| 治理我国医疗服务领域供方道德风险的策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 戈文鲁,葛洪刚,兰迎春. 治理我国医疗服务领域供方道德风险的策略研究[J]. 中国卫生政策研究, 2011, 4(2): 57-62. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-2982.2011.02.012 |
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| 作者姓名： | 戈文鲁 葛洪刚 兰迎春 |
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| 作者单位： | 山东济宁医学院社会科学部,山东济宁,272013 |
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| 摘 要： | 信息不对称和医疗服务供方的机会主义倾向而导致的供方道德风险是医疗服务领域普遍存在的现象,因此必须通过合理、科学的制度设计比如政府积极介入、加强医院和医生自身建设、完善激励机制和声誉机制、第三方积极介入等手段,才能抑制由于信息不对称等原因而引发的供方道德风险,从而有效维护患者的切身利益。
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| 关 键 词： | 医疗服务 道德风险 制度设计 |
| 收稿时间： | 2010-07-28 |
| 修稿时间： | 2010-11-12 |
Strategies of inquiry on the governance of supplier' moral hazard in health care sector in China |
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| GE Wen-lu,GE Hong-gang and LAN Ying-chun. Strategies of inquiry on the governance of supplier' moral hazard in health care sector in China[J]. Chinese Journal of Health Policy, 2011, 4(2): 57-62. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-2982.2011.02.012 |
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| Authors: | GE Wen-lu GE Hong-gang LAN Ying-chun |
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| Affiliation: | Social Science Department, Jining Medical University;Social Science Department, Jining Medical University;Social Science Department, Jining Medical University |
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| Abstract: | The moral hazard is the universal phenomenon based on the asymmetry information and the opportunism of the suppliers,so we must adopt effective measures to control it through scientific system designs such as government actively intervention,strengthening the construction of hospitals and doctors,improving inventive mechanism and credit mechanism,third-party actively intervention.This could effectively preserve the vital interest of the patients. |
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| Keywords: | Medical service Moral hazard System design |
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