| 基本公共卫生服务供给方激励问题的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 齐英,樊立华,毛静馥. 基本公共卫生服务供给方激励问题的博弈分析[J]. 中国卫生经济, 2011, 30(11): 39-40 |
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| 作者姓名： | 齐英 樊立华 毛静馥 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨医科大学公共卫生学院 哈尔滨 150086 |
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| 摘 要： | 在基本公共卫生服务"当年预拨、次年结算"的资金补偿制度下,基于政府和基层医疗卫生机构间的委托代理关系,运用博弈论分析完全信息条件下双方激励-努力动态博弈均衡,对机构努力程度和政府资金拨付方式进行了分析,力图为基本公共卫生服务激励机制的设计提供一种可供借鉴的思路。
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| 关 键 词： | 基本公共卫生服务 补偿 委托代理 博弈 |
Game Analysis on Incentive Issue about the Basic Public Health Service Supplier |
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| QI Ying,FAN Li-hua,MAO Jing-fu. Game Analysis on Incentive Issue about the Basic Public Health Service Supplier[J]. Chinese Health Economics, 2011, 30(11): 39-40 |
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| Authors: | QI Ying FAN Li-hua MAO Jing-fu |
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| Affiliation: | QI Ying,FAN Li-hua,MAO Jing-fu School of Public Health,Harbin Medical University,Harbin,150086,China |
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| Abstract: | Under the compensative system of pre-appropriate this year,balance next year in the basic public health service program,the study will analyze the dynamic equilibrium of government incentive's variable and basic health service organization work-hard variable under complete information.Then the degree of work-hard and the appropriate mode are discussed in order to provide a method for incentive mechanism designing of the basic public health service program. |
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| Keywords: | the basic public health service compensation agent game |
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