Subsidies and the demand for individual health insurance in California

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the effect of changes in premiums for individual insurance on decisions to purchase individual insurance and how this price response varies among subgroups of the population. DATA SOURCE: Survey responses from the Current Population Survey (http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp), the National Health Interview Survey (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis.htm), and data about premiums and plans offered in the individual insurance market in California, 1996-2001. STUDY DESIGN: A logit model was used to estimate the decisions to purchase individual insurance by families without access to group insurance. This was modeled as a function of premiums, controlling for family characteristics and other characteristics of the market. A multinomial model was used to estimate the choice between group coverage, individual coverage, and remaining uninsured for workers offered group coverage as a function of premiums for individual insurance and out-of-pocket costs of group coverage. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The elasticity of demand for individual insurance by those without access to group insurance is about -.2 to -.4, as has been found in earlier studies. However, there are substantial differences in price responses among subgroups with low-income, young, and self-employed families showing the greatest response. Among workers offered group insurance, a decrease in individual premiums has very small effects on the choice to purchase individual coverage versus group coverage. CONCLUSIONS: Subsidy programs may make insurance more affordable for some families, but even sizeable subsidies are unlikely to solve the problem of the uninsured. We do not find evidence that subsidies to individual insurance will produce an unraveling of the employer-based health insurance system.     

The effect of premiums on the decision to participate in health insurance and other fringe benefits offered by the employer: evidence from a real-world experiment

In this paper, we investigate the effect of the out-of-pocket premium on the decision to enroll in employer health insurance and other benefits plans including dental insurance, vision care, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. Previous estimates of the effects of premium on takeup of health insurance could be biased toward zero due to a correlation between premium and unobservable demand or plan quality. We solve this problem using data representing hypothetical choices by employees under three different price regimes, providing price variation uncorrelated with either individual-specific or plan-specific unobservables. We find that workers are insensitive to price in health insurance takeup. Workers show much greater price sensitivity to decisions about dental insurance, vision plans, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. We conclude that premium subsidies are unlikely to have a substantial impact on increasing insurance rates of workers already offered employer insurance.     

The effect of report cards on consumer choice in the health insurance market

We test the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the HMO market. Federal employees were provided with report cards on a limited basis in 1995 and then on a widespread basis in 1996. Exploiting this natural experiment, we find that subjective measures of quality and coverage influence plan choices, after controlling for plan premiums, expected out of pocket expenses and service coverages. The effect is stronger within a small sample of new hires compared to a larger sample of existing federal employees. We also find evidence that report cards increase the price elasticity of demand for health insurance.     

Tax policy and the demand for health insurance

Estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand for health insurance are derived from econometric estimates of the parameters of a discrete choice model of health insurance demand using data from a survey of plan choices among a sample of federal government employees. The estimated income elasticity (+0.01) is similar to most previous estimates. The estimated price elasticity (-0.16) is in absolute value much less than the earlier previous estimates and somewhat less than the more recent previous estimates. Possible causes of these differences in price elasticity estimates are discussed.     

Individual versus job-based health insurance: weighing the pros and cons

Although the majority of insured Americans receive their health insurance through their employers, some depend on the individual health insurance market. However, with increased criticism of the lack of choice in group coverage and various proposals including subsidies or tax credits to decrease the number of uninsured, the individual market may start to play a larger role. In this paper we conclude that although efficient large-group insurance will appropriately continue to exist, the individual market appears to be improving, in both administrative cost and protection against high premiums associated with high risk. For diverse workers now in small groups with little plan choice, the individual market might become a reasonable alternative.     

Employer Health Insurance Offerings and Employee Enrollment Decisions

Objective. To determine how the characteristics of the health benefits offered by employers affect worker insurance coverage decisions.
Data Sources. The 1996–1997 and the 1998–1999 rounds of the nationally representative Community Tracking Study Household Survey.
Study Design. We use multinomial logistic regression to analyze the choice between own-employer coverage, alternative source coverage, and no coverage among employees offered health insurance by their employer. The key explanatory variables are the types of health plans offered and the net premium offered. The models include controls for personal, health plan, and job characteristics.
Principal Findings. When an employer offers only a health maintenance organization married employees are more likely to decline coverage from their employer and take-up another offer (odds ratio (OR)=1.27, p <.001), while singles are more likely to accept the coverage offered by their employer and less likely to be uninsured (OR=0.650, p <.001). Higher net premiums increase the odds of declining the coverage offered by an employer and remaining uninsured for both married (OR=1.023, p <.01) and single (OR=1.035, p <.001) workers.
Conclusions. The type of health plan coverage an employer offers affects whether its employees take-up insurance, but has a smaller effect on overall coverage rates for workers and their families because of the availability of alternative sources of coverage. Relative to offering only a non-HMO plan, employers offering only an HMO may reduce take-up among those with alternative sources of coverage, but increase take-up among those who would otherwise go uninsured. By modeling the possibility of take-up through the health insurance offers from the employer of the spouse, the decline in coverage rates from higher net premiums is less than previous estimates.     

The demand for health insurance coverage by low-income workers: can reduced premiums achieve full coverage?

OBJECTIVE: To assess the degree to which premium reductions will increase the participation in employer-sponsored health plans by low-income workers who are employed in small businesses. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Sample of workers in small business (25 or fewer employees) in seven metropolitan areas. The data were gathered as part of the Small Business Benefits Survey, a telephone survey of small business conducted between October 1992 and February 1993. STUDY DESIGN: Probit regressions were used to estimate the demand for health insurance coverage by low-income workers. Predictions based on these findings were made to assess the extent to which premium reductions might increase coverage rates. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Workers included in the sample were selected, at random, from a randomly generated set of firms drawn from Dun and Bradstreet's DMI (Dun's Market Inclusion). The response rate was 81 percent. FINDINGS: Participation in employer-sponsored plans is high when coverage is offered. However, even when coverage is offered to employees who have no other source of insurance, participation is not universal. Although premium reductions will increase participation in employer-sponsored plans, even large subsidies will not induce all workers to participate in employer-sponsored plans. For workers eligible to participate, subsidies as high as 75 percent of premiums are estimated to increase participation rates from 89.0 percent to 92.6 percent. For workers in firms that do not sponsor plans, similar subsidies are projected to achieve only modest increases in coverage above that which would be observed if the workers had access to plans at unsubsidized, group market rates. CONCLUSIONS: Policies that rely on voluntary purchase of coverage to reduce the number of uninsured will have only modest success.     

Health insurance eroding for working families: employer-provided coverage declines for fifth consecutive year.

In 2005, the percentage of Americans with employer-provided health insurance fell for the fifth year in a row. Workers and their families have been falling into the ranks of the uninsured at alarming rates. The downward trend in employer-provided coverage for children also continued into 2005. In the previous four years, children were less likely to become uninsured as public sector health coverage expanded, but in 2005 the rate of uninsured children increased. While Medicaid and SCHIP still work for many, the government has not picked up coverage for everybody who lost insurance. The weakening of this system-notably for children-is particularly difficult for workers and their families in a time of stagnating incomes. Furthermore, these programs are not designed to prevent low-income adults or middle- or high-income families from becoming uninsured. Government at the federal and state levels has responded to medical inflation with policy changes that reduce public insurance eligibility or with proposals to reduce government costs. Federal policy proposals to lessen the tax advantage of workplace insurance or to encourage a private purchase system could further destabilize the employer-provided system. Now is a critical time to consider health insurance reform. Several promising solutions could increase access to affordable health care. The key is to create large, varied, and stable risk pools.     

Corporate benefit policies and health insurance costs

We tested the hypothesis that health insurance premium costs per employee are lower for employee groups where multiple health plans are offered and the employer pays a level dollar amount of the chosen premium than for employee groups where these two conditions are not met. Proposed national legislation relies on these conditions to create a competitive health care market. Data on 56 employee groups in 1981 and 66 employee groups in 1982 were collected from two surveys of large employers in Minnesota. Regression analysis of premium data from both surveys rejected the hypothesis. Indemnity plans in multiplan groups were cheaper if the employer paid a level dollar contribution versus a level percent (including 100) contribution. However, groups offered only an indemnity plan had lower premiums than groups meeting the two legislative conditions. These findings apply to both individual and family coverage premiums and are not caused by systematic differences in benefit provisions, employee demographics or factors influencing loading charges. Our findings cast doubt on attempts to achieve health care competition by legislative changes in insurance options and contribution methods.     

Worker demand for health insurance in the non-group market

This paper examines decisions to purchase individual insurance by workers who do not have employment-based insurance. Using data from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, coupled with prices for a standard insurance product in different market areas, we estimate a price elasticity of -0.3 to -0.4 and an income elasticity of 0.15. Our estimate of the price response raises doubts that even substantial subsidies to the working uninsured would induce many of them to purchase coverage voluntarily.     

Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: an empirical study

If premiums for health insurance are not risk related, there exists a consumer information surplus that may result in adverse selection. Our results indicate that insurers can greatly reduce this surplus by risk-adjusting the premium. We conclude that there need not be any substantial unavoidable consumer information surplus if consumers can choose whether to take a deductible for a one- or two-year health insurance contract with otherwise identical benefits. Therefore, adverse selection need not be a problem in a competitive insurance market with risk-adjusted premiums or vouchers and with such a consumer choice of health plan.     

The impact of the tax system on health insurance coverage

A central question in health economics is the extent to which this tax subsidization matters for the health insurance coverage of the U.S. population. I assess the impact of taxes on health insurance by using the considerable existing variation in tax subsidies, both at a point in time and across time. I do so by putting together data from more than a decade of Current Population Survey (CPS) data sets, and matching to workers in those data sets their tax subsidies to health insurance coverage. I find that the elasticity of insurance eligibility of workers is at least –0.6, and that the elasticity of own insurance coverage is roughly similar; the results imply that most of the impact of taxes on insurance coverage arise through firm offering and eligibility decisions. I also find that higher tax rates induce more private coverage through other sources, but less public coverage, so that overall there is a reduction in the rate of uninsurance that is comparable to the change in own employer-provided insurance coverage.     

Switching costs, price sensitivity and health plan choice

We investigate the extent to which sensitivity to health plan premiums differs across individuals according to characteristics related to the cost of switching plans. Our results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity related to expected health care costs: younger, healthier employees are between two and four times more sensitive to price than employees who are older and who have been recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer. We also find evidence of status quo bias: estimated premium elasticities are significantly higher for new hires than for incumbent employees. Simulations combining our results with actuarial data illustrate the cost implications of risk-related differences in price elasticity.     

Defined-contribution health insurance products: development and prospects

Defined-contribution health insurance products have received considerable recent attention, stimulated by double-digit increases in health plan premiums and employers' desire to get their employees more involved in health care purchasing decisions. Existing products typically feature a consumer health spending account, a major medical or other insurance policy, and the use of the Internet to support consumer decision making. They vary in their use of provider networks, provider payment approaches, the specific design of spending accounts, marketing strategies, and infrastructure investment. The companies producing these products are now at a critical juncture. They could grow rapidly over the next few years, be acquired by existing health plans, or fail if they do not deliver on their promises.     

Differences in price elasticities of demand for health insurance: a systematic review

Many health insurance systems apply managed competition principles to control costs and quality of health care. Besides other factors, managed competition relies on a sufficient price-elastic demand. This paper presents a systematic review of empirical studies on price elasticity of demand for health insurance. The objective was to identify the differing international ranges of price elasticity and to find socio-economic as well as setting-oriented factors that influence price elasticity. Relevant literature for the topic was identified through a two-step identification process including a systematic search in appropriate databases and further searches within the references of the results. A total of 45 studies from countries such as the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland were found. Clear differences in price elasticity by countries were identified. While empirical studies showed a range between ?0.2 and ?1.0 for optional primary health insurance in the US, higher price elasticities between ?0.6 and ?4.2 for Germany and around ?2 for Switzerland were calculated for mandatory primary health insurance. Dutch studies found price elasticities below ?0.5. In consideration of all relevant studies, age and poorer health status were identified to decrease price elasticity. Other socio-economic factors had an unclear impact or too limited evidence. Premium level, range of premiums, homogeneity of benefits/coverage and degree of forced decision were found to have a major influence on price elasticity in their settings. Further influence was found from supplementary insurance and premium-dependent employer contribution.     

Accessibility to the health insurance of the medical union in alexandria

Utilization of care is very important because of its link to access, quality of care and because of its importance to outcome. The aim of the study was to clarify the barriers towards accessibility to the Health Insurance of the Medical Union plan and to explain reasons why participants covered by other health insurance systems are using the Health Insurance Medical Union (HIMU). The study was carried out at the health insurance project situated in Alexandria Medical Syndicate. The insured members of HIMU included four specialties namely; physicians, pharmacists, dentists and veterinarians and their families. The sample amounted to 782 members. The highest reasons for participation in the project were freedom of choice of laboratory and/or radiology clinics 73.9%, affiliated providers (physicians and hospitals) offer good quality care to members 62.6%, and simplicity of getting services and/or referral system 59.2%. Whereas the highest reasons for not participating or continuing with the project were high premiums for members: high premium of parents accounted for the highest percentage (13.8%) followed by that of the spouse 9.3%, then high premium for members 5%, and high premium for children 4.9%. The reason that the period of participation was unsuitable for members (October-November-December) accounted for 4.9%. Recommendations: as a result of reviewing the system of determining premiums there were possibilities of a decrease in the annual premium for those beneficiaries who revealed low subsidies, decreasing cost sharing paid by beneficiaries for both outpatient and inpatient services in some essential services e.g. pregnancy and delivery, as well as vigorous control procedures regarding quality of medical care provided, art of care and price of medical services.     

Employee demand for health insurance and employer health plan choices

Although most private health insurance in US is employment-based, little is known about how employers choose health plans for their employees. In this paper, I examine the relationship between employee preferences for health insurance and the health plans offered by employers. I find evidence that employee characteristics affect the generosity of the health plans offered by employers and the likelihood that employers offer a choice of plans. Although the results suggest that employers do respond to employee preferences in choosing health benefits, the effects of worker characteristics on plan offerings are quantitatively small.     

Employer contribution and premium growth in health insurance

We study whether employer premium contribution schemes could impact the pricing behavior of health plans and contribute to rising premiums. Using 1991–2011 data before and after a 1999 premium subsidy policy change in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), we find that the employer premium contribution scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the employer's premium contribution to that plan. Both incentives are found to contribute to premium growth. Counterfactual simulation shows that average premium would have been 10% less than observed and the federal government would have saved 15% per year on its premium contribution had the subsidy policy change not occurred in the FEHBP. We discuss the potential of similar incentives in other government-subsidized insurance systems such as the Medicare Part D and the Health Insurance Marketplace under the Affordable Care Act.     

Increasing health insurance costs and the decline in insurance coverage

OBJECTIVE: To determine the impact of rising health insurance premiums on coverage rates. DATA SOURCES & STUDY SETTING: Our analysis is based on two cohorts of nonelderly Americans residing in 64 large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) surveyed in the Current Population Survey in 1989-1991 and 1998-2000. Measures of premiums are based on data from the Health Insurance Association of America and the Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits. STUDY DESIGN: Probit regression and instrumental variable techniques are used to estimate the association between rising local health insurance costs and the falling propensity for individuals to have any health insurance coverage, controlling for a rich array of economic, demographic, and policy covariates. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: More than half of the decline in coverage rates experienced over the 1990s is attributable to the increase in health insurance premiums (2.0 percentage points of the 3.1 percentage point decline). Medicaid expansions led to a 1 percentage point increase in coverage. Changes in economic and demographic factors had little net effect. The number of people uninsured could increase by 1.9-6.3 million in the decade ending 2010 if real, per capita medical costs increase at a rate of 1-3 percentage points, holding all else constant. CONCLUSIONS: Initiatives aimed at reducing the number of uninsured must confront the growing pressure on coverage rates generated by rising costs.