Si je vous dis « rouge », à quoi pensez-vous ?! Discussion autour d’une dynamique associative inconsciente

PurposesThis article aims to deepen a theoretical model of the psychic apparatus introduced in a previous work, in particular one of its main characteristics: the presence, at the center of its functioning, of an unconscious dynamic of perceptive association partly inherited from the primary process of the Freudian theory.MethodThe article first surveys Freud's writings about three psychic phenomena: dreams, slips of the tongue, and jokes. Analyzing these works suggests a theoretical difficulty concerning two processes (primary and secondary) considered to be opposites by Freud, and leads to an alternative applied by our model. The article then moves on to the famous experiments conducted by Alfred Binet with his hysterical patients at the end of the 19th century, in which the so-called phenomenon of “double consciousness” was put on display.ResultsIt appears that the unconscious dynamic of perceptive association is always a driver of psychic life, in both unconscious phenomena as well as in regular thinking. It typically operates when we facetiously ask the reader: “If I say ‘red’, what comes to mind?” This dynamic seems to bring to the natural mechanism of thinking some proprieties of condensation and displacement already identified by Freud, in a more intense form, in the making of dreams and attributed to his primary process. More precisely, thinking appears to be the product of this dynamic, given that it is supervised by the activity of the field of consciousness, simultaneously able to activate and channel it.DiscussionThe irruption of dreams possibly results from a kind of switching in the collaboration between consciousness and the unconscious system during sleep: the lowering of conscious activity then opens the way for the associative dynamic of the unconscious whereas, on the contrary, the former tightens its grips in the alert thinking. More generally, we can consider that thinking, in all its forms, always depends on the control exercised by the field of consciousness over the associative dynamic of the unconscious. A great freedom given to the latter would necessarily be a condition for artistic creation, for example.ConclusionOur reflections and model clearly borrow from Freudian theory, while also clearly departing from it in several respects. Starting from the dynamic of the unconscious system, this article highlights the importance of conscious activity when Freud instead tended to minimize it. From this perspective, our model would appear to occupy a middle ground between Freud's and Janet's.     

What Little Hans Learned

In Hobson's model, the dream is a psychological event initiated and shaped by the functioning of the brain during sleep. Hobson's study of isomorphism between brain function and dream imagery has the potential to add another dimension as psychoanalysts think about the determinants of the dream from the point of view of the brain and neurobiology. I intend to explore briefly what Hobson's ideas may offer psychoanalysts about the form of the manifest dream and about the functioning of REM sleep in developing the brain's capacity to predict experience in the external world. I hope to interest Hobson and colleagues in other disciplines in the role of psychological defense in the selection of imagery in the manifest dream and in the functioning of unconscious motivation in the construction of internal models of reality.     

Consciousness

For decades Allan Hobson has proclaimed Freud's dream theory as thoroughly mistaken. He has also suggested that Freud's use of the mistaken tenets of 19th-century neurology undermined not just that theory, but also the fundamental psychoanalytic propositions of Freud's (1900/1950b) mental apparatus as conceptualized in Chapter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams. He is wrong on both accounts! Freud's theory of dreams remains an accurate general framework in which to understand and explore the origins, nature, and meaning of dreams. In addition, embodied within Freud's model of the mental apparatus are inferences about brain processes not just relevant to dreams but also to conscious perception, memory, reality testing, and creativity that are remarkably consonant with modern neuroscientific understanding.     

Erich Fromm: Clinician and Social Philosopher

After many years of radical criticism of Freudian dream theory on the grounds of his and others' neurophysiological findings, Allan Hobson now proposes a new model of the dreaming brain that is remarkably consistent with Freud's. This revision was necessitated by recent neuroscientific findings. Hobson is to be commended for his openness to the new evidence, but he does not make sufficiently clear how closely his new model resembles Freud's. The main focus of my article is to make these parallels explicit, so as to clarify the remaining points of difference. Fortunately, it appears that these points can now be resolved experimentally.     

On a Case of Bulimia

Freud proposed two sharply contrasting conceptions of the body's place in mental structure. Both were radical departures from established views of the mind. In the first, body-based thought is rooted in the drives and instincts. It is primitive in contrast to the body-free, logical, and rational thought of maturity. Freud remained committed to this view in his formal conceptions of the mind throughout his working life. It remains the one most fully accepted in psychoanalytic thought today.

Less formally, particularly in conceptions of the “accidental” factors that structure the primary processes, “stereotype plates” that pattern our experience, thinking as “action in the mind,” and “internalizations” that form our inner worlds, he suggested an even more radical notion. In this view, “bodily” refers to the behavioral patterns (of personal motivation, action, attitude, wish, and feeling) as opposed to mental ones. Body-based patterns occur primitively, but they may also become mental and structure the mind at the highest levels of sophistication. Neither in Freud's time nor subsequently, however, has it been possible to integrate this second view of the bodily in mental functioning into the accepted psychoanalytic theory of mind.

Now, however, developing perspectives in psychoanalysis provide a framework in which this second view can be accommodated. In this model the mind is initially composed of social-emotional-behavioral patterns (in Stern's useful term, “patterns of lived experience”) established in familial life (Freud's “accidental” factors that form “stereotype plates”). These patterns, articulated and modified in the course of development, can increasingly be activated mentally with or without accompanying bodily action (Freud's “action in the mind” and “internalization”). These, rather than the rational-logical processes of traditional thought, constitute the mature mind.     

Conscience et perception : contradictions de la théorie freudienne et perte d’un héritage philosophique

This paper uses the notion of consciousness as a starting point and a guideline for a theoretical discussion aiming to demonstrate the contradictions and impossibilities of the successive representations of the psychic apparatus that are the two Freudian topics, and justifying a change in the theory: splitting the notions of perception and consciousness and, consequently abandoning the Perception-Conscious system (Pcpt-Cs), which was the central element of Freud's thinking when evolving from his first to his second topic. Freud was unknowingly referring to and rephrasing one of Descartes’ postulates, which is incompatible as such with the concept of unconsciousness. From an epistemological standpoint, it is ironical that the philosophical school of thought, which proposed, after Leibniz and before Freud, the hypothesis of an unconscious life, sustainably defended, as the very basis of this hypothesis, the principle of a separation between perception and consciousness. This is something, which Freud never realized.     

History of Aphasia Freud as an aphasiologist

Between 1891 and 1901, Sigmund Freud published both psychoanalytic and neurological works. This review analyses the interactions between Freud's On the interpretation of the aphasias (1891) and the development of psychoanalytic concepts, as well as Freud's theoretical views on brain–mind interrelations and his neurolinguistic theory. It is pointed out that in his aphasia book, Freud developed elements of a neurobiological theory of cognition and behaviour that became important for the theoretical foundation of psychoanalysis. Although Jackson, whom Freud regarded highly, had understood that people communicate by propositions, Freud followed Wernicke in that the word and the word concept were the basis of language. This assumption guided the interpretation of associations in psychoanalysis. For aphasiology, Freud is one proponent among others who criticised mechanistic localisationist theories. His major obstacle was the lack of linguistic theories. Freud's influence on aphasiology was rather limited, mainly because his book was hardly read, to his dismay.     

The bioplasma concept and body-mind communication systems

The early obstacle in body-mind formulations was Freud's inability to demonstrate dynamic communications from internal organ cells to brain-mind transformations. Hence arose “metapsychology”. This dilemma was Freud's famous “Project” blocked by the “edict” that the brain could not directly influence the pituitary.In 1949 in $\text{The Growth Concept of Nervous Integration}$ I stated that the brain did directly influence the pituitary. There I developed equations showing that the brain acted as $\text{a force of growth}$ toward its own body while behaving as “computer-composer” outwardly. Guillemin and Schally in separate researches have recently proven the point.Here, using cancer and heart attack dreams capable of forewarning, I describe the tissue-cell “sending system” and the brain's “receiving-transforming” systems. The “sending system” results from the concept of cytoplasm as $\text{a true bioplasma}$ of measurable biophysical proportions. It amplifies the already known attributes of the double helix. The brain's “receiving-transforming system” includes prefrontal-temporal lobe interplay integrated with alert-alarm mechanisms (RAS). From 1953 to the present, I have named this system $\text{the paraconscious}$ to differentiate it from the previous Freudian systems of consciousness with which the paraconscious co-exists. (Cf. The Image of the Heart (1956) : $\text{Psychoanalysis of Heart Attack}$ (1967) and other papers).The paraconscious acts as a “life-process protective barrier” in its discharge of tension in dreams (the “dream-screen”) and as energy-mobilizer against shock.Both forewarning cancer dreams and heart attack dreams can be seen as paraconscious operation. Since 1953–1956 I have stated that heart attack is basic paraconscious injury (now including genetic effects in the arterial bioplasma as in familial xanthomatosis). There is no such thing as a unique “heart attack personality type”.The warning cancer dream and “recovery-from-cancer” dreams show “tearing-apart” of body symmetry and of the sense of reality including gender-reality.Heart attack dreams show severe distortion of the heart's imagery with the familiar “Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde” configuration, including symbols of Self as clever near-animals. Hence the “drive” to fame and wealth at all impossible, magic, near-animal costs.The mathematic biophysical equations of the bioplasma and their implications are in the process of publication in a separate work.     

Unusual case report: Do violent dreams cause violent acts?

For most people most of the time nocturnal dreams seem to have a life of their own with little, if any, recognisable relevance to life in the waking state. Freud and other theorists have attempted to relate nocturnal dreams to underlying impulses and conflicts which also affect one's mental state when awake. In only a few mental disorders has the manifest content of dreams achieved widely accepted diagnostic significance. The case presented here demonstrates that a patient's tenuous hold on reality can allow manifest dream content to direct the patient's waking behaviour. In this case the dream content seemed to identify the potential victim and to prime the patient to take violent action. For the astute clinician, careful attention to violent dreams may help to anticipate both violent acts and specific victims and to make appropriate, preventive interventions.     

The “Voice” of Breakdown: On Facing the Unbearable Traumatic Experience in Psychoanalytic Work

This article weaves together three major contributions to the theory of trauma and repetition compulsion: Freud's (1920/1955b) reformulation in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” of his metapsychological theory regarding the notion of trauma and the compulsion to repeat traumatic experiences and traumatic dreams; Cathy Caruth's (1996) elaboration, based on a dramatic story in Freud's article, of “the voice that cries out, a voice that is released through the double wound”; and Winnicott's (1963/1986, 1965/1989a) unique ideas about the early unthinkable breakdown that has not yet been experienced and has to be relived and experienced in analysis.

The author explores the clinical implications of the intricate relation between knowing and not-knowing in facing trauma, which is simultaneously demanding and inaccessible, massively dissociated, and thus never and forever there. In particular, she relates to the profound difficulty of hearing the “voice” of breakdown that cries out from the belated “double wounding,” the critical importance of experiencing the unexperienced with the analyst; and the immensity of the terror and hope that is at the heart of reaching to the original unbearable traumatization in psychoanalytic work. Three detailed clinical illustrations from psychoanalytic writings and an autobiographical essay by Virginia Woolf are presented.     

Psychosomatic Symptoms as Physical Dreams: Emotional Experiences Given Expression through the Body

This article offers a view of psychosomatic symptoms as experiential phenomena that function as “physical dreams.” The author suggests a way of perceiving psychosomatic symptoms either as "undreamt" dreams or as "interrupted" dreams, reflecting the various ways in which patients are able to utilize their symptoms in undertaking unconscious psychological work. For this work to be carried out, patients, as well as their analysts, need to have some ability to engage in intersubjective “dream-work” with the patient’s symptomatology. In the tradition of Bion's conception of the dual function of the contact-barrier, I propose viewing psychosomatic symptoms as constructions by which aspects of the psyche-soma are rendered conscious or unconscious in the service of psychological work. With the analyst's aid, the analysand may restart his or her interrupted “physical” dreaming and/or (re)form an “undreamt” dream, transferring and transforming “physical” into “psychical” material and verse versa.     

Commençons par écarter tous les faits. Quelques réflexions freudiennes et lyotardiennes sur la réalité psychique

ObjectivesThe aim of this article is to question the Freudian notion of psychic reality, by asking ourselves whether it prefigures the recognition of a form of emancipation from the facts of the world. The assertion that fact often carry less weight than certain thoughts is at the heart of the Freudian notion of psychic reality. Indeed, Freud is not content, when he discovers the depth of hysterical fantasies, to ask that psychic reality be taken into account alongside practical reality, nor that it not be confused with material reality; instead, he endeavors to show that the unconscious literally ignores the difference between fact and desire. Thus, the difficulty is not only that of an overestimation of reality and an underestimation of fantasy. Nor is it confined to neurosis, which places psychic reality above factual reality, but it is necessary to admit the superiority and even the domination of psychic reality in the formation of many contents of representation: in the unconscious, nothing distinguishes desire from fact. Therefore it is very difficult to differentiate between “normal” beings, who would only trust realities, and neurotics, who would react with the greatest seriousness to thoughts alone. The point is delicate and will be at the heart of the Freudian discussion, an open-ended discussion on whether the original act of parricide is an historical truth or more of a fantasy.MethodTo discuss these questions, I will compare the reflections on the unconscious found in S. Freud and in the French philosopher J.-F. Lyotard, who both commented on Freudian texts devoted to fantasy but also drew inspiration from Freudian theories, while putting them at a distance, in order to forge his own conception of the unconscious and of affect. The first step will be a reconstruction of this great unconscious scene from which any formation powerfully invested with affect has more value and importance than its denial by reality or the so-called objective facts. In a second step, I will ask whether the Freudian psychic model is thus only an anticipation of the empire of the post-truth or whether Freud also fails to spot unmistakable signals of reality or signs that are not themselves mere layers of interpretation. I will then question the Freudian idea, formulated in The Interpretation of Dreams, according to which affect is always right, at least as far as its quality is concerned. It is well understood that affects, like representations, can be reversed into their opposite. It seems, however, that affects are less subject to modification than the contents of the representation. Following Jean-François Lyotard's philosophical interpretation of the Freudian notion of affect, which leads him to elaborate the notion of “affect-phrase,” I will, in a third step, summon this affective voice that would testify – in truth – without representing anything and without ever “lying.”ResultsThe comparison of Freud and Lyotard allows for the establishment of a connection between the question of the meaning to be given to the notions of psychic reality and fantasy and that of unconscious affect. Indeed, it seems that what prevents us from assimilating the unconscious to a place only containing facts of desire, completely devoid of any index of reality or referenciality, from concluding, in so doing, that nothing is a sign towards reality or that it is only constituted of interpretative layers that we never finish going through, is perhaps that fantasy can create an event on the psychic “stage” – and that this possibility is conditioned by a strong investment in affects.DiscussionThe aim is to initiate a discussion about the points of similarity between a thought and the unconscious, as well as their differences, in terms of Freud's “small unconscious things.” This is followed by a discussion on the distinction between thought and unconscious in Lyotard, in terms of sentences, affect sentences.ConclusionThe double view of affectivity based on the thoughts of Freud and Lyotard displaces the idea of an unconscious, in a way that is post-factual. Admittedly, the full and complete motivation or justification of affect derives from the recognition of psychic realities on which these affects are based. Nevertheless, these affects signify the existence of a dimension of psychic reality that goes beyond the structure of the layers of fantasy or interpretation that one never stops going through and that constitute the unconscious as a reality devoid of facts. In this article, I have insisted on the importance of the Freudian idea formulated from the Interpretation of Dreams, according to which the affect is always true, as to its quality. In the same way, I have argued that, in the last period of his thought, Lyotard presents the affect or infantia as a fact of the unconscious.     

The Form of Play in the Shape and Unity of Self

In The Three Essays, Sigmund Freud advances a radical account of gender, sexuality, and knowledge. The power and implications of his account remain underappreciated, even within contemporary psychoanalysis. Freud portrays masculinity and femininity as equally problematic and painfully acquired social constructs. Concepts such as the unconscious and desire further undermine conventional ideas about masculinity and femininity, sexuality and rationality. Despite objectionable statements about women, Freud's ideas subvert traditional justifications for male dominance. Freud makes the equally radical claim that there is no intrinsic relationship between anatomical difference and sexual desire. Heterosexuality is neither the “natural” expression of the drive for pleasure nor a consequence of anatomical difference. Conventional gender arrangements and sexual identities reflect socially conditioned channeling of desire. Despite the supposed pervasiveness of psychoanalytic thinking, such ideas contravene conventional Western thinking. Taken seriously they undermine dominant notions of gender relations, ideologies of the family, and theories of knowledge and the mind. Such still scandalous ideas partially account for the persistent disrepute of Freud's ideas.     

Toward a Theoretical Integration of Psychotherapies

It is no accident, in our highly materialist culture, that the neuroscientists are now taking their turn in the exploration of dreaming. Following a technological expansion of all our capacities (muscles, eyes, ears, etc.) over the centuries, it is now onto “the mind,” consciousness, and dreams. With a “war” on the significance of inner experience in our culture (e.g., managed care), only the material realm (brain-stuff, medication, and behavior control) seems to be taken seriously. Despite such limitations, the brain-dream scientists are contributing their significant research and may well lead to a deeper understanding of dreams. Meanwhile, it is clear that from the point of view of Zeitgeist, the materialists are in the ascendance as they explore dream life.     

Inconscients et Mémoires : considérations sur les recherches en neurosciences et l’approche freudienne de ces notions

The word of “memory” is such a complex and rich concept. But behind this simple word, a lot of different memories have been divided during last decades. Different models have been established like the Tulving's model or the Squire's model but there are still lot of researches about different kind of memories. It's such a specific domain that there are many studies about specific memories like declarative memory with the semantic memory and the episodic memory, or non-declarative memory which includes procedural memory, priming and perceptual learning or non-associative learning. Each specific memory is a wonderful and limitless perspective of researches and new discoveries. But we must add to these distinctions between all this kind of memories, the difference between a conscious or an unconscious treatment of the information stocked in memories. Due to the studies of these phenomenons, we are about to go further in comprehension of memory's working. With neurosciences and cognitive psychology, we can use the concept of “cognitive unconscious” and, with Freud and his conception of memory, we can still summon this other unconscious that we have to define as “Freudian”. Because this is a real issue to understand how the unconscious and obviously memory have an influence on conscious life. Like Freud said, many acts, many choices, even many sentences when we speak consciously, have a curious origin. What we are interested in is the understanding of the relation between elements stored in memories, such as episodic memory, semantic memory, or autobiographical memory, and the specific moment of awareness. Then we must include processes like sorting, weighting and selecting information. At last, we must add the fundamental question in Freudian theory: the influence of unconscious mental life on our acts and our conscious thoughts. Thus armed, we can study the singularity of the conscious answer, its specificity and the multiple influences that participated in its emergence. Memories, especially because they are based on a partially unconscious mode, are precious to understand the cognitive as well as subjective mechanisms that lead to consciousness. They allow to study brain's mechanisms, but also to ask the question of the causality of conscious mental life. Then, we can go further in these reflections on memory studying how from neural functions to elaborate and conscious metacognitive work, subjectivity emerge in every human being. Because through the different memories, the Freudian unconscious and consciousness we can try to understand how the accumulation of elements lead to an original and singular answer that would be the possible signature of subjectivity in human kind.     

“A Psychotherapy for the People”

The development of psychoanalytic technique can be traced in part to the dialogues between Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, dialogues that took place in the context of psychoanalysis's encounter with poverty and destitution in the wake of World War I. These dialogues, which served as precursors to contemporary, especially Relational, psychoanalysis, also inspired Freud's call for greater psychoanalytic engagement with the poorest and most vulnerable. This inspired the early psychoanalysts to “sharpen in all directions the sense of social justice” by engaging in political activism, experimenting with clinical technique, and by promoting short-term, more affordable treatments. The relevance of this history for clinical work with diverse populations will be discussed, and aspects of contemporary psychoanalysis (countertransference, enactment, new relational experience) will be understood in light of Freud and Ferenczi's responsiveness to the underprivileged.     

Qu’est-ce qu’une fiction ? Anatomie des fictions de Freud à Lacan

Aims

When the issue is the relationship between psychoanalysis and fiction, fiction is often envisaged from the point of view of art and literature. This perspective is essential, yet it is important not to underestimate another little explored aspect: the epistemology of fiction, which relates at once to fiction as a form of knowledge and to the theory of fiction. Thus, the aim of this article is to identify different types of fiction and to determine how they took shape in different philosophical traditions, from Freud to Lacan. In this context, this text sets out to link the possible meanings of the word “fiction” in psychoanalytic thought and classic theories of fiction. This approach thus has a critical dimension, exploring various types of fiction – “aesthetic fictions”, “heuristic fictions”, “constructions”, “speculations” and “symbolic fictions”.

Analysis of the Dream Contents in Japanese College Students by REMP-Awakening Technique

Abstract: An experiment was performed on 39 college students aged from 19 to 21 years using the REMP-awakening technique. The contents of 297 dreams were analyzed according to the Hall-Van de Castle scale. The recall rate was 76% (home) and 85.5% (laboratory). The dream with past experiences was 75% (home), 64.9% (laboratory) and the bizarre dream was 30.5% (home), 28.8% (laboratory) and the dream experiment was 3.6% (home) and 11.7% (laboratory). Emotional and color dreams were noted more in females than in males. Female dreamers tended to be the victim of aggressive dreams as compared with the males. In our student dreams, there were more characters and they dreamed more about food and less about movement activity than in the American students of Hall & Van de Castle. From the polygraphic records, the relation between verbal activity and submental EMG activity, the pulse rate variability and emotionality in dreams, the number of reported dreams and the amount of body movement, eye movement density and the vividness of dream contents were revealed.     

Fragmentation as a Defense in Large Groups

Not all kinds of irrationality are equal. The comparative study of dreams, brain damage, and psychopathology can reveal the “grammar of irrationality,” the rules of what can and cannot happen in various states of consciousness. We may then modify and refine the properties of the “system unconscious” described by Freud (1915). Examples are provided of “disjunctive cognitions” and “interobjects” which suggest constraints on the irrational combinations and distortions that are possible in dreams. Further exploration of these phenomena and their underlying neural mechanisms may help clarify the neurobiology of transference. Unusual experiences of nested reality in dreams suggest also that reality may be a quality that our minds can apply to an experience. We should study not only “reality testing,” but also “reality assignment.”     

Psychoanalytic Intervention with Children

By taking a social psychological approach, this article seeks to offer an alternative perspective to the traditional psychoanalytic studies of Freud and Ferenczi's close personal and professional relationship, and the rift that occurred in the early 1930s. It is suggested that the socially constructed, divergent roles that these two men fulfilled in the psychoanalysis movement deeply influenced the dynamics of their relationship. It is further proposed that the ever-present, conflicted political interdependence that characterized Freud's and Ferenczi's home countries (Austria and Hungary, respectively) may have affected them differently, and contributed to their divergent attitudes towards power and other issues relevant to the development of psychoanalytic theory and technique, as well as how they related to one another personally.