Who Switches from Medigap to Medicare HMOs?

OBJECTIVE: To determine the factors affecting whether Medigap owners switch to Medicare managed care plans. DATA SOURCES: The primary data were the 1993-1996 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use Files. These were supplemented by data available from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) website. STUDY DESIGN: Individuals on the MCBS files with Medigap coverage in the period 1993-1996 were included in the study. The person-year was the unit of analysis. We used multivariate logistic regression analysis to determine whether or not a Medigap owner switched to a Medicare-managed care plan during a particular year. Independent variables included measures of affordability, need for services, health insurance benefits, sociodemographics, and supply of managed care plans. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We did not detect strong evidence that beneficiaries in poorer health were more likely than others to switch from Medigap coverage to Medicare-managed care. In addition, higher Medigap premiums did not appear to induce beneficiaries to switch into managed care. CONCLUSIONS: We examined selection bias in joining managed care plans among the subset of Medicare beneficiaries who have Medigap policies. No strong evidence of selection bias was found in this population. We conclude that there was no evidence that the Medigap market is becoming prohibitively expensive as a result of unfavorable selection.     

Creating a Health-Promoting Group for Elderly Couples on a Home Health Care Program

The hospital home care social worker has a unique opportunity to develop a home-keeping, health-promoting group for frail elderly couples within his or her caseload. Through home visits, working as a filial professional, the worker enters, then strengthens the couples' pre-illness formal and informal support networks, and then goes on to create an additional informal peer support group, that meets in each others' homes. The group is capable of decreasing the chance of nursing home placement for all its members. It is proposed that home health care agencies within hospitals incorporate such groups into their regular programs.     

An economic history of Medicare part C

Context: Twenty‐five years ago, private insurance plans were introduced into the Medicare program with the stated dual aims of (1) giving beneficiaries a choice of health insurance plans beyond the fee‐for‐service Medicare program and (2) transferring to the Medicare program the efficiencies and cost savings achieved by managed care in the private sector. Methods: In this article we review the economic history of Medicare Part C, known today as Medicare Advantage, focusing on the impact of major changes in the program's structure and of plan payment methods on trends in the availability of private plans, plan enrollment, and Medicare spending. Additionally, we compare the experience of Medicare Advantage and of employer‐sponsored health insurance with managed care over the same time period. Findings: Beneficiaries’ access to private plans has been inconsistent over the program's history, with higher plan payments resulting in greater choice and enrollment and vice versa. But Medicare Advantage generally has cost more than the traditional Medicare program, an overpayment that has increased in recent years. Conclusions: Major changes in Medicare Advantage's payment rules are needed in order to simultaneously encourage the participation of private plans, the provision of high‐quality care, and to save Medicare money.     

Health plan enrollment and mortality in the Medicare program

Prior studies have found that Medicare health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollees have lower mortality (over a fixed observation period) than beneficiaries in traditional fee‐for‐service (FFS) Medicare. We use Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) data to compare 2‐year predicted mortality for Medicare enrollees in the HMO and FFS sectors using a sample selection model to control for observed beneficiaries characteristics and unobserved confounders. The difference in raw, unadjusted mortality probabilities was 0.5% (HMO lower). Correcting for numerous observed confounders resulted in a difference of ?0.6% (HMO higher). Further adjustment for unobserved confounders resulted in an estimated difference of 3.7 and 4.2% (HMO lower), depending on the specification of geographic‐fixed effects. The latter result (4.2%) was statistically significant and consistent with prior studies that did not adjust for unobserved confounding. Our findings suggest there may be unobserved confounders associated with adverse selection in the HMO sector, which had a large effect on our mortality estimates among HMO enrollees. An important topic for further research is to identify such confounders and explore their relationship to mortality. The methods presented in this paper represent a promising approach to comparing outcomes between the HMO and FFS sectors, but further research is warranted. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Medicare Advantage Plan Availability and Enrollment

Objective

To assess the impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act''s (ACA) changes in Medicare Advantage (MA) payment rates on the availability of and enrollment in MA plans.

Data Sources

Secondary data on MA plan offerings, contract offerings, and enrollment by state and county, in 2010–2011.

Study Design

We estimated regression models of the change in the number of plans, the number of contracts, and enrollment as a function of quartiles of FFS spending and pre-ACA MA payment generosity. Counties in the lowest quartile of spending are treated most generously by the ACA.

Principal Findings

Relative to counties in the highest quartile of spending, the number of plans in counties in the first, second, and third quartiles rose by 12 percent, 7.6 percent, and 5.4 percent, respectively. Counties with more generous MA payment rates before the ACA lost significantly more plans. We did not find a similar impact on the change in contracts or enrollment.

Conclusions

The ACA-induced MA payment changes reduced the number of plan choices available for Medicare beneficiaries, but they have yet affected enrollment patterns.     

Medicare Managed Care Spillovers and Treatment Intensity

Evidence suggests that the share of Medicare managed care enrollees in a region affects the costs of treating traditional fee‐for‐service (FFS) Medicare beneficiaries; however, little is known about the mechanisms through which these ‘spillover effects’ operate. This paper examines the relationship between Medicare managed care penetration and treatment intensity for FFS enrollees hospitalized with a primary diagnosis of AMI. I find that increased Medicare managed care penetration is associated with a reduction in both the costs and the treatment intensity of FFS AMI patients. Specifically, as Medicare managed care penetration increases, FFS AMI patients are less likely to receive surgical reperfusion and mechanical ventilation and to experience an overall reduction in the number of inpatient procedures. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The costs of decedents in the Medicare program: implications for payments to Medicare + Choice plans

OBJECTIVE: To discuss and quantify the incentives that Medicare managed care plans have to avoid (through selective enrollment or disenrollment) people who are at risk for very high costs, focusing on Medicare beneficiaries in the last year of life-a group that accounts for more than one-quarter of Medicare's annual expenditures. DATA SOURCE: Medicare administrative claims for 1994 and 1995. STUDY DESIGN: We calculated the payment a plan would have received under three risk-adjustment systems for each beneficiary in our 1995 sample based on his or her age, gender, county of residence, original reason for Medicare entitlement, and principal inpatient diagnoses received during any hospital stays in 1994. We compared these amounts to the actual costs incurred by those beneficiaries. We then looked for clinical categories that were predictive of costs, including costs in a beneficiary's last year of life, not accounted for by the risk adjusters. DATA EXTRACTION METHODS: The analyses were conducted using claims for a 5 percent random sample of Medicare beneficiaries who died in 1995 and a matched group of survivors. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Medicare is currently implementing the Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Groups (PIP-DCG) risk adjustment payment system to address the problem of risk selection in the Medicare+Choice program. We quantify the strong financial disincentives to enroll terminally ill beneficiaries that plans still have under this risk adjustment system. We also show that up to one-third of the selection observed between Medicare HMOs and the traditional fee-for-service system could be due to differential enrollment of decedents. A risk adjustment system that incorporated more of the available diagnostic information would attenuate this disincentive; however, plans could still use clinical information (not included in the risk adjustment scheme) to identify beneficiaries whose expected costs exceed expected payments. CONCLUSIONS: More disaggregated prospective risk adjustment methods and alternative payment systems that compensate plans for delivering care to certain classes of patients should be considered to ensure access to high-quality managed care for all beneficiaries.     

Variations in patterns of care and outcomes after acute myocardial infarction for Medicare beneficiaries in fee-for-service and HMO settings

OBJECTIVE: To assess revascularization and mortality after acute myocardial infarction (AMI) for all Medicare patients in fee-for-service (FFS) and health maintenance organization (HMO) settings in California. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Hospital discharge abstract and death certificate data linked with Medicare enrollment files for patients aged 65 and over with Medicare coverage (69,040) discharged from a California-licensed hospital in 1994-1996. STUDY DESIGN: Risk-adjusted results were assessed for HMOs and FFS, as well as for FFS beneficiaries from areas served by each plan. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Risk models were based on all sampled patients. The HMO patients were aggregated into 17 pseudoplans: 5 individual plans, 4 large plans split geographically (10 observations), and 2 "pseudoplans" of small HMOs. Observed versus expected 30-day mortality rates, lengths-of-stay (LOS) during the index hospitalization and any transfers, revascularization (coronary artery bypass graft [CABG] surgery and/or percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty [PTCA]) during the index hospitalization or 30 days after admission, were calculated for each pseudoplan. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Risk-adjusted death rate was slightly higher in FFS than in HMO settings (p < .01 with one risk adjustment model, n.s. with another). Three pseudoplans had significantly (p < .01) better than expected mortality rates. One pseudoplan was significantly worse (p < .05) with one risk adjustment model but not the other. The LOS and revascularization rates varied widely, but were not associated with outcomes. Plans with among the best results had the lowest LOS and revascularization rates. These pseudoplans were less likely to have their patients initially admitted to a hospital with revascularization capability, but the hospitals they used had higher CABG volumes. Even if CABG facilities were available during the index admission, in these plans with better than expected mortality rates, revascularization was often postponed or carried out elsewhere. CONCLUSIONS: For Medicare patients having an AMI in the mid-1990s in California, risk-adjusted outcomes were no different, or slightly better on average, for those in HMOs than in FFS. Not all plans performed equally well, so understanding what leads to differences in quality is more important than simple comparisons of HMOs versus FFS.     

Market Variations in Intensity of Medicare Service Use and Beneficiary Experiences with Care

Objective

Examine associations between patient experiences with care and service use across markets.

Data Sources/Study Setting

Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) and managed care (Medicare Advantage [MA]) beneficiaries in 306 markets from the 2003 Consumer Assessments of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) surveys. Resource use intensity is measured by the 2003 end-of-life expenditure index.

Study Design

We estimated correlations and linear regressions of eight measures of case-mix-adjusted beneficiary experiences with intensity of service use across markets.

Data Collection/Extraction

We merged CAHPS data with service use data, excluding beneficiaries under 65 years of age or receiving Medicaid.

Principal Findings

Overall, higher intensity use was associated (p<.05) with worse (seven measures) or no better care experiences (two measures). In higher-intensity markets, Medicare FFS and MA beneficiaries reported more problems getting care quickly and less helpful office staff. However, Medicare FFS beneficiaries in higher-intensity markets reported higher overall ratings of their personal physician and main specialist. Medicare MA beneficiaries in higher-intensity markets also reported worse quality of communication with physicians, ability to get needed care, and overall ratings of care.

Conclusions

Medicare beneficiaries in markets characterized by high service use did not report better experiences with care. This trend was strongest for those in managed care.     

Are HMOs bad for health maintenance?

This study examines the impact of Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) coverage on the provision of preventive medicine. We investigate whether any association reflects selection effects on the part of patients and/or physicians or a causal impact of managed care itself. Causal effects may occur on the supply side or the demand side. Using a large national database of Medicare and non-Medicare patients, we investigate these issues for eight common preventive medical procedures. We find that preventive care is substantially higher with HMO coverage than with traditional fee-for-service reimbursement. Our findings also suggest that the impact of HMOs on preventive medicine is a causal one, and does not merely reflect selection effects. Both supply-side (e.g. provider) and demand-side (e.g. patient) factors appear to play a role in the higher incidence of preventive care among HMO enrollees. Patient demand effects are stronger for simple treatments such as physicals, while supply-side effects seem to dominate for relatively complex preventive care procedures such as mammograms.     

Modeling the impact of Medicare Advantage payment cuts on ambulatory care sensitive and elective hospitalizations

Objective. To assess relationships between changes in Medicare Advantage (MA) payment rates and Medicare beneficiary hospitalizations and to simulate the effects of scheduled payment cuts on ambulatory care sensitive (ACS) and elective hospitalization rates. Data. State Inpatient Database discharge abstracts from Arizona, Florida, and New York merged with administrative Medicare enrollment and MA payment data. Study Design. Retrospective, fixed effect regression analysis of the relationship between MA payment rates and rates of ACS and elective hospitalizations among Medicare beneficiaries in counties with at least 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and 3 percent MA penetration from 1999 to 2005. Principal Findings. MA payment rates were negatively related to rates of ACS admissions. Simulations suggest that payment cuts could be associated with higher rates of ACS admissions. No relationship between MA payments and rates of elective hospitalizations was found. Conclusions. Reductions in MA payment rates may result in a small increase in ACS admissions. Trends in ACS admissions among chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries should be tracked following MA payment cuts.     

Open enrollment periods and plan choices

Open enrollment periods are pervasively used in insurance markets to limit adverse selection risks resulting when enrollees can switch plans at will. We exploit a change in the open enrollment rules of Medicare Advantage to analyze how beneficiaries responded to the option of switching to a 5‐star‐rated plan at anytime, in a setting where insurers adjusted premiums and benefit design to counterbalance the increased selection risk. We present three findings: Within‐year switches to 5‐star plans increase by 7–16%; demand for 5‐star plans across the years does not decline; and the enrollees who switch to a 5‐star plan during the year are in better health status than those who do not switch.