A plan for the handling of externally contaminated livestock

Nuclear accidents and access to radiological weapons for terrorist organizations and countries with hostile intentions towards the United States are realistic scenarios in the current global landscape. A dispersion of radionuclides can result from a nuclear weapon detonation or from a nuclear accident occurring in facilities handling or using radioactive material, such as nuclear power reactors. Any target of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or an attack with a nuclear weapon and the surrounding area of a reactor accident could be subject to a significant amount of fallout and radioactive contamination. Therefore, a nuclear event in close proximity to agricultural areas will cause significant concern regarding the contamination of food products. In order to respond quickly and effectively to a large amount of contaminated agricultural products, such as livestock, a prepared and effective plan for handling and processing of these products is necessary. A protocol outlining the evaluation of and procedures for handling and processing radioactively contaminated livestock is proposed, to ensure safe animal food production and economic stability in the livestock industry in the wake of such a nuclear or radiological event. An evaluation of the salvageability of the contaminated livestock is performed based on the degree of exposure, the cost of decontamination, expected demand for food products, and economic impact to the owner/producer. Important factors that impact the salvageability of affected livestock are listed and analyzed to support the decision process for handling contaminated animals.     

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism: an introduction for occupational physicians

BACKGROUND: Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism poses considerable threat throughout the world. AIM: To provide occupational physicians with an understanding of this threat and its main forms and what action can be taken to counter this threat. METHODS: Presenters at a conference on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism were asked to contribute their evidence-based opinions in order to produce a review article. RESULTS: This paper presents a summary of the different forms of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism and the effective counter-measures and also provides a review of current scientific literature. CONCLUSION: The threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism is present throughout the world and is one that occupational physicians should be aware of, as well as the action that can be taken to counter it.     

Safety and security of radiation sources in the aftermath of 11 September 2001

The attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 resulted in an increased awareness of the need for safety and security measures to protect against terrorism. The potential use of radiation sources in terrorism, in particular radioactive sources, was recognized prior to 11 September 2001, but has taken on new significance since. The planning of security measures for radioactive sources must take greater account of the potential for deliberate acts to attack or use radioactive sources to expose people and cause contamination. The potential consequences of an act of terrorism using radioactive sources can be gauged from the consequences of serious accidents that have occurred involving radioactive sources. These include fatal and injurious radiation exposures, contamination of the environment, and serious economic and psychosocial costs the total effect of which is mass disruption. Steps are being taken to improve security for radioactive sources but strategic approaches that can minimize the threat of radiological terrorism should be considered. When justifying a practice that uses radioactive sources, the potential for diversion or use in terrorism should be considered to be a detriment. In this regard, the consideration and development of alternatives to radioactive sources, such as radiation producing machines, have been recommended by terrorism experts as measures to reduce the threat of radiological terrorism. If a practice using radioactive sources is determined to be justified, the need for special security measures to protect against terrorism should then become part of the safety assessment.     

Addressing the psychosocial and communication challenges posed by radiological/nuclear terrorism: key developments since NCRP Report No. 138

One of the most innovative aspects of NCRP Report No. 138 (Management of Terrorist Incidents Involving Radioactive Material) was the high priority it accorded to psychosocial and communication issues. While previous discussions of radiological and nuclear terrorism had occasionally referred to these topics, NCRP Report No. 138 was the first report of its kind to recognize the profound challenges posed by these issues and to place them at the heart of preparedness and response efforts. In the years since the report's release, a host of important developments have taken place in relation to psychosocial and communication issues. This paper reviews key changes and advances in five broad areas: (1) training exercises, (2) policy and guidance development, (3) findings on hospital and clinician needs, (4) survey research on public perceptions of radiological terrorism, and (5) risk communication for radiological and nuclear terrorism situations. The article concludes with a discussion of continuing psychosocial and communication challenges, including critical areas needing further attention as the nation moves to meet the threat of terrorism involving radioactive materials.     

Nuclear security and radiological preparedness for the olympic games, athens 2004: lessons learned for organizing major public events

In light of the exceptional circumstances that arose from hosting the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004 and from recent terrorist events internationally, Greece attributes the highest priority to security issues. According to its statutory role, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for emergency preparedness and response in case of nuclear and radiological events, and advises the Government on the measures and interventions necessary to protect the public. In this context, the Commission participated in the Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, and Chemical Threat National Emergency Plan, specially developed for the Olympic Games, and coordinated by the Olympic Games Security Division. The objective of this paper is to share the experience gained during the organization of the Olympic Games and to present the nuclear security program implemented prior to, during, and beyond the Games, in order to prevent, detect, assess, and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism. This program adopted a multi-area coverage of nuclear security, including physical protection of nuclear and radiological facilities, prevention of smuggling of radioactive materials through borders, prevention of dispersion of these materials into the Olympic venues, enhancement of emergency preparedness and response to radiological events, upgrading of the technical infrastructure, establishment of new procedures for assessing the threat and responding to radiological incidents, and training personnel belonging to several organizations involved in the National Emergency Response Plan. Finally, the close cooperation of Greek Authorities with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy, under the coordination of the Greek Atomic Energy Commission, is also discussed.     

U.S. national response assets for radiological incidents

The federal government has had the ability to respond to incidents of national significance for decades. Since 11 September 2001, there have been enhancements to existing federal assets and the creation of new federal assets. This presentation will provide an overview of the more significant federal assets. Pivotal to a response of national significance is the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, which organizes and coordinates federal agency monitoring activities during an emergency. DOE manages the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center during the emergency phase, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) manages the response during the recovery phase once the emergency is terminated. EPA monitoring teams provide support during both the emergency and recovery phases of an emergency. Other DOE teams are available to respond to major nuclear power plant events, transportation accidents, or terrorism events involving the use of radiological materials, including the Radiological Assistance Program, the Aerial Measuring System, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. For incidents involving a nuclear weapon, an improvised nuclear device, or a radiological dispersal device, DOE assets such as the Nuclear Emergency Support Team and the Accident Response Group could provide capabilities for weapon or device search, recovery, and removal. The Radiological Triage System harnesses the weapons scientists and engineers at the DOE national laboratories to provide gamma spectroscopy interpretation for agencies responding to an incident. In recent years, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams have been created to support state and local response to terrorism events. The Civil Support Teams normally come under direct control of the state and can respond without requiring authorization from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Changes brought about by the events of September 11 also extend to changing federal response policy and planning. Therefore, the Catastrophic Incident Response Annex to the National Response Plan is discussed. DoD also provides specifically designated radiological response capabilities that can be utilized within the guidelines of the National Response Plan. While optimally designed to support military missions, these resources also help provide for a well-equipped set of national assets to temporarily support and augment the local, state, and federal civil agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. The military's role in domestic emergencies is well defined in military regulations, as well as the national plan.     

Risk communication and radiological/nuclear terrorism: a strategic view

It is now widely recognized that effective communication is a crucial element in radiological/nuclear terrorism preparedness. Whereas in the past, communication and information issues were sometimes viewed as secondary in comparison with technical concerns, today the need to improve risk communication, public information, and emergency messaging is seen as a high priority. The process of improving radiological/nuclear terrorism risk communication can be conceptualized as occurring in four overlapping phases. The first phase involves the recognition that communication and information issues will be pivotal in shaping how a radiological/nuclear terrorism incident unfolds and in determining its outcome. This recognition has helped shape the second phase, in which various research initiatives have been undertaken to provide an empirical basis for improved communication. In the third and most recent phase, government agencies, professional organizations and others have worked to translate research findings into better messages and informational materials. Like the first and second phases, the third phase is still unfolding. The fourth phase in risk communication for radiological/nuclear terrorism-a mature phase-is only now just beginning. Central to this phase is a developing understanding that for radiological/nuclear terrorism risk communication to be fully effective, it must go beyond crafting better messages and materials (as essential as that may be). This emerging fourth phase seeks to anchor radiological/nuclear communication in a broader approach: one that actively engages and partners with the public. In this article, each of the four stages is discussed, and future directions for improving radiological/nuclear terrorism risk communication are explored.     

Radiological threat assessment and the Federal Response Plan--a gap analysis

The ability of the federal government to effectively and efficiently respond to nuclear or radiological terrorist attacks has been the subject of intense discussion and analysis for many years. Because of recent terrorist activities and intelligence information, there is strong sentiment that it is not a question of if, but when, a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack will occur. As a result, there is considerable concern that the federal government may not be adequately prepared to respond to an attack involving a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device. In response to these concerns, federal departments and agencies have initiated actions to develop a better understanding of the magnitude of the radiological/nuclear terrorist threat, assess the ability of the federal government to support state and local responses to such attacks, and improve the Nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from these types of attacks. In an era of limited fiscal growth and competing priorities, the federal government will have to enhance its collaboration with state and local governments, the private sector, and academia to ensure that the Nation is capable of responding to a terrorist attack involving radioactive or nuclear material.     

The ALARA principle in the context of a radiological or nuclear emergency

Traditionally, the concept of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) has been applied to the workplace and to protect the public. The goals are to minimize small incremental exposures on a daily basis or per specific task, and on a yearly basis, thereby to keep the total annual dose equivalent as far below regulatory limits as practical. In an extreme emergency caused by radiological or nuclear terrorism, or a large scale radiological accident, it is proposed that the same principles can be applied to protect First Responders against potentially large exposures.     

Proposed framework for cleanup and site restoration following a terrorist incident involving radioactive material

Cleanup following a terrorism incident involving a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) is likely to be technically challenging, costly, and politically charged. Lessons learned from the Top Officials 2 exercise and the increased threat of terrorist use of an RDD or IND have driven federal officials to push for an agreed-upon process for determining appropriate cleanup levels. State and local authorities generally have the ultimate responsibility for final public health decisions in their jurisdictions. In response to terrorist attacks, local authorities are likely to request federal assistance in assessing the risk and establishing appropriate cleanup levels. It is realistic to expect local and state requests for significant federal assistance in planning and implementing recovery operations. State and local authorities may desire "shared accountability" with the federal government in setting the appropriate cleanup levels. Government officials at all levels will face pressure to say how clean is clean enough and how quickly people can re-enter affected areas. Issues arising include (1) the nature of the relationship between the federal, state, and local leadership involved in the recovery efforts and (2) where the funding for recovery comes from. Many agencies, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have long been involved in cleanup activities involving radioactive materials. These agencies have recognized the need for a participatory process and realize the need to remain flexible when faced with possible unprecedented environmental challenges following a terrorist attack. Currently, the Department of Homeland Security has a committee process underway, with participation of the EPA, NRC, DOE, and other federal agencies, to try to resolve these issues and to begin engaging state, local, and tribal governments, and others as appropriate.     

International efforts in countering radiological terrorism

An analysis of the possible goals of terrorists and the means of achieving them leads to an assessment of the most likely target materials and facilities for radiological terrorism. International efforts in countering these terrorist goals cover several objectives. The first is to prevent acquisition of the target radioactive materials, or access to the target facilities. This has to be achieved throughout the life cycle for radioactive sources. The second objective is to detect attempts to acquire, or actual acquisition of, radioactive materials. The third objective is to effectively detect and respond to the use (or threat of use) of these materials, or sabotage of the facilities. An additional goal is to minimize the consequences of any such use or sabotage. The number of international bodies, groups, agencies, and organizations contributing to these goals is very large and almost impossible to catalogue. However, this paper groups the types of efforts that are being undertaken, identifies the key agencies involved, and provides some specific examples of their work.     

单一核武器袭击伤亡情况模拟分析

目的 评估单一核武器攻击后可能对公众造成的伤害及影响范围。方法 利用核武器爆炸参数及大气扩散模型等理论工具,可以计算特定场景的核爆伤亡情况。结果 通过计算得到了潜在冲突热点地区遭受单一核武器攻击后烧伤、冲击伤和放射伤的人数及地域分布情况,并给出核爆影响分布图。结论 鉴于单一核武器袭击造成的严重伤亡情况,建议加强核爆杀伤后果研究,评估现有卫生应急体系,并以此为依据,改进和提高核辐射卫生应急能力。     

Fukushima nuclear incident: the challenges of risk communication

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred off the Sanriku coast of Japan, which resulted in multiple tsunamis. The earthquake and tsunami damaged several nuclear power stations, with the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant being the worst affected, which led Japan to declare a State of Nuclear Emergency. As of November 9, 2011, the National Police Agency of Japan reported a death toll of 15 836 people, with 3664 people still reported missing, following the earthquake and tsunami. Australian radiation health advisers were deployed to Tokyo early in the nuclear emergency to assist the Australian Embassy in assessing the radiological threat, to provide risk advice to Embassy staff and Australian citizens in Japan, and to plan for any further deterioration in the nuclear situation. This article explores the challenges of risk assessment, risk communication, and contingency planning for expatriate staff in the worst nuclear incident since Chernobyl, outlines what measures were successful in addressing heightened perceived risks, and identifies areas where further research is required, particularly in a radiological context.     

Reconstruction of external dose from beta radiation sources of nuclear weapon origin

In response to requests from the Department of Veterans Affairs, a methodology was developed to assess the external dose accrued by personnel in the vicinity of beta radiation sources of nuclear weapon origin. This methodology has been applied in support of the Nuclear Test Personnel Review (NTPR) Program implemented by the Department of Defense. As required by the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 32, Part 218 and Title 38, Part 3.311), the NTPR Program must evaluate radiological hazards from nuclear testing activities that include alpha particle, beta particle, neutron, and photon emissions from radionuclides. Prior to the development of this methodology, only photon and neutron radiations were explicitly quantified for external dose assessments in this program. Alpha radiation of external origin presents no risk for biological effects due to external dose potential to skin tissue because of the particle's very limited range. However, beta particles are sufficiently penetrating to have such potential. Methods are provided to quantify ionizing radiation doses to the skin and lens of the eye from beta radiation sources of nuclear weapon origin located external to the body. This formulation allows the estimation of beta dose from a film badge (gamma) dose or from an equivalent reconstructed gamma dose.     

Testing of high-volume sampler inlets for the sampling of atmospheric radionuclides

Sampling of air for radioactive particles is one of the most important techniques used to determine the nuclear debris from a nuclear weapon test in the Earth's atmosphere or those particles vented from underground or underwater tests. Massive-flow air samplers are used to sample air for any indication of radionuclides that are a signature of nuclear tests. The International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization includes seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and gaseous xenon isotopes sampling technologies, in addition to radionuclide sampling, to monitor for any violation of the treaty. Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute has developed a large wind tunnel to test the outdoor radionuclide samplers for the International Monitoring System. The inlets for these samplers are tested for their collection efficiencies for different particle sizes at various wind speeds. This paper describes the results from the testing of two radionuclide sampling units used in the International Monitoring System. The possible areas of depositional wall losses are identified and the losses in these areas are determined. Sampling inlet type 1 was tested at 2.2 m s wind speed for 5, 10, and 20-microm aerodynamic diameter particles. The global collection efficiency was about 87.6% for 10-microm particles for sampling inlet type 1. Sampling inlet type 2 was tested for three wind speeds at 0.56, 2.2, and 6.6 m s for 5, 10, and 20-microm aerodynamic diameter particles in two different configurations (sampling head lowered and raised). The global collection efficiencies for these configurations for 10-microm particles at 2.2 m s wind speed were 77.4% and 82.5%, respectively. The sampling flow rate was 600 m h for both sampling inlets.     

Justification for a Nuclear Global Health Workforce: multidisciplinary analysis of risk,survivability & preparedness,with emphasis on the triage management of thermal burns

Major challenges and crises in global health will not be solved by health alone; requiring rather a multidisciplinary, evidence-based analytical approach to prevention, preparedness and response. One such potential crisis is the continued spread of nuclear weapons to more nations concurrent with the increased volatility of international relations that has significantly escalated the risk of a major nuclear weapon exchange. This study argues for the development of a multidisciplinary global health response agenda based on the reality of the current political analysis of nuclear risk, research evidence suggesting higher-than-expected survivability risk, and the potential for improved health outcomes based on medical advances. To date, the medical consequences of such an exchange are not credibly addressed by any nation at this time, despite recent advances. While no one country could mount such a response, an international body of responders organized in the same fashion as the current World Health Organization’s global health workforce initiative for large-scale natural and public health emergencies could enlist and train for just such an emergency. A Nuclear Global Health Workforce is described for addressing the unprecedented medical and public health needs to be expected in the event of a nuclear conflict or catastrophic accident. The example of addressing mass casualty nuclear thermal burns outlines the potential triage and clinical response management of survivors enabled by this global approach.     

Medical effects of internal contamination with actinides: further controversy on depleted uranium and radioactive warfare

The Nuclear Age began in 1945 with testing in New Mexico, USA, and the subsequent bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Regardless of attempts to limit the development of nuclear weapons, the current world arsenal has reached the staggering dimensions and presents a significant concern for the biosphere and mankind. In an explosion of a nuclear weapon, over 400 radioactive isotopes are released into the biosphere, 40 of which pose potential dangers including iodine, cesium, alkaline earths, and actinides. The immediate health effects of nuclear explosions include thermal, mechanical, and acute radiation syndrome. Long-term effects include radioactive fallout, internal contamination, and long-term genotoxicity. The current controversial concern over depleted uranium’s somatic and genetic toxicity is still a subject of worldwide sustained research. The host of data generated in the past decades has demonstrated conflicting findings, with the most recent evidence showing that its genotoxicity is greater than previously considered. Of particular concern are the osteotropic properties of uranium isotopes due to their final retention in the crystals of exchangeable and nonexchangeable bone as well as their proximity to pluripotent stem cells. Depleted uranium remains an unresolved issue in both warfare and the search for alternative energy sources.     

Countermeasures and vaccination against terrorism using smallpox: pre-event and post-event smallpox vaccination and its contraindications

Smallpox, when used as a biological weapon, presents a serious threat to civilian populations. Core components of the public health management of a terrorism attack using smallpox are: vaccination (ring vaccination and mass vaccination), adverse event monitoring, confirmed and suspected smallpox case management, contact management, identifying, tracing, monitoring contacts, and quarantine. Above all, pre-event and post-event vaccination is an indispensable part of the strategies. Since smallpox patients are most infectious from onset of the rash through the first 7–10 days of the rash, vaccination should be administered promptly within a limited time frame. However, vaccination can accompany complications, such as postvaccinial encephalitis, progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and generalized vaccinia. Therefore, vaccination is not recommended for certain groups. Public health professionals, as well as physicians and government officials, should also be well equipped with all information necessary for appropriate and effective smallpox management in the face of such a bioterrorism attack.     

Biological and toxin terrorism weapons

The use of biological agents and toxins in warfare and terrorism has a long history. Human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins can cause disease and can be used as a threat to humans, animals and staple crops. The same is true for biological agents. Although the use of biological agents and toxins in military conflicts has been a concern of military communities for many years, several recent events have increased the awareness of terrorist use of these weapons against civilian population. A Mass Casualty Biological (Toxin) Weapon (MCBTW) is any biological and toxin weapon capable of causing death or disease on a large scale, such that the military or civilian infrastructure of the state or organization being attacked is overwhelmed. A militarily significant (or terrorist) weapon is any weapon capable of affecting, directly or indirectly, that is physically or psychologically, the outcome of a military operation. Although many biological agents such as toxins and bioregulators can be used to cause diseases, there are only a few that can truly threaten civilian populations on a large scale. Bioregulators or modulators are biochemical compounds, such as peptides, that occur naturally in organisms. They are new class of weapons that can damage nervous system, alter moods, trigger psychological changes and kill. The potential military or terrorist use of bioregulators is similar to that of toxins. Some of these compounds are several hundred times more potent than traditional chemical warfare agents. Important features and military advantages of new bioregulators are novel sites of toxic action; rapid and specific effects; penetration of protective filters and equipment, and militarily effective physical incapacitation. This overview of biological agents and toxins is largely intended to help healthcare providers on all levels to make decisions in protecting general population from these agents.     

RADCONTAB 1.0: a look-up tables tool for radiological assessment of contaminated land on Nuclear Licensed sites.

This note describes a simple electronic spreadsheet 'look-up tables' tool (RADCONTAB version 1.0), developed by British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) to facilitate the radiological assessment of land affected by existing 'historic' radioactive contamination on UK Nuclear Licensed sites. The specification and design of the tool have been subject to open consultation and peer review. The tool with accompanying guide is now freely available on the internet.