Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and healthcare workers

The recent outbreak of severe acute respiratory synt drome (SARS) was spread by international air travel, a direct result of globalization. The disease is caused by a novel coronavirus, transmitted from human to human by droplets or by direct contact. Healthcare workers (HCWs) were at high risk and accounted for a fifth of all cases globally. Risk factors for infection in HCWs included lack of awareness and preparedness when the disease first struck, poor institutional infection control measures, lack of training in infection control procedures, poor compliance with the use of personal protection equipment (PPE), exposure to high-risk procedures such as intubation and nebulization, and exposure to unsuspected SARS patients. Measures to prevent nosocomial infection included establishing isolation wards for triage, SARS patients, and step-down; training and monitoring hospital staff in infection-control procedures; active and passive screening of HCWs; enforcement of droplet and contact precautions; and compliance with the use of PPE.     

88例SARS密切接触者流行病学调查

目的　探讨SARS密切接触者中是否有隐性感染者及评估防制措施的落实情况。方法　对广元市 88名SARS患者密切接触者进行随访 ,用“SARS病例密切接触者调查问卷”调查密切接触者的人口学特征、接触情况、防护情况及身体状况 ,用酶联免疫双抗原夹心法检测血清中特异性SARS冠状病毒总抗体水平。结果　 4名医务工作者检出SARS病毒总抗体阳性 ,阳性率 4 5 % ;密切接触者的个人综合防护率为 14 8% ;医务防疫人员在国家将SARS纳入法定传染病管理前后 ,个人综合防护率有显著提高 (R控制前 =9 5 % ;R控制后 =2 9 1% ,P <0 0 5 )。结论　SABS密切接触者中存在隐性感染者 ;及早采取综合防制措施可有效控制SARS的流行 ;加强高危人群个人防护和控制医院内感染是防制工作的重点     

Cluster of cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome among Toronto healthcare workers after implementation of infection control precautions: a case series.

OBJECTIVE: To review the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) infection control practices, the types of exposure to patients with SARS, and the activities associated with treatment of such patients among healthcare workers (HCWs) who developed SARS in Toronto, Canada, after SARS-specific infection control precautions had been implemented. METHODS: A retrospective review of work logs and patient assignments, detailed review of medical records of patients with SARS, and comprehensive telephone-based interviews of HCWs who met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. RESULTS: Seventeen HCWs from 6 hospitals developed disease that met the case definition for SARS after implementation of infection control precautions. These HCWs had a mean age (+/-SD) of 39+/-2.3 years. Two HCWs were not interviewed because of illness. Of the remaining 15, only 9 (60%) reported that they had received formal infection control training. Thirteen HCWs (87%) were unsure of proper order in which personal protective equipment should be donned and doffed. Six HCWs (40%) reused items (eg, stethoscopes, goggles, and cleaning equipment) elsewhere on the ward after initial use in a room in which a patient with SARS was staying. Use of masks, gowns, gloves, and eyewear was inconsistent among HCWs. Eight (54%) reported that they were aware of a breach in infection control precautions. HCWs reported fatigue due to an increased number and length of shifts; participants worked a median of 10 shifts during the 10 days before onset of symptoms. Seven HCWs were involved in the intubation of a patient with SARS. One HCW died, and the remaining 16 recovered. CONCLUSION: Multiple factors were likely responsible for SARS in these HCWs, including the performance of high-risk patient care procedures, inconsistent use of personal protective equipment, fatigue, and lack of adequate infection control training.     

Lack of SARS transmission among public hospital workers, Vietnam

The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Vietnam was amplified by nosocomial spread within hospital A, but no transmission was reported in hospital B, the second of two designated SARS hospitals. Our study documents lack of SARS-associated coronavirus transmission to hospital B workers, despite variable infection control measures and the use of personal protective equipment.     

Using an integrated infection control strategy during outbreak control to minimize nosocomial infection of severe acute respiratory syndrome among healthcare workers

Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) while caring for SARS patients. Personal protective equipment and negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs) have not been completely successful in protecting HCWs. We introduced an innovative, integrated infection control strategy involving triaging patients using barriers, zones of risk, and extensive installation of alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing. This integrated infection control approach was implemented at a SARS designated hospital ('study hospital') where NPIRs were not available. The number of HCWs who contracted SARS in the study hospital was compared with the number of HCWs who contracted SARS in 86 Taiwan hospitals that did not use the integrated infection control strategy. Two HCWs contracted SARS in the study hospital (0.03 cases/bed) compared with 93 HCWs in the other hospitals (0.13 cases/bed) during the same three-week period. Our strategy appeared to be effective in reducing the incidence of HCWs contracting SARS. The advantages included rapid implementation without NPIRs, flexibility to transfer patients, and re-inforcement for HCWs to comply with infection control procedures, especially handwashing. The efficacy and low cost are major advantages, especially in countries with large populations at risk and fewer economic resources.     

18例医护人员SARS感染调查分析

目的为进一步探讨医护人员SARS感染的危险因素,更好地预防和控制医护人员在医院感染的发病率. 方法对本院2003年3月31日～4月30日,18例医护人员SARS感染因素进行调查. 结果医护人员SARS感染与个人防护、岗前培训、近距离接触SARS患者有关. 结论医护人员接触患者时必须做好个人防护、岗前培训,管理人员应加强在岗期间的督导工作.     

医务人员SARS感染的危险因素病例对照研究

目的 了解医院医务人员感染严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)的相关危险因素。方法 应用病例对照研究设计,采用统一的调查表,调查接触和诊治SARS患者的医务人员造成感染SARS的可疑危险因素,以SARS患者为病例.未被感染者为对照,用SPSS 10.0软件进行单因素分析,SAS6.12进行多因素非条件logistic回归分析。结果 在所调查的49种因素中,27种与SARS感染显著关联,其中22种因素为保护性因素,5种为危险性因素。多因素非条件logistic回归分析结果显示:戴眼镜、受分泌物喷溅污染、穿防护服、从事现职时间、与患者接触方式和口罩类型等6种因素在SARS院内感染中起到重要作用。结论 医务人员在诊治SARS患者中,其医疗活动所涉及诸多因素与促使或造成感染有关,建议医务人员在临床诊治SARS患者时,防护重点应放在口罩、眼罩和防护服的穿戴上。     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome: lessons from Singapore

An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in Singapore in March 2003. To illustrate the problems in diagnosing and containing SARS in the hospital, we describe a case series and highlight changes in triage and infection control practices that resulted. By implementing these changes, we have stopped the nosocomial transmission of the virus.An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first recognized in Singapore on March 12, 2003. The index patient was hospitalized at Tan Tock Seng Hospital, which has since become the country’s designated SARS hospital. The patient infected 20 other people (including patients and healthcare workers), who subsequently became the sources for secondary spread of the infection (1). As of June 12, 2003, a total of 206 cases and 31 deaths attributed to SARS had been reported in Singapore.We describe the important lessons learned during the triage and containment of SARS at the National University Hospital, Singapore. Both involved expanding isolation criteria to include all patients with undifferentiated fever (even in the absence of respiratory symptoms or chest x-ray changes), improving contact-tracing methods, enforcing the use of fit-tested personal protective equipment in all patient-care areas, avoiding aerosol-generating procedures, and carefully monitoring all healthcare workers for fever or respiratory symptoms. We also highlight the impact of these measures on preventing the entry and nosocomial spread of infection.     

The 2003 SARS outbreak and its impact on infection control practices

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged recently as a new infectious disease that was transmitted efficiently in the healthcare setting and particularly affected healthcare workers (HCWs), patients and visitors. The efficiency of transmission within healthcare facilities was recognised following significant hospital outbreaks of SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The causative agent of SARS was identified as a novel coronavirus, the SARS coronavirus. This was largely spread by direct or indirect contact with large respiratory droplets, although airborne transmission has also been reported. High infection rates among HCWs led initially to the theory that SARS was highly contagious and the concept of 'super-spreading events'. Such events illustrated that lack of infection control (IC) measures or failure to comply with IC precautions could lead to large-scale hospital outbreaks. SARS was eventually contained by the stringent application of IC measures that limited exposure of HCWs to potentially infectious individuals. As the 'global village' becomes smaller and other microbial threats to health emerge, or re-emerge, there is an urgent need to develop a global strategy for infection control in hospitals. This paper provides an overview of the main IC practices employed during the 2003 SARS outbreak, including management measures, dedicated SARS hospitals, personal protective equipment, isolation, handwashing, environmental decontamination, education and training. The psychological and psychosocial impact on HCWs during the outbreak are also discussed. Requirements for IC programmes in the post-SARS period are proposed based on the major lessons learnt from the SARS outbreak.     

Factors associated with critical-care healthcare workers' adherence to recommended barrier precautions during the Toronto severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak.

OBJECTIVE: To assess factors associated with adherence to recommended barrier precautions among healthcare workers (HCWs) providing care to critically ill patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). SETTING: Fifteen acute care hospitals in Ontario, Canada. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study. PATIENTS: All patients with SARS who required intubation during the Toronto SARS outbreak in 2003. PARTICIPANTS: HCWs who provided care to or entered the room of a SARS patient during the period from 24 hours before intubation until 4 hours after intubation. METHODS: Standardized interviews were conducted with eligible HCWs to assess their interactions with the SARS patient, their use of barrier precautions, their practices for removing personal protective equipment, and the infection control training they received. RESULTS: Of 879 eligible HCWs, 795 (90%) participated. In multivariate analysis, the following predictors of consistent adherence to recommended barrier precautions were identified: recognition of the patient as a SARS case (odds ratio [OR], 2.5 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 1.5-4.5); recent infection control training (OR for interactive training, 2.7 [95% CI, 1.7-4.4]; OR for passive training, 1.7 [95% CI, 1.0-3.0]), and working in a SARS unit (OR, 4.0 [95% CI, 1.8-8.9]) or intensive care unit (OR, 4.3 [95% CI, 2.0-9.0]). Two factors were associated with significantly lower rates of consistent adherence: the provision of care for patients with higher Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) II scores (OR for score APACHE II of 20 or greater, 0.4 [95% CI, 0.28-0.68]) and work on shifts that required more frequent room entry (OR for 6 or more entries per shift, 0.5 [95% CI, 0.32-0.86]). CONCLUSIONS: There were significant deficits in knowledge about self-protection that were partially corrected by education programs during the SARS outbreak. HCWs' adherence to self-protection guidelines was most closely associated with whether they provided care to patients who had received a definite diagnosis of SARS.     

Possible SARS coronavirus transmission during cardiopulmonary resuscitation

Infection of healthcare workers with the severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) is thought to occur primarily by either contact or large respiratory droplet transmission. However, infrequent healthcare worker infections occurred despite the use of contact and droplet precautions, particularly during certain aerosol-generating medical procedures. We investigated a possible cluster of SARS-CoV infections in healthcare workers who used contact and droplet precautions during attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a SARS patient. Unlike previously reported instances of transmission during aerosol-generating procedures, the index case-patient was unresponsive, and the intubation procedure was performed quickly and without difficulty. However, before intubation, the patient was ventilated with a bag-valve-mask that may have contributed to aerosolization of SARS-CoV. On the basis of the results of this investigation and previous reports of SARS transmission during aerosol-generating procedures, a systematic approach to the problem is outlined, including the use of the following: 1) administrative controls, 2) environmental engineering controls, 3) personal protective equipment, and 4) quality control.     

广东省13家医院医护人员严重急性呼吸综合征医院内感染情况

目的　分析收治严重急性呼吸综合征 (SARS)患者重点医院医护人员发生SARS院内感染的因素 ,评价干预措施。方法　通过对 13家重点医院收治SARS患者的数量及病情、医护人员SARS的发病率、医院性质、病区 (科室 )环境及隔离措施调查 ,分析医护人员发生SARS院内感染的原因。结果　 13家医院共收治SARS患者 84 1例 ,参加诊治工作的 2 36 5名医护人员中 2 85人发病。综合性医院、收治危重患者较多的医院、医护人员个人防护不到位的医院医护人员发病率较高 (93/2 85 ,32 .6 3% ) ;独立病房收治SARS患者的医院、具有感染科或隔离病区 (包括临时开设的隔离病区 )的医院医护人员发病率较低。结论　收治SARS患者的病情、医院性质、病区 (科室 )环境、个人防护状况是医护人员感染SARS的危险因素     

Lack of SARS transmission among healthcare workers, United States

Healthcare workers accounted for a large proportion of persons with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) during the worldwide epidemic of early 2003. We conducted an investigation of healthcare workers exposed to laboratory-confirmed SARS patients in the United States to evaluate infection-control practices and possible SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) transmission. We identified 110 healthcare workers with exposure within droplet range (i.e., 3 feet) to six SARS-CoV-positive patients. Forty-five healthcare workers had exposure without any mask use, 72 had exposure without eye protection, and 40 reported direct skin-to-skin contact. Potential droplet- and aerosol-generating procedures were infrequent: 5% of healthcare workers manipulated a patient's airway, and 4% administered aerosolized medication. Despite numerous unprotected exposures, there was no serologic evidence of healthcare-related SARS-CoV transmission. Lack of transmission in the United States may be related to the relative absence of high-risk procedures or patients, factors that may place healthcare workers at higher risk for infection.     

Increased risk of hepatitis E in sewage workers from India

Considering feco-oral transmission of hepatitis E virus (HEV), the risk of the infection was assessed among sewage workers. On the basis of the close contact with sewage, the participants (n = 147) were divided into sewage workers (n = 92) and others (n = 55); none used personal protective equipment (eg, coveralls, boots, gloves) Age-matched individuals from lower socioeconomic status and without any exposure to sewage were used as controls. IgG-anti-HEV positivity in enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay was significantly higher (P < 0.01) among staff members (83/147, 56.5%) than the controls (19%). A significant rise in anti-HEV positivity (P < 0.05) was recorded in sewage workers working for >5 years. Multivariate regression analysis identified contact with sewage as the independent variable associated with anti-HEV positivity. Strict adherence to good working practices must take top priority for protection of these workers from sewage pathogens.     

综合医院医务人员感染SARS情况对比分析

目的：分析在防治SARS工作初期、后期医务人员感染SARS的差异和采取的对策，为减少综合医院内医务人员SARS的感染提供参考。方甚：对本院自2003年3月24日至6月2日SARS诊断治疗任务中发生的医务人员的感染原因和采取的对策进行回顾性分析。结果：防治SARS工作初期，急诊科交叉感染和在SARS隔离病房等与SARS患者密切接触的工作岗位，共有17名医务人员感染，及时隔离治疗，均已痊愈，未造成医护人员的进一步交叉感染：经加强防护培训，改善工作条件，在防治SARS工作后期，仅发生2名护工感染，亦已痊愈，派出非典医疗队实现零感染。结论：综合医院内医务人员感染SARS的问题严峻，加强医院内的全员防护培训，按岗分区管理，改善医务人员的工作条件和病人的隔离观察环境，做好监督检查，积极应对，可以减少医务人员的SARS感染。     

Hospital preparedness and SARS

On May 23, 2003, Toronto experienced the second phase of a severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Ninety cases were confirmed, and >620 potential cases were managed. More than 9,000 persons had contact with confirmed or potential case-patients; many required quarantine. The main hospital involved during the second outbreak was North York General Hospital. We review this hospital's response to, and management of, this outbreak, including such factors as building preparation and engineering, personnel, departmental workload, policies and documentation, infection control, personal protective equipment, training and education, public health, management and administration, follow-up of SARS patients, and psychological and psychosocial management and research. We also make recommendations for other institutions to prepare for future outbreaks, regardless of their origin.     

Efficiency of quarantine during an epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome--Beijing, China, 2003

During March--July 2003, an epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Beijing, China, accounted for 2,521 probable cases (attack rate: 19 per 100,000 population). To control the epidemic, public health officials initiated enhanced surveillance, isolation of SARS patients, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) by health-care workers, and quarantine of contacts of known SARS patients. Approximately 30,000 Beijing residents were quarantined in their homes or quarantine sites. To guide future quarantine policy, the Chinese Field Epidemiology Training Program (China FETP) of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) conducted a survey to estimate the risk for acquiring SARS among quarantined residents of Haidian District (2001 population: 2.24 million), Beijing, in May 2003, 1 month after the epidemic peaked. This report summarizes the results of that survey, which indicate that, as a component of a comprehensive SARS-control program, quarantine should be limited to persons who have contact with an actively ill SARS patient in the home or hospital, allowing for better focus of resources in future outbreaks.     

广州市医务人员传染性非典型肺炎流行情况及预防控制效果分析

目的 分析广州市医务人员传染性生非典型肺炎(SARS)流行的基本特征，探讨流行因素，评价防制措施，为医疗卫生单位开展SARS收治及预防控制工作提供指导。方法 采用统一调查表对医务人员SARS患进行流行病学调查，采用定性生研究方法对医院SARS流行影响因素、预防控制措施及其效果进行调查，资料采用描述性流行病学方法分析。结果 广州市医务人员首例SARS患发病时间为2003年1月13日，截止5月5日共有29家医疗卫生单位报告医护人员发病280例，占全市总病例数的26．07％。医务人员发病高峰在2月上、中旬，共有167例，占医务人员发病总数的59．64％，呈明显聚集性。4月后病例为零星散发。病例主要集中在1月下旬前开始收治SARS患(对SARS尚缺乏认识的时期)的6家医院，占总病例数的73．2％(2c15／280)。调查180例医务人员SARS患中92．22％直接参与过SARS患的救治工作。采取定点收治患、加强医院病区通风、加强医护人员自身的个人防护等综合措施后，2月下旬开始，医务人员的新发SARS病例明显减少。结论 控制SARS在医务人员中流行的关键措施是：(1)要对出现SARS症状的患高度警惕，及时诊断并隔离患；(2)严格按照操作规范做好个人防护措施；(3)收治区要合理布局，严格区分污染区、半污染区和清洁区；(4)加强病区通风换气；(5)严格按照有关指引做好污染物、空气及环境的消毒工作。     

Anti-SARS-CoV immunoglobulin G in healthcare workers, Guangzhou, China

To determine the prevalence of inapparent infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) among healthcare workers, we performed a serosurvey to test for immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibodies to the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) among 1,147 healthcare workers in 3 hospitals that admitted SARS patients in mid-May 2003. Among them were 90 healthcare workers with SARS. As a reference group, 709 healthcare workers who worked in 2 hospitals that never admitted any SARS patients were similarly tested. The seroprevalence rate was 88.9% (80/90) for healthcare workers with SARS and 1.4% (15/1,057) for healthcare workers who were apparently healthy. The seroprevalence in the reference group was 0.4% (3/709). These findings suggest that inapparent infection is uncommon. Low level of immunity among unaffected healthcare workers reinforces the need for adequate personal protection and other infection control measures in hospitals to prevent future epidemics.