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新型农村合作医疗混合支付方式的博弈模型研究
引用本文:姚岚,陈瑶,项莉,熊巨洋,罗五金. 新型农村合作医疗混合支付方式的博弈模型研究[J]. 中国卫生政策研究, 2009, 2(9): 6-9
作者姓名:姚岚  陈瑶  项莉  熊巨洋  罗五金
作者单位:华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院;华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院;华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院;华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院;华中科技大学同济医学院医药卫生管理学院
基金项目:卫生部国外贷款办公室中国农村卫生发展项目
摘    要:利用博弈论基本概念和不完全信息动态模型,构建新农合经办机构与医疗机构之间关于费用控制的博弈模型,并利用博弈树,分析得到模型的均衡解,即经办机构选择预付制与后付制相结合的混合支付方式,才能使医疗机构有动力控制医药费用,并为新农合制度带来利益均衡,维持其可持续发展。但混合支付方式的具体表现形式需要通过委托一代理模型进行进一步论证。

关 键 词:新型农村合作医疗  支付方式  博弈模型
收稿时间:2009-06-29
修稿时间:2009-08-12

The research on the game model of the mixed payment in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme
YAO Lan,CHEN Yao,XIANG Li,XIONG Ju-yang and LUO Wu-jin. The research on the game model of the mixed payment in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme[J]. Chinese Journal of Health Policy, 2009, 2(9): 6-9
Authors:YAO Lan  CHEN Yao  XIANG Li  XIONG Ju-yang  LUO Wu-jin
Affiliation:School of Medicine and Health Management, Tongji Medical College;School of Medicine and Health Management, Tongji Medical College;School of Medicine and Health Management, Tongji Medical College;School of Medicine and Health Management, Tongji Medical College;School of Medicine and Health Management, Tongji Medical College
Abstract:This paper establishes the cost control game model between the agency and the medical institutions by the basic concept on game theory and a dynamic game model of incomplete information, and attains the equilibrium when the mixed payment is selected with medical institution controlling the expenses and the interest equilibrium will be gained in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme which could have sustainable development. However, the exact form of the mixed payment is needed to be proved by a principal-agent model in further study.
Keywords:New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme   Payment   Game model
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