The market for paid sick leave |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Finance, University of Iowa, United States;2. Munich Risk and Insurance Center, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich, Germany;3. Department of Finance, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, United States;1. Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain;2. Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom;3. Barcelona GSE, Spain;1. Johns Hopkins University, 624 N. Broadway Room 406, Baltimore, MD 21205, United States;2. Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States;3. RAND, 4570 Fifth Avenue Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, United States;4. Harvard Medical School, 25 Shattuck Street, Boston, MA 02115, United States;5. RAND, 20 Park Plaza 9th Floor Suite 920, Boston, MA 02116, United States;6. University of Minnesota, 420 Delaware Street, Minneapolis MN 55455, United States;7. University of Southern California, 635 Downey Way, Los Angeles, CA 90089, United States;8. NBER, United States;1. Department of Economics, University of New Mexico, United States;2. School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 1037 Luoyu Road, Wuhan 430074, China;1. University of Lucerne, Department of Health Sciences and Health Policy and Center for Health, Policy and Economics, Frohburgstrasse 3, PO Box 4466, CH-6002 Lucerne, Switzerland;2. University of Bern, Department of Economics and CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics, Tribschenstrasse 21, CH-6002 Lucerne, Switzerland;1. Department of Economics, Università Bocconi, Italy;2. Analysis Group, United States |
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| Abstract: | In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients’ insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services. |
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| Keywords: | Absenteeism Gatekeeping Competition Role-conflicts |
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