Reaching a shared understanding of shared decision making in health care: NICE's experience of scoping the shared decision making guideline

NICE's guideline on shared decision making, currently under development, endeavours to support shared decision making as part of routine health care practice. In this article, we summarize our learning to date, gained through the scoping of the guideline, on the key challenges that need to be addressed in the guideline. The production of a scope is the first stage in the development of a NICE guideline, setting the parameters for what will be considered in the guideline. The process for scoping the shared decision making guideline involved discussion with early recruited committee members and engagement with registered stakeholders, through both a workshop and formal consultation. Important, and sometimes divergent, viewpoints about shared decision making were revealed through this process. The key challenges centred on the issues of a need for a common definition of shared decision making, measurability, opportunities, barriers to implementation, and feasibility. Recognizing these challenges aided the refinement of the scope in terms of what the guideline will cover, draft questions and main outcomes for consideration.     

Person‐centred shared decision making

While multiple versions of shared decision making (SDM) have been advanced, most share two seemingly essential elements: (a) SDM is primarily focused on treatment choices and (b) the clinician is primarily responsible for providing options while the patient contributes values and preferences. We argue that these two elements render SDM suboptimal for clinical practice. We suggest that SDM is better viewed as collaboration in all aspects of clinical care, with clinicians needing to fully engage with the patient's experience of illness and participation in treatment. SDM can only take place within an ongoing partnership between clinician and patient, both respecting the other as a person, not as part of an isolated encounter. Respect for the patient as a person goes beyond respect for their choice. Non‐interference is not the only way, or even the most important way, to respect patient autonomy. Knowing the patient as a person and providing an autonomy‐supportive context for care are crucial. That is, the clinician must know the patient well enough to be able to answer the patient's question “What would you do, if you were me?” This approach acknowledges clinicians as persons, requiring them to understand patients as persons. We provide examples of such a model of SDM and assert that this pragmatic method does not require excessive time or effort on the part of clinicians or patients but does require direct and particular knowledge of the patient that is often omitted from clinical decisions.     

Objective and quantitative equilibriometric evaluation of individual locomotor behaviour in schizophrenia: Translational and clinical implications

Psychiatry is the only medical specialty that lacks clinically applicable biomarkers for objective evaluation of the existing pathology at a single‐patient level. On the basis of an original translational equilibriometric method for evaluation of movement patterns, we have introduced in the everyday clinical practice of psychiatry an easy‐to‐perform computerized objective quantification of the individual locomotor behaviour during execution of the Unterberger stepping test. For the last 20 years, we have gradually collected a large database of more than 1000 schizophrenic patients, their relatives, and matched psychiatric, neurological, and healthy controls via cross‐sectional and longitudinal investigations. Comparative analyses revealed transdiagnostic locomotor similarities among schizophrenic patients, high‐risk schizotaxic individuals, and neurological patients with multiple sclerosis and cerebellar ataxia, thus suggesting common underlying brain mechanisms. In parallel, intradiagnostic dissimilarities were revealed, which allow to separate out subclinical locomotor subgroups within the diagnostic categories. Prototypical qualitative (dysmetric and ataxic) locomotor abnormalities in schizophrenic patients were differentiated from 2 atypical quantitative ones, manifested as either hypolocomotion or hyperlocomotion. Theoretical analyses suggested that these 3 subtypes of locomotor abnormalities could be conceived as objectively measurable biomarkers of 3 schizophrenic subgroups with dissimilar brain mechanisms, which require different treatment strategies. Analogies with the prominent role of locomotor measures in some well‐known animal models of mental disorders advocate for a promising objective translational research in the so far over‐subjective field of psychiatry. Distinctions among prototypical, atypical, and diagnostic biomarkers, as well as between neuromotor and psychomotor locomotor abnormalities, are discussed. Conclusions are drawn about the translational and clinical implications of the new approach and its future perspectives.     

Modern medicine and the one‐size‐fits‐all approach: A clinician's comment to Alexandra Pârvan's “Mind Electric” article

As a clinician, I can easily agree with the author that a person's own reality of being healthy is independent of physical evidence or clinical categories and that this perspective should be considered to improve clinical care. However, I cannot follow the assumptions about the nature and working of modern medicine and psychiatry as typically using “black box” and one‐size‐fits‐all treatments in daily practice. I outline several working contexts of doctors where this criticism does only marginally apply or not at all and wonder whether the author might wish, if possible at all from a philosophical viewpoint, to differentiate her concepts with regard to these different contexts. In addition, I think that ill health in the field of psychiatry might have to be dealt with differently than physical ill health.     

Ethical persuasion: the rhetoric of communication in critical care

This article reviews the ethics of rhetoric in critical care. Rational appeals in critical care fail to move patients or surrogates to a better course of action. Appeals to their emotions are considered illegitimate because they may preclude autonomous choice. This article discusses whether it is always unethical to change someone's beliefs, whether persuasive communication is inherently harmful and whether it leaves no space for voluntariness. To answer these questions, the article engages with Aristotle's work, Rhetoric. In considering whether there is a place for emotionally charged messages in a patient–provider relationship, the article intends to delineate the nature of this relationship and describe the duties this relationship implies. The article presents examples of persuasive communication used in critical care and discusses whether providers may have a duty to persuade patients. This duty is supported by the fact that doctors often influence patients' and families' choices by framing presented options. Doctors should assume responsibility in recognizing these personal and contextual influences that may influence the medical choices of their patients. They should attempt to modify these contextual factors and biases in a way that would assist patients and families in reaching the desired outcomes. The opening sections surveyed a number of definitions found in relevant literature and outlined some of the concepts included in the proposed definition. This definition helps to distinguish instances of persuasion from cases of manipulation, coercion and deception. Considering the fact that patients and families often make irrational decisions and the fact that doctors inadvertently influence their choices, the article suggested that persuasion can be a positive tool in medical communication. When patients or families clearly do not understand the risks or make decisions that contradict their long‐term goals, persuasion can be used as a positive influence.     

Effect of visit length and a clinical decision support tool on abdominal aortic aneurysm screening rates in a primary care practice

Rationale, aims and objectives In 2005, the US Preventive Services Task Force issued recommendations for one‐time abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) screening using abdominal ultrasonography in men aged 65 to 75 years with a history of smoking. However, despite a mortality rate of up to 80% for ruptured AAAs, providers order the screening for a minority of patients. We examined AAA screening rates among providers and investigated the role of visit duration and other factors in whether patients received screening. We also looked for potential interventions to improve compliance. Methods We retrospectively reviewed the records of patients who visited our clinic over a 4‐month period and met the US Preventive Services Task Force criteria for AAA screening when our practice had a real‐time decision support tool implemented to identify patients due for the screening. We also surveyed our clinic's providers about their knowledge and attitudes regarding AAA screening. Results Despite the use of physician reminders, providers ordered screening for only 12.9% of eligible patients. Screening was more likely to be ordered during longer visits versus shorter ones (24% vs. 6%). When surveyed, most providers (70.6%) indicated that a nurse‐directed ordering system would improve compliance. Conclusions This study illustrates that physician reminders alone are not sufficient to improve care and that more time is needed for preventive services. This provides additional support for the use of a multidisciplinary approach to preventive screening, as in a patient‐centred medical home. In a patient‐centred medical home, a care team of physicians, nurses and office staff use technology such as clinical decision support to provide comprehensive, coordinated patient care.     

Use of a Web-based clinical decision support system to improve abdominal aortic aneurysm screening in a primary care practice

Rationale, aims and objectives The United States Preventive Services Task Force recommends a one‐time screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) with ultrasonography for men aged 65 to 75 years who have ever smoked. However, despite a mortality rate of up to 80% for ruptured AAAs, providers order the screening for a minority of patients. We sought to determine the effect of a Web‐based point‐of‐care clinical decision support system on AAA screening rates in a primary care practice. Methods We conducted a retrospective review of medical records of male patients aged 65 to 75 years who were seen at any of our practice sites in 2007 and 2008, before and after implementation of the clinical decision support system. Results Overall screening rates were 31.36% in 2007 and 44.09% in 2008 (P‐value: <0.001). Of patients who had not had AAA screening prior to the visit, 3.22% completed the screening after the visit in 2007, compared with 18.24% in 2008 when the clinical support system was implemented, 5.36 times improvement (P‐value: <0.001). Conclusions A Web‐based clinical decision support for primary care physicians significantly improved delivery of AAA screening of eligible patients. Carefully developed clinical decision support systems can optimize care delivery, ensuring that important preventive services are delivered to eligible patients.