The viral polymerase mediates adaptation of an avian influenza virus to a mammalian host

Mammalian influenza viruses are descendants of avian strains that crossed the species barrier and underwent further adaptation. Since 1997 in southeast Asia, H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses have been causing severe, even fatal disease in humans. Although no lineages of this subtype have been established until now, such repeated events may initiate a new pandemic. As a model of species transmission, we used the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus SC35 (H7N7), which is low-pathogenic for mice, and its lethal mouse-adapted descendant SC35M. Specific mutations in SC35M polymerase considerably increase its activity in mammalian cells, correlating with high virulence in mice. Some of these mutations are prevalent in chicken and mammalian isolates, especially in the highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses from southeast Asia. These activity-enhancing mutations of the viral polymerase complex demonstrate convergent evolution in nature and, therefore, may be a prerequisite for adaptation to a new host paving the way for new pandemic viruses.     

Avian influenza and human health

Natural infections with influenza A viruses have been reported in a variety of animal species including humans, pigs, horses, sea mammals, mustelids and birds. Occasionally devastating pandemics occur in humans. Although viruses of relatively few HA and NA subtype combinations have been isolated from mammalian species, all 15 HA subtypes and all 9 NA subtypes, in most combinations, have been isolated from birds.In the 20th century the sudden emergence of antigenically different strains transmissible in humans, termed antigenic shift, has occurred on four occasions, 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2), 1968 (H3N2) and 1977 (H1N1), each time resulting in a pandemic. Genetic analysis of the isolates demonstrated that 'new' strains most certainly emerged after reassortment of genes of viruses of avian and human origin in a permissive host. The leading theory is that the pig represents the 'mixing vessel' where this genetic reassortment may occur.In 1996, an H7N7 influenza virus of avian origin was isolated from a woman with a self-limiting conjunctivitis. During 1997 in Hong Kong, an H5N1 avian influenza virus was recognised as the cause of death of 6 of 18 infected patients. Genetic analysis revealed these human isolates of H5N1 subtype to be indistinguishable from a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus that was endemic in the local poultry population. More recently, in March 1999, two independent isolations of influenza virus subtype H9N2 were made from girls aged one to four who recovered from flu-like illnesses in Hong Kong. Subsequently, five isolations of H9N2 virus from humans on mainland China in August 1998 were reported. H9N2 viruses were known to be widespread in poultry in China and other Asian countries.In all these cases there was no evidence of human to human spread except with the H5N1 infections where there was evidence of very limited spread. This is in keeping with the finding that all these viruses possessed all eight genes of avian origin. It may well be that infection of humans with avian influenza viruses occurs much more frequently than originally assumed, but due to their limited effect go unrecognised.For the human population as a whole the main danger of direct infection with avian influenza viruses appears to be if people infected with an 'avian' virus are infected simultaneously with a 'human' influenza virus. In such circumstances reassortment could occur with the potential emergence of a virus fully capable of spread in the human population, but with antigenic characteristics for which the human population was immunologically naive. Presumably this represents a very rare coincidence, but one which could result in a true influenza pandemic.     

Human and avian influenza viruses target different cell types in cultures of human airway epithelium

The recent human infections caused by H5N1, H9N2, and H7N7 avian influenza viruses highlighted the continuous threat of new pathogenic influenza viruses emerging from a natural reservoir in birds. It is generally believed that replication of avian influenza viruses in humans is restricted by a poor fit of these viruses to cellular receptors and extracellular inhibitors in the human respiratory tract. However, detailed mechanisms of this restriction remain obscure. Here, using cultures of differentiated human airway epithelial cells, we demonstrated that influenza viruses enter the airway epithelium through specific target cells and that there were striking differences in this respect between human and avian viruses. During the course of a single-cycle infection, human viruses preferentially infected nonciliated cells, whereas avian viruses as well as the egg-adapted human virus variant with an avian virus-like receptor specificity mainly infected ciliated cells. This pattern correlated with the predominant localization of receptors for human viruses (2-6-linked sialic acids) on nonciliated cells and of receptors for avian viruses (2-3-linked sialic acids) on ciliated cells. These findings suggest that although avian influenza viruses can infect human airway epithelium, their replication may be limited by a nonoptimal cellular tropism. Our data throw light on the mechanisms of generation of pandemic viruses from their avian progenitors and open avenues for cell level-oriented studies on the replication and pathogenicity of influenza virus in humans.     

Lack of transmission of H5N1 avian-human reassortant influenza viruses in a ferret model

Avian influenza A H5N1 viruses continue to spread globally among birds, resulting in occasional transmission of virus from infected poultry to humans. Probable human-to-human transmission has been documented rarely, but H5N1 viruses have not yet acquired the ability to transmit efficiently among humans, an essential property of a pandemic virus. The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were caused by avian-human reassortant influenza viruses that had acquired human virus-like receptor binding properties. However, the relative contribution of human internal protein genes or other molecular changes to the efficient transmission of influenza viruses among humans remains poorly understood. Here, we report on a comparative ferret model that parallels the efficient transmission of H3N2 human viruses and the poor transmission of H5N1 avian viruses in humans. In this model, an H3N2 reassortant virus with avian virus internal protein genes exhibited efficient replication but inefficient transmission, whereas H5N1 reassortant viruses with four or six human virus internal protein genes exhibited reduced replication and no transmission. These findings indicate that the human virus H3N2 surface protein genes alone did not confer efficient transmissibility and that acquisition of human virus internal protein genes alone was insufficient for this 1997 H5N1 virus to develop pandemic capabilities, even after serial passages in a mammalian host. These results highlight the complexity of the genetic basis of influenza virus transmissibility and suggest that H5N1 viruses may require further adaptation to acquire this essential pandemic trait.     

Influenza A virus survival in water is influenced by the origin species of the host cell

Background

Influenza A viruses have an envelope made of a lipid bilayer and two surface glycoproteins, the hemagglutinin and the neuraminidase. The structure of the virus is directly dependent on the genetic makeup of the viral genome except the glycosylation moieties and the composition of the lipid bilayer. They both depend on the host cell and are in direct contact with the environment, such as air or water. Virus survival is important for virus transmission from contaminated waters in the case of wild aquatic birds or from contaminated surface or air for humans.

Objective

The objective of this study was to check whether the origin species of the host cell has an influence on influenza A virus survival.

Method

The persistence in water at 35°C of viruses grown on either mammalian cells or avian cells and belonging to two different subtypes H1N1 and H5N1 was compared.

Results

Both H5N1 and H1N1 viruses remained infectious for periods of time as long as 19–25 days, respectively. However, within the same subtype, viruses grown on mammalian cells were more stable in water at 35°C than their counterparts grown on avian cells, even for viruses sharing the same genetic background.

Conclusions

This difference in virus stability outside the host is probably connected to the nature of the lipid bilayer taken from the cell or to the carbohydrate side chains of the virus surface glycoproteins. Moreover, the long-lasting survival time might have a critical role in the ecology of influenza viruses, especially for avian viruses.     

Minimal molecular constraints for respiratory droplet transmission of an avian–human H9N2 influenza A virus

Pandemic influenza requires interspecies transmission of an influenza virus with a novel hemagglutinin (HA) subtytpe that can adapt to its new host through either reassortment or point mutations and transmit by aerosolized respiratory droplets. Two previous pandemics of 1957 and 1968 resulted from the reassortment of low pathogenic avian viruses and human subtypes of that period; however, conditions leading to a pandemic virus are still poorly understood. Given the endemic situation of avian H9N2 influenza with human-like receptor specificity in Eurasia and its occasional transmission to humans and pigs, we wanted to determine whether an avian–human H9N2 reassortant could gain respiratory transmission in a mammalian animal model, the ferret. Here we show that following adaptation in the ferret, a reassortant virus carrying the surface proteins of an avian H9N2 in a human H3N2 backbone can transmit efficiently via respiratory droplets, creating a clinical infection similar to human influenza infections. Minimal changes at the protein level were found in this virus capable of respiratory droplet transmission. A reassortant virus expressing only the HA and neuraminidase (NA) of the ferret-adapted virus was able to account for the transmissibility, suggesting that currently circulating avian H9N2 viruses require little adaptation in mammals following acquisition of all human virus internal genes through reassortment. Hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) analysis showed changes in the antigenic profile of the virus, which carries profound implications for vaccine seed stock preparation against avian H9N2 influenza. This report illustrates that aerosolized respiratory transmission is not exclusive to current human H1, H2, and H3 influenza subtypes.     

From the Cover: Dating the emergence of pandemic influenza viruses

Pandemic influenza viruses cause significant mortality in humans. In the 20th century, 3 influenza viruses caused major pandemics: the 1918 H1N1 virus, the 1957 H2N2 virus, and the 1968 H3N2 virus. These pandemics were initiated by the introduction and successful adaptation of a novel hemagglutinin subtype to humans from an animal source, resulting in antigenic shift. Despite global concern regarding a new pandemic influenza, the emergence pathway of pandemic strains remains unknown. Here we estimated the evolutionary history and inferred date of introduction to humans of each of the genes for all 20th century pandemic influenza strains. Our results indicate that genetic components of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic virus circulated in mammalian hosts, i.e., swine and humans, as early as 1911 and was not likely to be a recently introduced avian virus. Phylogenetic relationships suggest that the A/Brevig Mission/1/1918 virus (BM/1918) was generated by reassortment between mammalian viruses and a previously circulating human strain, either in swine or, possibly, in humans. Furthermore, seasonal and classic swine H1N1 viruses were not derived directly from BM/1918, but their precursors co-circulated during the pandemic. Mean estimates of the time of most recent common ancestor also suggest that the H2N2 and H3N2 pandemic strains may have been generated through reassortment events in unknown mammalian hosts and involved multiple avian viruses preceding pandemic recognition. The possible generation of pandemic strains through a series of reassortment events in mammals over a period of years before pandemic recognition suggests that appropriate surveillance strategies for detection of precursor viruses may abort future pandemics.     

Early and sustained innate immune response defines pathology and death in nonhuman primates infected by highly pathogenic influenza virus

The mechanisms responsible for the virulence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus in humans remain poorly understood. To identify crucial components of the early host response during these infections by using both conventional and functional genomics tools, we studied 34 cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) to compare a 2004 human H5N1 Vietnam isolate with 2 reassortant viruses possessing the 1918 hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) surface proteins, known conveyors of virulence. One of the reassortants also contained the 1918 nonstructural (NS1) protein, an inhibitor of the host interferon response. Among these viruses, HPAI H5N1 was the most virulent. Within 24 h, the H5N1 virus produced severe bronchiolar and alveolar lesions. Notably, the H5N1 virus targeted type II pneumocytes throughout the 7-day infection, and induced the most dramatic and sustained expression of type I interferons and inflammatory and innate immune genes, as measured by genomic and protein assays. The H5N1 infection also resulted in prolonged margination of circulating T lymphocytes and notable apoptosis of activated dendritic cells in the lungs and draining lymph nodes early during infection. While both 1918 reassortant viruses also were highly pathogenic, the H5N1 virus was exceptional for the extent of tissue damage, cytokinemia, and interference with immune regulatory mechanisms, which may help explain the extreme virulence of HPAI viruses in humans.     

H6N1亚型禽流感病毒跨种属传播研究进展

禽流感病毒H6N1亚型广泛存在于水禽和陆禽,是最常分离到的甲型流感病毒亚型,遗传分析表明该病毒可能是高致病禽流感病毒H5N1的前体。随着病毒基因的持续进化,H6N1可跨种间屏障传播至哺乳动物,其对于哺乳动物小鼠、猪和雪貂已经具有较强感染能力。血清流行病学调查结果显示少数人H6禽流感病毒抗体阳性,2013年5月,我国台湾出现全球首例人类感染H6N1亚型流感病毒。因此,H6N1病毒宿主范围不断扩大,在这些宿主内可发生病毒基因突变、基因重配,进而演变为具有感染人类潜能的新变异株的可能。本文从病原学、流行病学、病毒感染哺乳动物和人类等方面对H6N1亚型禽流感病毒的研究进展进行综述,以期为H6N1禽流感病毒的防控提供参考。     

Peering into Avian Influenza A(H5N8) for a Framework towards Pandemic Preparedness

2014 marked the first emergence of avian influenza A(H5N8) in Jeonbuk Province, South Korea, which then quickly spread worldwide. In the midst of the 2020–2021 H5N8 outbreak, it spread to domestic poultry and wild waterfowl shorebirds, leading to the first human infection in Astrakhan Oblast, Russia. Despite being clinically asymptomatic and without direct human-to-human transmission, the World Health Organization stressed the need for continued risk assessment given the nature of Influenza to reassort and generate novel strains. Given its promiscuity and easy cross to humans, the urgency to understand the mechanisms of possible species jumping to avert disastrous pandemics is increasing. Addressing the epidemiology of H5N8, its mechanisms of species jumping and its implications, mutational and reassortment libraries can potentially be built, allowing them to be tested on various models complemented with deep-sequencing and automation. With knowledge on mutational patterns, cellular pathways, drug resistance mechanisms and effects of host proteins, we can be better prepared against H5N8 and other influenza A viruses.     

Identification of H2N3 influenza A viruses from swine in the United States

Although viruses of each of the 16 influenza A HA subtypes are potential human pathogens, only viruses of the H1, H2, and H3 subtype are known to have been successfully established in humans. H2 influenza viruses have been absent from human circulation since 1968, and as such they pose a substantial human pandemic risk. In this report, we isolate and characterize genetically similar avian/swine virus reassortant H2N3 influenza A viruses isolated from diseased swine from two farms in the United States. These viruses contained leucine at position 226 of the H2 protein, which has been associated with increased binding affinity to the mammalian α2,6Gal-linked sialic acid virus receptor. Correspondingly, the H2N3 viruses were able to cause disease in experimentally infected swine and mice without prior adaptation. In addition, the swine H2N3 virus was infectious and highly transmissible in swine and ferrets. Taken together, these findings suggest that the H2N3 virus has undergone some adaptation to the mammalian host and that their spread should be very closely monitored.     

The Influenza Virus H5N1 Infection Can Induce ROS Production for Viral Replication and Host Cell Death in A549 Cells Modulated by Human Cu/Zn Superoxide Dismutase (SOD1) Overexpression

Highly pathogenic H5N1 infections are often accompanied by excessive pro-inflammatory response, high viral titer, and apoptosis; as such, the efficient control of these infections poses a great challenge. The pathogenesis of influenza virus infection is also related to oxidative stress. However, the role of endogenic genes with antioxidant effect in the control of influenza viruses, especially H5N1 viruses, should be further investigated. In this study, the H5N1 infection in lung epithelial cells decreased Cu/Zn superoxide dismutase (SOD1) expression at mRNA and protein levels. Forced SOD1 expression significantly inhibited the H5N1-induced increase in reactive oxygen species, decreased pro-inflammatory response, prevented p65 and p38 phosphorylation, and impeded viral ribonucleoprotein nuclear export and viral replication. The SOD1 overexpression also rescued H5N1-induced cellular apoptosis and alleviated H5N1-caused mitochondrial dysfunction. Therefore, this study described the role of SOD1 in the replication of H5N1 influenza virus and emphasized the relevance of this enzyme in the control of H5N1 replication in epithelial cells. Pharmacological modulation or targeting SOD1 may open a new way to fight H5N1 influenza virus.     

Adaptive strategies of the influenza virus polymerase for replication in humans

Transmission of influenza viruses into the human population requires surmounting barriers to cross-species infection. Changes in the influenza polymerase overcome one such barrier. Viruses isolated from birds generally contain polymerases with the avian-signature glutamic acid at amino acid 627 in the PB2 subunit. These polymerases display restricted activity in human cells. An adaptive change in this residue from glutamic acid to the human-signature lysine confers high levels of polymerase activity in human cells. This mutation permits escape from a species-specific restriction factor that targets polymerases from avian viruses. A 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A virus recently established a pandemic infection in humans, even though the virus encodes a PB2 with the restrictive glutamic acid at amino acid 627. We show here that the 2009 H1N1 virus has acquired second-site suppressor mutations in its PB2 polymerase subunit that convey enhanced polymerase activity in human cells. Introduction of this polymorphism into the PB2 subunit of a primary avian isolate also increased polymerase activity and viral replication in human and porcine cells. An alternate adaptive strategy has also been identified, whereby introduction of a human PA subunit into an avian polymerase overcomes restriction in human cells. These data reveal a strategy used by the 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus and identify other pathways by which avian and swine-origin viruses may evolve to enhance replication, and potentially pathogenesis, in humans.     

Evolutionary Selection of the Nuclear Localization Signal in the Viral Nucleoprotein Leads to Host Adaptation of the Genus Orthobornavirus

Adaptation of the viral life cycle to host cells is necessary for efficient viral infection and replication. This evolutionary process has contributed to the mechanism for determining the host range of viruses. Orthobornaviruses, members of the family Bornaviridae, are non-segmented, negative-strand RNA viruses, and several genotypes have been isolated from different vertebrate species. Previous studies revealed that some genotypes isolated from avian species can replicate in mammalian cell lines, suggesting the zoonotic potential of avian orthobornaviruses. However, the mechanism by which the host specificity of orthobornaviruses is determined has not yet been identified. In this study, we found that the infectivity of orthobornaviruses is not determined at the viral entry step, mediated by the viral glycoprotein and matrix protein. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the nuclear localization signal (NLS) sequence in the viral nucleoprotein (N) has evolved under natural selection and determines the host-specific viral polymerase activity. A chimeric mammalian orthobornavirus, which has the NLS sequence of avian orthobornavirus N, exhibited a reduced propagation efficiency in mammalian cells. Our findings indicated that nuclear transport of the viral N is a determinant of the host range of orthobornaviruses, providing insights into the evolution and host adaptation of orthobornaviruses.     

Influenza heute und in Zukunft

Every year, influenza causes seasonal epidemics and is responsible for increased morbidity and mortality worldwide. In general, clinical signs include fever, respiratory symptoms and myalgia. Human influenza viruses include influenza viruses A/H1N1, A/H3N2, A/H1N1pdm09, influenza virus B and influenza virus C. Wild waterfowl are the natural reservoir of influenza A virus. On a sporadic basis novel viruses can emerge from the zoonotic reservoir and cross the species barrier. In such events clinical presentation in humans can range from mild (e.g. conjunctivitis) to severe pneumonia and acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). In early 2013, a novel avian influenza A virus H7N9 emerged in China and the clinical presentation included bilateral pneumonia with ARDS and a high case fatality rate. In this article a summary is given on diagnosis, therapy and prophylaxis of influenza and on future developments.     

Influenza pandemic--current crisis

In most cases, influenza is not fatal, even without treatment. Moreover, vaccination and antivirals have reduced influenza-related mortality in recent years. However, the direct transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans with lethal outcomes in Hong Kong in 1997 was a potent reminder of the devastating potential of the disease. Currently, H5N1 avian influenza viruses are circulating in many Asian countries, and the human death toll continues to rise as the virus spreads to European countries as well. Since the beginning of the outbreak in Asia, more than 120 cases have been confirmed and the mortality rate has been no less than 50%. Current vaccines for H3N2 and H1N1 viruses, of course, have no effect on infection by H5N1 viruses. In addition, H5N1 viruses that are resistant to the antiviral drugs amantadine and oseltamivir have emerged. Fortunately, a virus that is capable of efficient transmission among humans has not emerged. However, it is not a matter of if, but when, such a virus will appear. Here, we review the current situation of avian influenza and pandemic preparedness.     

Avian-to-human transmission of H9N2 subtype influenza A viruses: relationship between H9N2 and H5N1 human isolates

In 1997, 18 cases of influenza in Hong Kong (bird flu) caused by a novel H5N1 (chicken) virus resulted in the deaths of six individuals and once again raised the specter of a potentially devastating influenza pandemic. Slaughter of the poultry in the live bird markets removed the source of infection and no further human cases of H5N1 infection have occurred. In March 1999, however, a new pandemic threat appeared when influenza A H9N2 viruses infected two children in Hong Kong. These two virus isolates are similar to an H9N2 virus isolated from a quail in Hong Kong in late 1997. Although differing in their surface hemagglutinin and neuraminidase components, a notable feature of these H9N2 viruses is that the six genes encoding the internal components of the virus are similar to those of the 1997 H5N1 human and avian isolates. This common feature emphasizes the apparent propensity of avian viruses with this genetic complement to infect humans and highlights the potential for the emergence of a novel human pathogen.     

Generation of candidate human influenza vaccine strains in cell culture – rehearsing the European response to an H7N1 pandemic threat

Background Although H5N1 avian influenza viruses pose the most obvious imminent pandemic threat, there have been several recent zoonotic incidents involving transmission of H7 viruses to humans. Vaccines are the primary public health defense against pandemics, but reliance on embryonated chickens eggs to propagate vaccine and logistic problems posed by the use of new technology may slow our ability to respond rapidly in a pandemic situation. Objectives We sought to generate an H7 candidate vaccine virus suitable for administration to humans whose generation and amplification avoided the use of eggs. Methods We generated a suitable H7 vaccine virus by reverse genetics. This virus, known as RD3, comprises the internal genes of A/Puerto Rico/8/34 with surface antigens of the highly pathogenic avian strain A/Chicken/Italy/13474/99 (H7N1). The multi‐basic amino acid site in the HA gene, associated with high pathogenicity in chickens, was removed. Results The HA modification did not alter the antigenicity of the virus and the resultant single basic motif was stably retained following several passages in Vero and PER.C6 cells. RD3 was attenuated for growth in embryonated eggs, chickens, and ferrets. RD3 induced an antibody response in infected animals reactive against both the homologous virus and other H7 influenza viruses associated with recent infection by H7 viruses in humans. Conclusions This is the first report of a candidate H7 vaccine virus for use in humans generated by reverse genetics and propagated entirely in mammalian tissue culture. The vaccine has potential use against a wide range of H7 strains.     

Egyptian Fruit Bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) Were Resistant to Experimental Inoculation with Avian-Origin Influenza A Virus of Subtype H9N2, But Are Susceptible to Experimental Infection with Bat-Borne H9N2 Virus

Influenza A viruses (IAV) of subtype H9N2, endemic in world-wide poultry holdings, are reported to cause spill-over infections to pigs and humans and have also contributed substantially to recent reassortment-derived pre-pandemic zoonotic viruses of concern, such as the Asian H7N9 viruses. Recently, a H9N2 bat influenza A virus was found in Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus), raising the question of whether this bat species is a suitable host for IAV. Here, we studied the susceptibility, pathogenesis and transmission of avian and bat-related H9N2 viruses in this new host. In a first experiment, we oronasally inoculated six Egyptian fruit bats with an avian-related H9N2 virus (A/layer chicken/Bangladesh/VP02-plaque/2016 (H9N2)). In a second experiment, six Egyptian fruit bats were inoculated with the newly discovered bat-related H9N2 virus (A/bat/Egypt/381OP/2017 (H9N2)). While R. aegyptiacus turned out to be refractory to an infection with H9N2 avian-type, inoculation with the bat H9N2 subtype established a productive infection in all inoculated animals with a detectable seroconversion at day 21 post-infection. In conclusion, Egyptian fruit bats are most likely not susceptible to the avian H9N2 subtype, but can be infected with fruit bat-derived H9N2. H9-specific sero-reactivities in fruit bats in the field are therefore more likely the result of contact with a bat-adapted H9N2 strain.     

Natural Selection of H5N1 Avian Influenza A Viruses with Increased PA-X and NS1 Shutoff Activity

Influenza A viruses (IAV) can infect a broad range of mammalian and avian species. However, the host innate immune system provides defenses that restrict IAV replication and infection. Likewise, IAV have evolved to develop efficient mechanisms to counteract host antiviral responses to efficiently replicate in their hosts. The IAV PA-X and NS1 non-structural proteins are key virulence factors that modulate innate immune responses and virus pathogenicity during infection. To study the determinants of IAV pathogenicity and their functional co-evolution, we evaluated amino acid differences in the PA-X and NS1 proteins of early (1996–1997) and more recent (since 2016) H5N1 IAV. H5N1 IAV have zoonotic and pandemic potential and represent an important challenge both in poultry farming and human health. The results indicate that amino acid changes occurred over time, affecting the ability of these two non-structural H5N1 IAV proteins to inhibit gene expression and affecting virus pathogenicity. These results highlight the importance to monitor the evolution of these two virulence factors of IAV, which could result in enhanced viral replication and virulence.