Pandemic influenza preparedness: a survey of businesses

Several Omaha businesses were surveyed on pandemic influenza preparedness and general disaster preparedness. Most businesses had started pandemic influenza planning, but few had exercised the plan or used it to educate employees. Responses provided insight into the status of business planning. The survey uncovered a need for providing assistance to businesses in pandemic preparedness as well as training in infection control in the workplace, which should be a niche for infection control professionals.     

National pandemic influenza preparedness planning

Abstract The recent outbreaks of influenza A/H5N1 and ‘swine influenza’ A/H1N1 have caused global concern over the potential for a new influenza pandemic. Although it is impossible to predict when the next pandemic will occur, appropriate planning is still needed to maximize efficient use of resources and to minimize loss of life and productivity. Many tools now exist to assist countries in evaluating their plans but there is little to aid in writing of the plans. This study discusses the process of drafting a pandemic influenza preparedness plan for developing countries that conforms to the International Health Regulations of 2005 and recommendations of the World Health Organization. Stakeholders from many sectors should be involved in drafting a comprehensive pandemic influenza plan that addresses all levels of preparedness.     

Issues relevant to the adoption and modification of hospital infection-control recommendations for avian influenza (H5N1 infection) in developing countries.

The reemergence of avian influenza (H5N1 infection) has heightened concern for a potential human influenza pandemic. Recommendations regarding preparation for a global avian influenza pandemic are available, and it is imperative that health care workers participate in preparedness planning and training. In developing countries, health care worker preparedness training should address the modes of avian influenza transmission and specify how to implement appropriate infection-control strategies to prevent and control the spread of avian influenza. We provide evidence for avian influenza transmission methods and identify prevention strategies relevant to infection control for hospitals in developing countries. Pandemic influenza preparedness plans must include health care administrative support, mechanisms to rapidly create temporary isolation facilities, systems to restrict access to exposed health care workers, and plans to involve specialists to screen and identify cases early, to provide for continuous monitoring to ensure adherence to optimal infection-control practices, and to provide regular feedback to health care workers.     

Pandemic Influenza Planning in Nursing Homes: Are We Prepared?

Avian influenza or Influenza A (H5N1) is caused by a viral strain that occurs naturally in wild birds, but to which humans are immunologically naïve. If an influenza pandemic occurs, it is expected to have dire consequences, including millions of deaths, social disruption, and enormous economic consequences. The Department of Health and Human Resources plan, released in November 2005, clearly affirms the threat of a pandemic. Anticipating a disruption in many factions of society, every segment of the healthcare industry, including nursing homes, will be affected and will need to be self‐sufficient. Disruption of vaccine distribution during the seasonal influenza vaccine shortage during the 2004/05 influenza season is but one example of erratic emergency planning. Nursing homes will have to make vital decisions and provide care to older adults who will not be on the initial priority list for vaccine. At the same time, nursing homes will face an anticipated shortage of antiviral medications and be expected to provide surge capacity for overwhelmed hospitals. This article provides an overview of current recommendations for pandemic preparedness and the potential effect of a pandemic on the nursing home industry. It highlights the need for collaborative planning and dialogue between nursing homes and various stakeholders already heavily invested in pandemic preparedness.     

Response to avian influenza and preparedness for pandemic influenza: Thailand's experience

Thailand has been struggling to control and prevent H5N1 avian influenza on both the animal health and public health fronts. Prevention and control programs for animals and humans are improving, with infections in poultry currently under control and no human cases seen in 2007. In awareness of the risk of an influenza pandemic, Thailand is joining global efforts in pandemic influenza preparedness. The national preparedness plan highlights building of national capacity for self-reliance and regional/international cooperation. Public health response to avian influenza and pandemic preparedness benefit significantly from the experience of responses to severe acute respiratory syndrome. This underlines the need to strengthen infrastructure and manpower, ensure public confidence and cooperation, secure maximum government advocacy and support, and forge multi-sector and international cooperation.     

Seasonal and pandemic influenza preparedness: science and countermeasures

Influenza has not been treated with the degree of medical attention that the disease warrants. As such, there is not an adequate baseline of preparedness in the United States to deal with the potential of pandemic influenza. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has been working to enact measures to deal more effectively with a potential influenza pandemic and also to assist in the management of seasonal influenza. The majority of the NIAID's efforts have been dedicated to basic research aimed ultimately at developing and testing, in clinical trials, countermeasures in the form of antiviral drugs and vaccines. Some of the NIAID's current and planned antiviral projects include the (1) assessment of oseltamivir therapy in infants, (2) conduct of clinical trials of higher doses of osteltamivir for avian influenza, (3) appraisal of combination therapies, and (4) evaluation of the next generation of neuraminidase inhibitors. In addition, the NIAID is screening potential new antiviral drugs and evaluating novel drug targets. Similarly, significant funding has been committed to vaccine preparedness, and numerous novel candidate influenza vaccines are in various stages of development. Importantly, there is an integral relationship between preparation for seasonal influenza and preparation for pandemic influenza. Until these approaches are firmly linked, the community will not have optimized its preparedness for a pandemic.     

Pandemic influenza in Australia: Using telephone surveys to measure perceptions of threat and willingness to comply

Background  

Baseline data is necessary for monitoring how a population perceives the threat of pandemic influenza, and perceives how it would behave in the event of pandemic influenza. Our aim was to develop a module of questions for use in telephone health surveys on perceptions of threat of pandemic influenza, and on preparedness to comply with specific public health behaviours in the event of pandemic influenza.     

Seasonal and pandemic influenza preparedness: a global threat

The increase in the incidence of avian influenza worldwide in both poultry and humans introduces the potential for another influenza A pandemic that could pose a significant threat to both human health and the global economy. The impact of the next influenza pandemic will be influenced, in part, by how well the medical, government, business, and lay communities are prepared. Despite the additional tools and resources that have become available since prior epidemics, there are limits to the quantity of antiviral drugs that can be manufactured and concerns over the current vaccine production systems. Despite these challenges, there is an opportunity to take action before the emergence of a pandemic influenza strain and, possibly, to prevent its spread or at least mitigate its impact on the world. In February 2006, a group of representatives from federal, state, and local governments; professional bodies; academia; and the pharmaceutical industry met to review the current state of preparedness in the United States for a potential influenza pandemic and its relationship to seasonal influenza. The goal of the meeting was to examine the recently revised US Department of Health and Human Services plan for preparedness and response to an influenza pandemic and to make recommendations to actualize this plan at the state and local levels.     

Managing public health crises: the role of models in pandemic preparedness

Background Given the enormity of challenges involved in pandemic preparedness, design and implementation of effective and cost‐effective public health policies is a major task that requires an integrated approach through engagement of scientific, administrative, and political communities across disciplines. There is ample evidence to suggest that modeling may be a viable approach to accomplish this task. Methods To demonstrate the importance of synergism between modelers, public health experts, and policymakers, the University of Winnipeg organized an interdisciplinary workshop on the role of models in pandemic preparedness in September 2008. The workshop provided an excellent opportunity to present outcomes of recent scientific investigations that thoroughly evaluate the merits of preventive, therapeutic, and social distancing mechanisms, where community structures, priority groups, healthcare providers, and responders to emergency situations are given specific consideration. Results This interactive workshop was clearly successful in strengthening ties between various disciplines and creating venues for modelers to effectively communicate with policymakers. The importance of modeling in pandemic planning was highlighted, and key parameters that affect policy decision‐making were identified. Core assumptions and important activities in Canadian pandemic plans at the provincial and national levels were also discussed. Conclusions There will be little time for thoughtful and rapid reflection once an influenza pandemic strikes, and therefore preparedness is an unavoidable priority. Modeling and simulations are key resources in pandemic planning to map out interdependencies and support complex decision‐making. Models are most effective in formulating strategies for managing public health crises when there are synergies between modelers, planners, and policymakers.     

The national inventory of core capabilities for pandemic influenza preparedness and response: an instrument for planning and evaluation

Background

Reviews of the global response to the 2009 pandemic of influenza A/H1N1 affirmed the importance of assessment of preparedness and response capabilities.

Design

The U. S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and partners developed the National Inventory of Core Capabilities for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/international/tools.htm) to collect data on coverage, quality, and timeliness in 12 domains: country planning, research and use of findings, communications, epidemiologic capability, laboratory capability, routine influenza surveillance, national respiratory disease surveillance and reporting, outbreak response, resources for containment, community-based interventions to prevent the spread of influenza, infection control, and health sector pandemic response. For each of the capabilities, we selected four indicators. Each indicator includes four levels of performance (0–3), ranging from no or limited capability to fully capable.

Results

In 2008, 40 countries in 6 regions of the World Health Organization (WHO) collected data using the instrument. In 2010 and 2012, 36 and 39 countries did so, respectively. Data collection at regular intervals allows changes in preparedness and response capabilities to be documented. In most countries, participants used the instrument and data collected to inform discussion and planning toward improving the country''s level of preparedness for pandemic influenza.

Conclusions

The National Inventory provides countries with a systematic method to document the status of their capabilities with regard to pandemic influenza and to assess progress over time. The National Inventory produces data and findings that serve a wide range of users and uses.     

Pandemic influenza preparedness in the Asia-Pacific region

Concerns are mounting that the threat of another influenza pandemic will become a reality and that the epicentre of the outbreak could be the Asia-Pacific region. We assessed the documents that some Asia-Pacific countries have published as part of preparedness planning for an outbreak of influenza in people. Regional approaches were polarised. Thailand, China, and Vietnam had set out a strategic vision to strengthen future capacity in preparedness planning. By contrast, Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand took a strategic approach aimed mainly at harnessing available resources or preparing for the deployment of resources such as stockpiled antiviral agents and vaccines. The plans of Hong Kong, Australia, and New Zealand compared favourably with the best European plans. The plans of resource-poor countries addressed some issues that were largely neglected by most European plans. Other countries (including those that do not yet have plans) could benefit from analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the plans drawn up by countries in the region and in Europe.     

Preparing to prevent severe acute respiratory syndrome and other respiratory infections

Globalisation and its effect on human development has rendered an environment that is conducive for the rapid international spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and other new infectious diseases yet to emerge. After the unprecedented multi-country outbreak of avian influenza with human cases in the winter of 2003-2004, an influenza pandemic is a current threat. A critical review of problems and solutions encountered during the 2003-2004 SARS epidemics will serve as the basis for considering national preparedness steps that can be taken to facilitate the early detection of avian influenza, and a rapid response to an influenza pandemic should it occur.     

Transmissibility of the 1918 pandemic influenza in Montreal and Winnipeg of Canada

Background  The threat of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) is still causing widespread public concern. A comprehensive understanding of the epidemiology of 1918 pandemic influenza commonly referred to as the Spanish flu may be helpful in offering insight into control strategies for the new pandemic. Objective  We explore how the preparedness for a pandemic at the community and individual level impacts the spread of the virus by comparing the transmissibility of the 1918 Spanish flu in two Canadian cities: Montreal and Winnipeg, bearing in mind that each pandemic is unique and the current one may not follow the pattern of the 1918 outbreak. Methods  The historical epidemiological data obtained for Montreal and Winnipeg in Canada is analyzed to estimate the basic reproduction number which is the most important summary measure of transmission potential of the pandemic. Results  The transmissibility of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus in Winnipeg in the fall of 1918 was found to be much lower than in Montreal based on the estimated reproduction number obtained assuming different serial intervals which are the time between onsets of symptoms in an index case and a secondary case. Conclusion  The early preparedness and public health control measures could suggest an explanation for the fact that the number of secondary cases generated by a primary case was significantly reduced in Winnipeg comparing to it in Montreal.     

The 1918 influenza pandemic: insights for the 21st century

The 1918-1919 H1N1 influenza pandemic was among the most deadly events in recorded human history, killing an estimated 50-100 million persons. Because recent H5N1 avian epizootics have been associated with sporadic human fatalities, concern has been raised that a new pandemic, as fatal as the pandemic of 1918, or more so, could be developing. Understanding the events and experiences of 1918 is thus of great importance. However, despite the genetic sequencing of the entire genome of the 1918 virus, many questions about the 1918 pandemic remain. In this review we address several of these questions, concerning pandemic-virus origin, unusual epidemiologic features, and the causes and demographic patterns of fatality. That none of these questions can yet be fully answered points to the need for continued pandemic vigilance, basic and applied research, and pandemic preparedness planning that emphasizes prevention, containment, and treatment with antiviral medications and hospital-based intensive care.     

Southern Hemisphere Influenza and Vaccine Effectiveness Research and Surveillance

The 2009 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic highlighted the need for improved scientific knowledge to support better pandemic preparedness and seasonal influenza control. The Southern Hemisphere Influenza and Vaccine Effectiveness Research and Surveillance (SHIVERS) project, a 5‐year (2012–2016) multiagency and multidisciplinary collaboration, aimed to measure disease burden, epidemiology, aetiology, risk factors, immunology, effectiveness of vaccination and other prevention strategies for influenza and other respiratory infectious diseases of public health importance. Two active, prospective, population‐based surveillance systems were established for monitoring influenza and other respiratory pathogens among those hospitalized patients with acute respiratory illness and those enrolled patients seeking consultations at sentinel general practices. In 2015, a sero‐epidemiological study will use a sample of patients from the same practices. These data will provide a full picture of the disease burden and risk factors from asymptomatic infections to severe hospitalized disease and deaths and related economic burden. The results during the first 2 years (2012–2013) provided scientific evidence to (a) support a change to NZ's vaccination policy for young children due to high influenza hospitalizations in these children; (b) contribute to the revision of the World Health Organization's case definition for severe acute respiratory illness for global influenza surveillance; and (c) contribute in part to vaccine strain selection using vaccine effectiveness assessment in the prevention of influenza‐related consultations and hospitalizations. In summary, SHIVERS provides valuable international platforms for supporting seasonal influenza control and pandemic preparedness, and responding to other emerging/endemic respiratory‐related infections.     

Stigma in the time of influenza: social and institutional responses to pandemic emergencies

This article examines the role of stigma in social and institutional responses to infectious disease emergencies, to better understand and minimize these dynamics in the event of a pandemic of virulent influenza. In addition to their impact on human suffering, fear and stigma can seriously delay detection and treatment efforts, cooperation with contact tracing and isolation measures, and the effective distribution of resources for the prevention and control of infectious diseases. These dynamics are illustrated by the Indian plague epidemic of 1994, which occurred in a region where H5N1 influenza has been detected recently. Public fear and stigma also played a significant role in the social and institutional responses to the 1918 influenza pandemic. These historical models provide important lessons for pandemic preparedness and global health policy.     

Seasonal and pandemic influenza: recommendations for preparedness in the United States

There is a continued need to improve the state of preparedness for a potential influenza pandemic in the United States despite the publication of a pandemic influenza plan by the Department of Health and Human Services. Of particular importance are the sense of urgency for a coordinated response plan, an allocation of adequate funds to deal with this issue, and the need for a national leader to coordinate the development and execution of a national plan, including its relationship to the control of seasonal influenza. In addition, an infrastructure needs to be established in the United States to enable the rapid development and large-scale production of a safe and effective vaccine for new influenza strains; methods to treat influenza pneumonia need to be evaluated; a coordinated public health response needs to be defined; a nationally developed blueprint to deal with logistics of pandemic prevention is required; and there is a need to establish reliable communication systems on a national and local basis, to provide accurate information to the lay public, health care workers, and the agricultural sector.     

2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1): Diagnosis,Management, and Prevention— Lessons Learned

The 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) was responsible for the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century. The virus— a previously unknown triple-reassortant virus containing segments of avian, human, and swine origins— generally caused mild disease. Unlike seasonal influenza, 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) primarily affected adults 18 to 64 years of age. During the course of the pandemic, public health officials tried to facilitate diagnostic procedures and share information about treatment modalities globally. Efforts to contain the spread of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) included personal protective mechanisms and the 2009 H1N1 vaccine, which was not produced quickly enough or in large enough quantities. The lessons learned from this pandemic should be applied to ensure better preparedness in case of future pandemics.     

Stockpiling prepandemic influenza vaccines: a new cornerstone of pandemic preparedness plans

The history of pandemic influenza, along with the evolving epizootic of the highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus and the severity of associated human infections, serve as a warning to the world of the threat of another influenza pandemic. Conservative estimates suggest that up to 350 million people could die and many more would be affected, causing disruption to health-care systems, society, and the world's economy. WHO has encouraged countries to prepare in advance by developing influenza pandemic preparedness plans that involve public-health and pharmaceutical interventions. Vaccination is a cornerstone of these plans; however, a pandemic vaccine cannot be manufactured in advance because the next pandemic virus cannot be predicted. The concepts of vaccine stockpiling and prepandemic vaccination have thus become attractive. Human H5N1 vaccines are currently available and can induce heterotypic immunity. WHO and governments should give urgent consideration to the use of these vaccines for the priming of individuals or communities who would be at greatest risk of infection if an H5N1 influenza pandemic were to emerge.     

Potential for a global dynamic of Influenza A (H1N1)

Background  

Geographical and temporal diffusion patterns of a human pandemic due to Swine Origin Influenza Virus (S-OIV) remain uncertain. The extent to which national and international pandemic preparedness plans and control strategies can slow or stop the process is not known. However, despite preparedness efforts, it appears that, particularly in the USA, Mexico, Canada and the UK, local chains of virus transmission can sustain autonomous dynamics which may lead to the next pandemic. Forecasts of influenza experts usually rely on information related to new circulating strains.