Issues regarding health plan payments under Medicare and recommendations for reform.

The failures of the market for current Medicare health plans include poor information and price distortions and can be attributed to government policy. Reforms that could improve its structure are annual open enrollment periods, premium rebates from health management organizations (HMOs) to members, and termination of the federal government's subsidy of Medicare supplementary insurance. However, the price for a basic Medicare benefits package would still be distorted because Medicare bases its contribution on the cost of a comparable package in the fee-for-service (FFS) sector rather than on the cost of the most efficient plan available to beneficiaries in each market area. The present Medicare HMO program almost certainly increases total Medicare costs and actually discourages HMO growth by shielding beneficiaries from the true price difference between basic benefits in the HMO and FFS sectors. Lacking payment reforms, the Medicare HMO program should be terminated.     

Biased enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in HMO plans--implications for Medicare costs

Policymakers assumed that the enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in health maintenance organization (HMO) plans would generate significant cost savings for Medicare. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) calculates the reimbursement to HMOs per Medicare beneficiary on the basis of individual and community-specific characteristics. Estimates of the individual-specific profitability rate for enrolling an individual in a Medicare HMO risk plan suggest that the probability of enrollment in HMOs increases with a higher profitability score. The probability of not enrolling high-loss cases is found to be high, indicating that the biased selection in HMO plans actually increases the overall cost of running the Medicare program.     

Consumer information and biased selection in the demand for coverage supplementing Medicare.

This study examines how the relationship between health insurance knowledge and the health status of health insurance consumers influences their decisions to purchase insurance coverage. Data from the federal Medicare health insurance program for the elderly in the United States are used. The basic Medicare program provides a limited amount of coverage for health care services obtained from any provider in the private fee-for-service (FFS) market. Beneficiaries of this program may choose to supplement the basic coverage which they receive by two mechanisms: either they may purchase private insurance designed to fill some of the gaps left by the federal program ('Medigap' policies), thereby remaining in the FFS market and preserving their choice of provider, or they may enroll in health maintenance organizations (HMOs), thereby leaving the FFS market and agreeing to use only those providers affiliated with the HMO, and in return receiving broader coverage at little additional out-of-pocket cost. The study was made possible by a unique data set which combines measures of beneficiary knowledge of Medicare coverage with measures of perceived health status, socio-economic characteristics, and insurance coverage choices for a sample of Medicare beneficiaries who participated in an educational workshop about their insurance coverage options. These data were used to estimate a multinomial logistic model of the determinants of insurance choices, where the options included the two listed above and a basic Medicare option. The study explicitly recognizes the interaction between insurance information and health status in health plan choice. These results show that knowledge of coverage does have a differential impact on the decision to purchase health insurance depending on health status. With a high level of knowledge, sicker beneficiaries are less likely to have basic Medicare alone, compared with HMOs or Medigap policies, while healthier beneficiaries are less likely to be enrolled in HMOs, compared with Medigap policies. This finding has important implications for the use of health status measures to adjust capitated payment formulas when knowledgable consumers have the option to enroll in HMOs or remain in the FFS environment. In the absence of health status adjusters for the HMO capitation payments, high levels of coverage knowledge may exacerbate inherent selection bias among these coverage options by healthier and sicker consumers of health insurance.     

Illness-episode approach: costs and benefits of medigap insurance

Over two-thirds of Medicare beneficiaries have private supplementary coverage, but few know enough about Medicare, their own supplements, or available alternatives to make intelligent comparisons and informed purchasing decisions. The illness-episode approach, a new way to provide insurance information to Medicare beneficiaries, calculates out-of-pocket costs likely to be faced by beneficiaries experiencing 13 illnesses, under Medicare alone and under different medigap policies. Applying the approach to six policies marketed in Los Angeles in 1986 revealed that plans varied widely in their ability to reduce financial vulnerability; many still leave the elderly with substantial out-of-pocket costs.     

Trends in Medicare health maintenance organization enrollment: 1986-93

This study examines Medicare health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 (Public Law 97-248) from 1986 to 1993. It shows that there was moderate growth in the number of Medicare beneficiaries participating in the TEFRA risk program, reaching 1 in 20 beneficiaries in 1993. Medicare HMO enrollment is heavily concentrated in a few large plans, resulting in heavy concentrations geographically. California and Florida accounted for over one-third of Medicare HMO enrollees. One-half of the States have no Medicare HMO enrollment and one-fifth of the States have fewer than 15,000 Medicare HMO enrollees.     

Comparing mortality and time until death for medicare HMO and FFS beneficiaries

OBJECTIVE: To compare adjusted mortality rates of TEFRA-risk HMO enrollees and disenrollees with rates of beneficiaries enrolled in the Medicare fee-for-service sector (FFS), and to compare the time until death for decedents in these three groups. DATA SOURCE: Data are from the 124 counties with the largest TEFRA-risk HMO enrollment using 1993-1994 Medicare Denominator files for beneficiaries enrolled in the FFS and TEFRA-risk HMO sectors. STUDY DESIGN: A retrospective study that tracks the mortality rates and time until death of a random sample of 1,240,120 Medicare beneficiaries in the FFS sector and 1,526,502 enrollees in HMOs between April 1, 1993 and April 1, 1994. A total of 58,201 beneficiaries switched from an HMO to the FFS sector and were analyzed separately. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: HMO enrollees have lower relative odds of mortality than a comparable group of FFS beneficiaries. Conversely, HMO disenrollees have higher relative odds of mortality than comparable FFS beneficiaries. Among decedents in the three groups, HMO enrollees lived longer than FFS beneficiaries, who in turn lived longer than HMO disenrollees. CONCLUSIONS: Medicare TEFRA-risk HMO enrollees appear to be, on average, healthier than beneficiaries enrolled in the FFS sector, who appear to be in turn healthier than HMO disenrollees. These health status differences persist, even after controlling for beneficiary demographics and county-level variables that might confound the relationship between mortality and the insurance sector.     

Managed care and dually eligible beneficiaries: challenges in coordination

This article describes administrative issues and beneficiary perspectives on the delivery of medical services under Medicare+Choice (M+C) and/or Medicaid managed care organizations (MCOs) for dually eligible beneficiaries. We interviewed staff at nine health plans in four market areas in 2000 and 2001, and conducted beneficiary focus groups in 2001. The study reveals beneficiary confusion about the relationship between their dual coverage and managed care enrollment, and problems with care and benefit coordination across these arrangements, based on regulatory and administrative obstacles to effective benefit and care coordination for beneficiaries enrolled in these varied managed care arrangements.     

Search costs and Medicare plan choice

There is increasing evidence suggesting that Medicare beneficiaries do not make fully informed decisions when choosing among alternative Medicare health plans. To the extent that deciphering the intricacies of alternative plans consumes time and money; the Medicare health plan market is one in which search costs may play an important role. To account for this, we split beneficiaries into two groups – those who are informed and those who are uninformed. If uninformed, beneficiaries only use a subset of covariates to compute their maximum utilities, and if informed, they use the full set of variables considered. In a Bayesian framework with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, we estimate search cost coefficients based on the minimum and maximum statistics of the search cost distribution, incorporating both horizontal differentiation and information heterogeneities across eligibles. Our results suggest that, conditional on being uninformed, older, higher income beneficiaries with lower self‐reported health status are more likely to utilize easier access to information. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paying Medicare Advantage plans: To level or tilt the playing field

Medicare beneficiaries are eligible for health insurance through the public option of traditional Medicare (TM) or may join a private Medicare Advantage (MA) plan. Both are highly subsidized but in different ways. Medicare pays for most of costs directly in TM, and subsidizes MA plans based on a “benchmark” for each beneficiary choosing a private plan. The level of this benchmark is arguably the most important policy decision Medicare makes about the MA program. Many analysts recommend equalizing Medicare’s subsidy across the options – referred to in policy circles as a “level playing field.” This paper studies the normative question of how to set the level of the benchmark, applying the versatile model developed by Einav and Finkelstein (EF) to Medicare. The EF framework implies unequal subsidies to counteract risk selection across plan types. We also study other reasons to tilt the field: the relative efficiency of MA vs. TM, market power of MA plans, and institutional features of the way Medicare determines subsidies and premiums. After review of the empirical and policy literature, we conclude that in areas where the MA market is competitive, the benchmark should be set below average costs in TM, but in areas characterized by imperfect competition in MA, it should be raised in order to offset output (enrollment) restrictions by plans with market power. We also recommend specific modifications of Medicare rules to make demand for MA more price elastic.     

Medicare's risk-adjusted capitation method

Since 1997, the method to establish capitation rates for Medicare beneficiaries who are members of risk-bearing managed care plans has undergone several important developments. This includes the factoring of beneficiary health status into the rate-setting calculations. These changes were expected to increase the number of participating health plans, accelerate Medicare enrollment growth, and slice Medicare spending.     

Medicare HMO marketing and information: keeping the focus on what consumers need

Across the country, Medicare beneficiaries face complicated choices about health insurance and HMOs, but too often they lack the information they need to make good decisions. Instead, they rely on marketing information that is frequently inadequate, sometimes downright misleading. This issue of States of Health looks at efforts to improve the ways that HMOs market their Medicare plans and assesses whether "choice" really benefits beneficiaries.     

Medigap premiums and Medicare HMO enrollment

OBJECTIVE: Markets for Medicare HMOs (health maintenance organizations) and supplemental Medicare coverage are often treated separately in existing literature. Yet because managed care plans and Medigap plans both cover services not covered by basic Medicare, these markets are clearly interrelated. We examine the extent to which Medigap premiums affect the likelihood of the elderly joining managed care plans. DATA SOURCES: The analysis is based on a sample of Medicare beneficiaries drawn from the 1996-1997 Community Tracking Study (CTS) Household Survey by the Center for Studying Health System Change. Respondents span 56 different CTS sites from 30 different states. Measures of premiums for privately-purchased Medigap policies were collected from a survey of large insurers serving this market. Data for individual, market, and HMO characteristics were collected from the CTS, InterStudy, and HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration). STUDY DESIGN: Our analysis uses a reduced-form logit model to estimate the probability of Medicare HMO participation as a function of Medigap premiums controlling for other market- and individual-level characteristics. The logit coefficients were then used to simulate changes in Medicare participation in response to changes in Medigap premiums. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We found that Medigap premiums vary considerably among the geographic markets included in our sample. Measures of premiums from different insurers and for different types of Medigap policies were generally highly correlated across markets. Our models consistently indicate a strong positive relationship between Medigap premiums and HMO participation. This result is robust across several specifications. Simulations suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Medigap premiums would increase HMO participation by more than 8 percentage points. CONCLUSIONS: This research provides strong evidence that Medigap premiums have a significant effect on seniors' participation in Medicare HMOs. Policy initiatives aimed at lowering Medigap premiums will likely discourage enrollment in Medicare HMOs, holding other factors constant. Although the Medigap premiums are just one factor affecting the future penetration rate of Medicare HMOs, they are an important driver of HMO enrollment and should be considered carefully when creating policy related to seniors' supplemental coverage. Similarly, our results imply that reforms to the Medicare HMO market would influence the demand for Medigap policies.     

Assessing the validity of insurance coverage data in hospital discharge records: California OSHPD data

OBJECTIVE: To assess the accuracy of data on "expected source of payment" in the patient discharge database compiled by the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). DATA SOURCES: The OSHPD discharge data for the years 1993 to 1996 linked with administrative data from the University of California (UC) health benefits program for the same years. The linked dataset contains records for all stays in California hospitals by UC employees, retirees, and spouses. STUDY DESIGN: The accuracy of the OSHPD data is assessed using cross-tabulations of insurance type as coded in the two data sources. The UC administrative data is assumed to be accurate, implying that differences between the two sources represent measurement error in the OSHPD data. We cross-tabulate insurance categories and analyze the concordance of dichotomous measures of health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment derived from the two sources. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: There are significant coding errors in the OSHPD data on expected source of payment. A nontrivial percentage of patients with preferred provider organization (PPO) coverage are erroneously coded as being in HMOs, and vice versa. The prevalence of such errors increased after OSHPD introduced a new expected source of payment category for PPOs. Measurement problems are especially pronounced for older patients. Many patients over age 65 who are still covered by a commercial insurance plan are erroneously coded as having Medicare coverage. This, combined with the fact that during the period we analyzed, Medicare HMO enrollees and beneficiaries in the fee-for-service (FFS) program are combined in a single payment category, means that the OSHPD data provides essentially no information on insurance coverage for older patients. CONCLUSIONS: Researchers should exercise caution in using the expected source of payment in the OSHPD data. While measures of HMO coverage are reasonably accurate, it is not possible in these data to clearly identify PPOs as a distinct insurance category. For patients over age 65, it is not possible at all to distinguish among alternative insurance arrangements.     

An economic history of Medicare part C

Context: Twenty‐five years ago, private insurance plans were introduced into the Medicare program with the stated dual aims of (1) giving beneficiaries a choice of health insurance plans beyond the fee‐for‐service Medicare program and (2) transferring to the Medicare program the efficiencies and cost savings achieved by managed care in the private sector. Methods: In this article we review the economic history of Medicare Part C, known today as Medicare Advantage, focusing on the impact of major changes in the program's structure and of plan payment methods on trends in the availability of private plans, plan enrollment, and Medicare spending. Additionally, we compare the experience of Medicare Advantage and of employer‐sponsored health insurance with managed care over the same time period. Findings: Beneficiaries’ access to private plans has been inconsistent over the program's history, with higher plan payments resulting in greater choice and enrollment and vice versa. But Medicare Advantage generally has cost more than the traditional Medicare program, an overpayment that has increased in recent years. Conclusions: Major changes in Medicare Advantage's payment rules are needed in order to simultaneously encourage the participation of private plans, the provision of high‐quality care, and to save Medicare money.