | To be rational is to be able to reason. Thirty years ago psychologists believed that human reasoning depended on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. This hypothesis ran into difficulties, which led to an alternative view: reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the starting point--a perception of the world, a set of assertions, a memory, or some mixture of them. We construct mental models of each distinct possibility and derive a conclusion from them. The theory predicts systematic errors in our reasoning, and the evidence corroborates this prediction. Yet, our ability to use counterexamples to refute invalid inferences provides a foundation for rationality. On this account, reasoning is a simulation of the world fleshed out with our knowledge, not a formal rearrangement of the logical skeletons of sentences. |
| |
Keywords: | abduction deduction induction logic rationality |
本文献已被 PubMed 等数据库收录! |
|