Microbiological safety of xenotransplantation compared with allotransplantation

Transmission of viral, bacterial, parasitic, and fungal infections via organ allografts is uncommon but may be associated with life‐threatening disease. Internationally, programs for screening of human organ donors for infectious risk are non‐uniform and vary with national standards and the availability of screening assays. Further, the failure to recognize and/or to report transmission events limits the utility of available data regarding the incidence of allograft‐associated disease transmission. Advances in xenotransplantation biology have allowed some limited clinical trials with the prospect for increased opportunities for clinical xenotransplantation. As with human allotransplantation, the examination of infectious risk has been a central theme in these studies. Significant advances have been made in the breeding and screening of swine for preclinical studies including the identification of novel, potential human pathogens derived from source animals. Thus far, “expected” xenograft‐derived pathogens such as porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV) have become activated in immunosuppressed primates but have not resulted in systemic infection outside the xenograft. PCMV has been bred out of swine herds by early weaning strategies. Conversely, host pathogens such as primate‐derived cytomegalovirus (CMV) have become activated and have produced serious infectious complications. These infections are preventable using antiviral prophylaxis. Xenogeneic tissues appear to be relatively resistant to infection by common human pathogens such as HIV, HTLV and the hepatitis viruses. Concerns regarding the potential activation of latent porcine retroviruses from xenograft tissues have resulted in the development of novel assays for xenotropic porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV). PERV transmission to primate xenograft recipients or to human cells in in vivo models has not been detected. Multiple intrinsic cellular mechanisms appear to be active in the prevention of infection of human cells by PERV. Further, PERV appears to be susceptible to available antiretroviral agents. Thus, while the absolute risk for such infections remains unknown in the absence of human studies with prolonged graft survival in immunosuppressed xenograft recipients, the risk of transmission to human recipients appears limited. Some general principles have been developed to guide clinical trials: Outcomes of xenotransplantation trials, including any infectious disease transmissions, should be reported in the scientific literature and to appropriate public health authorities. Surveillance programs should be developed to detect known infectious agents as well as previously unknown or unexpected pathogens in the absence of recognizable clinical syndromes. Standardization of procedures and validation by expert and/or reference laboratories are needed for microbiological assays. Such validation may require international collaboration. Repositories of samples from source animals and from recipients prior to, and following xenograft transplantation are essential to the investigation of possible infectious disease events. Infection is common in allograft recipients. Thus, in advance of clinical trials, policies and procedures should be developed to guide the evaluation of any infectious syndromes that may develop. (e.g. fever of unknown origin [FUO], leukocytosis, leukopenia, graft dysfunction, pneumonia, hepatitis, abscess formation) in xenograft recipients. Based on preclinical experience these procedures will include: (i) Exclusion of infectious syndromes commonly associated with allotransplantation (e.g. CMV, bacterial pneumonia); (ii) Evaluation of PERV infection by serologic and NAT testing; (iii) Assessment of other recipients of xenografts derived from the same herd or source of swine; and (iv) Evaluation of social contacts of the recipient. Consideration of investigation of xenograft recipients for unknown pathogens may require application of advanced research technologies, possibly including use of broad‐range molecular probes, microarrays or high throughput pyrosequencing. References: 1. Meije Y, TÖnjes RR, Fishman JA. Retroviral restriction factors and infectious risk in xenotransplantation. Amer J Transplant 2010; 10: 1511–1516. 2. Fishman JA, Scobie L, Takeuchi Y. Xenotransplantation‐associated infectious risk: A WHO consultation. Xenotransplantation 2012; 19: 72–81.     

Retroviral Restriction Factors and Infectious Risk in Xenotransplantation

The clinical application of xenotransplantation poses immunologic, ethical, and microbiologic challenges. Significant progress has been made in the investigation of each of these areas. Among concerns regarding infectious risks for human xenograft recipients is the identification in swine of infectious agents including porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV) that are capable of replication in some human cell lines. PERV replication has, however, been difficult to demonstrate in primate‐derived cell lines and in preclinical studies of non‐human primates receiving porcine xenografts. Endogenous ‘retroviral restriction factors’ are intracellular proteins and components of the innate immune system that act at various steps in retroviral replication. Recent studies suggest that some of these factors may have applications in the management of endogenous retroviruses in xenotransplantation. The risks of PERV infection and the potential role of retroviral restriction factors in xenotransplantation are reviewed in detail.     

Xenotransplantation: Infectious Risk Revisited

Xenotransplantation is a possible solution for the shortage of tissues for human transplantation. Multiple hurdles exist to clinical xenotransplantation, including immunologic barriers, metabolic differences between pigs--the source species most commonly considered--and humans, and ethical concerns. Since clinical trials were first proposed almost 10 years ago, the degree of risk for infection transmitted from the xenograft donor to the recipient has been extensively investigated. A number of potential viral pathogens have been identified including porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV), porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV), and porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus (PLHV). Sensitive diagnostic assays have been developed for each virus. Human-tropic PERV are exogenous recombinants between PERV-A and PERV-C sequences and are present in only a subset of swine. Porcine cytomegalovirus can be excluded from herds of source animals by early weaning of piglets. In contrast, the risks associated with PLHV remain undefined. Microbiologic studies and assays for potential xenogeneic pathogens have furthered understanding of risks associated with xenotransplantation. Thus far, clinical xenotransplantation of pig tissues has not resulted in transmission of viral infection to humans; significant risks for disease transmission from swine to humans have not been confirmed. If immunologic hurdles can be overcome, it is reasonable to initiate carefully monitored clinical trials.     

Xenotransplantation-associated infectious risk: a WHO consultation

Xenotransplantation carries the potential risk of the transmission of infection with the cells or tissues of the graft. The degree of risk is unknown in the absence of clinical trials. The clinical application of xenotransplantation has important implications for infectious disease surveillance, both at the national and international levels. Preclinical data indicate that infectious disease events associated with clinical xenotransplantation from swine, should they occur, will be rare; data in human trials are limited but have demonstrated no transmission of porcine microorganisms including porcine endogenous retrovirus. Xenotransplantation will necessitate the development of surveillance programs to detect known infectious agents and, potentially, previously unknown or unexpected pathogens. The development of surveillance and safety programs for clinical trials in xenotransplantation is guided by a "Precautionary Principle," with the deployment of appropriate screening procedures and assays for source animals and xenograft recipients even in the absence of data suggesting infectious risk. All assays require training, standardization and validation, and sharing of laboratory methods and expertise to optimize the quality of the surveillance and diagnostic testing. Investigation of suspected xenogeneic infection events (xenosis, xenozoonosis) should be performed in collaboration with an expert data safety review panel and the appropriate public health and competent authorities. It should be considered an obligation of performance of xenotransplantation trials to report outcomes, including any infectious disease transmissions, in the scientific literature. Repositories of samples from source animals and from recipients prior to, and following xenograft transplantation are essential to the investigation of possible infectious disease events. Concerns over any potential hazards associated with xenotransplantation may overshadow potential benefits. Careful microbiological screening of source animals used as xenotransplant donors may enhance the safety of transplantation beyond that of allotransplant procedures. Xenogeneic tissues may be relatively resistant to infection by some human pathogens. Moreover, xenotransplantation may be made available at the time when patients require organ replacement on a clinical basis. Insights gained in studies of the microbiology and immunology of xenotransplantation will benefit transplant recipients in the future. This document summarizes approaches to disease surveillance in individual recipients of nonhuman tissues.     

Infectious risk and retroviral restriction factors in xenotransplantation

The clinical application of xenotransplantation evokes immunological and microbiological as well as virological challenges. Porcine pathogens that do not show any symptoms in their natural host could exhibit a risk of fatal infections to humans. The presence of pig infectious agents including zoonotic and dissimilar agents should be reduced by specific pathogen free (spf) breeding of donor animals. However, the genetic information of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV) is integrated in the pig genome and can not be eradicated by spf breeding. The concerns about PERV for human xenograft recipients are based on data of in vitro replication of PERV in some human cell lines. So far, viral replication of PERV has been difficult to demonstrate in non‐human primate cell lines and in preclinical studies of non‐human primates receiving porcine xenografts, respectively. In this regard, natural and effective mechanisms of human and porcine cells counteracting productive infections caused by PERV are important to investigate. Intracellular proteins and components of the innate immune system including endogenous “antiretroviral restriction factors” act at various steps in retroviral replication. The cellular front is composed by several constitutively expressed genes which prevent or suppress retroviral infections. Some of these factors such as members of the tripartite motif (TRIM) and the apolipoprotein B mRNA‐editing polypeptide (APOBEC) families as well as tetherin and zinc‐finger antiviral protein (ZAP) could be useful in the management of PERV in xenotransplantation. The risks of infection and the potential role of antiretroviral restriction factors in xenotransplantation are presented in detail.     

Prevention of infection in xenotransplantation: Designated pathogen-free swine in the safety equation

Post-transplantation infections are common. In immunosuppressed human xenograft recipients, infection is most likely to be due to the same pathogens seen in human allotransplantation. However, organisms derived from swine and transmitted with xenografts have the potential to cause novel infections in xenograft recipients. The specific organisms likely to cause infection or “xenosis” are unknown but are postulated to be like those causing infection in allograft recipients. On this basis, theoretical exclusion criteria have been developed to guide the development of source animal herds. Herds developed based on the exclusion of potential human pathogens have been termed “designated pathogen-free” (DPF). Lists of potential pathogens will require revision with changing epidemiology of infection in swine worldwide and clinical experience. Development of new microbiological assays is required both for animal screening and in clinical diagnosis should infections occur. Genetic modifications of swine have the potential to eliminate certain infectious agents such as the porcine endogenous retrovirus; infectious complications of such modifications have not been observed. Unexpected, off target effects of genetic modifications require further study. Monitoring for infection in asymptomatic recipients is important to define infectious risks which are unknown in the absence of clinical trials data. Advanced microbiological techniques may be applied to diagnose and prevent infection in xenograft recipients.     

Donor‐derived infections and infectious risk in xenotransplantation and allotransplantation

Post‐transplantation infections are common in allograft recipients and should be expected in all immunocompromised hosts. Based on the need for immunosuppression in xenotransplantation, procedures developed to enhance safety in allotransplantation can be applied in future xenotransplantation clinical trials. Standardized approaches can be developed to guide the evaluation of common infectious syndromes in xenograft recipients. The opportunity created by screening of swine intended as xenograft donors has equal applicability to allotransplantation—notably broader screening strategies for allograft donors such as use of advanced sequencing modalities including broad‐range molecular probes, microarrays, and high‐throughput pyrosequencing. Considerations in management of allotransplant‐ and xenotransplant‐associated infections are largely the same. Experience in xenotransplantation will continue to inform thinking regarding donor‐derived infections in allotransplantation. We expect that experience in managing complex allotransplant recipients will similarly inform clinical trials in xenotransplantation.     

First update of the International Xenotransplantation Association consensus statement on conditions for undertaking clinical trials of porcine islet products in type 1 diabetes—Chapter 2a: source pigs—preventing xenozoonoses

Chapter 2 of the original consensus statement published in 2009 by IXA represents an excellent basis for the production of safe donor pigs and pig‐derived materials for porcine islet xenotransplantation. It was intended that the consensus statement was to be reviewed at interval to remain relevant. Indeed, many of the original salient points remain relevant today, especially when porcine islet xenotransplantation is performed in conjunction with immunosuppressants. However, progress in the field including demonstrated safe clinical porcine xenograft studies, increased understanding of risks including those posed by PERV, and advancement of diagnostic capabilities now allow for further consideration. Agents of known and unknown pathogenic significance continue to be identified and should be considered on a geographic, risk‐based, dynamic, and product‐specific basis, where appropriate using validated, advanced diagnostic techniques. PERV risk can be sufficiently reduced via multicomponent profiling including subtype expression levels in combination with infectivity assays. Barrier facilities built and operated against the AAALAC Ag Guide or suitable alternative criteria should be considered for source animal production as long as cGMPs and SOPs are followed. Bovine material‐free feed for source animals should be considered appropriate instead of mammalian free materials to sufficiently reduce TSE risks. Finally, the sponsor retention period for archival samples of donor materials was deemed sufficient until the death of the recipient if conclusively determined to be of unrelated and non‐infectious cause or for a reasonable period, that is, five to 10 yrs. In summary, the safe and economical production of suitable pigs and porcine islet xenograft materials, under appropriate guidance and regulatory control, is believed to be a viable means of addressing the unmet need for clinical islet replacement materials.     

The Resurgence of Xenotransplantation

There has been an upsurge of interest in xenotransplantation in recent years. This resurgence can attributed to a combination of factors. First, there has been a dramatic improvement in efficacy in several preclinical models, with maximum xenograft survival times increasing to 950 days for islets, 945 days for hearts, and 310 days for kidneys. Second, the rapid development of genome editing technology (particularly the advent of clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats/Cas9) has revolutionized the capacity to generate new donor pigs with multiple protective genetic modifications; what once took many years to achieve can now be performed in months, with much greater precision and scope. Third, the specter of porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV) has receded significantly. There has been no evidence of PERV transmission in clinical trials and preclinical models, and improved screening methods and new options for the treatment or even elimination of PERV are now available. Balancing these positive developments are several remaining challenges, notably the heavy and often clinically inapplicable immunosuppression required to prevent xenograft rejection. Nonetheless, the potential for xenotransplantation as a solution to the shortage of human organs and tissues for transplantation continues to grow.     

Safety of xenotransplantation: screening the donor pig and the recipient

Introduction: Xenotransplantation using pig cells and tissues may be associated with the transmission of porcine microorganisms including bacteria, parasites, fungi and viruses to the human recipient and may result in zoonones. Porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) represent a special risk since PERV‐A and PERV‐B are present in the genome of all pigs and infect human cells. PERV‐C is not present in all pigs and does not infect human cells. However, recombinants between PERV‐A and PERV‐C have been observed in normal pigs characterised by higher replication rates compared with PERV‐A, and they are also able to infect human cells (1). Methods: In the past years numerous assays based on the PCR technology have been developed to screen for the prevalence and expression of PERV and other porcine microorganisms in the donor pig (2). Whereas most microorganisms may be eliminated by designated pathogen‐free breeding, PERVs cannot be removed this way. In addition, assays have been developed to analyse the recipient for the transmission of PERV and other microorganisms, either using PCR methods or immunological assays to detect an antibody production as a result of infection (3). Results: Using these assays, no transmission of PERV as well as of other porcine microorganisms has been observed in first preclinical and clinical xenotransplantations or animal infection experiments. This was especially true for the first clinical transplantation of pig islet cells approved by the New Zealand government (4). Until now there is no susceptible animal model to study PERV transmission and transplantations of porcine cells or organs to non‐human primates as they are associated with limitations concerning the safety aspect, which do not allow transmitting the negative findings to humans (5). Different experimental approaches are under development to reduce the probability of PERV transmission, e.g. the generation of transgenic pigs expressing PERV‐specific siRNA inhibiting PERV expression by RNA interference (6), genotypic selection of pigs with a low prevalence and expression of PERV and neutralising antibodies against the envelope proteins inhibiting PERV infection (7). Conclusion: Investigations of the last years resulted in highly sensitive and specific methods to study PERV and other microorganisms in donor pigs and human recipients of xenotransplants. These methods showed absence of PERV transmission in all investigated cases, both in more than 200 human xenotransplant recipients, mostly recipients of cellular xenotransplants, as well as in non‐human primates and small animals. New technologies under development may further decrease the probability of transmission. References: 1. Denner J. Recombinant porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV‐A/C): A new risk for xenotransplantation? Arch Virol 2008; 153: 1421–1426. 2. Kaulitz D, Mihica D, Dorna J, Costa MR, Petersen B, Niemann H, TÖnjes RR, Denner J. Development of sensitive methods for detection of porcine endogenous retrovirus‐C (PERV‐C) in the genome of pigs J Virol Methods 2011; 175(1): 60–65. 3. Denner, J. Infectious risk in xenotransplantation – what post‐transplant screening for the human recipient? Xenotransplantation 2011; 18(3): 151–157. 4. Wynyard S, Garkavenko O, Nathu D, Denner J, Elliott R. Microbiological safety of the first clinical pig islet xenotransplantation trial in New Zealand, submitted. 5. Mattiuzzo G, Takeuchi Y. Suboptimal porcine endogenous retrovirus infection in non‐human primate cells: implication for preclinical xenotransplantation. PLoS One 2010; 5(10): e13203. 6. Semaan M, Kaulitz D, Petersen B, Niemann H, Denner J. Long‐term effects of PERV‐specific RNA interference in transgenic pigs. Xenotransplantation 2012; 19(2): 112–21. 7. Kaulitz D, Fiebig U, Eschricht M, Wurzbacher C, Kurth R, Denner J. Generation of neutralising antibodies against porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs). Virology 2011; 411(1): 78–86.     

Generation and testing of a highly specific anti-serum directed against porcine endogenous retrovirus nucleocapsid

Advances in xenotransplantation offer chances to alleviate the shortage of human donor organs. The discovery that pig endogenous retroviruses (PERV) can infect human cells in vitro has stimulated the discussion on infectious risk in xenotransplantation. A molecular and immunologic monitoring of xenograft recipients and of donor animals for putative infection with PERV and other microorganisms is inevitable. In this report, we describe the generation and testing of a highly specific anti-serum directed against the PERV nucleocapsid protein. The Gag amino acid (aa) sequence of PERV class B was used to define immunogenic domains by computer analysis. A peptide corresponding to the C-terminal 19 aa of the 10 kDa (p10) nucleocapsid (NC) portion of the Gag polyprotein was used to immunize rabbits. The generated serum was tested using recombinant PERV Gag protein expressed in insect cells, purified PERV virus particles and human 293 cells transfected or infected with PERV, respectively. Test methods included Western blotting, indirect immunofluorescence, immunoperoxidase assay and ELISA. The PERV anti-serum provides a tool that is instrumental for detection of a potential agent of zoonosis. It can be used for screening of donor animals and xenograft recipients in the course of xenotransplantation procedures.     

Porcine pathogens and xenotransplantation: PERV and beyond!

Concerns regarding the transmission of potentially zoonotic porcine viruses via a xenotransplant have prompted a significant number of studies on methods to eliminate or prevent expression and transmission of these viruses. The main focus of these studies, to date, has been the porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV); PERV is a genetically acquired element and present in the genome of all swine. This situation is problematic as it cannot simply be eliminated from swine by using methods currently employed to exclude exogenous pathogens in barrier facilities. As such, alternative strategies have been sought to circumvent the potential risk of PERV expression and transmission via a xenotransplant, however, there are other existing and emerging pathogens of concern that should be addressed when using this novel technology in vivo. Zoonotic porcine viruses have been identified that require specific diagnostic methods to confirm their absence. Animal husbandry and the exclusion of pathogens from SPF herds for use in xenotransplantation have been widely discussed and a number of organizations have issued guidelines on the screening for infectious agents. Although these recommendations on monitoring protocol and the identification of adventitious agents are clear, there is no comprehensive list of pathogens to be excluded from these animals that can be applied to all centres carrying out xenotransplantation. Currently, SPF animals used for research purposes are monitored for specific pathogens as defined by local guidelines, and may not be tested for all pathogens relevant to xenotransplantation. As recent data has indicated the potential for certain porcine pathogens to cross the species barrier, it is clear that xenotransplantation is a unique situation which may require us to address a more comprehensive panel of microorganisms than is currently recommended for SPF animals. This presentation will discuss data on the presence of pathogens in pigs, other than PERV, that may cause concern during the clinical application of xenotransplantation and the issues regarding the potential transfer of new zoonotic microorganisms.     

Infection in Organ Transplantation

The prevention, diagnosis, and management of infectious disease in transplantation are major contributors to improved outcomes in organ transplantation. The risk of serious infections in organ recipients is determined by interactions between the patient's epidemiological exposures and net state of immune suppression. In organ recipients, there is a significant incidence of drug toxicity and a propensity for drug interactions with immunosuppressive agents used to maintain graft function. Thus, every effort must be made to establish specific microbiologic diagnoses to optimize therapy. A timeline can be created to develop a differential diagnosis of infection in transplantation based on common patterns of infectious exposures, immunosuppressive management, and antimicrobial prophylaxis. Application of quantitative molecular microbial assays and advanced antimicrobial therapies have advanced care. Pathogen‐specific immunity, genetic polymorphisms in immune responses, and dynamic interactions between the microbiome and the risk of infection are beginning to be explored. The role of infection in the stimulation of alloimmune responses awaits further definition. Major hurdles include the shifting worldwide epidemiology of infections, increasing antimicrobial resistance, suboptimal assays for the microbiologic screening of organ donors, and virus‐associated malignancies. Transplant infectious disease remains a key to the clinical and scientific investigation of organ transplantation.     

Cellular interaction of functional porcine endogenous retrovirus

Human cells might display mechanisms counteracting infections by porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV) in the course of pig‐to‐human xenotransplantation. Mammals have developed a number of protective strategies against viruses, including an intracellular antiretroviral defense as part of the innate immunity. In addition to the conventional innate and acquired immune responses an array of dominant genes have evolved that are constitutively expressed which suppress or prevent retroviral infections. Several of these antiretroviral restriction mechanisms have been identified including members of the tripartite motif (TRIM) and APOBEC families. The TRIM5 class of inhibitors appears to target incoming retroviral capsids and the APOBEC class of cytidine deaminases hypermutates and destabilizes retroviral genomes. Our data show that human and porcine cytidine deaminases inhibit PERV replication significantly, thereby reducing the infectious risk raised by PERV in vitro. The exact mechanism of the TRIM5 mediated restriction has not been exactly determined so far. Data published by Wood et al. (2009) indicate that PERV are insensitive to restriction by divergent TRIM5 molecules including human and monkey TRIM5α?proteins. The role of pig TRIM5 has not been clarified. We have identified a single TRIM5 gene in the pig genome. The impact of porcine TRIM5 protein on PERV will be tested using the human TRIM5α as a negative control, expecting that PERV will be insensitive to porcine TRIM5.     

First update of the International Xenotransplantation Association consensus statement on conditions for undertaking clinical trials of porcine islet products in type 1 diabetes—Chapter 5: recipient monitoring and response plan for preventing disease transmission

Xenotransplantation of porcine cells, tissues, and organs may be associated with the transmission of porcine microorganisms to the human recipient. A previous, 2009, version of this consensus statement focused on strategies to prevent transmission of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs). This version addresses potential transmission of all porcine microorganisms including monitoring of the recipient and provides suggested approaches to the monitoring and prevention of disease transmission. Prior analyses assumed that most microorganisms other than the endogenous retroviruses could be eliminated from donor animals under appropriate conditions which have been called “designated pathogen‐free” (DPF) source animal production. PERVs integrated as proviruses in the genome of all pigs cannot be eliminated in that manner and represent a unique risk. Certain microorganisms are by nature difficult to eliminate even under DPF conditions; any such clinically relevant microorganisms should be included in pig screening programs. With the use of porcine islets in clinical trials, special consideration has to be given to the presence of microorganisms in the isolated islet tissue to be used and also to the potential use of encapsulation. It is proposed that microorganisms absent in the donor animals by sensitive microbiological examination do not need to be monitored in the transplant recipient; this will reduce costs and screening requirements. Valid detection assays for donor and manufacturing‐derived microorganisms must be established. Special consideration is needed to preempt potential unknown pathogens which may pose a risk to the recipient. This statement summarizes the main achievements in the field since 2009 and focus on issues and solutions with microorganisms other than PERV.