Foundations of the severe acute respiratory syndrome preparedness and response plan for healthcare facilities.

OBJECTIVE: To help facilities prepare for potential future cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), assisted by members of professional societies representing public health, healthcare workers, and healthcare administrators, developed guidance to help facilities both prepare for and respond to cases of SARS. INTERVENTIONS: The recommendations in the CDC document were based on some of the important lessons learned in healthcare settings around the world during the SARS outbreak of 2003, including that (1) a SARS outbreak requires a coordinated and dynamic response by multiple groups; (2) unrecognized cases of SARS-associated coronavirus are a significant source of transmission; (3) restricting access to the healthcare facility can minimize transmission; (4) airborne infection isolation is recommended, but facilities and equipment may not be available; and (5) staffing needs and support will pose a significant challenge. CONCLUSIONS: Healthcare facilities were at the center of the SARS outbreak of 2003 and played a key role in controlling the epidemic. Recommendations in the CDC's SARS preparedness and response guidance for healthcare facilities will help facilities prepare for possible future outbreaks of SARS.     

Protecting against SARS during equipment maintenance

The recent outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) raises questions about the appropriate infection control measures to use when conducting maintenance procedures on medical devices that may have been exposed to the SARS virus--that is, devices that have been used on, or located in the same room as, a patient with (or suspected to have) SARS. Although there is considerable information and guidance available on many aspects of SARS, very little exists on this particular topic. What's more, we have found significant differences in the perspectives and recommendations of some of the experts on the subject. This article provides guidance for clinical engineering, respiratory therapy, and other personnel involved in maintaining potentially SARS-exposed equipment. To derive our recommendations, we reviewed the material posted on the Web sites of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), along with other information sources; we also discussed issues related to equipment use and servicing with experts outside ECRI.     

HHS/CDC legal response to SARS outbreak

Before the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) legal authority to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release persons was limited to seven listed diseases, not including SARS, and could only be changed using a two-step process: 1) executive order of the President of the United States on recommendation by the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and 2) amendment to CDC quarantine regulations (42 CFR Parts 70 and 71). In April 2003, in response to the SARS outbreak, the federal executive branch acted rapidly to add SARS to the list of quarantinable communicable diseases. At the same time, HHS amended the regulations to streamline the process of adding future emerging infectious diseases. Since the emergence of SARS, CDC has increased legal preparedness for future public health emergencies by establishing a multistate teleconference program for public health lawyers and a Web-based clearinghouse of legal documents.     

"Exposing the cracks": Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and the Hong Kong health system

PURPOSE: Hong Kong was particularly affected by the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). During the epidemic, it seemed as if the Hong Kong government and health system were barely coping, leading to calls of mismanagement and governance incapacity. In the wake of the SARS outbreak, two inquiries were conducted. The purpose of this article is to review the Hong Kong's response to SARS from the perspective of two inquiries. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: An historical analysis of the institutional arrangements for health care delivery in Hong Kong is undertaken, followed by a chronology of developments in the SARS outbreak. The article then reviews outbreak management and the findings of the two inquiries. Finally, it considers whether the Hong Kong health system can be reformed to manage any future infectious disease epidemic better. FINDINGS: Both leadership and coherency were lacking in Hong Kong's response to SARS. These are age-old problems in the Hong Kong health sector. The prospects for mending the health system appear limited, given that leadership and coherency have been consistently absent features of post-1997 governance in Hong Kong. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS/IMPLICATIONS: This article reviews events in the immediate period following the SARS outbreak. A future follow-up study of the Hong Kong government and health system's capacity to respond to infectious disease outbreaks would be useful. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: This article provides a review that will be useful to policymakers and researchers. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: No other article reviews the Hong Kong health system's SARS response.     

Influenza and SARS: the impact of viral pandemics on maritime health

Global travel and transport play a critical role in the spread of infections. We see this clearly in the first two pandemics of the 21st century: SARS and influenza H1N1-2009. Although air travel contributed to dissemination in these two pandemics, the travel restrictions, quarantines, and heightened vigilance which resulted had an impact on maritime health. Seasonal, pandemic, and avian influenza have some important differences with regards to exposure risks, infectivity, and severity. Most of the data for maritime influenza outbreaks focus on seasonal influenza on cruise ships, but influenza among crew members occurs due to close working conditions and is potentially preventable with staff vaccination programs. To date, avian influenza has low human-to-human transmission; infection typically requires close contact with poultry, but presents with severe disease and a high fatality rate. Pandemic (swine) influenza was readily transmitted between people, including young adults, and caused severe illness in high-risk groups including pregnant women, children, and those with co-morbidities and obesity. In contrast, SARS had lower infectivity compared to influenza, and a longer incubation period. These characteristics slowed its propagation enough that outbreak control measures, such as isolation of infected cases and quarantine of exposed but well persons, were effective in terminating this pandemic. No effective vaccine exists for SARS at this time, whereas countries were able to deploy millions of doses of pandemic influenza vaccine within 7 months after the outbreak was first recognized in Mexico. The lack of a protective vaccine and the higher case fatality rate in SARS will mean that stringent quarantine measures may still be required for outbreak control if SARS ever occurs again. Compliance with international health regulations, and the ability to adapt these to maritime health needs, will be important in the shipping industry.     

The 2003 SARS outbreak and its impact on infection control practices

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged recently as a new infectious disease that was transmitted efficiently in the healthcare setting and particularly affected healthcare workers (HCWs), patients and visitors. The efficiency of transmission within healthcare facilities was recognised following significant hospital outbreaks of SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The causative agent of SARS was identified as a novel coronavirus, the SARS coronavirus. This was largely spread by direct or indirect contact with large respiratory droplets, although airborne transmission has also been reported. High infection rates among HCWs led initially to the theory that SARS was highly contagious and the concept of 'super-spreading events'. Such events illustrated that lack of infection control (IC) measures or failure to comply with IC precautions could lead to large-scale hospital outbreaks. SARS was eventually contained by the stringent application of IC measures that limited exposure of HCWs to potentially infectious individuals. As the 'global village' becomes smaller and other microbial threats to health emerge, or re-emerge, there is an urgent need to develop a global strategy for infection control in hospitals. This paper provides an overview of the main IC practices employed during the 2003 SARS outbreak, including management measures, dedicated SARS hospitals, personal protective equipment, isolation, handwashing, environmental decontamination, education and training. The psychological and psychosocial impact on HCWs during the outbreak are also discussed. Requirements for IC programmes in the post-SARS period are proposed based on the major lessons learnt from the SARS outbreak.     

Control of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Singapore

A Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak occurred in Singapore from February to May 2003. A high vigilance for the disease, frequent and regular temperature monitoring, early case identification and isolation of patients, as well as tracing and home quarantine of contacts, played major roles in controlling the outbreak. Hospitals were dedicated to the screening and treatment of SARS patients. Within and between hospitals, movement by healthcare workers, patients and visitors were restricted, as was the number of hospital visitors. Staff education and audits of infection control practices also featured prominently. To prevent cross-border transmission, incoming travellers from SARS affected areas had to complete health declaration cards. They, as well as all outgoing travellers from Singapore, were monitored for fever. In the meantime, the public was urged to refrain from travelling to SARS affected regions. Containment elements targeting the community included school closure, public education on good hygiene and readily accessible public information. In response to a laboratory acquired SARS infection, laboratories were audited, and directives issued on the mandatory use of biosafety level 3 laboratories for SARS virus culture, and compliance of laboratory workers to biosafety guidelines.     

广州市医务人员传染性非典型肺炎流行情况及预防控制效果分析

目的 分析广州市医务人员传染性生非典型肺炎(SARS)流行的基本特征，探讨流行因素，评价防制措施，为医疗卫生单位开展SARS收治及预防控制工作提供指导。方法 采用统一调查表对医务人员SARS患进行流行病学调查，采用定性生研究方法对医院SARS流行影响因素、预防控制措施及其效果进行调查，资料采用描述性流行病学方法分析。结果 广州市医务人员首例SARS患发病时间为2003年1月13日，截止5月5日共有29家医疗卫生单位报告医护人员发病280例，占全市总病例数的26．07％。医务人员发病高峰在2月上、中旬，共有167例，占医务人员发病总数的59．64％，呈明显聚集性。4月后病例为零星散发。病例主要集中在1月下旬前开始收治SARS患(对SARS尚缺乏认识的时期)的6家医院，占总病例数的73．2％(2c15／280)。调查180例医务人员SARS患中92．22％直接参与过SARS患的救治工作。采取定点收治患、加强医院病区通风、加强医护人员自身的个人防护等综合措施后，2月下旬开始，医务人员的新发SARS病例明显减少。结论 控制SARS在医务人员中流行的关键措施是：(1)要对出现SARS症状的患高度警惕，及时诊断并隔离患；(2)严格按照操作规范做好个人防护措施；(3)收治区要合理布局，严格区分污染区、半污染区和清洁区；(4)加强病区通风换气；(5)严格按照有关指引做好污染物、空气及环境的消毒工作。     

Impact of public health interventions in controlling the spread of SARS: modelling of intervention scenarios

A variety of intervention measures exist to prevent and control diseases with pandemic potential like SARS or pandemic influenza. They differ in their approach and effectiveness in reducing the number of cases getting infected. The effects of different intervention measures were investigated by a mathematical modelling approach, with comparisons based on the effective reproduction number (R(e)). The analysis showed that early case detection followed by strict isolation could control a SARS outbreak. Tracing close contacts of cases and contacts of exposed health care workers additionally reduces the R(e). Tracing casual contacts and measures aiming to decrease social interaction were less effective in reducing the number of SARS cases. The study emphasizes the importance of early identification and isolation of SARS cases to reduce the number of people getting infected. However, doing so transfers cases to health care facilities, making infection control measures in hospitals essential to avoid nosocomial spread. The modelling approach applied in this study is useful for analysing interactions of different intervention measures for reducing the R(e) of SARS.     

Sociocultural aspects of risk to pregnant women during the 2013–2015 multinational Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa

Researchers reflect on sociocultural aspects of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and critically analyze the epidemic's effects on pregnant mothers and their babies. We address structural inequalities contributing to poor maternal health in lower-income countries, while reflecting on how the Ebola outbreak highlights the still-marginalized role of pregnant women. Drawing on prior research in West and East Africa, we discuss health care providers’ responses to risk of infection during maternity work under normal circumstances and in times of crisis. We end with recommendations for preventing such detrimental effects on the health of pregnant women in the case of another epidemic.     

某SARS隔离区疫情的流行病学调查及效果评价

目的：分析深圳市某SARS隔离区内4例SARS疑似病例的流行病学调查和处理，对主要控制措施的效果进行初步评价，为今后控制类似社区SARS爆发提供经验和借鉴。方法：收集该隔离区人口、地理、卫生条件等基本情况．SARS疑似病例个案调查表、临床资料、密切接触者个案调查表、隔离人群医学观察资料、发热人员情况、实验室检查结果等，以及根据现场流行病学调查所采取的处理措施进行流行病学分析和评价。结果：该临时住宅区共有人口345人，自5月14日发生首例SARS疑似病例后．在一个潜伏期内先后共有29人发热，8人显示肺部有不同程度改变，共4人诊断为SARS疑似病例，采集发热病人急性期咽拭子及血清检测流感病毒及SARS病毒抗体，一例疑似病人的SARS病毒抗体可疑阳性。通过采取隔离、消毒、预防服药、加强医学观察、监测、健康教育等综合措施有效控制疫情蔓延。结论：社区获得非典病例应根据现场流调确定有针对性的预防控制措施，防止该病爆发和蔓延。     

Update: Outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome--worldwide, 2003

CDC continues to support the World Health Organization (WHO) in the investigation of a multicountry outbreak of unexplained atypical pneumonia referred to as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). This report includes summaries of the epidemiologic investigations and public health responses in several affected locations where CDC is collaborating with international and national health authorities. This report also describes an unusual cluster of cases associated with a hotel in Hong Kong and identifies the potential etiologic agent of SARS. Epidemiologic and laboratory investigations of SAPS are ongoing.     

Management of inpatients exposed to an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

This is a prospective observational study of a cohort of inpatients exposed to a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Strict infection control policies were instituted. The 70 patients exposed to the SARS outbreak were isolated from the rest of the hospital. They were triaged, quarantined and cohorted in three open plan wards. Selective isolation was carried out immediately when symptoms and signs suspicious of SARS manifested clinically. The patients' ages ranged from 21 to 90 years and 56% had surgery before the quarantine. Sixteen patients with unexplained fever during the period of quarantine were isolated, seven of whom were eventually diagnosed with probable SARS. The crude incidence of SARS in our cohort was 10%. The SARS case fatality was 14%. No secondary transmission of the SARS virus within the cohort was observed. Strict infection control, together with appropriate triaging, cohorting and selective isolation, is an effective and practical model of intervention in cohorts exposed to a SARS outbreak. Such a management strategy eases the logistic constraints imposed by demands for large numbers of isolation facilities in the face of a massive outbreak.     

Crisis prevention and management during SARS outbreak, Singapore

We discuss crisis prevention and management during the first 3 months of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Singapore. Four public health issues were considered: prevention measures, self-health evaluation, SARS knowledge, and appraisal of crisis management. We conducted telephone interviews with a representative sample of 1,201 adults, > or = 21 years of age. We found that sex, age, and attitude (anxiety and perception of open communication with authorities) were associated with practicing preventive measures. Analysis of Singapore's outbreak improves our understanding of the social dimensions of infectious disease outbreaks.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and healthcare workers

The recent outbreak of severe acute respiratory synt drome (SARS) was spread by international air travel, a direct result of globalization. The disease is caused by a novel coronavirus, transmitted from human to human by droplets or by direct contact. Healthcare workers (HCWs) were at high risk and accounted for a fifth of all cases globally. Risk factors for infection in HCWs included lack of awareness and preparedness when the disease first struck, poor institutional infection control measures, lack of training in infection control procedures, poor compliance with the use of personal protection equipment (PPE), exposure to high-risk procedures such as intubation and nebulization, and exposure to unsuspected SARS patients. Measures to prevent nosocomial infection included establishing isolation wards for triage, SARS patients, and step-down; training and monitoring hospital staff in infection-control procedures; active and passive screening of HCWs; enforcement of droplet and contact precautions; and compliance with the use of PPE.     

Quarantine for SARS, Taiwan

During the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, >150,000 persons were quarantined, 24 of whom were later found to have laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. Since no evidence exists that SARS-CoV is infective before the onset of symptoms and the quarantined persons were exposed but not symptomatic, we thought the quarantine's effectiveness should be investigated. Using the Taiwan quarantine data, we found that the onset-to-diagnosis time of previously quarantined confirmed case-patients was significantly shortened compared to that for those who had not been quarantined. Thus, quarantine for SARS in Taiwan screened potentially infective persons for swift diagnosis and hospitalization after onset, thereby indirectly reducing infections. Full-scale quarantine measures implemented on April 28 led to a significant improvement in onset-to-diagnosis time of all SARS patients, regardless of previous quarantine status. We discuss the temporal effects of quarantine measures and other interventions on detection and isolation as well as the potential usefulness of quarantine in faster identification of persons with SARS and in improving isolation measures.     

Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: lessons from SARS on the role of risk perception, communication and management

With increased globalisation comes the likelihood that infectious disease appearing in one country will spread rapidly to another, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) being a recent example. However, although SARS infected some 10,000 individuals, killing around 1000, it did not lead to the devastating health impact that many feared, but a rather disproportionate economic impact. The disproportionate scale and nature of this impact has caused concern that outbreaks of more serious disease could cause catastrophic impacts on the global economy. Understanding factors that led to the impact of SARS might help to deal with the possible impact and management of such other infectious disease outbreaks. In this respect, the role of risk--its perception, communication and management--is critical. This paper looks at the role that risk, and especially the perception of risk, its communication and management, played in driving the economic impact of SARS. It considers the public and public health response to SARS, the role of the media and official organisations, and proposes policy and research priorities for establishing a system to better deal with the next global infectious disease outbreak. It is concluded that the potential for the rapid spread of infectious disease is not necessarily a greater threat than it has always been, but the effect that an outbreak can have on the economy is, which requires further research and policy development.     

Lessons from the severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak in Hong Kong

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is now a global public health threat with many medical, ethical, social, economic, political, and legal implications. The nonspecific signs and symptoms of this disease, coupled with a relatively long incubation period and the initial absence of a reliable diagnostic test, limited the understanding of the magnitude of the outbreak. This paper outlines our experience with public health issues that have arisen during this outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong. We confirmed that case detection, reporting, clear and timely dissemination of information, and strict infection control measures are essential in handling such an infectious disease outbreak. The need for an outbreak response unit is crucial to combat any future outbreak.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and coronavirus testing--United States, 2003

CDC and the World Health Organization (WHO) are continuing to investigate the multicountry outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Infection with a novel coronavirus has been implicated as a possible cause of SARS. This report updates information on U.S. residents with SARS and summarizes the clinical histories of the five U.S. residents identified as of April 9, 2003, who have both suspected SARS and laboratory evidence of infection with a novel coronavirus.     

The SARS outbreak in a general hospital in Tianjin, China -- the case of super-spreader

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly emerged infectious disease with a high case-fatality rate and devastating socio-economic impact. In this report we summarized the results from an epidemiological investigation of a SARS outbreak in a hospital in Tianjin, between April and May 2003. We collected epidemiological and clinical data on 111 suspect and probable cases of SARS associated with the outbreak. Transmission chain and outbreak clusters were investigated. The outbreak was single sourced and had eight clusters. All SARS cases in the hospital were traced to a single patient who directly infected 33 people. The patients ranged from 16 to 82 years of age (mean age 38.5 years); 38.7% were men. The overall case fatality in the SARS outbreak was 11.7% (13/111). The outbreak lasted around 4 weeks after the index case was identified. SARS is a highly contagious condition associated with substantial case fatality; an outbreak can result from one patient in a relatively short period. However, stringent public health measures seemed to be effective in breaking the disease transmission chain.