Informal patient payments in maternity hospitals in Kiev,Ukraine

Maternity care in Ukraine is a government priority. However, it has not undergone substantial changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar to the entire health care sector in Ukraine, maternity care suffers from inefficient funding, which results in low quality and poor access to services. The objective of this paper is to explore the practice of informal payments for maternity care in Ukraine, specifically in cases of childbirth in Kiev maternity hospitals. The paper provides an ethnographic study on the consumers' and providers' experiences with informal payments. The results suggest that informal payments for childbirth are an established practice in Kiev maternity hospitals. The bargaining process between the pregnant woman (incl. her partner) and the obstetrician is an important part of the predelivery arrangement, including the informal payment. To deal with informal payments in Kiev maternity hospitals, there is a need for the following: (i) regulation of the “quasi‐official” patient payments at the health care facility level; and (ii) improvement of professional ethics through staff training. These strategies should be coupled with improved governance of the health care sector in general, and maternity care in particular in order to attain international quality standards and adequate access to facilities. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding informal payments for health care: the example of Bulgaria

INTRODUCTION: Throughout the 1990s, in response to funding deficits, out-of-pocket payment has grown as a share of total expenditure in countries in transition. A clear policy response to informal payments is, however, lacking. The current study explores informal payments in Bulgaria within a conceptual framework developed by triangulating information using a variety of methodologies. OBJECTIVE: To estimate the scale and determinants of informal payments in the health sector of Bulgaria and to identify who benefits, the characteristics and timing of payments, and the reasons for paying. DESIGN: Data were derived from a national representative survey of 1547 individuals complemented by in-depth interviews and focus groups with over 100 respondents, conducted in Bulgaria in 1997. Informal payments are defined as a monetary or in-kind transaction between a patient and a staff member for services that are officially free of charge in the state sector. RESULTS: Informal payments are relatively common in Bulgaria, especially if in the form of gifts. Informal cash payments are universal for operations and childbirth, clear-cut and life-threatening procedures, in hospitals or elite urban facilities or well-known physicians. Most gifts were given at the end of treatment and most cash payments-before or during treatment. Wealthier, better educated, younger respondents tend to pay more often, as a means of obtaining better-quality treatment in a de facto two-tier system. Since the transition, informal payments had become frequent, explicit, solicited by staff, increasingly in cash, and less affordable. Informal payments stem from the low income of staff, patients seeking better treatment; acute funding shortages; and from tradition. Attitudes to informal payments range from strongly negative (if solicited) to tolerant (if patient-initiated), depending on the circumstances. CONCLUSIONS: The study provides important new insights into the incidence and nature of informal payments in the health sector in Bulgaria. Payments were less than expected, very complex, organised in a chaotic, although adaptive, system, and relatively equitable. The timing of payment and the presence of compulsion is a key factor in distinguishing between informal payments given in gratitude or as a bribe, and the latter are seen as problematic, needing to be addressed. Paying informally appeared to be a product of socio-economic reality rather than culture and tradition. The study showed that the principle of comprehensive free coverage existing in Bulgaria until 1989 has been significantly eroded. Initiating a public debate on informal payments is important in a health care reform process that purports to increase accountability.     

Out-of-pocket payments for health care in Serbia

BackgroundThis study focuses on out-of-pocket payments for health care in Serbia. In contrast to previous studies, we distinguish three types of out-of-pocket patient payments: official co-payments, informal (under-the-table) payments and payments for “bought and brought goods” (i.e. payments for health care goods brought by the patient to the health care facility).MethodsWe analyse the probability and intensity of three different types of out-of-pocket patient payments in the public health care sector in Serbia and their distribution among different population groups. We use data from the Serbian Living Standard Measures Study carried out in 2007. Out-of-pocket patients payments for both outpatient and inpatient health care are included. The data are analysed using regression analysis.ResultsThe majority of health care users report official co-payments (84.7%) and payments for “bought and brought goods” (61.1%), whereas only 5.7% health care users declare that they have paid informally. Regarding the regression results, users with an income below the poverty line, those from rural areas and who are not married are more likely to report payments for “bought and brought goods, while young and more educated users are more likely to report informal patient payments.ConclusionOverall, the three types of out-of-pocket payments are not correlated. Payments for “bought and brought goods” take the highest share of the total annual household budget. Serbian policymakers need to consider different strategies to deal with informal payments and to eliminate the practice of “bought and brought goods”.     

INFORMAL PAYMENTS AND HEALTH WORKER EFFORT: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY FROM TANZANIA

Informal payments—payments made from patients to health personnel in excess of official fees—are widespread in low‐income countries. It is not obvious how such payments affect health worker effort. On the one hand, one could argue that because informal payments resemble formal pay for performance schemes, they will incite higher effort in the health sector. On the other hand, health personnel may strategically adjust their base effort downwards to maximise patients' willingness to pay informally for extra services. To explore the relationship between informal payments and health worker effort, we use a unique data set from Tanzania with over 2000 observations on the performance of 156 health workers. Patient data on informal payments are used to assess the likelihood that a particular health worker accepts informal payment. We find that health workers who likely accept payments do not exert higher average effort. They do however have a higher variability in the effort they exert to different patients. These health workers are also less sensitive to the medical condition of the patient. A likely explanation for these findings is that health workers engage in rent seeking and lower baseline effort to induce patients to pay. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“If the Big Fish are Doing It Then Why Not Me Down Here?”: Informal Fee Payments and Reproductive Health Care Provider Motivation in Kenya

Informal fees are payments made by patients to their health care provider that are over and above the official cost of services. Payments may be motivated by a combination of factors such as low supervision, weak sanctions, and inadequate provider salaries. The practice of soliciting informal fees from patients may result in restricted access to medical care and reduced care-seeking behavior among vulnerable populations. The objective of this study is to examine nuanced health care provider perspectives on informal fee payments solicited from reproductive health patients in Kenya. We conducted in-depth semistructured interviews in 2015–2016 among a sample of 20 public and private-sector Kenyan health care workers. Interviews were coded and analyzed using an iterative thematic approach. More than half of participants reported that solicitation of informal fees is common practice in health care facilities. Providers reported low public-sector wages were a primary driver of informal fee solicitation coupled with collusion among senior staff. Additionally, patients may be unaware that they are being asked to pay more than the official cost of services. Strategies for reducing this behavior include more adequate and timely remuneration within the public sector, educating patient populations of free or low-cost services, and evidence-based methods to increase provider motivation.     

How much uncompensated care do doctors provide?

The magnitude of provider uncompensated care has become an important public policy issue. Yet existing measures of uncompensated care are flawed because they compare uninsured payments to list prices, not to the prices actually paid by the insured. We address this issue using a novel source of data from a vendor that processes financial data for almost 4000 physicians. We measure uncompensated care as the net amount that physicians lose by lower payments from the uninsured than from the insured. Our best estimate is that physicians provide negative uncompensated care to the uninsured, earning more on uninsured patients than on insured patients with comparable treatments. Even our most conservative estimates suggest that uncompensated care amounts to only 0.8% of revenues, or at most $3.2 billion nationally. These results highlight the important distinction between charges and payments, and point to the need for a re-definition of uncompensated care in the health sector going forward.     

Informal payments in government health facilities in Albania: results of a qualitative study

As governments seek to expand access to quality health care services, policy makers in many countries are confronting the problem of informal payments to medical personnel. The aim of this study was to help health planners in Albania understand informal payments occurring in government health facilities. Researchers used in-depth interviews and focus groups with 131 general public and provider informants in three districts. The results suggest that factors promoting informal payments in Albania include perceived low salaries of health staff; a belief that good health is worth any price; the desire to get better service; the fear of being denied treatment; and the tradition of giving a gift to express gratitude. Members of the general public also believe informal payments create uncertainties and anxiety during the care-seeking process, while providers perceive that informal payments harm their professional reputation, induce unnecessary medical interventions, and create discontinuity of care. The study showed that focusing on the most harmful effects and targeting the most vulnerable populations may be one way to gain consensus for policy reform. Understanding citizens' and caregivers' viewpoints is an important step in designing regulatory and bureaucratic interventions.     

Informal payments for health care in the Former Soviet Union: some evidence from Kazakstan

An important feature of the health care system of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe is the presence of informal or under-the-table payments. It is generally accepted that these represent a significant contribution to the income of medical staff. Discussions with medical practitioners suggest that for certain specialities in certain hospitals a doctor might obtain many times his official income. Yet little empirical work has been done in this area. Informal payments can be divided into those paid to health care providers and those that go directly to practitioners. They can be further divided into monetary and non-monetary. The complexity of these payments make obtaining estimates using quantitative survey techniques difficult. Estimates on contributions to the costs of medicines in Kazakstan suggest that they may add 30% to national health care expenditure. Payments to staff are likely to add substantially to this figure, although few reliable statistics exist. Research in this area is important since informal payment is likely to impact on equity in access to medical care and the efficiency of provision. The impact of attempts to reform systems using Western ideas could be reduced unless account is taken of the effect and size of the informal payment system.     

Financing health services in Poland: new evidence on private expenditures

This paper estimates total expenditure on health care in Poland in 1994 and provides new evidence on high levels of private spending on health care. The analysis shows that health care expenditures in Poland are higher than has usually been maintained, and are comparable with the prevailing levels in many other European countries. Private expenditure on health is a significant proportion of total expenditure on health, and in particular on financing outpatient care. Available evidence indicates that informal payments made by patients to physicians contribute as much as double of the physician's salary, and thus form an important source of earnings for physicians. This situation of high private expenditures on health care and informal payments to physicians is likely to be true of other transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe as well. One policy implication that emerges is these transitional economies face a big challenge in managing existing resources, as opposed to finding new resources, in the health sector more effectively to meet the health care needs of their population. The paper highlights the need for better understanding of the current availability and distribution of resources in the health sector and their directions of flow, in both public and private sectors, and suggests using tools such as National Health Accounts to track and monitor changes in the financing of the health care system. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Poverty, out-of-pocket payments and access to health care: evidence from Tajikistan

Most countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have either initiated or are contemplating reform of the health sector. With negative real income growth and falling government revenues, a key concern of many governments is to secure additional finance through non-budgetary sources such as hypothecated payroll taxes, voluntary insurance, and increased private finance through patient cost-sharing. However, before such reforms can be considered, information is needed both on the current levels and distribution of household expenditures on health care, and the extent to which increased charges may affect access to health services, especially amongst the poor. This paper uses the Tajikistan Livings Standard Survey to investigate the level and distribution of out-of-pocket payments for health care in Tajikistan and to examine the extent to which such payments act as barriers to health-care access. The data show that there are significant differences in health-care utilisation rates across socio-economic groups and that these differences are related to ability to pay. Official and informal payments are acting both to deter people from seeking medical assistance and once advice has been sought, from receiving the most appropriate treatment. Despite informal exemptions, out-of-pocket payments for health care are exacting a high toll on household welfare with households being forced to sell assets or go into debt to meet the costs of care. Urgent action is needed to ensure equity in access to health care.     

Paying informally in the Albanian health care sector: a two-tiered stochastic frontier model

Informal payments are deeply ingrained in the health care sector of most Central, Eastern and Southern European countries. Evidence suggests that the price paid informally to medical staff is negotiated either directly or indirectly between patients and medical staff. The aim of this paper is to measure the imperfect information that exists on the amount that has to be paid informally to medical staff. We measure the extent to which patients pay more than the amount medical staff expect informally and the extent to which medical staff request less than patients are willing to pay informally. A two-tiered stochastic frontier model is developed to estimate indicators of patients’ and medical staff’s imperfect information on informal payments and the effects on the amount the other party is minimally expecting or maximally willing to pay informally. The estimates are based on informal payments to medical staff in the inpatient health care sector in Albania. We use data from the Albania Living Standards Measurement Survey 2002 and 2005. The pooled samples include 707 individuals who have visited inpatient health care services in these 2?years. Our results show that medical staff has less information on the patients’ maximum willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical staff’s minimum expected amount. These estimates do not depend on categories of illnesses but on certain socio-demographic characteristics.     

How do supply‐side factors influence informal payments for healthcare? The case of HIV patients in Cameroon

Direct out‐of‐pocket payments for healthcare continue to be a major source of health financing in low‐income and middle‐income countries. Some of these direct payments take the form of informal charges paid by patients to access the needed healthcare services. Remarkably, however, little is known about the extent to which these payments are exercised and their determinants in the context of Sub‐Saharan Africa. This study attempts therefore to shed light on the role of supply‐side factors in the occurrence of informal payments while accounting for the demand‐side factors. The study relies on data taken from a nationally representative survey conducted among people living with HIV/AIDS in Cameroon. A multilevel mixed‐effect logistic model is employed to identify the factors associated with the incidence of informal payments. Results reveal that circa 3.05% of the surveyed patients incurred informal payments for the consultations made on the day of the survey. The amount paid informally represents up to four times the official tariff. Factors related to the following: (i) human resource management of the health facilities (e.g., task shifting); (ii) health professionals' perceptions vis‐à‐vis the remunerations of HIV care provision; and (iii) reception of patients (e.g., waiting time) significantly influence the probability of incurring informal payments. Also of note, the type of healthcare facilities is found to play a role: informal payments appear to be significantly lower in private non‐profit facilities compared with those belonging to public sector. Our findings allude to some policy recommendations that can help reduce the incidence of informal payments. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informal payment for health care: evidence from Hungary

While there is a growing body of evidence that informal payments for health care are widespread and enduring in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, evidence on the scale of the phenomenon is not only limited, but what is available is often conflicting. Hungary exemplifies this controversy, as the available literature provides conflicting figures, differing by an order of magnitude among various surveys, with a similarly large difference between survey findings and expert estimates. This study advances understanding of the methodological issues involved in researching informal payments by providing a systematic analysis of the methodology of available empirical research and official statistics on the scale of informal payments in Hungary. The paper explores the potential sources of differences, to assess the scope to reduce the differences between various estimates and to define the upper and lower boundaries within which the true magnitude of informal payments can be expected to lie. Our analysis suggests that in 2001 the overall magnitude of informal payments lay between 16.2 and 50.9 billion HUF (euro 64.8- euro 203.6 million, US dollars 77.1-242.4 million), which amounted to 1.5-4.6% of total health expenditures in Hungary. Looked at this way, informal payments do not seem to be an important source of health care financing. However, as informal payments are unequally distributed among health workers, with the bulk of the money going to physicians, with some not taking any informal payments, family doctors and some specialists may have earned between 60 and 236% of their net official income from this source in 2001. This suggests that it is not the overall amount of informal payment that makes it a policy concern, but the consequences of its unequal distribution among health workers. What is remarkable about informal payments in Hungary is that a relatively small amount of money can keep the system running, which gives rise to the hypothesis that, in certain cases, it is the hope of substantial informal payments in the future that motivates physicians to remain in the system. This is a difficult challenge for policy-makers as it would require a much larger amount of money to achieve equilibrium under any formal alternative.     

Factors influencing the burden of health care financing and the distribution of health care benefits in Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa

In Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa, health care financing is progressive overall. However, out-of-pocket payments and health insurance for the informal sector are regressive. The distribution of health care benefits is generally pro-rich. This paper explores the factors influencing these distributions in the three countries. Qualitative data were collected through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with insurance scheme members, the uninsured, health care providers and managers. Household surveys were also conducted in all countries. Flat-rate contributions contributed to the regressivity of informal sector voluntary schemes, either by design (in Tanzania) or due to difficulties in identifying household income levels (in Ghana). In all three countries, the regressivity of out-of-pocket payments is due to the incomplete enforcement of exemption and waiver policies, partial or no insurance cover among poorer segments of the population and limited understanding of entitlements among these groups. Generally, the pro-rich distribution of benefits is due to limited access to higher level facilities among poor and rural populations, who rely on public primary care facilities and private pharmacies. Barriers to accessing health care include medical and transport costs, exacerbated by the lack of comprehensive insurance coverage among poorer groups. Service availability problems, including frequent drug stock-outs, limited or no diagnostic equipment, unpredictable opening hours and insufficient skilled staff also limit service access. Poor staff attitudes and lack of confidence in the skills of health workers were found to be important barriers to access. Financing reforms should therefore not only consider how to generate funds for health care, but also explicitly address the full range of affordability, availability and acceptability barriers to access in order to achieve equitable financing and benefit incidence patterns.     

Beliefs about informal payments in Albania

Informal payments for health care are a growing concern in Albania and other transitional economy countries. Recent international studies have shown that informal payments can have negative effects on health care access, equity and health status by causing people to forgo or delay seeking care, or sell assets to pay for care. Many countries are putting in place reforms meant to reduce informal payments. In order to be successful, such policies need to consider people's attitudes and beliefs about the practice. This study collected data from 222 citizens in Albania regarding intentions, past behaviours, attitudes and beliefs about informal payments. Comparing people who intend to make informal payments with people who do not intend to make payments, the study found differences in attitudes as well as beliefs about the consequences of making informal payments, in perceptions about what others think and in control beliefs, but no difference in moral beliefs or demographic characteristics. People who intend to make informal payments the next time they seek care are more likely to believe they will get faster and better quality care than non-intenders, but also think they must pay to receive any care at all. People who do not intend to make informal payments are more likely to report that they have connections with medical personnel, which may be substituting for informal payments. The study has implications for educational campaigns accompanying policy reforms. Campaigns which focus on anti-corruption messages are unlikely to be effective, as moral beliefs do not appear to influence intention.     

The inequity of informal payments for health care: the case of Hungary

As in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, informal payments have been a characteristic feature of the Hungarian health care system both during and since the demise of Soviet type socialist rule. Although informal payments continue to be so characteristic in the region, little empirical evidence exists on their scope or working. As far as equity is concerned, it has sometimes been suggested that physicians play a 'Robin Hood' role and subsidise the poor at the expense of the rich. With the aid of an interview survey of a representative sample of the Hungarian population, we examine the distribution of the burden of informal payments across income groups. Results indicate that informal payments are a highly regressive way of funding health care, with Kakwani progressivity indices of -0.38, -0.39, -0.35 and -0.36 for GP, outpatient specialist, hospital, and total care, respectively. The finding that people with lower income pay proportionally more for public health care through informal payments underlines the emptiness of the 'Robin Hood' claims and the need for reform.     

Empirical studies on informal patient payments for health care services: a systematic and critical review of research methods and instruments

Background  

Empirical evidence demonstrates that informal patient payments are an important feature of many health care systems. However, the study of these payments is a challenging task because of their potentially illegal and sensitive nature. The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic review and analysis of key methodological difficulties in measuring informal patient payments.     

Perceptions and utilization of primary health care services in Iraq: findings from a national household survey

Background

After many years of sanctions and conflict, Iraq is rebuilding its health system, with a strong emphasis on the traditional hospital-based services. A network exists of public sector hospitals and clinics, as well as private clinics and a few private hospitals. Little data are available about the approximately 1400 Primary Health Care clinics (PHCCs) staffed with doctors. How do Iraqis utilize primary health care services? What are their preferences and perceptions of public primary health care clinics and private primary care services in general? How does household wealth affect choice of services?

Methods

A 1256 household national survey was conducted in the catchment areas of randomly selected PHCCs in Iraq. A cluster of 10 households, beginning with a randomly selected start household, were interviewed in the service areas of seven public sector PHCC facilities in each of 17 of Iraq's 18 governorates. A questionnaire was developed using key informants. Teams of interviewers, including both males and females, were recruited and provided a week of training which included field practice. Teams then gathered data from households in the service areas of randomly selected clinics.

Results

Iraqi participants are generally satisfied with the quality of primary care services available both in the public and private sector. Private clinics are generally the most popular source of primary care, however the PHCCs are utilized more by poorer households. In spite of free services available at PHCCs many households expressed difficulty in affording health care, especially in the purchase of medications. There is no evidence of informal payments to secure health services in the public sector.

Conclusions

There is widespread satisfaction reported with primary health care services, and levels did not differ appreciably between public and private sectors. The public sector PHCCs are preferentially used by poorer populations where they are important providers. PHCC services are indeed free, with little evidence of informal payments to providers.     

Informal payments in transitional economies: implications for health sector reform

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union increasing evidence is emerging of informal payments by patients for health care services that are officially free. There is little information, however, on the characteristics of these payments and the effect that they have on health care reform initiatives. This paper examines these issues and concludes that the endemic and complex nature of such payments suggests that a range of policy tools are necessary to address the negative features of informal payments in those countries undergoing transition.     

Informal payment for health care and the theory of 'INXIT'

Informal payments are known to be widespread in the post-communist health care systems of Central and Eastern Europe. However, their role and nature remains contentious, with the debate characterized by much polemic. This paper steps back from this debate to examine the theoretical basis for understanding the persistence of informal payments. The authors develop a cognitive behavioural model of informal payment, which draws on the theory of government failure and extends Hirschman's theory of 'exit, voice, loyalty', the behavioural responses to 'decline in firms, organizations and states'. It is argued that informal payment represents another possible behavioural reaction: 'inxit', which becomes important when the channels of exit and voice are blocked. The theory is applied to explain informal payments in Hungary, but can be shown to be relevant to other countries facing similar issues. The paper examines the proposed policies to tackle informal payments, and on the basis of the theory of 'inxit' it advocates that solutions should contain an appropriate balance between exit and voice to optimize the chances of maintaining a good standard of public services.