Possible SARS coronavirus transmission during cardiopulmonary resuscitation

Infection of healthcare workers with the severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) is thought to occur primarily by either contact or large respiratory droplet transmission. However, infrequent healthcare worker infections occurred despite the use of contact and droplet precautions, particularly during certain aerosol-generating medical procedures. We investigated a possible cluster of SARS-CoV infections in healthcare workers who used contact and droplet precautions during attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a SARS patient. Unlike previously reported instances of transmission during aerosol-generating procedures, the index case-patient was unresponsive, and the intubation procedure was performed quickly and without difficulty. However, before intubation, the patient was ventilated with a bag-valve-mask that may have contributed to aerosolization of SARS-CoV. On the basis of the results of this investigation and previous reports of SARS transmission during aerosol-generating procedures, a systematic approach to the problem is outlined, including the use of the following: 1) administrative controls, 2) environmental engineering controls, 3) personal protective equipment, and 4) quality control.     

SARS surveillance during emergency public health response, United States, March-July 2003

In response to the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the United States established national surveillance using a sensitive case definition incorporating clinical, epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria. Of 1,460 unexplained respiratory illnesses reported by state and local health departments to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from March 17 to July 30, 2003, a total of 398 (27%) met clinical and epidemiologic SARS case criteria. Of these, 72 (18%) were probable cases with radiographic evidence of pneumonia. Eight (2%) were laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infections, 206 (52%) were SARS-CoV negative, and 184 (46%) had undetermined SARS-CoV status because of missing convalescent-phase serum specimens. Thirty-one percent (124/398) of case-patients were hospitalized; none died. Travel was the most common epidemiologic link (329/398, 83%), and mainland China was the affected area most commonly visited. One case of possible household transmission was reported, and no laboratory-confirmed infections occurred among healthcare workers. Successes and limitations of this emergency surveillance can guide preparations for future outbreaks of SARS or respiratory diseases of unknown etiology.     

SARS in hospital emergency room

Thirty-one cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred after exposure in the emergency room at the National Taiwan University Hospital. The index patient was linked to an outbreak at a nearby municipal hospital. Three clusters were identified over a 3-week period. The first cluster (5 patients) and the second cluster (14 patients) occurred among patients, family members, and nursing aids. The third cluster (12 patients) occurred exclusively among healthcare workers. Six healthcare workers had close contact with SARS patients. Six others, with different working patterns, indicated that they did not have contact with a SARS patient. Environmental surveys found 9 of 119 samples of inanimate objects to be positive for SARS coronavirus RNA. These observations indicate that although transmission by direct contact with known SARS patients was responsible for most cases, environmental contamination with the SARS coronavirus may have lead to infection among healthcare workers without documented contact with known hospitalized SARS patients.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus infection

Whether severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection can be asymptomatic is unclear. We examined the seroprevalence of SARS-CoV among 674 healthcare workers from a hospital in which a SARS outbreak had occurred. A total of 353 (52%) experienced mild self-limiting illnesses, and 321 (48%) were asymptomatic throughout the course of these observations. None of these healthcare workers had antibody to SARS CoV, indicating that subclinical or mild infection attributable to SARS-CoV in adults is rare.     

Lack of SARS transmission and U.S. SARS case-patient

In early April 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was diagnosed in a Pennsylvania resident after his exposure to persons with SARS in Toronto, Canada. To identify contacts of the case-patient and evaluate the risk for SARS transmission, a detailed epidemiologic investigation was performed. On the basis of this investigation, 26 persons (17 healthcare workers, 4 household contacts, and 5 others) were identified as having had close contact with this case-patient before infection-control practices were implemented. Laboratory evaluation of clinical specimens showed no evidence of transmission of SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection to any close contact of this patient. This investigation documents that, under certain circumstances, SARS-CoV is not readily transmitted to close contacts, despite ample unprotected exposures. Improving the understanding of risk factors for transmission will help focus public health control measures.     

Anti-SARS-CoV immunoglobulin G in healthcare workers, Guangzhou, China

To determine the prevalence of inapparent infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) among healthcare workers, we performed a serosurvey to test for immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibodies to the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) among 1,147 healthcare workers in 3 hospitals that admitted SARS patients in mid-May 2003. Among them were 90 healthcare workers with SARS. As a reference group, 709 healthcare workers who worked in 2 hospitals that never admitted any SARS patients were similarly tested. The seroprevalence rate was 88.9% (80/90) for healthcare workers with SARS and 1.4% (15/1,057) for healthcare workers who were apparently healthy. The seroprevalence in the reference group was 0.4% (3/709). These findings suggest that inapparent infection is uncommon. Low level of immunity among unaffected healthcare workers reinforces the need for adequate personal protection and other infection control measures in hospitals to prevent future epidemics.     

Revised U.S. surveillance case definition for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and update on SARS cases--United States and worldwide, December 2003

During the 2003 epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) developed surveillance criteria to identify persons with SARS. The surveillance case definition changed throughout the epidemic as understanding of the clinical, laboratory, and transmission characteristics of SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) increased. On June 26, CSTE adopted a position statement to add SARS-CoV disease to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS). The position statement included criteria for defining a SARS case for national reporting. On November 3, CSTE issued a new interim position statement with a revised SARS case definition. This report summarizes the new U.S. surveillance case definition for SARS and updates reported cases of SARS worldwide and in the United States.     

Occupationally acquired human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection: national case surveillance data during 20 years of the HIV epidemic in the United States.

OBJECTIVE: To characterize occupationally acquired human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection detected through case surveillance efforts in the United States. DESIGN: National surveillance systems, based on voluntary case reporting. SETTING: Healthcare or laboratory (clinical or research) settings. PATIENTS: Healthcare workers, defined as individuals employed in healthcare or laboratory settings (including students and trainees), who are infected with HIV. METHODS: Review of data reported through December 2001 in the HIV/AIDS Reporting System and the National Surveillance for Occupationally Acquired HIV Infection. RESULTS: Of 57 healthcare workers with documented occupationally acquired HIV infection, most (86%) were exposed to blood, and most (88%) had percutaneous injuries. The circumstances varied among 51 percutaneous injuries, with the largest proportion (41%) occurring after a procedure, 35% occurring during a procedure, and 20% occurring during disposal of sharp objects. Unexpected circumstances difficult to anticipate during or after procedures accounted for 20% of all injuries. Of 55 known source patients, most (69%) had acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) at the time of occupational exposure, but some (11%) had asymptomatic HIV infection. Eight (14%) of the healthcare workers were infected despite receiving postexposure prophylaxis (PEP). CONCLUSIONS: Prevention strategies for occupationally acquired HIV infection should continue to emphasize avoiding blood exposures. Healthcare workers should be educated about both the benefits and the limitations of PEP, which does not always prevent HIV infection following an exposure. Technologic advances (eg, safety-engineered devices) may further enhance safety in the healthcare workplace.     

SARS-associated coronavirus transmission, United States

To better assess the risk for transmission of the severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV), we obtained serial specimens and clinical and exposure data from seven confirmed U.S. SARS patients and their 10 household contacts. SARS-CoV was detected in a day-14 sputum specimen from one case-patient and in five stool specimens from two case-patients. In one case-patient, SARS-CoV persisted in stool for at least 26 days after symptom onset. The highest amounts of virus were in the day-14 sputum sample and a day-14 stool sample. Residual respiratory symptoms were still present in recovered SARS case-patients 2 months after illness onset. Possible transmission of SARS-CoV occurred in one household contact, but this person had also traveled to a SARS-affected area. The data suggest that SARS-CoV is not always transmitted efficiently. Routine collection and testing of stool and sputum specimens of probable SARS case-patients may help the early detection of SARS-CoV infection.     

Hepatitis C virus: an important occupational hazard?

Infection with Hepatitis C virus (HCV) is estimated to affect 3% of the world's population and is an important cause of liver disease. It is most commonly transmitted by percutaneous exposure. Although current evidence does not suggest an increased prevalence of HCV infection among healthcare workers, transmission of infection following occupational exposure has been demonstrated. An average transmission rate of 1.8%, following percutaneous injury, has been reported. The risk of transmission is higher from patients with viraemia, as measured by a positive polymerase chain reaction for HCV RNA. After exposure to HCV, healthcare workers should be actively followed up, initially using a test to detect viral RNA. This may facilitate earlier diagnosis and treatment. Recent reports in the UK, of transmission of infection to patients from HCV infected healthcare workers, have prompted a review of the appropriateness of HCV infected individuals undertaking exposure prone procedures.     

Superspreading SARS events, Beijing, 2003

Superspreading events were pivotal in the global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). We investigated superspreading in one transmission chain early in Beijing's epidemic. Superspreading was defined as transmission of SARS to at least eight contacts. An index patient with onset of SARS 2 months after hospital admission was the source of four generations of transmission to 76 case-patients, including 12 healthcare workers and several hospital visitors. Four (5%) case circumstances met the superspreading definition. Superspreading appeared to be associated with older age (mean 56 vs. 44 years), case fatality (75% vs. 16%, p = 0.02, Fisher exact test), number of close contacts (36 vs. 0.37) and attack rate among close contacts (43% vs. 18.5%, p < 0.025). Delayed recognition of SARS in a hospitalized patient permitted transmission to patients, visitors, and healthcare workers. Older age and number of contacts merit investigation in future studies of superspreading.     

Seroprevalence of IgG antibodies to SARS-coronavirus in asymptomatic or subclinical population groups

We systematically reviewed the current understanding of human population immunity against SARS-CoV in different groups, settings and geography. Our meta-analysis, which included all identified studies except those on wild animal handlers, yielded an overall seroprevalence of 0.10% [95% confidence interval (CI) 0.02-0.18]. Health-care workers and others who had close contact with SARS patients had a slightly higher degree of seroconversion (0.23%, 95% CI 0.02-0.45) compared to healthy blood donors, others from the general community or non-SARS patients recruited from the health-care setting (0.16%, 95% CI 0-0.37). When analysed by the two broad classes of testing procedures, it is clear that serial confirmatory test protocols resulted in a much lower estimate (0.050%, 95% CI 0-0.15) than single test protocols (0.20%, 95% CI 0.06-0.34). Potential epidemiological and laboratory pitfalls are also discussed as they may give rise to false or inconsistent results in measuring the seroprevalence of IgG antibodies to SARS-CoV.     

Nosocomial transmission of tuberculosis (TB) associated with care of an infant with peritoneal TB.

Nosocomial transmission of tuberculosis (TB) after exposure to infected peritoneal fluid has not been described. We report the exposure of 111 healthcare workers to infected dialysate from an infant with TB peritonitis. Two (5%) of 39 primary-care nurses, but no doctors or environmental service workers, had apparent tuberculin skin test conversions, raising the concern that patients with peritoneal TB may be a source for nosocomial transmission of TB.     

SARS in healthcare facilities, Toronto and Taiwan

The healthcare setting was important in the early spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in both Toronto and Taiwan. Healthcare workers, patients, and visitors were at increased risk for infection. Nonetheless, the ability of individual SARS patients to transmit disease was quite variable. Unrecognized SARS case-patients were a primary source of transmission, and early detection and intervention were important to limit spread. Strict adherence to infection control precautions was essential in containing outbreaks. In addition, grouping patients into cohorts and limiting access to SARS patients minimized exposure opportunities. Given the difficulty in implementing several of these measures, control measures were frequently adapted to the acuity of SARS care and level of transmission within facilities. Although these conclusions are based only on a retrospective analysis of events, applying the experiences of Toronto and Taiwan to SARS preparedness planning efforts will likely minimize future transmission within healthcare facilities.     

Asymptomatic SARS coronavirus infection among healthcare workers, Singapore

We conducted a study among healthcare workers (HCWs) exposed to patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) before infection control measures were instituted. Of all exposed HCWs, 7.5% had asymptomatic SARS-positive cases. Asymptomatic SARS was associated with lower SARS antibody titers and higher use of masks when compared to pneumonic SARS.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome: lessons from Singapore

An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in Singapore in March 2003. To illustrate the problems in diagnosing and containing SARS in the hospital, we describe a case series and highlight changes in triage and infection control practices that resulted. By implementing these changes, we have stopped the nosocomial transmission of the virus.An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first recognized in Singapore on March 12, 2003. The index patient was hospitalized at Tan Tock Seng Hospital, which has since become the country’s designated SARS hospital. The patient infected 20 other people (including patients and healthcare workers), who subsequently became the sources for secondary spread of the infection (1). As of June 12, 2003, a total of 206 cases and 31 deaths attributed to SARS had been reported in Singapore.We describe the important lessons learned during the triage and containment of SARS at the National University Hospital, Singapore. Both involved expanding isolation criteria to include all patients with undifferentiated fever (even in the absence of respiratory symptoms or chest x-ray changes), improving contact-tracing methods, enforcing the use of fit-tested personal protective equipment in all patient-care areas, avoiding aerosol-generating procedures, and carefully monitoring all healthcare workers for fever or respiratory symptoms. We also highlight the impact of these measures on preventing the entry and nosocomial spread of infection.     

Efficiency of human immunodeficiency virus transmission through injections and other medical procedures: evidence, estimates, and unfinished business.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the transmission efficiency of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) through medical injections and other invasive procedures. DESIGN: We searched our own files and Medline (from 1966-2004, using the keywords ["iatrogenic" or "nosocomial" or "injections"] and "HIV") for reports of iatrogenic outbreaks worldwide, except outbreaks traced to receipt of contaminated blood or blood products. We also analyzed information from a case-control study of percutaneous exposures to healthcare workers. SETTING: Worldwide healthcare settings. EVENTS: We identified 8 iatrogenic outbreaks that met our study criteria; published information from 4 outbreaks was sufficient to estimate transmission efficiency. RESULTS: From the 4 documented iatrogenic outbreaks, we estimated that 1 iatrogenic infection occurred after 8-52 procedures involving HIV-infected persons. Although only 0.3% of healthcare workers seroconvert after percutaneous exposure, a case-control study reported that deep injuries and other risk factors collectively increased seroconversion risk by as much as 50 times. Laboratory investigations demonstrate HIV survival through time and various rinsing regimens. We estimate that the transmission efficiency in medical settings with no or grossly insufficient efforts to clean equipment ranges from 0.5% to 3% for lower risk procedures (eg, intramuscular injections) and from 10% to 20% or more for high-risk procedures. Efforts to clean equipment, short of sterilization, may cut the transmission efficiency by 0%-100%. Procedures that contaminate multidose vials may accelerate transmission efficiency. CONCLUSION: To achieve better estimates of the transmission efficiency for a range of medical procedures and settings, investigations of iatrogenic outbreaks should be accorded high priority.     

SARS transmission among hospital workers in Hong Kong

Despite infection control measures, breakthrough transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred for many hospital workers in Hong Kong. We conducted a case-control study of 72 hospital workers with SARS and 144 matched controls. Inconsistent use of goggles, gowns, gloves, and caps was associated with a higher risk for SARS infection (unadjusted odds ratio 2.42 to 20.54, p < 0.05). The likelihood of SARS infection was strongly associated with the amount of personal protection equipment perceived to be inadequate, having <2 hours of infection control training, and not understanding infection control procedures. No significant differences existed between the case and control groups in the proportion of workers who performed high-risk procedures, reported minor protection equipment problems, or had social contact with SARS-infected persons. Perceived inadequacy of personal protection equipment supply, infection control training <2 hours, and inconsistent use of personal protection equipment when in contact with SARS patients were significant independent risk factors for SARS infection.     

Update: severe acute respiratory syndrome--United States,June 11, 2003

CDC continues to work with state and local health departments, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other partners to investigate cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). This report updates SARS cases reported worldwide and in the United States, and describes the eighth probable U.S. SARS case with laboratory evidence of SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection.