Systematic assessment of South Korea’s capabilities to control COVID-19

South Korea’s COVID-19 control strategy has been widely emulated. Korea’s ability to rapidly achieve disease control in early 2020 without a “Great Lockdown” despite its proximity to China and high population density make its achievement particularly intriguing. This paper helps explain Korea’s pre-existing capabilities which enabled the rapid and effective implementation of its COVID-19 control strategies. A systematic assessment across multiple domains demonstrates that South Korea’s advantages in controlling its epidemic are owed tremendously to legal and organizational reforms enacted after the MERS outbreak in 2015. Successful implementation of the Korean strategy required more than just a set of actions, measures and policies. It relied on a pre-existing legal framework, financing arrangements, governance and a workforce experienced in outbreak management.     

MERS coronavirus outbreak: Implications for emerging viral infections

In September 2012, a novel coronavirus was isolated from a patient who died in Saudi Arabia after presenting with acute respiratory distress and acute kidney injury. Analysis revealed the disease to be due to a novel virus which was named Middle East Respiratory Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). There have been several MERS-CoV hospital outbreaks in KSA, continuing to the present day, and the disease has a mortality rate in excess of 35%. Since 2012, the World Health Organization has been informed of 2220 laboratory-confirmed cases resulting in at least 790 deaths. Cases have since arisen in 27 countries, including an outbreak in the Republic of Korea in 2015 in which 36 people died, but more than 80% of cases have occurred in Saudi Arabia.. Human-to-human transmission of MERS-CoV, particularly in healthcare settings, initially caused a ‘media panic’, however human-to-human transmission appears to require close contact and thus far the virus has not achieved epidemic potential. Zoonotic transmission is of significant importance and evidence is growing implicating the dromedary camel as the major animal host in spread of disease to humans. MERS-CoV is now included on the WHO list of priority blueprint diseases for which there which is an urgent need for accelerated research and development as they have the potential to cause a public health emergency while there is an absence of efficacious drugs and/or vaccines. In this review we highlight epidemiological, clinical, and infection control aspects of MERS-CoV as informed by the Saudi experience. Attention is given to recommended treatments and progress towards vaccine development.     

Evaluation of Patients under Investigation for MERS-CoV Infection,United States,January 2013–October 2014

Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) cases continue to be reported from the Middle East. Evaluation and testing of patients under investigation (PUIs) for MERS are recommended. In 2013–2014, two imported cases were detected among 490 US PUIs. Continued awareness is needed for early case detection and implementation of infection control measures.     

Cluster of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Infections in Iran, 2014

During January 2013–August 2014, a total of 1,800 patients in Iran who had respiratory illness were tested for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. A cluster of 5 cases occurred in Kerman Province during May–July 2014, but virus transmission routes for some infections were unclear.     

Molecular Epidemiology of Hospital Outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome,Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2014

We investigated an outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) at King Fahad Medical City (KFMC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, during March 29–May 21, 2014. This outbreak involved 45 patients: 8 infected outside KFMC, 13 long-term patients at KFMC, 23 health care workers, and 1 who had an indeterminate source of infection. Sequences of full-length MERS coronavirus (MERS-CoV) from 10 patients and a partial sequence of MERS-CoV from another patient, when compared with other MERS-CoV sequences, demonstrated that this outbreak was part of a larger outbreak that affected multiple health care facilities in Riyadh and possibly arose from a single zoonotic transmission event that occurred in December 2013 (95% highest posterior density interval November 8, 2013–February 10, 2014). This finding suggested continued health care–associated transmission for 5 months. Molecular epidemiology documented multiple external introductions in a seemingly contiguous outbreak and helped support or refute transmission pathways suspected through epidemiologic investigation.     

Kinetics of Serologic Responses to MERS Coronavirus Infection in Humans,South Korea

We investigated the kinetics of serologic responses to Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection by using virus neutralization and MERS-CoV S1 IgG ELISA tests. In most patients, robust antibody responses developed by the third week of illness. Delayed antibody responses with the neutralization test were associated with more severe disease.     

Mortality Risk Factors for Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Outbreak,South Korea, 2015

As of July 15, 2015, the South Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare had reported 186 case-patients with Middle East respiratory syndrome in South Korea. For 159 case-patients with known outcomes and complete case histories, we found that older age and preexisting concurrent health conditions were risk factors for death.     

COVID-19, SARS and MERS: are they closely related?

BackgroundThe 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) is a new human coronavirus which is spreading with epidemic features in China and other Asian countries; cases have also been reported worldwide. This novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is associated with a respiratory illness that may lead to severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). Although related to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), COVID-19 shows some peculiar pathogenetic, epidemiological and clinical features which to date are not completely understood.AimsTo provide a review of the differences in pathogenesis, epidemiology and clinical features of COVID-19, SARS and MERS.SourcesThe most recent literature in the English language regarding COVID-19 has been reviewed, and extracted data have been compared with the current scientific evidence about SARS and MERS epidemics.ContentCOVID-19 seems not to be very different from SARS regarding its clinical features. However, it has a fatality rate of 2.3%, lower than that of SARS (9.5%) and much lower than that of MERS (34.4%). The possibility cannot be excluded that because of the less severe clinical picture of COVID-19 it can spread in the community more easily than MERS and SARS. The actual basic reproductive number (R₀) of COVID-19 (2.0–2.5) is still controversial. It is probably slightly higher than the R₀ of SARS (1.7–1.9) and higher than that of MERS (<1). A gastrointestinal route of transmission for SARS-CoV-2, which has been assumed for SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, cannot be ruled out and needs further investigation.ImplicationsThere is still much more to know about COVID-19, especially as concerns mortality and its capacity to spread on a pandemic level. Nonetheless, all of the lessons we learned in the past from the SARS and MERS epidemics are the best cultural weapons with which to face this new global threat.