Cluster of cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome among Toronto healthcare workers after implementation of infection control precautions: a case series.

OBJECTIVE: To review the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infection control practices, the types of exposure to patients with SARS, and the activities associated with treatment of such patients among healthcare workers (HCWs) who developed SARS in Toronto, Canada, after SARS-specific infection control precautions had been implemented. METHODS: A retrospective review of work logs and patient assignments, detailed review of medical records of patients with SARS, and comprehensive telephone-based interviews of HCWs who met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. RESULTS: Seventeen HCWs from 6 hospitals developed disease that met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. These HCWs had a mean age (+/-SD) of 39+/-2.3 years. Two HCWs were not interviewed because of illness. Of the remaining 15, only 9 (60%) reported that they had received formal infection control training. Thirteen HCWs (87%) were unsure of proper order in which personal protective equipment should be donned and doffed. Six HCWs (40%) reused items (eg, stethoscopes, goggles, and cleaning equipment) elsewhere on the ward after initial use in a room in which a patient with SARS was staying. Use of masks, gowns, gloves, and eyewear was inconsistent among HCWs. Eight (54%) reported that they were aware of a breach in infection control precautions. HCWs reported fatigue due to an increased number and length of shifts; participants worked a median of 10 shifts during the 10 days before onset of symptoms. Seven HCWs were involved in the intubation of a patient with SARS. One HCW died, and the remaining 16 recovered. CONCLUSION: Multiple factors were likely responsible for SARS in these HCWs, including the performance of high-risk patient care procedures, inconsistent use of personal protective equipment, fatigue, and lack of adequate infection control training.     

The 2003 SARS outbreak and its impact on infection control practices

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged recently as a new infectious disease that was transmitted efficiently in the healthcare setting and particularly affected healthcare workers (HCWs), patients and visitors. The efficiency of transmission within healthcare facilities was recognised following significant hospital outbreaks of SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The causative agent of SARS was identified as a novel coronavirus, the SARS coronavirus. This was largely spread by direct or indirect contact with large respiratory droplets, although airborne transmission has also been reported. High infection rates among HCWs led initially to the theory that SARS was highly contagious and the concept of 'super-spreading events'. Such events illustrated that lack of infection control (IC) measures or failure to comply with IC precautions could lead to large-scale hospital outbreaks. SARS was eventually contained by the stringent application of IC measures that limited exposure of HCWs to potentially infectious individuals. As the 'global village' becomes smaller and other microbial threats to health emerge, or re-emerge, there is an urgent need to develop a global strategy for infection control in hospitals. This paper provides an overview of the main IC practices employed during the 2003 SARS outbreak, including management measures, dedicated SARS hospitals, personal protective equipment, isolation, handwashing, environmental decontamination, education and training. The psychological and psychosocial impact on HCWs during the outbreak are also discussed. Requirements for IC programmes in the post-SARS period are proposed based on the major lessons learnt from the SARS outbreak.     

Using an integrated infection control strategy during outbreak control to minimize nosocomial infection of severe acute respiratory syndrome among healthcare workers

Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) while caring for SARS patients. Personal protective equipment and negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs) have not been completely successful in protecting HCWs. We introduced an innovative, integrated infection control strategy involving triaging patients using barriers, zones of risk, and extensive installation of alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing. This integrated infection control approach was implemented at a SARS designated hospital ('study hospital') where NPIRs were not available. The number of HCWs who contracted SARS in the study hospital was compared with the number of HCWs who contracted SARS in 86 Taiwan hospitals that did not use the integrated infection control strategy. Two HCWs contracted SARS in the study hospital (0.03 cases/bed) compared with 93 HCWs in the other hospitals (0.13 cases/bed) during the same three-week period. Our strategy appeared to be effective in reducing the incidence of HCWs contracting SARS. The advantages included rapid implementation without NPIRs, flexibility to transfer patients, and re-inforcement for HCWs to comply with infection control procedures, especially handwashing. The efficacy and low cost are major advantages, especially in countries with large populations at risk and fewer economic resources.     

Infection control for SARS in a tertiary paediatric centre in Hong Kong

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging infectious disease. After the appearance of an index patient in Hong Kong in February 2003, SARS outbreaks occurred rapidly in hospitals and spread to the community. The aim of this retrospective study is to evaluate the effectiveness of a triage policy and risk-stratified infection control measures in preventing nosocomial SARS infection among paediatric healthcare workers (HCWs) at the Prince of Wales Hospital, a general hospital to which children with SARS are referred in Hong Kong. The acute paediatric wards were stratified into three areas: (1) ultra high-risk area, (2) high-risk area and (3) moderate-risk area according to different risk levels of nosocomial SARS transmission. The implementation of different levels of infection control precautions was guided by this risk stratification strategy. Between 13 March and 23 June, 38 patients with probable and suspected SARS, 90 patients with non-SARS pneumonia, and 510 patients without pneumonia were admitted into our unit. All probable SARS cases were isolated in negative-pressure rooms. Twenty-six HCWs worked in the ultra high-risk area caring for SARS patients and 88 HCWs managed non-SARS patients in other ward areas. None of the HCWs developed clinical features suggestive of SARS. In addition, there was no nosocomial spread of SARS-associated coronavirus to other patients or visitors during this period. In conclusion, stringent infection control precautions, appropriate triage and prompt isolation of potential SARS patients may have contributed to a lack of nosocomial spread and HCW acquisition of SARS in our unit.     

The procedures of hygiene to control hospital-acquired diarrhoea in paediatric wards: a multicentre audit

An audit was carried out in paediatric wards to study the compliance of healthcare workers (HCWs) to the procedures recommended for the control of hospital-acquired diarrhoea. Thirty-two paediatric wards in the southeast of France participated on a voluntary basis in this prospective observational study after completing a self-administered questionnaire recording measures of hygiene. All the observations were made by the same investigator and focused on preventive procedures: use of single room, handwashing, hand disinfection, overclothing, single-use gloves and masks. Two hundred and seventy patient-HCW contacts were observed, including mainly diapering, temperature measurement, collection of blood sample and catheter care. The isolation of patients in a single room and use of gowns by HCWs were significantly associated with diarrhoea. Whereas handwashing before care was performed by HCWs in more than 95% of all the procedures, the compliance in the use of disposable gloves by HCWs was only of 39.4% for technical procedures (including those with potential exposure to blood) and 20.3% for diapering or temperature measurement. A substantial agreement between reported and observed measures of hygiene was observed for handwashing before contact and hand disinfection with antimicrobial soap before contact. In contrast, this agreement was moderate for use of single room, handwashing after contact, overclothing and wearing disposable gloves after a diaper change. Despite the excellent compliance of HCWs to handwashing, clearer recommendations for the indication and use of disinfectants and disposable gloves are urgently needed.     

Taiwan's traffic control bundle and the elimination of nosocomial severe acute respiratory syndrome among healthcare workers

The traffic control bundle consists of procedures designed to help prevent epidemic nosocomial infection. We retrospectively studied the serial infection control measures to determine factors most effective in preventing nosocomial infections of healthcare workers (HCWs) during the 2003 Taiwanese severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Fever screening stations, triage of fever patients, separating SARS patients from other patients, separation of entrances and passageways between patients and HCWs, and increasing hand-washing facilities all demonstrated a protective effect for HCWs (univariate analysis; P<0.05). By multiple logistic regression: (i) checkpoint alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing between zones of risk, and (ii) fever screening at the fever screen station outside the emergency department, were the significant methods effectively minimising nosocomial SARS infection of HCWs (P<0.05). The traffic control bundle should be implemented in future epidemics as a tool to achieve strict infection control measures.     

Appropriate use of personal protective equipment among healthcare workers in public sector hospitals and primary healthcare polyclinics during the SARS outbreak in Singapore

Background: Singapore was affected by an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) from 25 February to 31 May 2003, with 238 probable cases and 33 deaths.

Aims: To study usage of personal protective equipment (PPE) among three groups of healthcare workers (HCWs: doctors, nurses, and administrative staff), to determine if the appropriate PPE were used by the different groups and to examine the factors that may determine inappropriate use.

Methods: A self-administered questionnaire survey of 14 554 HCWs in nine healthcare settings, which included tertiary care hospitals, community hospitals, and polyclinics, was carried out in May–July 2003. Only doctors, nurses, and clerical staff were selected for subsequent analysis.

Results: A total of 10 236 valid questionnaires were returned (70.3% response); 873 doctors, 4404 nurses, and 921 clerical staff were studied. A total of 32.5% of doctors, 48.7% of nurses, and 77.1% of the administrative staff agreed that paper and/or surgical masks were "useful in protecting from contracting SARS". Among this group, 23.6% of doctors and 42.3% of nurses reported working with SARS patients. The view that a paper and/or surgical mask was adequate protection against SARS was held by 33.3% of doctors and 55.9% of nurses working at the A&E unit, 30.5% of doctors and 49.4% of nurses from medical wards, and 27.5% of doctors and 37.1% of nurses from intensive care units. Factors which predicted for agreement that paper and/or surgical masks were protective against SARS, included HCW's job title, reported contact with SARS patients, area of work, and Impact Events Scale scores.

Conclusion: A variety of factors determine appropriate use of personal protective equipment by HCWs in the face of a major SARS outbreak.

     

Resource consumption in the infection control management of pertussis exposure among healthcare workers in pediatrics.

OBJECTIVE: To assess consumption of resources in the infection control management of healthcare workers (HCWs) exposed to pertussis and to assess avoidability of exposure. SETTING: Tertiary care children's medical center. METHODS: Analysis of the extent of and reasons for HCW exposure to pertussis during contact with children with the disease, whether exposures were avoidable (because of the failure to recognize a case or to order or adhere to isolation precautions) or unavoidable (because the case was not recognizable or because another diagnosis was confirmed), and the cost of implementing exposure management. INTERVENTIONS: Interventions consisted of an investigation of every HCW encounter with any patient who was confirmed later to have pertussis from the time of hospital admission of the patient, use of azithromycin as postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) for exposed HCWs, performance of 21-day surveillance for cough illness, testing of symptomatic exposed HCWs for Bordetella pertussis, and enhanced preexposure education of HCWs. RESULTS: From September 2003 through April 2005, pertussis was confirmed in 28 patients (median age, 62 days); 24 patients were admitted. For 11 patients, pertussis was suspected, appropriate precautions were taken, and no HCW was exposed. Inadequate precautions for 17 patients led to 355 HCW exposures. The median number of HCWs exposed per exposing patient was 9 (range, 1-86 HCWs; first quartile mean, 2; fourth quartile mean, 61). Exposure was definitely avoidable for only 61 (17%) of 355 HCWs and was probably unavoidable for 294 HCWs (83%). The cost of 20-month infection control management of HCWs exposed to pertussis was $69,770. The entire cohort of HCWs involved in direct patient care at the facility could be immunized for approximately $60,000. CONCLUSIONS: Exposure of HCWs to pertussis during contact with children who have the disease is largely unavoidable, and management of this exposure is resource intensive. Universal preexposure vaccination of HCWs is a better utilization of resources than is case-based postexposure management.     

医护人员预防SARS医院内感染的个人防护措施效果评价

目的 评价医务人员预防SARS医院内感染个人防护措施的效果,验证SARS的传播途径。方法 在广东省10家收治SARS患者的主要医院进行了成组设计的病例对照研究,对象为常规参加SARS诊治工作且直接抢救重患者的医护人员,共257人,其中病例组77例,对照组180人。采用统一调查表了解调查对象接触SARS患者程度、个人防护情况、卫生习惯、预防服药等方面情况。单因素分析采用X2检验、多因素分析利用非条件logistic回归分析。并用趋势X2检验分析个人防护措施的剂量反应关系和联合使用效果。结果 单因素分析结果显示,一直戴12层及以上口罩、穿隔离衣、用鞋套、戴手套、必要时戴眼罩、消毒洗手、漱口液漱口、用滴鼻滴眼液保护鼻眼黏膜、及时洗澡换衣、“不在病区吃饭/饮水/抽烟”、服oseltamivir phosphate等均有保护作用(P<0.05)。非条件logistic多因素回归分析有显著意义的有戴口罩(OR=0.78,95％CI:0.60～0.99)、戴眼罩(OR=0.20,95％CI:0.10～0.41)和穿鞋套(OR=0.58,95％CI:0.39～0.86)。并且趋势分析显示口罩及口罩类型、穿隔离衣、用鞋套、戴手套、必要时戴眼罩、漱口液漱口、用滴鼻滴眼液保护鼻眼黏膜和及时洗澡换衣等措施存在剂量效应关系。无防护参与SARS患者抢救的医护人员的罹患率高达61.5％(16/26),保护率随防     

Use of quarantine to prevent transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome--Taiwan, 2003

On July 5, 2003, Taiwan was removed from the World Health Organization (WHO) list of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-affected countries. As of July 9, a total of 671 probable cases of SARS had been reported in Taiwan. On February 21, the first identified SARS patient in Taiwan returned from travel to Guangdong Province, mainland China, by way of Hong Kong. Initial efforts to control SARS appeared to be effective; these efforts included isolation of suspect and probable SARS patients, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) for health-care workers (HCWs) and visitors, and quarantine of contacts of known SARS patients. However, beginning in mid-April, unrecognized cases of SARS led to a large nosocomial cluster and subsequent SARS-associated coronavirus transmission to other health-care facilities and community settings. In response to the growing epidemic, additional measures were taken to limit nosocomial and community transmission of SARS, including more widespread use of quarantine. By the end of the epidemic, 131,132 persons had been placed in quarantine, including 50,319 close contacts of SARS patients and 80,813 travelers from WHO-designated SARS-affected areas. This report describes the quarantine measures used in Taiwan and discusses the need for further evaluation of quarantine and other control measures used to prevent SARS.     

我市医务人员严重急性呼吸综合征医院感染流行原因调查与对策

目的 调查某市医务人员感染严重急性呼吸综合征(severe acute respiratory syndrome，SARS)的途径及危险因素。方法 对直接参加过抢救和间接接触SARS患而被感染的医务人员采取统一填表、座谈、走访、电话采访等方式进行调查。结果 调查三所医院感染SARS的医务人员共88人，占全市发病医务人员总人数的87．13％。导致医务人员易感的原因是：对疾病缺乏认识，防范意识不强；管理网络不健全；患隐瞒流行病史；隔离环境及防护用品达不到要求等。结论 重视医院感染管理及对医务人员的医院感染知识培训，强化消毒隔离和自我保护意识，是控制医院感染流行及保护医务人员的有力措施。     

Asymptomatic SARS coronavirus infection among healthcare workers, Singapore

We conducted a study among healthcare workers (HCWs) exposed to patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) before infection control measures were instituted. Of all exposed HCWs, 7.5% had asymptomatic SARS-positive cases. Asymptomatic SARS was associated with lower SARS antibody titers and higher use of masks when compared to pneumonic SARS.     

新冠肺炎疫情期间医疗机构不同区域工作岗位个人防护专家共识

 

为更好地防控新型冠状病毒（2019-nCoV）医院感染,保障医疗机构医务人员及其他工作人员的安全,合理使用个人防护用品,中华预防医学会医院感染控制分会、中国医院协会医院感染管理专业委员会、中国感染控制 杂志编辑委员会组织国内专家（包括赴武汉抗疫一线的部分专家）共同制定本共识。本共识主要适用于同时收治新冠肺炎患者和普通患者的医疗机构;指导疫情期间医疗机构一线医务人员合理有效利用防护用品,同时也覆盖了几乎所有非一线医务人员及其他工作人员的防护用品使用。本共识通过评估医疗机构工作人员新冠肺炎暴露的风险,根据暴露风险来确定不同区域不同岗位工作人员的个人防护标准。本共识主要内容还包括：个人防护用品介绍及适用范围,三级防护穿脱流程,个人防护用品异常的防范与应急处理,新型冠状病毒肺炎职业暴露处置流程。同时,本共识特别强调,要合理进行新冠疫情期间医疗机构区域划分,以及重点分诊岗位安排有经验的感染科或呼吸科医生参与分诊,这些是风险评估的前提要求;在选择个人防护用品时,既要防止防护不足,又要避免 滥用与过度使用,以保障工作人员安全为前提,预防新冠肺炎医院感染。

     

SARS transmission among hospital workers in Hong Kong

Despite infection control measures, breakthrough transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred for many hospital workers in Hong Kong. We conducted a case-control study of 72 hospital workers with SARS and 144 matched controls. Inconsistent use of goggles, gowns, gloves, and caps was associated with a higher risk for SARS infection (unadjusted odds ratio 2.42 to 20.54, p < 0.05). The likelihood of SARS infection was strongly associated with the amount of personal protection equipment perceived to be inadequate, having <2 hours of infection control training, and not understanding infection control procedures. No significant differences existed between the case and control groups in the proportion of workers who performed high-risk procedures, reported minor protection equipment problems, or had social contact with SARS-infected persons. Perceived inadequacy of personal protection equipment supply, infection control training <2 hours, and inconsistent use of personal protection equipment when in contact with SARS patients were significant independent risk factors for SARS infection.     

Covid-19 infection and diffusion among the healthcare workforce in a large university-hospital in northwest Italy

Backgroud:Since the beginning of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak, healthcare workers (HCWs) have been the workers most likely to contract the disease. Intensive focus is therefore needed on hospital strategies that minimize exposure and diffusion, confer protection and facilitate early detection and isolation of infected personnel.Methods:To evaluate the early impact of a structured risk-management for exposed COVID-19 HCWs and describe how their characteristics contributed to infection and diffusion. Socio-demographic and clinical data, aspects of the event-exposure (date, place, length and distance of exposure, use of PPE) and details of the contact person were collected.Results:The 2411 HCWs reported 2924 COVID-19 contacts. Among 830 HCWs who were at ‘high or medium risk’, 80 tested positive (9.6%). Physicians (OR=2.03), and non-medical services resulted in an increased risk (OR=4.23). Patient care did not increase the risk but sharing the work environment did (OR=2.63). There was a significant time reduction between exposure and warning, exposure and test, and warning and test since protocol implementation. HCWs with management postitions were the main source of infection due to the high number of interactions.Discussion:A proactive system that includes prompt detection of contagious staff and identification of sources of exposure helps to lower the intra-hospital spread of infection. A speedier return to work of staff who would otherwise have had to self-isolate as a precautionary measure improves staff morale and patient care by reducing the stress imposed by excessive workloads arising from staff shortages.Key words: Infection diffusion, social network analysis, healthcare professionals, occupational health, COVID-19     

Impact of severe acute respiratory syndrome care on the general health status of healthcare workers in taiwan.

BACKGROUND: The impact of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was enormous, but few studies have focused on the infectious and general health status of healthcare workers (HCWs) who treated patients with SARS. DESIGN: We prospectively evaluated the general health status of HCWs during the SARS epidemic.The Medical Outcome Study Short-Form 36 Survey was given to all HCWs immediately after caring for patients with SARS and 4 weeks after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts. Tests for detection of SARS coronavirus antibody were performed for HCWs at these 2 time points and for control subjects during the SARS epidemic. SETTING: Tertiary care referral center in Taipei, Taiwan. SUBJECTS: Ninety SARS-care task force members (SARS HCWs) and 82 control subjects. RESULTS: All serum specimens tested negative for SARS antibody. Survey scores for SARS HCWs immediately after care were significantly lower than those for the control group (P<.05 by the t test) in 6 categories. Vitality, social functioning, and mental health immediately after care and vitality and mental health after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts were among the worst subscales. The social functioning, role emotional, and role physical subscales significantly improved after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts (P<.05, by paired t test). The length of contact time (mean number of contact-hours per day) with patients with SARS was associated with some subscales (role emotional, role physical, and mental health) to a mild extent. The total number of contact-hours with symptomatic patients with SARS was a borderline predictor (adjusted R2=0.069; P=.038) of mental health score. CONCLUSIONS: The impact of the SARS outbreak on SARS HCWs was significant in many dimensions of general health. The vitality and mental health status of SARS HCWs 1 month after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts remained inferior to those of the control group.     

Surgical nurses and compliance with personal protective equipment

The study objectives were to evaluate self-reported compliance with personal protective equipment (PPE) use among surgical nurses and factors associated with both compliance and non-compliance. A total of 601 surgical nurses, from 18 randomly selected hospitals (seven urban and 11 rural) in the Pomeranian region of Poland, were surveyed using a confidential questionnaire. The survey indicated that compliance with PPE varied considerably. Compliance was high for glove use (83%), but much lower for protective eyewear (9%). Only 5% of respondents routinely used gloves, masks, protective eyewear and gowns when in contact with potentially infective material. Adherence to PPE use was highest in the municipal hospitals and in the operating rooms. Nurses who had a high or moderate level of fear of acquiring human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) at work were more likely (P<0.005 and P<0.04, respectively) than staff with no fear to be compliant. Significantly higher compliance was found among nurses with previous training in infection control or experience of caring for an HIV patient; the combined effect of training and experience exceeded that for either alone. The most commonly stated reasons for non-compliance were non-availability of PPE (37%), the conviction that the source patient was not infected (33%) and staff concern that following locally recommended practices actually interfered with providing good patient care (32%). We recommend wider implementation, evaluation and improvement of training in infection control, preferably combined with practical experience with HIV patients and easier access and improved comfort of PPE.     

Compliance with routine use of gowns by healthcare workers (HCWs) and non-HCW visitors on entry into the rooms of patients under contact precautions.

BACKGROUND: Modified contact precautions (MCP), defined as routine donning of isolation gowns (along with routine gloving) on entry into the rooms of patients under contact precautions, regardless of the likelihood of direct exposure to the patient or their immediate environment, were instituted at our medical center to reduce nosocomial transmission of common hospital pathogens. OBJECTIVES: To study compliance with MCP policy regarding routine gowning in intensive care units (ICUs) and general wards and to determine the relationship between gown and glove use in the care of patients under MCP in ICUs. DESIGN: Prospective observational study from February 20, 2004, through January 8, 2005, involving 2,110 persons (1,504 healthcare workers [HCWs] and 606 non-HCW visitors). SETTING: A 900-bed tertiary care teaching community hospital. RESULTS: Overall compliance with routine gown use was observed for 1,542 persons (73%), including 1,150 HCWs (76%) and 392 visitors (65%) (odds ratio [OR], 1.8 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 1.4-2.2]; P<.001). Visitors in the ICUs (186 [91%] of 204) were more likely than visitors in the general wards (202 [51%] of 398) to comply with gown use (OR, 10 [95% CI, 6.0-17.0]; P<.001). In logistic regression analysis, independent predictors of gown compliance among HCWs were female sex (OR, 2.3 [95% CI, 1.8-3.0]; P<.001) and ICU setting (OR, 2.2 [95% CI, 1.7-2.9]; P<.001). In the ICUs, gown use was highly predictive of glove use among HCWs (positive predictive value, 95%). CONCLUSION: Improvement in compliance with gown use at our medical center will require more-intensive educational efforts targeted at male HCWs and at HCWs and visitors on general wards. In the care of ICU patients under MCP, HCW compliance with gown use may be used as a proxy for their compliance with glove use.     

HIV, HBV, or HDV transmission from infected health care workers to patients

BACKGROUND: The report of transmission of viruses, such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV), from health care workers (HCWs) to patient has alarmed public opinion with potential repercussions on health organisation. OBJECTIVES: To review available information on cases of transmission of HIV, HBV and HCV from HCW to patient reported worldwide. METHODS: A literature review was conducted with a Medline search of English language full papers, using the following key terms: HIV, HBV, HCV; healthcare workers, occupational and hospital transmission, outbreak, look back investigation. The Medline search was supplemented by a manual search using reference lists of published studies and proceedings of meetings, including some personal communications already reported in a previous review. RESULTS: Since 1972, 50 outbreaks have been reported in which 48 HBV infected HCWs (39 surgeons) transmitted the infection to approximately 500 persons. To date, 3 cases of transmission of HIV and 8 confirmed cases of transmission of HCV (to a total of 18 patients) from infected healthcare workers to patients have been reported. The factors influencing the transmissibility of infection include: type of procedures performed, surgical techniques used, compliance with infection control precautions, the clinical status and viral burden of the infected HCW and susceptibility of the patient to infection. The risk of transmission of HIV, HBV and HCV from HCWs to patients is associated primarily with certain types of surgical specialties (obstetrics and gynaecology, orthopaedics, cardiothoracic surgery) and surgical procedures that can expose the patient to the blood of the HCW: exposure-prone procedures. Since the early 90's industrialized countries have issued recommendations for preventing transmission of blood-borne pathogens to patients during "exposure prone" invasive procedures. With regard to HBV there is common consent to restricting or excluding HCWs tested HbeAg positive or HBV DNA-positive from performing exposure-prone procedures, while there are still some discrepancies in the different countries for dealing with HCV-infected personnel and in some cases also for those with HIV infection. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to prevent surgeon-to-patient transmission of blood-borne infections should focus not only on ascertaining the infection status of the HCW but principally on eliminating the cause of blood-borne exposures, for example by the use of blunt suture needles, improved instruments, reinforced gloves, changes in surgical technique and the use of less invasive alternative procedures. These measures should be implemented in order to minimize the risk of blood exposure and consequently of virus transmission both to and from HCW to patients.