A growing global network's role in outbreak response: AFHSC-GEIS 2008-2009

A cornerstone of effective disease surveillance programs comprises the early identification of infectious threats and the subsequent rapid response to prevent further spread. Effectively identifying, tracking and responding to these threats is often difficult and requires international cooperation due to the rapidity with which diseases cross national borders and spread throughout the global community as a result of travel and migration by humans and animals. From Oct.1, 2008 to Sept. 30, 2009, the United States Department of Defense's (DoD) Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) identified 76 outbreaks in 53 countries. Emerging infectious disease outbreaks were identified by the global network and included a wide spectrum of support activities in collaboration with host country partners, several of which were in direct support of the World Health Organization's (WHO) International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). The network also supported military forces around the world affected by the novel influenza A/H1N1 pandemic of 2009. With IHR (2005) as the guiding framework for action, the AFHSC-GEIS network of international partners and overseas research laboratories continues to develop into a far-reaching system for identifying, analyzing and responding to emerging disease threats.     

Department of Defense influenza and other respiratory disease surveillance during the 2009 pandemic

The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center's Division of Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) supports and oversees surveillance for emerging infectious diseases, including respiratory diseases, of importance to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). AFHSC-GEIS accomplishes this mission by providing funding and oversight to a global network of partners for respiratory disease surveillance. This report details the system's surveillance activities during 2009, with a focus on efforts in responding to the novel H1N1 Influenza A (A/H1N1) pandemic and contributions to global public health. Active surveillance networks established by AFHSC-GEIS partners resulted in the initial detection of novel A/H1N1 influenza in the U.S. and several other countries, and viruses isolated from these activities were used as seed strains for the 2009 pandemic influenza vaccine. Partners also provided diagnostic laboratory training and capacity building to host nations to assist with the novel A/H1N1 pandemic global response, adapted a Food and Drug Administration-approved assay for use on a ruggedized polymerase chain reaction platform for diagnosing novel A/H1N1 in remote settings, and provided estimates of seasonal vaccine effectiveness against novel A/H1N1 illness. Regular reporting of the system's worldwide surveillance findings to the global public health community enabled leaders to make informed decisions on disease mitigation measures and controls for the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic. AFHSC-GEIS's support of a global network contributes to DoD's force health protection, while supporting global public health.     

United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention support for influenza surveillance, 2013–2021

ObjectiveTo assess the stability of improvements in global respiratory virus surveillance in countries supported by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) after reductions in CDC funding and with the stress of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.MethodsWe assessed whether national influenza surveillance systems of CDC-funded countries: (i) continued to analyse as many specimens between 2013 and 2021; (ii) participated in activities of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System; (iii) tested enough specimens to detect rare events or signals of unusual activity; and (iv) demonstrated stability before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We used CDC budget records and data from the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System.FindingsWhile CDC reduced per-country influenza funding by about 75% over 10 years, the number of specimens tested annually remained stable (mean 2261). Reporting varied substantially by country and transmission zone. Countries funded by CDC accounted for 71% (range 61–75%) of specimens included in WHO consultations on the composition of influenza virus vaccines. In 2019, only eight of the 17 transmission zones sent enough specimens to WHO collaborating centres before the vaccine composition meeting to reliably identify antigenic variants.ConclusionGreat progress has been made in the global understanding of influenza trends and seasonality. To optimize surveillance to identify atypical influenza viruses, and to integrate molecular testing, sequencing and reporting of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 into existing systems, funding must continue to support these efforts.     

Epidemiological surveillance activities during the 2009 influenza pandemic in Spain: lessons learnt one year after

In this article the actions taken in the area of epidemiological surveillance in Spain during the influenza pandemic and the recommendations drawn from them during the progression of the pandemic are reviewed. The performance of the Surveillance Subcommittee established in the National Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan was central to the coordination of these activities. The Surveillance Subcommittee was immediately activated when the alert was issued. Its role is also described in this review. The existence of a National Plan allowed a rapid and coordinated response after the alert declaration. The epidemiological and virological surveillance of the influenza pandemic was adapted to an evolving situation. In addition to routine influenza monitoring systems, new surveillance systems were put in place such as a case-based surveillance for community influenza cases and a case-based surveillance for severe cases and deaths due to the pandemic. Among the lessons learned from this pandemic, we would highlight the need to strengthen the timely analysis of data collected during an alert, the need to promote the exchange of information among public health and health care professionals, and to strengthen the response capacity in order to have resilient and consolidated public health structures for future health alerts.     

Training initiatives within the AFHSC-Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System: support for IHR (2005)

Training is a key component of building capacity for public health surveillance and response, but has often been difficult to quantify. During fiscal 2009, the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Division of Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) supported 18 partner organizations in conducting 123 training initiatives in 40 countries for 3,130 U.S. military, civilian and host-country personnel. The training assisted with supporting compliance with International Health Regulations, IHR (2005). Training activities in pandemic preparedness, outbreak investigation and response, emerging infectious disease (EID) surveillance and pathogen diagnostic techniques were expanded significantly. By engaging local health and other government officials and civilian institutions, the U.S. military's role as a key stakeholder in global public health has been strengthened and has contributed to EID-related surveillance, research and capacity-building initiatives specified elsewhere in this issue. Public health and emerging infections surveillance training accomplished by AFHSC-GEIS and its Department of Defense (DoD) partners during fiscal 2009 will be tabulated and described.     

Strategy to Enhance Influenza Surveillance Worldwide

The emergence of a novel strain of influenza virus A (H1N1) in April 2009 focused attention on influenza surveillance capabilities worldwide. In consultations before the 2009 outbreak of influenza subtype H1N1, the World Health Organization had concluded that the world was unprepared to respond to an influenza pandemic, due in part to inadequate global surveillance and response capacity. We describe a sentinel surveillance system that could enhance the quality of influenza epidemiologic and laboratory data and strengthen a country’s capacity for seasonal, novel, and pandemic influenza detection and prevention. Such a system would 1) provide data for a better understanding of the epidemiology and extent of seasonal influenza, 2) provide a platform for the study of other acute febrile respiratory illnesses, 3) provide virus isolates for the development of vaccines, 4) inform local pandemic planning and vaccine policy, 5) monitor influenza epidemics and pandemics, and 6) provide infrastructure for an early warning system for outbreaks of new virus subtypes.     

解析《国际卫生条例(2005)》在应对全球突发公共卫生事件中的首次运用

2009年的甲型流感作为《国际卫生条例(2005)》经修订实施以来世界卫生组织首次宣布的能引起国际关注的突发公共卫生事件,其全球应对措施在《国际卫生条例(2005)》的框架下操作实施。本文主要从预案、通报、事件宣布、联络沟通、口岸监测及控制等方面对《国际卫生条例(2005)》在应对全球突发公共卫生事件中的首次运用进行了探讨。     

Evaluation of the spread of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 among Japanese university students

The pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 virus is commonly known to affect younger individuals. Several epidemiological studies have clarified the epidemic features of university students in Japan. In this study, we reviewed these studies in Japan in comparison with reports from other countries. The average cumulative incidence rate among university students was 9.6 %, with the major symptoms being cough, sore throat, and rhinorrhea. These epidemiological features were similar between Japan and other countries. Attitudes and behaviors toward pandemic influenza control measures were different before and improved during and after the epidemic. These features were also similar to those in other countries. On the other hand, the epidemic spread through club activities or social events, and transmission was attenuated after temporary closure of such groups in Japan. This transmission pattern was inconsistent among countries, which may have been due to differences in lifestyle and cultural habits. Based on these results, infection control measures of pandemic influenza for university organizations in Japan should be considered.     

Global health security and the International Health Regulations

Global nuclear proliferation, bioterrorism, and emerging infections have challenged national capacities to achieve and maintain global security. Over the last century, emerging infectious disease threats resulted in the development of the preliminary versions of the International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO). The current HR(2005) contain major differences compared to earlier versions, including: substantial shifts from containment at the border to containment at the source of the event; shifts from a rather small disease list (smallpox, plague, cholera, and yellow fever) required to be reported, to all public health threats; and shifts from preset measures to tailored responses with more flexibility to deal with the local situations on the ground. The new IHR(2005) call for accountability. They also call for strengthened national capacity for surveillance and control; prevention, alert, and response to international public health emergencies beyond the traditional short list of required reporting; global partnership and collaboration; and human rights, obligations, accountability, and procedures of monitoring. Under these evolved regulations, as well as other measures, such as the Revolving Fund for vaccine procurement of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), global health security could be maintained in the response to urban yellow fever in Paraguay in 2008 and the influenza (H1N1) pandemic of 2009-2010.     

Influenza and the work of the World Health Organization

Before World War I, influenza was not considered a particularly serious problem. The great pandemic of 1918-1919 changed all that, and the possibility that such a catastrophe could occur again has conditioned all subsequent developments. In epidemiological terms, the hallmark of an influenza is the excess mortality that it causes combined with an enormous burden of ill-health that saps the energy of individuals, families and communities throughout the whole world. In order to engage in influenza prevention and control, the global influenza surveillance network was set up by World Health Organization (WHO) in 1948 as a worldwide alert system for the identification of new influenza viruses, gathering information from 110 participating laboratories in 82 countries and four WHO Collaborating Centers for Influenza reference and research: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta (USA), National Institute for Medical Research, London (UK), WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza Reference and Research, Melbourne (Australia) and the National Institute for Infectious Diseases, Tokyo (Japan). This network helps WHO to monitor influenza activity all over the world and provides the organization with the viral isolates and information it requires to decide which new virus strains will be used to produce influenza vaccines during the following season. Each year, information about the isolates over the previous 12 months is analyzed and used to determine the composition of the influenza vaccine to be administered during the coming influenza season both for the northern and southern hemisphere. If necessary, the recommendations for the southern hemisphere differ from the ones formulated for the northern hemisphere vaccine. The information supplied by this network enables the organization to regularly update its World Wide Web (WWW) site (FluNet), which reports on the situation of diseases. This network will also enable the WHO to detect a new influenza pandemic as early as possible.     

International Health Regulations (2005) and the U.S. Department of Defense: building core capacities on a foundation of partnership and trust

A cornerstone of effective global health surveillance programs is the ability to build systems that identify, track and respond to public health threats in a timely manner. These functions are often difficult and require international cooperation given the rapidity with which diseases cross national borders and spread throughout the global community as a result of travel and migration by both humans and animals. As part of the U.S. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC), the Department of Defense's (DoD) Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) has developed a global network of surveillance sites over the past decade that engages in a wide spectrum of support activities in collaboration with host country partners. Many of these activities are in direct support of International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]). The network also supports host country military forces around the world, which are equally affected by these threats and are often in a unique position to respond in areas of conflict or during complex emergencies. With IHR(2005) as the guiding framework for action, the AFHSC-GEIS network of international partners and overseas research laboratories continues to develop into a far-reaching system for identifying, analyzing and responding to emerging disease threats.     

Strengthening the influenza vaccine virus selection and development process: Report of the 3rd WHO Informal Consultation for Improving Influenza Vaccine Virus Selection held at WHO headquarters,Geneva, Switzerland, 1–3 April 2014

Despite long-recognized challenges and constraints associated with their updating and manufacture, influenza vaccines remain at the heart of public health preparedness and response efforts against both seasonal and potentially pandemic influenza viruses.Globally coordinated virological and epidemiological surveillance is the foundation of the influenza vaccine virus selection and development process. Although national influenza surveillance and reporting capabilities are being strengthened and expanded, sustaining and building upon recent gains has become a major challenge.Strengthening the vaccine virus selection process additionally requires the continuation of initiatives to improve the timeliness and representativeness of influenza viruses shared by countries for detailed analysis by the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS).Efforts are also continuing at the national, regional, and global levels to better understand the dynamics of influenza transmission in both temperate and tropical regions. Improved understanding of the degree of influenza seasonality in tropical countries of the world should allow for the strengthening of national vaccination policies and use of the most appropriate available vaccines.There remain a number of limitations and difficulties associated with the use of HAI assays for the antigenic characterization and selection of influenza vaccine viruses by WHOCCs. Current approaches to improving the situation include the more-optimal use of HAI and other assays; improved understanding of the data produced by neutralization assays; and increased standardization of serological testing methods.A number of new technologies and associated tools have the potential to revolutionize influenza surveillance and response activities. These include the increasingly routine use of whole genome next-generation sequencing and other high-throughput approaches. Such approaches could not only become key elements in outbreak investigations but could drive a new surveillance paradigm. However, despite the advances made, significant challenges will need to be addressed before next-generation technologies become routine, particularly in low-resource settings.Emerging approaches and techniques such as synthetic genomics, systems genetics, systems biology and mathematical modelling are capable of generating potentially huge volumes of highly complex and diverse datasets. Harnessing the currently theoretical benefits of such bioinformatics (“big data”) concepts for the influenza vaccine virus selection and development process will depend upon further advances in data generation, integration, analysis and dissemination.Over the last decade, growing awareness of influenza as an important global public health issue has been coupled to ever-increasing demands from the global community for more-equitable access to effective and affordable influenza vaccines. The current influenza vaccine landscape continues to be dominated by egg-based inactivated and live attenuated vaccines, with a small number of cell-based and recombinant vaccines. Successfully completing each step in the annual influenza vaccine manufacturing cycle will continue to rely upon timely and regular communication between the WHO GISRS, manufacturers and regulatory authorities.While the pipeline of influenza vaccines appears to be moving towards a variety of niche products in the near term, it is apparent that the ultimate aim remains the development of effective “universal” influenza vaccines that offer longer-lasting immunity against a broad range of influenza A subtypes.     

The new International Health Regulations: considerations for global public health surveillance

Global public health surveillance is critical for the identification and prevention of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. The World Health Organization recently released revised International Health Regulations (IHR) that serve as global legislation and provide guidelines for surveillance systems. The IHR aim to identify and prevent spread of these infectious diseases; however, there are some practical challenges that limit the usability of these regulations. IHR requires Member States to build necessary infrastructure for global surveillance, which may not be possible in underdeveloped countries. A large degree of freedom is given to each individual government and therefore different levels of reporting are common, with substantial emphasis on passive reporting. The IHR need to be enforceable and enforced without impinging on government autonomy or human rights. Unstable governments and developing countries require increased assistance in setting up and maintaining surveillance systems. This article addresses some challenges and potential solutions to the ability of national governments to adhere to the global health surveillance requirements detailed in the IHR. The authors review some practical challenges such as inadequate surveillance and reporting infrastructure, and legal enforcement and maintenance of individual human rights.     

Influenza Surveillance: Why?

Surveillance is also one of the few bright spots in influenza preparedness in Europe. A sentinel network of 13,500 physicians provides an early warning in the event of an influenza outbreak. The network is part of the European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS). Germany has one of the most advanced surveillance networks in Europe, and has made the reporting of laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza mandatory. Monitoring avian influenza is a good way to anticipate human influenza outbreaks. Coordinated surveillance of influenza in humans and animals is needed, and the human and veterinary surveillance systems should be linked to exchange information, diagnostic tools and antigens. Although not perfect, the current surveillance network managed by EISS functions effectively, and can play a key role in the early identification and ongoing monitoring of a pandemic influenza virus as well as the annual epidemics.     

Short message service sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness in Madagascar, 2008-2012

Problem

The revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR) and the threat of influenza pandemics and other disease outbreaks with a major impact on developing countries have prompted bolstered surveillance capacity, particularly in low-resource settings.

Approach

Surveillance tools with well-timed, validated data are necessary to strengthen disease surveillance. In 2007 Madagascar implemented a sentinel surveillance system for influenza-like illness (ILI) based on data collected from sentinel general practitioners.

Setting

Before 2007, Madagascar’s disease surveillance was based on the passive collection and reporting of data aggregated weekly or monthly. The system did not allow for the early identification of outbreaks or unexpected increases in disease incidence.

Relevant changes

An innovative case reporting system based on the use of cell phones was launched in March 2007. Encrypted short message service, which costs less than 2 United States dollars per month per health centre, is now being used by sentinel general practitioners for the daily reporting of cases of fever and ILI seen in their practices. To validate the daily data, practitioners also report epidemiological and clinical data (e.g. new febrile patient’s sex, age, visit date, symptoms) weekly to the epidemiologists on the research team using special patient forms.

Lessons learnt

Madagascar’s sentinel ILI surveillance system represents the country’s first nationwide “real-time” surveillance system. It has proved the feasibility of improving disease surveillance capacity through innovative systems despite resource constraints. This type of syndromic surveillance can detect unexpected increases in the incidence of ILI and other syndromic illnesses.     

The 2009 A (H1N1) influenza virus pandemic: A review

In March and early April 2009 a new swine-origin influenza virus (S-OIV), A (H1N1), emerged in Mexico and the USA. The virus quickly spread worldwide through human-to-human transmission. In view of the number of countries and communities which were reporting human cases, the World Health Organization raised the influenza pandemic alert to the highest level (level 6) on June 11, 2009. The propensity of the virus to primarily affect children, young adults and pregnant women, especially those with an underlying lung or cardiac disease condition, and the substantial increase in rate of hospitalizations, prompted the efforts of the pharmaceutical industry, including new manufacturers from China, Thailand, India and South America, to develop pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccines. All currently registered vaccines were tested for safety and immunogenicity in clinical trials on human volunteers. All were found to be safe and to elicit potentially protective antibody responses after the administration of a single dose of vaccine, including split inactivated vaccines with or without adjuvant, whole-virion vaccines and live-attenuated vaccines. The need for an increased surveillance of influenza virus circulation in swine is outlined.     

Performance of public health surveillance systems during the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic in the Americas: testing a new method based on Benford's Law

The A(H1N1) influenza pandemic has been a challenge for public health surveillance systems in all countries. An objective evaluation has not been conducted, as yet, of the performance of those systems during the pandemic. This paper presents an algorithm based on Benford's Law and the mortality ratio in order to evaluate the quality of the data and the sensitivity of surveillance systems. It analyses records of confirmed cases reported to the Pan American Health Organization by its 35 member countries between epidemiological weeks 13 and 47 in 2009. Seventeen countries did not fulfil Benford's Law, and mortality exceeded the regional average in 40% of the countries. The results suggest uneven performance by surveillance systems in the different countries, with the most frequent problem being low diagnostic coverage. Benford's Law proved to be a useful tool for the evaluation of a public health surveillance system's performance.     

The PHLS response to a pandemic of influenza

This document sets out the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) action plan for responding to an influenza pandemic. The plan entails, in phase 0, interpandemic surveillance by the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) and the Enteric & Respiratory Virus Laboratory (ERVL) of the Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), as well as maintenance by Area & Regional (A & R) Public Health Laboratories of updated diagnostic techniques for influenza. In phase 1 (the emergence of a shifted influenza virus strain) a Pandemic Working Group will be convened to consider what action by PHLS is necessary. In phase 2 (pandemic influenza outside UK) the pre-defined roles for PHLS laboratories and CDSC will be adopted. When a pandemic is imminent in the United Kingdom (phase 3) the Working Group will co-ordinate PHLS activities and the Director of the Service will assess what special studies should be implemented. In phase 4, when the pandemic has reached the UK, the action plan sets out comprehensive measures that will be taken by CDSC, ERVL and A & R Laboratories to gather and collate information, provide DoH with weekly surveillance data and develop recommendations for prophylaxis, clinical management and treatment. When influenza activity has returned to background levels (phase 5) a report will be drafted by the Working Group prior to it being stood down by the Director of the Service. The response is summarised in tabular form in Table 1.Reproduced by kind permissin of thePHLS Microbiology Digest (first published 1993, 10: 147–154)     

Role of antiviral drugs in containing pandemic influenza. Contribution of recent modelling exercises synthesis prepared by the InVS/Inserm "epidemiology" group - November 2005

The growing threat of influenza pandemic has lead many countries to stockpile specific antiviral drugs, mainly oseltamivir, as it can be used both for prophylaxis and therapy. Several recently published studies, based on mathematical modelling, have assessed the impact of a large scale use of this drug to contain an emerging pandemic, slow its spread within a country or reduce its epidemiological impact. They conclude that ring antiviral prophylaxis around the first cases, combined with social distancing measures, may halt a nascent pandemic, if the human-to-human transmissibility of the virus is limited and the control measures implemented promptly and with a high coverage. In case of failure, these same strategies could delay the spread of the virus within a country. The use of influenza antiviral drugs would reduce the burden of disease and even the clinical attack rate, under the assumption of a shorter infectious period for treated patients. These studies are in favour of stockpiling influenza antiviral drugs, at least to cover the curative needs and, even better, to contribute to the global effort to contain an emergent pandemic and to allow an intervention around the first chains of indigenous transmission in a country, thus slowing the virus spread. These results are based on the hypothesis of the effectiveness of oseltamivir on the pandemic virus and confirm the critical importance of a sensitive and reactive surveillance.