Update: severe acute respiratory syndrome--Toronto,Canada, 2003

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first recognized in Toronto in a woman who returned from Hong Kong on February 23, 2003 (1). Transmission to other persons resulted subsequently in an outbreak among 257 persons in several Greater Toronto Area (GTA) hospitals. After implementation of provincewide public health measures that included strict infection-control practices, the number of recognized cases of SARS declined substantially, and no cases were detected after April 20. On April 30, the World Health Organization (WHO) lifted a travel advisory issued on April 22 that had recommended limiting travel to Toronto. This report describes a second wave of SARS cases among patients, visitors, and health-care workers (HCWs) that occurred at a Toronto hospital approximately 4 weeks after SARS transmission was thought to have been interrupted. The findings indicate that exposure to hospitalized patients with unrecognized SARS after a provincewide relaxation of strict SARS control measures probably contributed to transmission among HCWs. The investigation underscores the need for monitoring fever and respiratory symptoms in hospitalized patients and visitors, particularly after a decline in the number of reported SARS cases.     

Factors associated with critical-care healthcare workers' adherence to recommended barrier precautions during the Toronto severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak.

OBJECTIVE: To assess factors associated with adherence to recommended barrier precautions among healthcare workers (HCWs) providing care to critically ill patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). SETTING: Fifteen acute care hospitals in Ontario, Canada. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study. PATIENTS: All patients with SARS who required intubation during the Toronto SARS outbreak in 2003. PARTICIPANTS: HCWs who provided care to or entered the room of a SARS patient during the period from 24 hours before intubation until 4 hours after intubation. METHODS: Standardized interviews were conducted with eligible HCWs to assess their interactions with the SARS patient, their use of barrier precautions, their practices for removing personal protective equipment, and the infection control training they received. RESULTS: Of 879 eligible HCWs, 795 (90%) participated. In multivariate analysis, the following predictors of consistent adherence to recommended barrier precautions were identified: recognition of the patient as a SARS case (odds ratio [OR], 2.5 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 1.5-4.5); recent infection control training (OR for interactive training, 2.7 [95% CI, 1.7-4.4]; OR for passive training, 1.7 [95% CI, 1.0-3.0]), and working in a SARS unit (OR, 4.0 [95% CI, 1.8-8.9]) or intensive care unit (OR, 4.3 [95% CI, 2.0-9.0]). Two factors were associated with significantly lower rates of consistent adherence: the provision of care for patients with higher Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) II scores (OR for score APACHE II of 20 or greater, 0.4 [95% CI, 0.28-0.68]) and work on shifts that required more frequent room entry (OR for 6 or more entries per shift, 0.5 [95% CI, 0.32-0.86]). CONCLUSIONS: There were significant deficits in knowledge about self-protection that were partially corrected by education programs during the SARS outbreak. HCWs' adherence to self-protection guidelines was most closely associated with whether they provided care to patients who had received a definite diagnosis of SARS.     

The 2003 SARS outbreak and its impact on infection control practices

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged recently as a new infectious disease that was transmitted efficiently in the healthcare setting and particularly affected healthcare workers (HCWs), patients and visitors. The efficiency of transmission within healthcare facilities was recognised following significant hospital outbreaks of SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The causative agent of SARS was identified as a novel coronavirus, the SARS coronavirus. This was largely spread by direct or indirect contact with large respiratory droplets, although airborne transmission has also been reported. High infection rates among HCWs led initially to the theory that SARS was highly contagious and the concept of 'super-spreading events'. Such events illustrated that lack of infection control (IC) measures or failure to comply with IC precautions could lead to large-scale hospital outbreaks. SARS was eventually contained by the stringent application of IC measures that limited exposure of HCWs to potentially infectious individuals. As the 'global village' becomes smaller and other microbial threats to health emerge, or re-emerge, there is an urgent need to develop a global strategy for infection control in hospitals. This paper provides an overview of the main IC practices employed during the 2003 SARS outbreak, including management measures, dedicated SARS hospitals, personal protective equipment, isolation, handwashing, environmental decontamination, education and training. The psychological and psychosocial impact on HCWs during the outbreak are also discussed. Requirements for IC programmes in the post-SARS period are proposed based on the major lessons learnt from the SARS outbreak.     

Cluster of cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome among Toronto healthcare workers after implementation of infection control precautions: a case series.

OBJECTIVE: To review the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infection control practices, the types of exposure to patients with SARS, and the activities associated with treatment of such patients among healthcare workers (HCWs) who developed SARS in Toronto, Canada, after SARS-specific infection control precautions had been implemented. METHODS: A retrospective review of work logs and patient assignments, detailed review of medical records of patients with SARS, and comprehensive telephone-based interviews of HCWs who met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. RESULTS: Seventeen HCWs from 6 hospitals developed disease that met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. These HCWs had a mean age (+/-SD) of 39+/-2.3 years. Two HCWs were not interviewed because of illness. Of the remaining 15, only 9 (60%) reported that they had received formal infection control training. Thirteen HCWs (87%) were unsure of proper order in which personal protective equipment should be donned and doffed. Six HCWs (40%) reused items (eg, stethoscopes, goggles, and cleaning equipment) elsewhere on the ward after initial use in a room in which a patient with SARS was staying. Use of masks, gowns, gloves, and eyewear was inconsistent among HCWs. Eight (54%) reported that they were aware of a breach in infection control precautions. HCWs reported fatigue due to an increased number and length of shifts; participants worked a median of 10 shifts during the 10 days before onset of symptoms. Seven HCWs were involved in the intubation of a patient with SARS. One HCW died, and the remaining 16 recovered. CONCLUSION: Multiple factors were likely responsible for SARS in these HCWs, including the performance of high-risk patient care procedures, inconsistent use of personal protective equipment, fatigue, and lack of adequate infection control training.     

我市医务人员严重急性呼吸综合征医院感染流行原因调查与对策

目的 调查某市医务人员感染严重急性呼吸综合征(severe acute respiratory syndrome，SARS)的途径及危险因素。方法 对直接参加过抢救和间接接触SARS患而被感染的医务人员采取统一填表、座谈、走访、电话采访等方式进行调查。结果 调查三所医院感染SARS的医务人员共88人，占全市发病医务人员总人数的87．13％。导致医务人员易感的原因是：对疾病缺乏认识，防范意识不强；管理网络不健全；患隐瞒流行病史；隔离环境及防护用品达不到要求等。结论 重视医院感染管理及对医务人员的医院感染知识培训，强化消毒隔离和自我保护意识，是控制医院感染流行及保护医务人员的有力措施。     

Nosocomial acquisition of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus during an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome.

OBJECTIVE: The four hospitals assessed in this study use active surveillance cultures for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and contact precautions for MRSA-positive patients as part of routine infection control practices. The objective of this study was to determine whether nosocomial acquisition of MRSA decreased in these hospitals during an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) when barrier precautions were routinely used for all patients. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study. SETTING: Three tertiary-care hospitals (a 1100-bed hospital; a 500-bed hospital; and an 823-bed hospital) and a 430-bed community hospital, each located in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. PATIENTS: All admitted patients were included. RESULTS: The nosocomial rate of MRSA in all four hospitals combined during the SARS outbreak (3.7 per 10,000 patient-days) was not significantly different from that before (4.7 per 10,000 patient-days) or after (3.4 per 10,000 patient-days) the outbreak (P = .30 and P = .76, respectively). The nosocomial rate of MRSA after the outbreak was significantly lower than that before the outbreak (P = .003). Inappropriate reuse of gloves and gowns and failure to wash hands between patients on non-SARS wards were observed during the outbreak. Increased attention was paid to infection control education following the outbreak. CONCLUSIONS: Inappropriate reuse of gloves and gowns and failure to wash hands between patients may have contributed to transmission of MRSA during the SARS outbreak. Attention should be paid to training healthcare workers regarding the appropriate use of precautions as a means to protect themselves and patients.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and healthcare workers

The recent outbreak of severe acute respiratory synt drome (SARS) was spread by international air travel, a direct result of globalization. The disease is caused by a novel coronavirus, transmitted from human to human by droplets or by direct contact. Healthcare workers (HCWs) were at high risk and accounted for a fifth of all cases globally. Risk factors for infection in HCWs included lack of awareness and preparedness when the disease first struck, poor institutional infection control measures, lack of training in infection control procedures, poor compliance with the use of personal protection equipment (PPE), exposure to high-risk procedures such as intubation and nebulization, and exposure to unsuspected SARS patients. Measures to prevent nosocomial infection included establishing isolation wards for triage, SARS patients, and step-down; training and monitoring hospital staff in infection-control procedures; active and passive screening of HCWs; enforcement of droplet and contact precautions; and compliance with the use of PPE.     

Stress, coping and lessons learned from the SARS outbreak

Talking about stress implies that we are talking about two things: an event and a response to that event. The 2003 SARS outbreak was an extraordinary event in the life of Ontario hospitals, especially around Toronto, and in the lives of the healthcare workers.     

如何预防医务人员COVID-19感染：来自中国武汉的经验

 在新型冠状病毒肺炎（COVID-19）大流行的背景下,全球已有数以千计的医务人员感染新型冠状病毒（SARS-CoV-2）,并有人因此失去生命。在疫情早期,中国发生了医务人员感染。由于对SARS-CoV-2的特点认识有限,湖北有3,000多名医务人员在疫情暴发初期感染了SARS-CoV-2。由于当地医院医务人员工作超负荷,超过4.2万名医务人员（包括军队医务人员）,从全国各地被派往湖北。在疫情最严重的时期,中国有十分之一的重症监护医生在武汉工作。在中国抗击COVID-19的过程中,虽然在疫情早期发生了一定数量的医务人员感染SARS-CoV-2,但通过及时采取预防措施,包括快速诊断,及时对患者进行隔离,强调医务人员的安全,加强医务人员基本防护知识培训和统一管理等有效防护措施,国家援鄂医疗队42,632名队员最终未报告感染,并且当地医院医务人员感染病例显著减少,说明医务人员院内感染COVID-19是完全可以预防的。本文旨在阐述中国武汉疫情期间,如何通过采取有效措施预防医务人员感染SARS-CoV-2。     

Using an integrated infection control strategy during outbreak control to minimize nosocomial infection of severe acute respiratory syndrome among healthcare workers

Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) while caring for SARS patients. Personal protective equipment and negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs) have not been completely successful in protecting HCWs. We introduced an innovative, integrated infection control strategy involving triaging patients using barriers, zones of risk, and extensive installation of alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing. This integrated infection control approach was implemented at a SARS designated hospital ('study hospital') where NPIRs were not available. The number of HCWs who contracted SARS in the study hospital was compared with the number of HCWs who contracted SARS in 86 Taiwan hospitals that did not use the integrated infection control strategy. Two HCWs contracted SARS in the study hospital (0.03 cases/bed) compared with 93 HCWs in the other hospitals (0.13 cases/bed) during the same three-week period. Our strategy appeared to be effective in reducing the incidence of HCWs contracting SARS. The advantages included rapid implementation without NPIRs, flexibility to transfer patients, and re-inforcement for HCWs to comply with infection control procedures, especially handwashing. The efficacy and low cost are major advantages, especially in countries with large populations at risk and fewer economic resources.     

Impact of severe acute respiratory syndrome care on the general health status of healthcare workers in taiwan.

BACKGROUND: The impact of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was enormous, but few studies have focused on the infectious and general health status of healthcare workers (HCWs) who treated patients with SARS. DESIGN: We prospectively evaluated the general health status of HCWs during the SARS epidemic.The Medical Outcome Study Short-Form 36 Survey was given to all HCWs immediately after caring for patients with SARS and 4 weeks after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts. Tests for detection of SARS coronavirus antibody were performed for HCWs at these 2 time points and for control subjects during the SARS epidemic. SETTING: Tertiary care referral center in Taipei, Taiwan. SUBJECTS: Ninety SARS-care task force members (SARS HCWs) and 82 control subjects. RESULTS: All serum specimens tested negative for SARS antibody. Survey scores for SARS HCWs immediately after care were significantly lower than those for the control group (P<.05 by the t test) in 6 categories. Vitality, social functioning, and mental health immediately after care and vitality and mental health after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts were among the worst subscales. The social functioning, role emotional, and role physical subscales significantly improved after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts (P<.05, by paired t test). The length of contact time (mean number of contact-hours per day) with patients with SARS was associated with some subscales (role emotional, role physical, and mental health) to a mild extent. The total number of contact-hours with symptomatic patients with SARS was a borderline predictor (adjusted R2=0.069; P=.038) of mental health score. CONCLUSIONS: The impact of the SARS outbreak on SARS HCWs was significant in many dimensions of general health. The vitality and mental health status of SARS HCWs 1 month after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts remained inferior to those of the control group.     

Appropriate use of personal protective equipment among healthcare workers in public sector hospitals and primary healthcare polyclinics during the SARS outbreak in Singapore

Background: Singapore was affected by an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) from 25 February to 31 May 2003, with 238 probable cases and 33 deaths.

Aims: To study usage of personal protective equipment (PPE) among three groups of healthcare workers (HCWs: doctors, nurses, and administrative staff), to determine if the appropriate PPE were used by the different groups and to examine the factors that may determine inappropriate use.

Methods: A self-administered questionnaire survey of 14 554 HCWs in nine healthcare settings, which included tertiary care hospitals, community hospitals, and polyclinics, was carried out in May–July 2003. Only doctors, nurses, and clerical staff were selected for subsequent analysis.

Results: A total of 10 236 valid questionnaires were returned (70.3% response); 873 doctors, 4404 nurses, and 921 clerical staff were studied. A total of 32.5% of doctors, 48.7% of nurses, and 77.1% of the administrative staff agreed that paper and/or surgical masks were "useful in protecting from contracting SARS". Among this group, 23.6% of doctors and 42.3% of nurses reported working with SARS patients. The view that a paper and/or surgical mask was adequate protection against SARS was held by 33.3% of doctors and 55.9% of nurses working at the A&E unit, 30.5% of doctors and 49.4% of nurses from medical wards, and 27.5% of doctors and 37.1% of nurses from intensive care units. Factors which predicted for agreement that paper and/or surgical masks were protective against SARS, included HCW's job title, reported contact with SARS patients, area of work, and Impact Events Scale scores.

Conclusion: A variety of factors determine appropriate use of personal protective equipment by HCWs in the face of a major SARS outbreak.

     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome--Taiwan, 2003

On April 22, 2003, the Taiwan Department of Health (DOH) was notified of seven cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) among health-care workers (HCWs) at a large municipal hospital in Taipei (hospital A). Subsequent cases at eight hospitals have been associated with exposures at hospital A. Previously, all reported cases had been associated with persons recently returning to Taiwan from SARS-affected regions. This report summarizes epidemiologic findings of the outbreak in Taiwan and describes the impact of health-care--associated transmission of SARS.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome, Beijing, 2003

The largest outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) struck Beijing in spring 2003. Multiple importations of SARS to Beijing initiated transmission in several healthcare facilities. Beijing's outbreak began March 5; by late April, daily hospital admissions for SARS exceeded 100 for several days; 2,521 cases of probable SARS occurred. Attack rates were highest in those 20-39 years of age; 1% of cases occurred in children <10 years. The case-fatality rate was highest among patients >65 years (27.7% vs. 4.8% for those 20-64 years, p < 0.001). Healthcare workers accounted for 16% of probable cases. The proportion of case-patients without known contact to a SARS patient increased significantly in May. Implementation of early detection, isolation, contact tracing, quarantine, triage of case-patients to designated SARS hospitals, and community mobilization ended the outbreak.     

Concerns and preparedness for an avian influenza pandemic: a comparison between community hospital and tertiary hospital healthcare workers

Little is known about differences in levels of concerns or preparedness for an avian influenza (AI) pandemic among healthcare workers (HCWs) in different types of hospitals. We compared these concerns and preparedness between 326 HCWs of two community hospitals (CHs) and 908 HCWs from a tertiary hospital (TH) using a self-administered questionnaire between March-June 2006. Response rates were 84.2% and 80.0% from the CHs and TH. Most HCWs (71.6%) felt prepared for an AI outbreak and had significant concerns. They perceive an AI pandemic having adverse impacts on their personal life and work, such as people avoiding them (57.1%). A greater percentage of TH compared to CH HCWs expressed concerns such as feeling their jobs put them at great AI exposure (78.3% vs 67.5%, p=0.012). TH HCWs were more likely to report participating in readiness preparation activities, such as training for infection control (90.0% vs 82.2%, p=0.014) and feel that they (74.1% vs 64.7%, p=0.045) and their hospital (86.8% vs 71.8%, p=0.000) were prepared for an outbreak. Healthcare institutions need to include personal, psychological and family concerns on the agenda and increase participation in readiness preparation activities among HCWs to help prepare for such future crises.     

Healthcare workers’ knowledge,beliefs, and coverage regarding vaccinations in critical care units in Italy

BackgroundLow rates of vaccine coverage have resulted in a resurgence of several vaccine-preventable diseases in many European countries. Routine vaccination of healthcare workers (HCWs) is important to reduce disease transmission, and to promote vaccine awareness and acceptance in the population. The objectives of this cross-sectional study were to investigate knowledge and beliefs about vaccines and to evaluate self-reported immunization coverage with vaccines recommended for HCWs. Additionally, the effects of several factors on these outcomes have been evaluated.MethodsA survey was conducted between September and November 2018 among a random sample of HCWs in cardiac, adult, and neonatal critical care units of 8 randomly selected hospitals across the Campania and Calabria Regions in Italy. Multivariate logistic and linear regression analysis has been performed.ResultsA total 531 HCWs returned the questionnaire for a response rate of 54.9%. Based on a vaccination knowledge score ranging from 0 to 9, more than half of the participants (55.4%) knew few of the vaccines recommended for HCWs (≤3 correct answers), 16.2% knew some vaccines (4–6 correct answers), and 28.4% knew most vaccines (≥7 correct answers), and only 13.2% knew all the vaccines recommended for HCWs. However, two-thirds (62.2%) knew that hepatitis B and influenza vaccines were recommended, and this knowledge was significantly higher among females (p < 0.001), among HCWs aged between 50 and 59 years (p = 0.01) compared with those aged < 30 years, and in those who search for information about recommended vaccines for HCWs (p = 0.012). The vaccine knowledge was significantly lower among nurses and nursing supporting staff compared with physicians (p = 0.032). Approximately two-thirds (62.7%) of HCWs considered themselves at risk of contracting vaccine-preventable infectious diseases during their professional practice. High rates of coverage were self-reported for hepatitis B (96.3%), tetanus and pertussis (93.7%), whereas they were lower for measles/mumps/rubella (80.5%), chickenpox (65.3%), and influenza (35.8%). Only 9.2% of HCWs reported prior receipt of all recommended vaccines. Male HCWs were less likely to report prior receipt of all recommended vaccines (p = 0.011). HCWs aged between 30 and 39 years compared with those aged < 30 years (p = 0.001) and those who knew some (p < 0.001) and most (p = 0.007) of all vaccines recommended for HCWs were more likely to self-report to be immunized.ConclusionsAdditional training about the vaccinations is needed to improve HCWs knowledge and to address specific concerns which may lead to better uptake among this group.     

SARS in three categories of hospital workers, Hong Kong

We analyzed attack rates for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in three categories of hospital workers (nurses, nonmedical support staff, and other technical or medical staff) in all public hospitals in Hong Kong that had admitted SARS patients. Of 16 such hospitals, 14 had cases. The overall attack rate was 1.20%. Nonmedical support staff had the highest attack rate (2.73%). The odds ratios of group nonmedical support staff versus those of nurses and of nonmedical support staff versus other technical or medical staff were 2.30 (p < 0.001) and 9.78 (p < 0.001), respectively. The number of affected staff and attack rates were significantly correlated with the number of SARS patients admitted (r = 0.914 and 0.686, respectively). Affected patients were concentrated in three hospitals and in the earlier phase of the epidemic. Cleaning and clerical staff on hospital wards were at a much higher risk.     

Infection control for SARS in a tertiary paediatric centre in Hong Kong

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging infectious disease. After the appearance of an index patient in Hong Kong in February 2003, SARS outbreaks occurred rapidly in hospitals and spread to the community. The aim of this retrospective study is to evaluate the effectiveness of a triage policy and risk-stratified infection control measures in preventing nosocomial SARS infection among paediatric healthcare workers (HCWs) at the Prince of Wales Hospital, a general hospital to which children with SARS are referred in Hong Kong. The acute paediatric wards were stratified into three areas: (1) ultra high-risk area, (2) high-risk area and (3) moderate-risk area according to different risk levels of nosocomial SARS transmission. The implementation of different levels of infection control precautions was guided by this risk stratification strategy. Between 13 March and 23 June, 38 patients with probable and suspected SARS, 90 patients with non-SARS pneumonia, and 510 patients without pneumonia were admitted into our unit. All probable SARS cases were isolated in negative-pressure rooms. Twenty-six HCWs worked in the ultra high-risk area caring for SARS patients and 88 HCWs managed non-SARS patients in other ward areas. None of the HCWs developed clinical features suggestive of SARS. In addition, there was no nosocomial spread of SARS-associated coronavirus to other patients or visitors during this period. In conclusion, stringent infection control precautions, appropriate triage and prompt isolation of potential SARS patients may have contributed to a lack of nosocomial spread and HCW acquisition of SARS in our unit.     

徐州地区医务人员锐器伤现状调查分析

目的调查徐州地区各级医院医务人员锐器伤发生及上报情况,为制定本地区锐器伤防护措施、完善上报制度提供依据。方法 2016年7—8月,采用多阶段分层随机抽样方法随机抽取徐州市13所不同级别医院的医务人员,对其一般资料、锐器伤发生及上报情况等进行问卷调查。结果共收集2 694份有效问卷,医务人员锐器伤发生率为10.32%,例次发生率为12.84%,上报率为30.64%。医务人员锐器伤例次发生率一级医院为44.83%,二级医院为11.53%,三级医院为12.52%,不同级别医院锐器伤例次发生率比较,差异具有统计学意义(χ~2=55.148,P0.001)。锐器伤发生时机主要为医务人员在回套针帽时(79例次,22.83%),器具种类主要为中空针类(297例次,85.84%)。参加培训情况不同的医务人员锐器伤发生率比较,差异具有统计学意义(χ~2=66.760,P0.001)。结论本地区医务人员的锐器伤现状不容乐观,存在培训效果欠佳,上报率较低且安全器具使用率不高等问题,应进一步采取有效措施,建立有效的锐器伤监测追踪系统以减少锐器伤的发生。