A second look at second-order belief attribution in autism

Compared the performance of autistic and mentally retarded subjects, all of whom had passed a standard first-order test of false belief, on a new second-order belief task 12 autistic and 12 mentally retarded subjects, matched on verbal mental age (assessed by PPVT and a sentence comprehension subtest of the CELF) and full-scale IQ were given two trials of a second-order reasoning task which was significantly shorter and less complex than the standard task used in all previous research. The majority of subjects in both groups passed the new task, and were able to give appropriate justifications to their responses. No group differences were found in performance on the control or test questions. Findings are interpreted as evidence for the role of information processing factors rather than conceptual factors in performance on higher order theory of mind tasks.This study was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (1RO1 DC 01234). We thank Jason Barker for his extensive help with this study. We are also very grateful to the schools where the study was conducted including the League School, and the public school systems in the following towns in Massachusetts: Hanover, Hanson, Hingham, Milton, Plymouth, and Rockland. We offer special thanks to Alan Dewey, Mary Dollar, Sandy D'Giacomo, Herman Fishbein, William Griffin, Nancy Kearns, Judy Monahan, Debbie Newhall, Cay Riley, Robert Sherman, and Kathy Staska for their continued support of our research.