Genetic screening,health care and the insurance industry

The potential use of genetic tests in insurance has raised concerns about discrimination and individuals losing access to health care either because of refusals to test for treatable diseases, or because test-positives cannot afford premiums. Governments have so far largely sought to restrict the use of genetic information by insurance companies. To date the number of tests available with significant actuarial value is limited. However, this is likely to change, raising more clearly the question as to whether the social costs of adverse selection outweigh the social costs of individuals not accessing health care for fear of the consequences of test information being used in insurance markets. In this contribution we set out the policy context and model the potential trade-offs between the losses faced by insurers from adverse selection by insurees (which will increase premiums reducing consumer welfare) and the detrimental health effects that may result from persons refusing to undergo tests that could identify treatable health conditions. It argues that the optimal public policy on genetic testing should reflect overall societal benefit, taking account of these trade-offs. Based on our model, the factors that influence the outcome include: the size of and value attached to the health gains from treatment; deterrent effects of a disclosure requirement on testing for health reasons; incidence of the disease; propensity of test-positives to adverse select; policy value adverse selectors buy in a non-disclosure environment; and price elasticity of demand for insurance. Our illustrative model can be used as a benchmark for developing other scenarios or incorporating real data in order to address the impact of different policies on disclosure and requirement to test.     

Welfare standards in hospital mergers

There is a broad literature on the consequences of applying different welfare standards in merger control. Total welfare is usually defined as the sum of consumer and provider surplus, i.e., potential external effects are not considered. The general result is then that consumer welfare is a more restrictive standard than total welfare, which is advantageous in certain situations. This relationship between the two standards is not necessarily true when the merger has significant external effects. We model mergers on hospital markets and allow for not-profit-maximizing behavior of providers and mandatory health insurance. Mandatory health insurance detaches the financial and consumption side of health care markets, and the concept consumer in merger control becomes non-evident. Patients not visiting the merging hospitals still are affected by price changes through their insurance premiums. External financial effects emerge on not directly affected consumers. We show that applying a restricted interpretation of consumer (neglecting externality) in health care merger control can reverse the relation between the two standards; consumer welfare standard can be weaker than total welfare. Consequently, applying the wrong standard can lead to both clearing socially undesirable and to blocking socially desirable mergers. The possible negative consequences of applying a simple consumer welfare standard in merger control can be even stronger when hospitals maximize quality and put less weight on financial considerations. We also investigate the implications of these results for the practice of merger control.     

Health insurance,cost expectations,and adverse job turnover

Because less healthy employees value health insurance more than the healthy ones, when health insurance is newly offered job turnover rates for healthier employees decline less than turnover rates for the less healthy. We call this adverse job turnover, and it implies that a firm's expected health costs will increase when health insurance is first offered. Health insurance premiums may fail to adjust sufficiently fast because state regulations restrict annual premium changes, or insurers are reluctant to change premiums rapidly. Even with premiums set at the long run expected costs, some firms may be charged premiums higher than their current expected costs and choose not to offer insurance. High administrative costs at small firms exacerbate this dynamic selection problem. Using 1998–1999 MEDSTAT MarketScan and 1997 Employer Health Insurance Survey data, we find that expected employee health expenditures at firms that offer insurance have lower within‐firm and higher between‐firm variance than at firms that do not. Turnover rates are systematically higher in industries in which firms are less likely to offer insurance. Simulations of the offer decision capturing between‐firm health‐cost heterogeneity and expected turnover rates match the observed pattern across firm sizes well. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Community financing of health care

This article discusses ways to lesson the restrictions on health development in sub-Saharan Africa caused by limited public health budgets. Health improvements can be funded by the implementation of health insurance, the use of foreign aid, the raising of taxes, the reallocation of public money, and direct contributions by users or households either in the form of charges for services received or prepayments for future services. Community financing, i.e. the direct financing of health care by households in villages or distinct urban communities, is seen as preferable to a national or regional plan. When community financing is chosen, a choice must then be made between direct payment, fee-for-service, and prepayment (insurance) systems. The 3 systems, using the example of an essential drugs program, are described. Theoretically, with direct payment the government receives full cost recovery, and the patients receive the drugs they need, thereby improving their health. Of course the poor may not be able to purchase the drugs, therefore a subsidy system must be worked out at the community level. Fee-for-service means charging for a consultation or course of treatment, including drugs. A sliding scale of fees or discounts for certain types of consultations (e.g. pre-and post natal) can be used. In fee-for-service the risk is shared; because the cost of drugs is financed by the fees, those who receive costly treatments are subsidized by those whose treatments are relatively inexpensive. With prepayment or health insurance the risk of illness is shifted from the patient to the insurance firm or state. 2 issues make insurance plans hard to implement. When patients are covered by insurance, they may demand "too much" medical care (moral hazard) and thus premiums may be too small to cover treatment costs. On the other hand, people in low-risk groups may be unwilling to pay a higher premium, thus leading to adverse selection. Eventually, premiums may rise to the point where even high-risk individuals no longer find it worthwhile. 2 forms of insurance which may be more successful in sub-Saharan Africa are extended family insurance and compulsory collective insurance organized by an enterprise, cooperative, community, or government. It is necessary to involve the population and to gather in-depth information about a community's socioeconomic status, preferences, and administrative know-how before advice is formulated on policy concerning the financing of drugs and health care.     

Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition

Paying insurers risk-adjusted prices for covering different individuals can correct selection incentives and induce the market to provide optimal insurance policies. To calculate the optimal risk-adjusted prices we need to know (a) what the optimal policies are; (b) how much they cost; and (c) how competitive the market is. We examine these issues in a model with spatial heterogeneity and adverse selection. Market equilibrium is characterized, and delivery of the socially optimal insurance policies is possible, as long as providers are paid risk-adjusted fees for each individual they serve. When the payment can be made on the basis of an individual's risk, it should be sufficient to cover the expected cost of the socially optimal policy for that person, plus a mark-up. If payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal, the optimal risk-based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation, identified by Glazer and McGuire [Glazer, J., McGuire, T., 2000. Optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums: an application to managed care.     

Adverse selection with a multiple choice among health insurance plans: a simulation analysis

This study uses simulation methods to quantify the effects of adverse selection. The data used to develop the model provide information about whether families can accurately forecast their risk and whether this forecast affects the purchase of insurance coverage--key conditions for adverse selection to matter. The results suggest that adverse selection is sufficient to eliminate high-option benefit plans in multiple choice markets if insurers charge a single, experience-rated premium. Adverse selection is substantially reduced if premiums are varied according to demographic factors. Adverse selection is also restricted in supplementary insurance markets. In this market, supplementary policies are underpriced because a part of the additional benefits that purchasers can expect is a cost to the base plan and is not reflected in the supplementary premium. As a result, full supplementary coverage is attractive to both low and high risks.     

Can premium differentiation counteract adverse selection in the Dutch supplementary health insurance? A simulation study

Most health insurers in the Netherlands apply community-rating and open enrolment for supplementary health insurance, although it is offered at a free market. Theoretically, this should result in adverse selection. There are four indications that adverse selection indeed has started to occur on the Dutch supplementary insurance market. The goal of this paper is to analyze whether premium differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. We do this by simulating the uptake and premium development of supplementary insurance over 25 years using data on healthcare expenses and background characteristics from 110,261 insured. For the simulation of adverse selection, it is assumed that only insured for whom supplementary insurance is expected not to be beneficial will consider opting out of the insurance. Therefore, we calculate for each insured the financial profitability (by making assumptions about the consumer’s expected claims and the premium set by the insurer), the individual’s risk attitude and the probability to opt out or opt in. The simulation results show that adverse selection might result in a substantial decline in insurance uptake. Additionally, the simulations show that if insurers were to differentiate their premium to 28 age and gender groups, adverse selection could be modestly counteracted. Finally, this paper shows that if insurers would apply highly refined risk-rating, adverse selection for this type of supplementary insurance could be counteracted completely.     

Is there evidence that recent consolidation in the health insurance industry has adversely affected premiums?

James Robinson suggests that recent consolidation in the insurance market has been a cause of higher health insurance prices (premiums). Although the recent consolidation among health insurers and rising premiums are indisputable, it is unlikely that consolidation has had any adverse effect on premiums nationwide, and Robinson provides no data that suggest otherwise. Specifically, he does not present data showing an increase in concentration in any relevant market during the past few years, let alone any resulting increase in premiums. Health insurance consolidation in certain local markets could adversely affect premiums, but it seems clear that it is not a major national antitrust issue.     

Access to coverage for high-risks in a competitive individual health insurance market: via premium rate restrictions or risk-adjusted premium subsidies?

A competitive market for individual health insurance tends to risk-adjusted premiums. Premium rate restrictions are often considered a tool to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals in such a market. However, such regulation induces selection which may have several adverse effects. As an alternative approach we consider risk-adjusted premium subsidies. Empirical results of simulated premium models and subsidy formulae are presented. It is shown that sufficiently adjusted subsidies eliminate the need for premium rate restrictions and consequently avoid their adverse effects. Therefore, the subsidy approach is the preferred strategy to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals.     

Defined-contribution health insurance products: development and prospects

Defined-contribution health insurance products have received considerable recent attention, stimulated by double-digit increases in health plan premiums and employers' desire to get their employees more involved in health care purchasing decisions. Existing products typically feature a consumer health spending account, a major medical or other insurance policy, and the use of the Internet to support consumer decision making. They vary in their use of provider networks, provider payment approaches, the specific design of spending accounts, marketing strategies, and infrastructure investment. The companies producing these products are now at a critical juncture. They could grow rapidly over the next few years, be acquired by existing health plans, or fail if they do not deliver on their promises.     

Subsidies to employee health insurance premiums and the health insurance market

One approach to covering the uninsured that is frequently advocated by policy-makers is subsidizing the employee portion of employer-provided health insurance premiums. But, since the vast majority of those offered employer-provided health insurance already take it up, such an approach is only appealing if there is a very high takeup elasticity among those who are offered and uninsured. Moreover, if plan choice decisions are price elastic, then such subsidies can at the same time increase health care costs by inducing selection of more expensive plans. We study an excellent example of such subsidies: the introduction of pre-tax premiums for postal employees in 1994, and then for the remaining federal employees in 2000. We do so using a census of personnel records for all federal employees from 1991 through 2002. We find that there is a very small elasticity of insurance takeup with respect to its after-tax price, and a modest elasticity of plan choice. Our results suggest that the federal government did little to improve insurance coverage, but much to increase health care expenditures, through this policy change.     

A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it,the lower your premium?

Adverse selection regarding a voluntary deductible (VD) in health insurance implies that insured only opt for a VD if they expect no (or few) healthcare expenses. This paper investigates two potential strategies to reduce adverse selection: (1) differentiating the premium to the duration of the contract for which the VD holds (ex-ante approach) and (2) differentiating the premium to the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD (ex-post approach). It can be hypothesized that premiums will decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD, providing an incentive to insured to opt for a deductible also in (incidental) years they expect relatively high expenses. To test this hypothesis, we examine which premium patterns would occur under these strategies using data on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of over 750,000 insured from 6 years. Our results show that, under the assumptions made, only without risk equalization the premiums could decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD. With (sophisticated) risk equalization, decreasing premiums seem unfeasible, both under the ex-ante and ex-post approach. Given these findings, we are sceptical about the feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse selection.     

Medigap reform legislation of 1990: have the objectives been met?

The 1990 medigap reform legislation had multiple objectives: To simplify the insurance market in order to facilitate policy comparison, provide consumer choice, provide market stability, promote competition, and avoid adverse selection. Based on case study interviews with a cross-section of individuals and organizations, we report that most of these objectives have been achieved. Consumers of medigap plans are able to make more informed choices, largely because they can adequately compare policies based on standard benefits. Marketing abuses have apparently declined, as evidenced by a decrease in the number of consumer complaints. Finally, no major detrimental impact on the insurance industry was detected. Beneficiaries still face some confusion in this market, however, such as understanding the rating methodologies used to set premiums and how this may affect their choices. Confusion could increase with the growth of managed care options.     

Cross-subsidization in the market for employment-related health insurance

This paper uses data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey to examine the nature of equilibrium in the market for employment-related health insurance. We examine coverage generosity, premiums, and insurance benefits net of expenditures on premiums, showing that despite a degree of market segmentation, there was a substantial amount of pooling of heterogeneous risks in 1987 among households with employment-related coverage. Our results are largely invariant to (i) firm size and (ii) whether or not employers offer a choice among plans. Our results suggest the need for caution concerning incremental reforms that would weaken the link between employment and insurance without substituting alternative institutions for the pooling of risks.     

Assessment of cost sharing in the Pima County Marketplace

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established health insurance marketplaces to allow consumers to make educated decisions about their health care coverage. During the first open enrollment period in 2013, the federally facilitated marketplace in Pima County, Arizona listed 119 plans, making it one of the most competitive markets in the country. This study compares these plans based on differences in consumer cost sharing, including deductibles, co-pays and premiums. Consumer costs were reviewed using specific cases including a normal delivery pregnancy, the management of Type II Diabetes, and the utilization of specialty drugs to treat Hepatitis C. Total cost of care was calculated as the cost of managing the condition or event plus the cost of monthly premiums, evaluated as a single individual age 27. Evaluating a plan on premium alone is not sufficient as cost sharing can dramatically raise the cost of care. A rating system and better cost transparency tools could provider easier access to pertinent information for consumers.     

Premium Variation in the Individual Health Insurance Market

Recent proposals to decrease the number of uninsured in the U.S. indicate that the individual health insurance market's role may increase. Amid fears of possible risk-segmentation in individual insurance, there exists limited information of the functioning of such markets. This paper examines the relationship between expected medical expense and actual paid premiums for households with individual insurance in the 1996–1997 Community Tracking Study's Household Survey. We find that premiums vary less than proportionately with expected expense and vary only with certain risk characteristics. We also explore how the relationship between risk and premiums is affected by local regulations and market characteristics. We find that premiums vary significantly less strongly with risk for persons insured by HMOs and in markets dominated by managed care insurers.     

Theory of health insurance

The conventional explanation for purchasing insurance is to transfer risk. Psychologists, however, have shown that this explanation does not match actual behavior. They find that people generally prefer the risk of no loss at all to the certainty of a smaller actuarially equivalent loss, a situation exactly opposite to the one represented by the purchase of insurance. Nevertheless, people do purchase insurance, so there must be an explanation other than risk transfer for purchasing it. Of the explanations so far advanced, however, none have yet developed a wide acceptance. Regardless of risk issues, people will be more likely to purchase insurance when the premium is low compared to the value of the coverage to the consumer. Moral hazard raises the premium, as does adverse selection. The presence of either makes the purchase of insurance less likely. With health insurance, the tax subsidy can reduce the effective premium to less than the actuarially fair cost of insurance. This would increase the likelihood that health insurance is purchased. Finally, because of the value we place on our health, we desire access to a full range of health care. Health insurance is often the only affordable way of gaining access to this care, given the high costs of many of these procedures.     

How and why the health insurance system will collapse

The advocates of defined-contribution health plans extol the virtues of consumer-driven health care, consumer choice, and empowered consumers as solutions to the problems--particularly the rapidly growing costs--of employer-sponsored health benefits. This paper argues that the widespread use of defined-contribution plans, with more consumer choice and more knowledgeable consumers, will lead to the erosion of the social contract on which health insurance must be based, with healthier employees subsidizing the care of older and sicker ones, and a death spiral of adverse selection. If unchecked by government intervention, these trends will lead to the collapse of employer-sponsored health insurance.     

Preferences and choices for care and health insurance

Legislation that came into effect in 2006 has dramatically altered the health insurance system in the Netherlands, placing greater emphasis on consumer choice and competition among insurers. The potential for such competition depends largely on consumer preferences for price and quality of service by insurers and quality of affiliated providers. This study provides initial evidence on the preferences of Dutch consumers and how they view trade-offs between various aspects of health insurance product design. A key feature of the analysis is that we compare the responses of high and low risk individuals, where risk is defined by the presence of a costly chronic condition. This contrast is critically important for understanding incentives facing insurers and for identifying potential unanticipated consequences of market competition. The results from our conjoint analysis suggest that not only high risk but also low risk individuals are willing to pay substantially more for insurance products that can be shown to provide better health outcomes. This suggests that insurance products that are more expensive and provide better quality of care may also attract low risk individuals. Therefore, development and dissemination of good, reliable and understandable health plan performance indicators may effectively reduce the problem of adverse selection.     

Public versus private: evidence on health insurance selection

This paper models health insurance choice in Chile (public versus private) as a dynamic, stochastic process, where individuals consider premiums, expected out-of pocket costs, personal characteristics and preferences. Insurance amenities and restrictions against pre-existing conditions among private insurers introduce asymmetry to the model. We confirm that the public system services a less healthy and wealthy population (adverse selection for public insurance). Simulation of choices over time predicts a slight crowding out of private insurance only for the most pessimistic scenario in terms of population aging and the evolution of education. Eliminating the restrictions on pre-existing conditions would slightly ameliorate the level (but not the trend) of the disproportionate accumulation of less healthy individuals in the public insurance program over time.