精神疾病中的凶杀行为与责任能力评定

目的探讨精神疾病与凶杀行为的关系及责任能力评定的现状.方法采用回顾性研究方法,对既往鉴定中精神疾病凶杀案例进行分析研究.结果精神分裂症和偏执性精神病患者凶杀行为的发生率显著高于其他危害行为(P均小于0.01),而精神发育迟滞、人格障碍及性变态出现凶杀行为,显著低于其他危害行为(P均小于0.01).对精神疾病患者凶杀行为责任能力评定绝大多数为无责任能力,少数为限定责任能力,极少为有责任能力.结论精神病人各类危害社会行为中以凶杀的发生率最高,危害性极大,应加强防范.尽管现时对精神病人危害行为任责任能力的评定趋严,但其凶杀行为的责任能力仍以无责任能力为主.     

抑郁症患者暴力行为责任能力评定

目的：探讨抑郁症患者暴力行为责任能力的评定。方法：回顾性分析20例抑郁症司法精神医学鉴定特点。结果：责任能力评定除应考虑疾病的严重程度、辨认和控制能力外，还应考虑到疾病分类、作案动机、与被害人关系、病前人格等。结论：应从严掌握、区别对待不同类型抑郁症责任能力的评定。     

不同责任能力者的认知功能、人格特征对照分析

目的探讨精神疾病司法鉴定中不同责任能力精神障碍者的认知、人格特点。方法对精神疾病司法鉴定案例中的被鉴定人进行一般资料收集、责任能力判断、智力、明尼苏达多项人格测试、威斯康星卡片分类测试,共收集精神病患者297例,其中完全责任能力者55例,限定责任能力者121例,无责任能力者117例;正常对照142例,进行对照分析。结果不同责任能力的精神病患者与正常者之间在IQ结果上存在显著差异,在MMPI、WCST上无统计学差异。结论精神病患者责任能力评定不同,在疾病种类、IQ等方面存在差异。     

司法精神病鉴定责任能力评定20年变迁

目的　探讨２０ 年来司法精神病鉴定中责任能力评定的现状。方法　以１９８９ 年《精神疾病司法鉴定暂行规定》颁布为界,对前后１０ 年责任能力评定结果进行比较分析。结果　规定后较规定前责任能力评定总体呈趋严的趋势（ Ｐ＜ ０－０１） ;对精神分裂症、精神发育迟滞、癫痫性精神病障碍患者责任能力评定趋严（ Ｐ＜０－０１、Ｐ＜ ０－０１ 和Ｐ＜０－０１） ;对盗窃、强奸和流氓危害行为责任能力评定趋严（Ｐ＜ ０－０５） 。结论　规定后１０ 年较规定前１０ 年责任能力评定呈趋严倾向,动机论对责任能力评定的影响较深远,但尚有待进一步研究完善。     

对抑郁症患者违法行为责任能力的评定

对抑郁症患者违法行为责任能力的评定上海市精神卫生中心（２０００３０）贾谊诚上海铁道大学医学院李玉珊对精神疾病患者违法行为责任能力的评定，逐有日益严格的趋势，不但国内如此，国外也是一样。我国在８０年代初期或以前，一旦被鉴定人确诊为精神分裂症或其它重性精...     

55例精神疾病司法鉴定限定责任能力分析

本文对55例精神疾病的司法鉴定限定责任能力有关资料作一分析,并就限定责任能力的有关问题提出讨论。认为用三分法来评定责任能力在司法鉴定工作中是科学的,切实可行的。     

精神疾病司法鉴定中精神病患者防御方式结果对照分析

目的探索精神疾病司法鉴定中精神病患者的防御方式及与责任能力评定的关系。方法对2006年10月～2007年11月进行的精神疾病司法鉴定案例中的被鉴定人进行一般资料收集、责任能力判断、防御方式测查,共收集精神病患者70例,正常者34例。然后,进行对照分析。结果精神病患者与正常者之间在防御方式结果上无显著差异,分值均较高。结论进行精神疾病司法鉴定的被鉴定人有类似的防御方式。在司法鉴定阶段,防御方式测试是一个不敏感的测试工具。     

妄想与辨认能力、责任能力的评定

探讨在精神疾病司法鉴定中,妄想与辨认能力、责任能力的评定之间的关系。     

评定为部分责任能力的58例违法精神病人分析

评定为部分责任能力的５８例违法精神病人分析广东省汕头市第四人民医院（５１５０２１）李植荣在精神疾病的司法鉴定中，一直存在二分法与三分法的争议，核心在于是否承认部分责任能力的存在。尽管国内目前都采用部分责任能力这一鉴定结论，但在具体疾病及具体案例的评定...     

对抑郁症患者违法行为责任能力的评定

对精神疾病患者违法行为责任能力的评定,目前在国内与国外都有日益严格化的趋势。例如我国过去受到前苏联司法精神病学模式的影响,认为被鉴定人一旦确诊患精神分裂症或其它重性精神病之后,就被视为“一律无责任能力”了。但自1980年我国正式颁布《刑法》     

Autonomy, criminal responsibility, and competence

Recently, Juth and Lorentzon proposed to replace the concept of free will, as considered relevant in criminal responsibility, with the concept of autonomy. In addition, they conceived of the assessment of criminal responsibility in terms of a decision-making process. In this article, I suggest that, based on these characterizations, there is an essential similarity between assessments of criminal responsibility and assessments of competent decision-making within the context of informed consent. In both assessments, autonomy and decision-making would be central factors. If one accepts this basic similarity, I argue, interesting opportunities are opened up in the sense that research on criminal responsibility could be directly informed by research on competent decision-making.     

‘My Brain Made Me Do It?’ Reflections on the Role of Neuroscience in Assessing Criminal Responsibility – A South African Medico-legal Perspective

Recently the role of neuroscience in assessing criminal responsibility has become an issue of academic and practical debate. The question that arises is the role that neurological or brain disorders can play in assessing criminal responsibility. Within the context of South African criminal law, the question arises as to whether these disorders will meet the threshold requirements for the defence of pathological criminal incapacity. Various medico-legal issues arise when assessing the role of neurological disorders in relation to criminal responsibility. In this contribution, the reflections are provided pertaining to the role of neuroscientific evidence in explaining criminal responsibility within the context of selected areas of application. Evidentiary aspects pertaining to the presentation of neuroscientific evidence are further canvassed as well as the role of neuroscientific evidence advanced in support of mitigation of punishment.     

A testimony procedure of forensic psychiatry used for criminal cases

A testimony procedure of forensic psychiatry containing of the following steps as: "to set-up the medical diagnosis-to clarify the criminal motive-to determine the property of criminal legal ability damage-to evaluate the criminal responsibility" is recommended, and upon them "to clarify the criminal motive" is of importance. The property of criminal legal ability damage can be determined through the criminal motive and then the degree of criminal responsibility can be evaluated objectively through the criminal motive and criminal legal ability effected by the disease.     

Rethinking criminal responsibility: practical application of operational diagnosis and gnostic into expert testimony]

There had been argument concerning the difference between the agnostic approach and the gnostic approach to the psychiatric perspective of criminal responsibility until the landmark ruling by the 3rd court of the Japanese Supreme Court in 1984. The decision upheld the gnostic approach and affirmed that the defendant's criminal responsibility should be based on such factors as psychopathology, motive, modus operandi, situation surrounding the crime, and pre-morbid personality, as long as the offense was not directly motivated by the delusion or hallucination. The gnostic explanation includes so many various factors that the psychiatric testimony cannot easily be objective, while agnostic experts can find a conclusion about criminal responsibility only by psychiatric diagnosis. To establish a standard, the authors summarized the means of determination of criminal responsibility. The authors also discussed various topics related to criminal responsibility including Asperger's syndrome, illicit drug intoxication, and prescribed drug intoxication.     

Le cadre juridique régissant la responsabilité pénale de l’aliéné mental au Maroc

IntroductionThe lunatic is any person deemed unfit for societal life. Nowadays, insanity is defined as a mental illness. The psychiatric expertise constitutes a judicial procedure designed to determine the insanity with regards to the effects on penal responsibility.ObjectivesThe aim of this work was to highlight the different rules governing penal responsibility of the insane in Morocco. It also aims to emphasize the main function of the expert psychiatrist in determining the mental status of the offender at the time of the crime.MethodThis is a legal analysis of the effects of insanity on criminal liability. It is based on the examination of different rules governing the penal procedure, and the study of different judgments and case treatments either by the judge, the expert psychiatrist or by the institutions where the insane was placed.ResultsTo detail procedural rules of criminal responsibility of the insane in Morocco as well as the role of the psychiatric expertise.DiscussionThe fundamental question is to determine whether the penal responsibility of the offender in the case of insanity is assumed solely by the criminal court, or whether it is mandatory to obtain the opinion of the expert psychiatric. Although the psychiatric expertise is the cornerstone of the procedure, the criminal court has the potential power to judge the different elements of the criminal process, whereas the medical expertise represents only one.ConclusionThe determination of insanity is paramount due to the importance of the effects that it may have on the criminal responsibility of the offender. Even if the legislature cares to determine the conditions and effects of the insanity on criminal responsibility, the boundaries between the judicial and medical expert intervention remain unclear. Therefore, it is crucial to establish a detailed legal schedule to specify the boundaries and limits, considering that both judge and psychiatrist must collaborate to find the way to improvement.     

Neurobiological determinism: questionable inferences on human freedom of choice and forensic criminal responsibility

Several authors argue that criminal behavior is generally caused by neurobiological deficits. Based on this neurobiological perspective of assumed causality, the concept of free will is questioned, and the theory of neurobiological determinism of all human behavior is put forward, thus maintaining that human beings are not responsible for their actions, and consequently the principle of guilt should be given up in criminal law. In this context the controversial debate on determinism and indeterminism, which has been held for centuries, has flared up anew, especially within the science of criminal law. When critically examining the current state of research, it becomes apparent that the results do not support the existence of a universally valid neurobiological causality of criminal behavior, nor a theory of an absolute neurobiological determinism. Neither is complete determination of all phenomena in the universe--as maintained--the logical conclusion of the principle of causality, nor is it empirically confirmed. Analyzed methodically, it cannot be falsified, and thus, as a theory which cannot be empirically tested, it represents a dogma against which plausible objections can be made. The criticism of the concept of free will, and even more so of human accountability and criminal responsibility, is not put forward in a valid way. The principle of relative determinism--the evaluation of the degree of determinism of personality factors potentially reducing criminal responsibility, which includes concrete observations and analysis of behavior--thus remains a central and cogent approach to the assessment of criminal responsibility. To sum up, the theories proposed by some authors on the complete neurobiological determinism of human behavior, and the subsequent impossibility of individual responsibility and guilt, reveal both methodical misconception and a lack of empirical foundation.     

限定刑事责任能力的应用

目的：探讨限定刑事责任能力评定量表（DCRRS）在广州地区责任能力3级评定中的应用。方法：采用DCRRS回顾性评定刑事责任能力鉴定504例,进一步检验该量表的信效度及其和专家鉴定结论的一致性。结果：DCRRS的分半信度为0.90,各条目之间及其与总量表分之间的相关均有统计学意义（r=0.11-0.91,P〈0.05）。据DCRRS的参考划界分分组,无、限定和完全责任能力3组间及两两间总量表分的差异均具有统计学意义（P〈0.001）。DCRRS评定和专家鉴定两种责任能力分级方法的结果一致性较好（Kappa值=0.71,P〈0.001）,建立判别函数,回代的判别正确率分别为96.2%和86.7%。结论：DCRRS在广州地区使用的信效度良好,可推广用于责任能力3级评定的辅助参考。     

Clinical analysis of 47 cases of epilepsy

This article makes a clinical analyses of the general data concerning 47 epileptic cases in our hospital, and especially reports on the forensic psychiatric assessment of two out of the seven criminal cases, their history of illness and responsibility. In the assessment of such cases, special emphasis should be laid on the diagnosis of the epilepsy so as to avoid misdiagnosis. The author suggests that the patient folds no responsibility for his criminal behaviour during the attack. But he should be responsible in a diminished criminal for his criminal behavior when he is only suffering from a personality disorder, since he has some discriminative and self-control ability.