William Hammond, the dynamometer, the dynamograph

The dynamometer came into general use by neurologists in the late 19th century. Various dynamometers were developed and adopted by neurologists at that time to measure muscle strength, in keeping with the general trend of adopting instrumentation to distinguish our specialty and aid observation and diagnosis. Many dynamometers were adaptations of the French Mathieu dynamometer, which was initially promoted by American neurologist William Hammond. Another variation, the Mathieu dynamograph, used to graphically record measurements made with a dynamometer, was also initially studied, used, and promoted by Hammond. The high cost of the dynamograph and the lack of demonstrated clinical utility contributed to its limited dissemination. The history of the dynamometer and the dynamograph illustrate both the practical difficulties associated with developing a new instrument, and the numerous modifications that such an instrument goes through, some of which have little to do with practical application.     

The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath

It is common for philosophers to argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible because they lack some of the essential capacities for morality. In legal terms, they are criminally insane. Typically, however, the insanity defense is not available to psychopaths. The primary reason is that they appear to have the knowledge and understanding required under the M’Naghten Rules. However, it has been argued that what is required for moral and legal responsibility is ‘deep’ moral understanding, something that psychopaths do not have either due to their lacking empathy or practical reason. In the first part of the paper, I argue that psychopaths do not lack the abilities required for deep moral understanding, although they have deficits in those areas. According the M’Naghten Rules, therefore, psychopaths are not insane. Under a less strict formulation of the insanity plea, like the Model Penal Code, however, there is a good case to be made for their lacking substantial capacity. I argue that because psychopathy is an essentially moral disorder, and because of the nature of psychopathic violence, psychopaths should not be excused under the insanity plea. It would be tantamount to excusing someone for committing a crime because they are bad. Arguably, this contravenes the entire system of law.

Opioids, dopamine, stress, and the addictions

The articulated goals of Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience are to serve as "an interface between clinical neuropsychiatry and the neurosciences by providing state-of-the-art information and original insights into relevant clinical, biological, and therapeutic aspects." My laboratory the Laboratory of the Biology of Addictive Diseases at The Rockefeller University, has for years been focused on "bidirectional translational research," that is, learning by careful observations and study in patient populations with the disorders under study, in this case primarily specific addictive diseases, and then using that knowledge to create improved animal models or other laboratory-based research paradigms, while, at the same time, taking research findings made at the bench into the clinic as promptly as that is appropriate and feasible. In this invited review, therefore, the focus will be on perspectives of our Laboratory of the Biology of Addictive Diseases and related National Institutes of Health/National Institute on Drug Abuse research Center, including laboratory-based molecular neurobiological research, research using several animal models designed to mimic human patterns of drug abuse and addiction, as well as basic clinical research, intertwined with treatment-related research.     

Thrombolysis 2004: the good, the bad, and the ugly

Nearly 8 years have passed since the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released recombinant tissue plasminogen activator (rt-PA) for treatment of patients with acute ischemic stroke. Yet thrombolysis remains an intensely controversial treatment strategy. Clearly thrombolysis is a step forward but there remain problems with its application. The author reviews early investigations that preceded the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) trial report, discusses NINDS and other randomized trials, and comments on results since the approval and release of tissue type plasminogen activator (tPA). Technology development and use have improved since the release of tPA, and the impact of this development is discussed. Finally, the author shares his advice to doctors about present thrombolytic management of patients with acute ischemic stroke.     

Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self

In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance (ipse is Latin for "self" or "itself") that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin to external objects. Diminished self-affection or self-presence refers to a weakened sense of existing as a vital and self-coinciding source of awareness and action. This article integrates recent psychiatric research and European phenomenological psychiatry with some current work in cognitive science and phenomenological philosophy. After introducing the phenomenological approach along with a theoretical account of normal consciousness and self-awareness, we turn to a variety of schizophrenic syndromes. We examine positive, then negative, and finally disorganization symptoms-attempting in each case to illuminate shared distortions of consciousness and the sense of self. We conclude by discussing the possible relevance of this approach for identifying early schizophrenic symptoms.