Specific alterations in plasma proteins during depressed,manic, and euthymic states of bipolar disorder

Bipolar disorder (BD) is a common psychiatric mood disorder affecting more than 1-2% of the general population of different European countries. Unfortunately, there is no objective laboratory-based test to aid BD diagnosis or monitor its progression, and little is known about the molecular basis of BD. Here, we performed a comparative proteomic study to identify differentially expressed plasma proteins in various BD mood states (depressed BD, manic BD, and euthymic BD) relative to healthy controls. A total of 10 euthymic BD, 20 depressed BD, 15 manic BD, and 20 demographically matched healthy control subjects were recruited. Seven high-abundance proteins were immunodepleted in plasma samples from the 4 experimental groups, which were then subjected to proteome-wide expression profiling by two-dimensional electrophoresis and matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization-time-of-flight/time-of-flight tandem mass spectrometry. Proteomic results were validated by immunoblotting and bioinformatically analyzed using MetaCore. From a total of 32 proteins identified with 1.5-fold changes in expression compared with healthy controls, 16 proteins were perturbed in BD independent of mood state, while 16 proteins were specifically associated with particular BD mood states. Two mood-independent differential proteins, apolipoprotein (Apo) A1 and Apo L1, suggest that BD pathophysiology may be associated with early perturbations in lipid metabolism. Moreover, down-regulation of one mood-dependent protein, carbonic anhydrase 1 (CA-1), suggests it may be involved in the pathophysiology of depressive episodes in BD. Thus, BD pathophysiology may be associated with early perturbations in lipid metabolism that are independent of mood state, while CA-1 may be involved in the pathophysiology of depressive episodes.     

Marr and Reductionism

David Marr's three-level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between Marr and reductionism than is usually acknowledged. I argue that Marr was correct in his criticism of the reductionists of his time—they were only describing (cellular activity), not explaining (cognitive functions). But a careful metascientific account of reductionistic neuroscience over the past two decades reveals that Marr's criticisms no longer have force. Contemporary neuroscience now explains cognition directly, although in a fashion—causal-mechanistically—quite different than Marr recommended. So while Marr was correct to reject the reductionism of his day and offer an alternative method for genuinely explaining cognition, contemporary cognitive scientists now owe us a new defense of Marr's famous method and the advantages of its explanations over the type now pursued successfully in current reductionist neuroscience. There are familiar reasons for thinking that this debt will not be paid easily.