Consumer price sensitivity and health plan choice in a regulated competition setting

We estimate premium elasticities in a regulated competition market based on a quasi‐exogenous premium increase for young adults in Switzerland. We exploit that individuals born before the turn of the year (“treatment group”) face a larger increase in premiums than individuals born after the turn of the year (“control group”). We find that the treatment group is 1.5 times more likely to switch their health plan than the control group. Overall, individuals respond to premium increases by choosing more frequently health plans with managed care features, increasing the deductible, and by switching the insurer. Regarding health plan choice, we find an average elasticity of ?0.56 with regard to the relative premium difference of any plan to the status quo contract. The elasticity is up to 5 times larger for the treated (?1.03) than for the controls (?0.19). Our results are not driven by health status as measured by health care expenditures and chronic conditions. Rather, our findings suggest that the difference in the premium elasticity is driven by the salience of the premium increase. We argue that this finding is of high relevance for health care policies that aim at fostering health plan competition.     

An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings: an MSA example

This paper outlines a feasible employee premium contribution policy, which would reduce the inefficiency associated with adverse selection when a limited coverage insurance policy is offered alongside a more generous policy. The "efficient premium contribution" is defined and is shown to lead to an efficient allocation across plans of persons who differ by risk, but it may also redistribute against higher risks. A simulation of the additional option of a catastrophic health plan (CHP) accompanied by a medical savings account (MSA) is presented. The efficiency gains from adding the MSA/catastrophic health insurance plan (CHP) option are positive but small, and the adverse consequences for high risks under an efficient employee premium are also small.     

Raising premiums and other costs for Oregon health plan enrollees drove many to drop out

The Oregon Health Plan was created to be a sustainable program that could weather budgetary storms without having to cut enrollees from Medicaid. A 2003 redesign of the program increased premiums, raised cost sharing, and imposed rigid premium payment deadlines for members in the "Standard" version of the program but not for members of the "Plus" version. This paper adds two years of longitudinal data to a previous study on the impacts of these changes. It shows that the redesign was a key factor driving a 77 percent disenrollment rate in the Standard program, from a high of 104,000 enrollees in February 2003 to just 24,000 by the end of the study period, November 2005. Those who were in the Standard plan when the reduced benefits and higher member costs went into effect were also nearly twice as likely to have unmet health care needs compared to those in the Plus plan. These changes underscore that in a period of economic downturn, policy makers must understand the impact of increased cost sharing on vulnerable populations.     

Setting a standard of affordability for health insurance coverage

Recently, Massachusetts passed landmark legislation designed to expand health insurance coverage. This legislation includes a requirement that all adults enroll in a health insurance plan. This mandate takes effect only if an "affordable" plan is available. The definition of affordability for individuals and families of different incomes or circumstances is a critical decision in implementation and is relevant to any state or federal reform requiring individual premium or cost-sharing contributions, or both. This analysis was done to assist the policy design process in Massachusetts and delineates an empirically based approach to setting affordability standards.     

THE PRICE SENSITIVITY OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

We use 4 years of data from the retiree health benefits program of the University of Michigan to estimate the effect of price on the health plan choices of Medicare beneficiaries. During the period of our analysis, changes in the University's premium contribution rules led to substantial price changes. A key feature of this ‘natural experiment’ is that individuals who had retired before a certain date were exempted from having to pay any premium contributions. This ‘grandfathering’ creates quasi‐experimental variation that is ideal for estimating the effect of price. Using regression discontinuity methods, we compare the plan choices of individuals who retired just after the grandfathering cutoff date and were therefore exposed to significant price changes to the choices of a ‘control group’ of individuals who retired just before that date and therefore did not experience the price changes. The results indicate a statistically significant effect of price, with a $10 increase in monthly premium contributions leading to a 2 to 3 percentage point decrease in a plan's market share. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Employer contribution and premium growth in health insurance

We study whether employer premium contribution schemes could impact the pricing behavior of health plans and contribute to rising premiums. Using 1991–2011 data before and after a 1999 premium subsidy policy change in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), we find that the employer premium contribution scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the employer's premium contribution to that plan. Both incentives are found to contribute to premium growth. Counterfactual simulation shows that average premium would have been 10% less than observed and the federal government would have saved 15% per year on its premium contribution had the subsidy policy change not occurred in the FEHBP. We discuss the potential of similar incentives in other government-subsidized insurance systems such as the Medicare Part D and the Health Insurance Marketplace under the Affordable Care Act.     

Two responses to a premium hike in a program for uninsured kids: 4 in 5 families stay in as enrollment shrinks by a fifth

This article reports on our study of the effect of premium increases on disenrollment from a health insurance program for low-income immigrant children in Los Angeles County. Two groups of children were compared: those ages 6-18, who were subject to an increase, and those ages 0-5, who were not. Fewer than half of the children in the older group remained enrolled after the premium increase-slightly more than 12,000 children, compared to more than 25,000 at the beginning-and there was a 20 percent decline in overall membership in the program that was attributable to the increase. Although many families paid the higher premium to keep their children enrolled, other families were not able to do so. As programs serving disadvantaged populations contemplate premium increases, we recommend that they tailor specific interventions to children most likely to drop out; establish "hardship funds" to support children with special needs; and link families that may disenroll their children with other programs that could provide coverage or providers who could offer care.     

The impact of premium subsidies on health plan choices in Switzerland: Who responds to the incentives set by in-kind as opposed to cash transfers?

Mandatory health insurance in Switzerland operates on a community-based premium scheme. This can lead to a high financial burden on lower income individuals. Until 2014, premium subsidies were paid as cash transfer or in-kind transfer, providing different incentives to individuals for choosing their health plans. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, the impact of in-kind subsidy transfers on deductible choice and the choice of a cost-saving health plan was evaluated to understand effect heterogeneity based on individual background characteristics. The results indicate that eligible individuals from in-kind transfer cantons in general are incentivized to choose a low deductible plan compared to eligible individuals from cash transfer cantons. This effect is found strongest among female, middle-aged and healthy individuals who have most flexibility in adjusting their health plan choices in response to the financial incentives. Additionally, eligible individuals are less likely to choose a cost-saving health plan compared to a cash transfer canton.     

Will Choice‐Based Reform Work for Medicare? Evidence from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program

OBJECTIVE:. To examine the effect of premiums and benefits on the health plan choices of older enrollees who choose Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) health plans as their primary payer. DATA SOURCES: Administrative enrollment data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and plan premiums and benefits data taken from the Checkbook Guide to health plans. STUDY DESIGN: We estimate individual plan choice models where the choice of health plan is a function of out-of-pocket premium, actuarial value, plan attributes, and individual characteristics. Plan attributes include plan structure (fee-for-service/preferred provider organization, point-of-service, or health maintenance organization), drug benefit structure, and whether or not the plan covers other types of spending such as dental services and diabetic supplies. The models are estimated by conditional logit. Our study focuses on three populations that currently choose FEHBP as their primary health care coverage and are similar to the Medicare population: current employees and retirees who are approaching the age of Medicare eligibility (ages 60-64) and current federal employees age 65+. Current employees age 65+ are eligible for Medicare, but their FEHBP plan is their primary payer. Retirees and employees 60-64 are not yet eligible for Medicare but are similar in many respects to recently age-eligible Medicare beneficiaries. We also estimate our model for current employees age 55 and younger as a comparison group. DATA COLLECTION METHODS: We select a random sample of retirees and employees age 60-64, as well as all current employees age 65+, from the OPM administrative database for the calendar year 2001. The plan choices available to each person are determined by the plans participating in their metropolitan statistical area. We match plan premium and attribute information from the Checkbook Guide to each plan in the enrollee's list of choices. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We find that current workers 65+, 60-64, and non-Medicare eligible retirees are sensitive to variation in plan premiums. The premium elasticities for these groups are similar in magnitude to those of the age 55 and under employee group. Older workers and retirees not yet eligible for Medicare are willing to pay a substantial amount for plans with open provider networks. The willingness to pay for open networks is significantly greater for these groups than for younger employees. Willingness to pay for open network plans varies significantly by income, but varies little by age within group. CONCLUSIONS: Our finding that older workers and non-Medicare eligible retirees are sensitive to plan premiums suggests that choice-based reform of Medicare would lead to cost-conscious choices by Medicare beneficiaries. However, our finding that these groups are willing to pay more for open network plans than younger employees suggest that higher risk individuals may migrate toward higher benefit, higher cost plans. Our findings on the relationship between income and willingness to pay for open network plans suggest that means testing is a viable reform for lowering Medicare program costs.     

The effect of premiums on the decision to participate in health insurance and other fringe benefits offered by the employer: evidence from a real-world experiment

In this paper, we investigate the effect of the out-of-pocket premium on the decision to enroll in employer health insurance and other benefits plans including dental insurance, vision care, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. Previous estimates of the effects of premium on takeup of health insurance could be biased toward zero due to a correlation between premium and unobservable demand or plan quality. We solve this problem using data representing hypothetical choices by employees under three different price regimes, providing price variation uncorrelated with either individual-specific or plan-specific unobservables. We find that workers are insensitive to price in health insurance takeup. Workers show much greater price sensitivity to decisions about dental insurance, vision plans, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. We conclude that premium subsidies are unlikely to have a substantial impact on increasing insurance rates of workers already offered employer insurance.     

Employee choice of flexible spending account participation and health plan

Despite the fact that flexible spending accounts (FSAs) are becoming an increasingly popular employer-provided health benefit, there has been very little empirical study of FSA use among employees at the individual level. This study contributes to the literature on FSAs using a unique data set that provides three years of employee-level-matched benefits data. Motivated by the theoretical model of FSA choice presented in Cardon and Showalter (J. Health Econ. 2001; 20(6):935-954), we examine the determinants of FSA participation and contribution levels using cross-sectional and random-effect two-part models. FSA participation and health plan choice are also modeled jointly in each year using conditional logit models. We find that, even after controlling for a number of other demographic characteristics, non-whites are less likely to participate in the FSA program, have lower contributions conditional on participation, and have a lower probability of switching to new lower cost share, higher premium plans when they were introduced. We also find evidence that choosing health plans with more expected out-of-pocket expenses is correlated with participation in the FSA program.     

Estimating workers' marginal valuation of employer health benefits: would insured workers prefer more health insurance or higher wages?

In recent years the cost of health insurance has been increasing much faster than wages. In the face of these rising costs, many employers will have to make difficult decisions about whether to cut back health benefits or to compensate workers with lower wages or lower wage growth. In this paper, we ask the question, "Which do workers value more -- one additional dollar's worth of health benefits or one more dollar in their pockets?" Using a new approach to obtaining estimates of insured workers' marginal valuation of health benefits this paper estimates how much, on average, employees value the marginal dollar paid by employers for their workers' health insurance. We find that insured workers value the marginal health premium dollar at significantly less than the marginal wage dollar. However, workers value insurance generosity very highly. The marginal dollar spent on health insurance that adds an additional dollar's worth of observable dimensions of plan generosity, such as lower deductibles or coverage of additional services, is valued at significantly more than one dollar.     

Issues regarding health plan payments under Medicare and recommendations for reform.

The failures of the market for current Medicare health plans include poor information and price distortions and can be attributed to government policy. Reforms that could improve its structure are annual open enrollment periods, premium rebates from health management organizations (HMOs) to members, and termination of the federal government's subsidy of Medicare supplementary insurance. However, the price for a basic Medicare benefits package would still be distorted because Medicare bases its contribution on the cost of a comparable package in the fee-for-service (FFS) sector rather than on the cost of the most efficient plan available to beneficiaries in each market area. The present Medicare HMO program almost certainly increases total Medicare costs and actually discourages HMO growth by shielding beneficiaries from the true price difference between basic benefits in the HMO and FFS sectors. Lacking payment reforms, the Medicare HMO program should be terminated.     

Plan choice,health insurance cost and premium sharing

We develop a model of premium sharing for firms that offer multiple insurance plans. We assume that firms offer one low quality plan and one high quality plan. Under the assumption of wage rigidities we found that the employee's contribution to each plan is an increasing function of that plan's premium. The effect of the other plan's premium is ambiguous. We test our hypothesis using data from the Employer Health Benefit Survey. Restricting the analysis to firms that offer both HMO and PPO plans, we measure the amount of the premium passed on to employees in response to a change in both premiums. We find evidence of large and positive effects of the increase in the plan's premium on the amount of the premium passed on to employees. The effect of the alternative plan's premium is negative but statistically significant only for the PPO plans.     

Do individuals respond to cost-sharing subsidies in their selections of marketplace health insurance plans?

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides assistance to low-income consumers through both premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions (CSRs). Low-income consumers’ lack of health insurance literacy or information regarding CSRs may lead them to not take-up CSR benefits for which they are eligible. We use administrative data from 2014 to 2016 on roughly 22 million health insurance plan choices of low-income individuals enrolled in ACA Marketplace coverage to assess whether they behave in a manner consistent with being aware of the availability of CSRs. We take advantage of discontinuous changes in the schedule of CSR benefits to show that consumers are highly sensitive to the value of CSRs when selecting insurance plans and that a very low percentage select dominated plans. These findings suggest that CSR subsidies are salient to consumers and that the program is well designed to account for any lack of health insurance literacy among the low-income population it serves.     

The Effect of Health Plan Characteristics on Medicare+Choice Enrollment

Objective. To provide national estimates of the effect of out-of-pocket premiums and benefits on Medicare beneficiaries' choice among managed care health plans.
Data Sources/Study Setting. The data represent the population of all Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans offered to Medicare beneficiaries in the United States in 1999.
Study Design. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the market share of the j th health plan to the lowest cost plan in the beneficiary's county of residence. The explanatory variables are measures of premiums and benefits in the j th health plan relative to the premiums and benefits in the lowest cost plan.
Data Collection Methods. The data are from the 1999 Medicare Compare database, and M+C enrollment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Principal Findings. A $10 increase in an M+C plan's out-of-pocket premium, relative to its competitors, is associated with a decrease of four percentage points in the j th plan's market share (i.e., from 25 to 21 percent), holding the premiums of competing plans constant.
Conclusions. Although our price elasticity estimates are low, the market share losses associated with small changes in a health plan's premium, relative to its competitors, may be sufficient to discipline premiums in a competitive market. Bidding behavior by plans in the Medicare Competitive Pricing Demonstration supports this conclusion.