Competition-driven physician-induced demand |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, New York University, 9 West 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012, USA;2. Federal Reserve Board, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., Washington, DC 20551, USA;3. Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033 JAPAN;1. School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 611130, China;2. Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York YO10 5DD, UK;1. Frank Batten School of Leadership & Public Policy University of Virginia, United States;2. Frank Batten School of Leadership & Public Policy, University of Virginia and National Bureau of Economic Research, United States;1. Department of Economics, University of Virginia, USA;2. American Institutes for Research, USA;3. Amazon, USA;4. Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia, USA;1. Bureau of Economic Analysis;2. Department of Economics, University of Georgia;3. The World Bank;1. Department of Economics, Centre for Health Economics, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden;2. Department of Economics, University of Central Florida, P.O. Box 161400, Orlando, FL 32816-1400, USA |
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| Abstract: | This paper empirically investigates how competition affects physicians’ opportunistic behavior in the context of the utilization of MRI scanners. We examine micro-panel data on Japanese hospitals, where we observe how physicians change their usage of MRI scanners in response to MRI adoption by nearby hospitals. We identify competition-driven physician-induced demand: Hospitals lose patients because of MRI adoption by nearby hospitals, and, to compensate for this loss, physicians perform more MRI scans per patient. Although competition may benefit consumers through better access to MRI scanners, it also causes additional physician-induced demand. |
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