Fatal deception: the tobacco industry's "new" world standards for tobacco marketing]

Being increasingly threatened by the worldwide antismoking struggle, the major tobacco companies are eager to improve their public image. This leads the companies to adopt inconsequential "measures" such as the tobacco industry's "new" standards for tobacco marketing that were "voluntarily" issued in September 2001 by the British American Tobacco company. These measures are clearly attempts to reduce the disapproval generated by the companies' promotion and advertising campaigns, which indirectly target young people. With these standards the tobacco companies supposedly commit themselves, among other things, to not using advertising directed at youth and to not selling or distributing tobacco products in places frequented by young people. This document explains why these measures are completely ineffective, are not anything new, and are a subtle effort to feign a conscientious, responsible attitude, which is far from genuine. As long as there are marketing activities directed at adults, young people will be exposed to the influence of those activities. Many countries have completely prohibited the marketing of tobacco products, given that the "new" marketing standards do not represent progress in any way whatsoever.     

The tobacco industry's response to the COMMIT Trial: an analysis of legacy tobacco documents

We analyzed internal tobacco industry documents that describe the industry's response to the Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation (COMMIT), a multi-center community-based tobacco intervention project funded by the National Cancer Institute from 1988 to 1992. Our analysis of documents from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (www.legacy.library.ucsf.edu) suggests that the tobacco industry reacted to COMMIT by (1) closely monitoring trial activities, (2) confronting COMMIT in communities where it was most active, (3) distorting COMMIT findings on underage smoking data reported in the media, and (4) using COMMIT activities as practice to strengthen their attack against the subsequent ASSIST trial, falsely accusing both studies of illegal political lobbying with taxpayers' money. The tobacco industry closely monitored COMMIT activities and organized local responses to findings and activities perceived as threatening to the industry's public image or interests. Although we could not document a concerted attack by the tobacco industry that impacted the results of the COMMIT trial, data suggest that the industry used COMMIT as a learning opportunity to mount a well orchestrated and potentially damaging response to the larger American Stop Smoking Intervention Study for Cancer Prevention Trial.     

Undoing an epidemiological paradox: the tobacco industry's targeting of US Immigrants

OBJECTIVES: We sought to ascertain whether the tobacco industry has conceptualized the US immigrant population as a separate market. METHODS: We conducted a content analysis of major tobacco industry documents. RESULTS: The tobacco industry has engaged in 3 distinct marketing strategies aimed at US immigrants: geographically based marketing directed toward immigrant communities, segmentation based on immigrants' assimilation status, and coordinated marketing focusing on US immigrant groups and their countries of origin. CONCLUSIONS: Public health researchers should investigate further the tobacco industry's characterization of the assimilated and non-assimilated immigrant markets, and its specific strategies for targeting these groups, in order to develop informed national and international tobacco control countermarketing strategies designed to protect immigrant populations and their countries of origin.     

The tobacco industry's worldwide ETS consultants project: European and Asian components

BACKGROUND: The tobacco industry has formed regional environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) consultants programs in order to generate controversy on the issue of secondhand smoke (SHS) in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Only those countries in which the industry foresaw SHS restrictions were included. This paper describes the European and Asian components of the tobacco industry's worldwide ETS consultants program. METHODS: A systematic search was carried out of tobacco industry documents available on the Internet between October 2002 and February 2004. RESULTS: Beginning in 1987, Philip Morris assembled an international ETS consultants program in collaboration with other tobacco companies based on their market shares in different regions of the world. The law firm Covington & Burling contacted and hired consultants with a wide range of expertise, usually affiliated with an academic institution, in order to avoid direct contact with the industry. The objective of the program was to influence policy makers, media and the public by providing, through their consultants, 'accurate' (pro-industry) information concerning smoking regulations in public places and workplaces, indoor air quality and ventilation standards, and scientific claims regarding SHS. Consultants also conducted research related to SHS and organized and attended regional and international symposiums related to SHS without acknowledging industry funding. CONCLUSIONS: Despite evidence that the issue of smoke-free environments was close to emerging within the general public throughout the world in the late 1980s, the tobacco industry used its well-organized network of consultants to avoid SHS regulations in most of the world.     

Support for population level tobacco control policies in Hungary

Background: Smoking is the leading, preventable risk factor for premature death and disability in Hungary. The objective of this paper was to assess the social acceptability of and the predictors of holding favourable attitudes toward tobacco control policies among the Hungarian population. Methods: A self-administered questionnaire-based study was carried out among individuals aged 16-70 years. Logistic regression analysis was used to assess whether support for the ten tobacco control policies varies as a function of age, sex, educational level, and smoking status. Results: The majority of the respondents supported the studied tobacco control measures. Over 90 percent of the sample supported: fines for retailers selling tobacco products to minors (92.3%), stricter enforcement of restrictions on selling tobacco products to minors (90.5%), and a ban on smoking in health care institutions (91.4%). The lowest levels of support were for bans on sponsorship by the tobacco industry (52.8%) and price increases on tobacco products (54.9%). For each measure, support was significantly lower among smokers than non-smokers. Age and education were significantly related to support for some but not all measures. Conclusions: Strong majorities of Hungarians support the enactment and enforcement of a wide range of tobacco control measures, a fact that was acknowledged by Parliament's passage of the 2011 Anti-Smoking Law. Advocacy efforts to encourage the acceptance of tobacco control policies should focus not only on smokers, but also on younger and less educated non-smokers.     

'We will speak as the smoker': the tobacco industry's smokers' rights groups

Introduction: The tobacco industry usually keeps its commercial and political communications separate. However, the images of the smoker developed by the two types of communication may contradict one another. This study assesses industry attempts to organize 'smokers' rights groups,' (SRGs) and the image of the smoker that underlay these efforts. METHODS: Searches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, the British American Tobacco documents database, and Tobacco Documents Online. RESULTS: 1100 documents pertaining to SRGs were found, including groups from across Europe and in Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong. From the late 1970s through the late 1990s they were active in numerous policy arenas, particularly the defeat of smoke-free laws. Their strategies included asserting their right to smoke and positioning themselves as courteous victims of tobacco control advocates. However, most SRGs were short-lived and apparently failed to inspire smokers to join in any significant numbers. CONCLUSION: SRGs conflated the legality of smoking with a right to smoke. SRGs succeeded by focusing debates about smoke-free policies on smokers rather than on smoke. However, SRGs' inability to attract members highlights the conflict between the image of the smoker in cigarette ads and that of the smokers' rights advocate. The changing social climate for smoking both compelled the industry's creation of SRGs, and created the contradictions that led to their failure. As tobacco control becomes stronger, the industry may revive this strategy in other countries. Advocates should be prepared to counter SRGs by exposing their origins and exploiting these contradictions.     

The tobacco industry's internal documents and smoking prevention in Spain

A 1998 agreement between several states in the USA and the tobacco industry made millions of pages of internal documents available to the public. Many of these documents contain information that the industry would have preferred to keep confidential. Systematic review of these internal documents constitutes a valuable resource for international tobacco control, since they are available on the Internet and can be accessed from anywhere in the world. These documents provide relevant and useful information to antismoking activists and researchers. To facilitate their use, the present article presents the electronic archives of the tobacco industry's documents, describes methods for conducting searches, and identifies the documents with information on the industry's tactics for manipulating Spanish politics and society for its own commercial interests during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.     

Waking a sleeping giant: the tobacco industry's response to the polonium-210 issue

The major tobacco manufacturers discovered that polonium was part of tobacco and tobacco smoke more than 40 years ago and attempted, but failed, to remove this radioactive substance from their products. Internal tobacco industry documents reveal that the companies suppressed publication of their own internal research to avoid heightening the public's awareness of radioactivity in cigarettes. Tobacco companies continue to minimize their knowledge about polonium-210 in cigarettes in smoking and health litigation. Cigarette packs should carry a radiation-exposure warning label.     

The tobacco industry's political efforts to derail the EPA report on ETS

Previously secret tobacco industry documents detailed a multifaceted approach of political strategies aimed to derail the 1993 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) risk assessment on environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). These pervasive strategies included the following: (1) lobbying the first Bush Administration to approve an executive order that would impose new risk assessment standards for federal agencies, thus delaying the release of the EPA report; (2) having the first Bush Administration transfer jurisdiction over ETS from the EPA to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), thus obviating the need for the release of the EPA report; and (3) applying enormous political pressure directly by alleging improper procedure and policy at EPA. Although some of the attempted strategies failed, the political pressure from Congressman Thomas Bliley (R-VA) was a success. This is the first report showing how a single member of Congress in conjunction with his staff, tobacco industry attorneys, and executives worked very aggressively to do the tobacco industry's bidding. These tactics successfully delayed the EPA risk assessment and placed a cloud over its validity that was not fully vindicated until December 2002 when the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the tobacco industry's suit against the EPA. The documents show that the industry will expend whatever effort is necessary to protect itself from public health policy that would adversely affect consumption of cigarettes and, therefore, profit.     

Breaking the alliance: Defeating the tobacco industry's allies and enacting youth access restrictions in Massachusetts

OBJECTIVES: We describe the tobacco industry's effort in Massachusetts to block the adoption of local regulations designed to reduce youth access to tobacco products. We also explain how state-funded tobacco control advocates overcame industry opposition. METHODS: We examined internal tobacco industry documents and records of local boards of health and conducted interviews with participants in local regulatory debates. RESULTS: The industry fought proposed regulations by working through a trade group, the New England Convenience Store Association. With industry direction and financing, the association's members argued against proposed regulations in local public hearings. However, these efforts failed because community-based advocates worked assiduously to cultivate support for the regulations among board of health members and local community organizations. CONCLUSIONS: Passage of youth access regulations by local boards of health in Massachusetts is attributed to ongoing state funding for local tobacco control initiatives, agreement on common policy goals among tobacco control advocates, and a strategy of persuading boards of health to adopt and enforce their own local regulations.     

Old wine in new bottles: Tobacco industry's submission to European Commission tobacco product directive public consultation

Between September and December 2010 the European Commission Health & Consumer Protection Directorate-General (DGSANCO) held a public consultation on a possible revision of the European Union Tobacco Products Directive (2001/37/EC). We used content analysis of the tobacco industry's and related parties’ 300 submissions to the public consultation to determine if tobacco industry and its allies in Europe are prepared to reduce harm of the tobacco products as their public statements assert. The industry submission resorted to traditional tobacco industry arguments where illicit trade and freedom of choice were emphasized and misrepresented the conclusions of a DGSANCO-commissioned scientific report on smokeless tobacco products. Retailers and wholesalers referred to employment and economic growth more often than respondents from other categories. The pattern of responses in the submission differed dramatically from independent public opinion polls of EU citizens’ support for tobacco control policies. None of the major tobacco manufacturers or their lobbying organizations supported any of the DGSANCO's proposed evidence based interventions (pictorial health warnings, plain packaging or point-of-sale display bans) to reduce harms caused by cigarette smoking.