Current state of biologic pharmacovigilance in the European Union: improvements are needed

Introduction: Pharmacovigilance is essential to monitoring the safety profiles of authorized medicines. Compared with small-molecule drugs, biological drugs are more complex, more susceptible to structural variability due to manufacturing processes, and have the potential to induce immune-related reactions, underscoring the importance of safety monitoring for these products. Although highly similar to reference products, biosimilars are not expected to be structurally identical. For these reasons, proper reporting of potential adverse drug reactions (ADRs) using distinguishable names and batch numbers is essential for accurate tracing of all biological drugs. To address the need for robust pharmacovigilance, the European Parliament and Council of the European Union provided legislation regarding pharmacovigilance of biologics in 2010.

Areas covered: This narrative review examines the current state of pharmacovigilance for biologics in the European Union (EU) and discusses relevant information on pharmacovigilance of biosimilars, the current EU pharmacovigilance system, and areas that could be improved.

Expert opinion: Although steps have been taken to improve pharmacovigilance of biologics in the EU, several enhancements can still be made, including additional training for healthcare professionals on ADR reporting, the use of 2D barcodes that enhance traceability, and an open discussion of potentially missed opportunities in the pharmacovigilance of biosimilars.     

Marr and Reductionism

David Marr's three-level method for completely understanding a cognitive system and the importance he attaches to the computational level are so familiar as to scarcely need repeating. Fewer seem to recognize that Marr defends his famous method by criticizing the “reductionistic approach.” This sets up a more interesting relationship between Marr and reductionism than is usually acknowledged. I argue that Marr was correct in his criticism of the reductionists of his time—they were only describing (cellular activity), not explaining (cognitive functions). But a careful metascientific account of reductionistic neuroscience over the past two decades reveals that Marr's criticisms no longer have force. Contemporary neuroscience now explains cognition directly, although in a fashion—causal-mechanistically—quite different than Marr recommended. So while Marr was correct to reject the reductionism of his day and offer an alternative method for genuinely explaining cognition, contemporary cognitive scientists now owe us a new defense of Marr's famous method and the advantages of its explanations over the type now pursued successfully in current reductionist neuroscience. There are familiar reasons for thinking that this debt will not be paid easily.