Hips and hearts: The variation in incentive effects of insurance across hospital procedures |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Division of Physical Therapy, Department of Rehabilitation Sciences, Faculty of Applied Medical Sciences, Jordan University of Science and Technology, PO Box 3030, Irbid 22110, Jordan;2. Faculty of Nursing, Maternal and Child Health Department, Jordan University of Science and Technology, Irbid, Jordan;3. Department of Medical Laboratory Sciences, Jordan University of Science and Technology, Jordan;4. Department of Clinical Pharmacy, Jordan University of Science and Technology, Irbid, Jordan |
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| Abstract: | The separate identification of effects due to incentives, selection and preference heterogeneity in insurance markets is the topic of much debate. In this paper, we investigate the presence and variation in moral hazard across health care procedures. The key motivating hypothesis is the expectation of larger causal effects in the case of more discretionary procedures. The empirical approach relies on an extremely rich and extensive dataset constructed by linking survey data to administrative data for hospital medical records. Using this approach we are able to provide credible evidence of large moral hazard effects but for elective surgeries only. |
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| Keywords: | Health insurance Asymmetric information Moral hazard |
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