Infectious disease risks in xenotransplantation

Hurdles exist to clinical xenotransplantation including potential infectious transmission from nonhuman species to xenograft recipients. In anticipation of clinical trials of xenotransplantation, the associated infectious risks have been investigated. Swine and immunocompromised humans share some potential pathogens. Swine herpesviruses including porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV) and porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus (PLHV) are largely species‐specific and do not, generally, infect human cells. Human cellular receptors exist for porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV), which infects certain human‐derived cell lines in vitro. PERV‐inactivated pigs have been produced recently. Human infection due to PERV has not been described. A screening paradigm can be applied to exclude potential human pathogens from “designated pathogen free” breeding colonies. Various microbiological assays have been developed for screening and diagnosis including antibody‐based tests and qualitative and quantitative molecular assays for viruses. Additional assays may be required to diagnose pig‐specific organisms in human xenograft recipients. Significant progress has been made in the evaluation of the potential infectious risks of clinical xenotransplantation. Infectious risk would be amplified by intensive immunosuppression. The available data suggest that risks of xenotransplant‐associated recipient infection are manageable and that clinical trials can be performed safely. Possible infectious risks of xenotransplantation to the community at large are undefined but merit consideration.     

Xenotransplantation: Infectious Risk Revisited

Xenotransplantation is a possible solution for the shortage of tissues for human transplantation. Multiple hurdles exist to clinical xenotransplantation, including immunologic barriers, metabolic differences between pigs--the source species most commonly considered--and humans, and ethical concerns. Since clinical trials were first proposed almost 10 years ago, the degree of risk for infection transmitted from the xenograft donor to the recipient has been extensively investigated. A number of potential viral pathogens have been identified including porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV), porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV), and porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus (PLHV). Sensitive diagnostic assays have been developed for each virus. Human-tropic PERV are exogenous recombinants between PERV-A and PERV-C sequences and are present in only a subset of swine. Porcine cytomegalovirus can be excluded from herds of source animals by early weaning of piglets. In contrast, the risks associated with PLHV remain undefined. Microbiologic studies and assays for potential xenogeneic pathogens have furthered understanding of risks associated with xenotransplantation. Thus far, clinical xenotransplantation of pig tissues has not resulted in transmission of viral infection to humans; significant risks for disease transmission from swine to humans have not been confirmed. If immunologic hurdles can be overcome, it is reasonable to initiate carefully monitored clinical trials.     

Xenotransplantation-associated infectious risk: a WHO consultation

Xenotransplantation carries the potential risk of the transmission of infection with the cells or tissues of the graft. The degree of risk is unknown in the absence of clinical trials. The clinical application of xenotransplantation has important implications for infectious disease surveillance, both at the national and international levels. Preclinical data indicate that infectious disease events associated with clinical xenotransplantation from swine, should they occur, will be rare; data in human trials are limited but have demonstrated no transmission of porcine microorganisms including porcine endogenous retrovirus. Xenotransplantation will necessitate the development of surveillance programs to detect known infectious agents and, potentially, previously unknown or unexpected pathogens. The development of surveillance and safety programs for clinical trials in xenotransplantation is guided by a "Precautionary Principle," with the deployment of appropriate screening procedures and assays for source animals and xenograft recipients even in the absence of data suggesting infectious risk. All assays require training, standardization and validation, and sharing of laboratory methods and expertise to optimize the quality of the surveillance and diagnostic testing. Investigation of suspected xenogeneic infection events (xenosis, xenozoonosis) should be performed in collaboration with an expert data safety review panel and the appropriate public health and competent authorities. It should be considered an obligation of performance of xenotransplantation trials to report outcomes, including any infectious disease transmissions, in the scientific literature. Repositories of samples from source animals and from recipients prior to, and following xenograft transplantation are essential to the investigation of possible infectious disease events. Concerns over any potential hazards associated with xenotransplantation may overshadow potential benefits. Careful microbiological screening of source animals used as xenotransplant donors may enhance the safety of transplantation beyond that of allotransplant procedures. Xenogeneic tissues may be relatively resistant to infection by some human pathogens. Moreover, xenotransplantation may be made available at the time when patients require organ replacement on a clinical basis. Insights gained in studies of the microbiology and immunology of xenotransplantation will benefit transplant recipients in the future. This document summarizes approaches to disease surveillance in individual recipients of nonhuman tissues.     

Reduction of consumptive coagulopathy using porcine cytomegalovirus-free cardiac porcine grafts in pig-to-primate xenotransplantation

BACKGROUND: Xenotransplantation using pigs as the source species for organs carries a potential risk for transmission and activation of porcine herpesviruses. Activation of porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV) in pig-to-baboon xenotransplantation is associated with xenograft injury and possibly an increased incidence of consumptive coagulopathy (CC). METHODS: To further investigate the role of PCMV activation in the occurrence of CC, a strategy to exclude PCMV from the donor was developed. To exclude PCMV, piglets were early-weaned and raised separated from other swine. These piglets were used as donors in an experimental protocol of pig-to-baboon heart xenotransplantation. RESULTS: Early weaning of piglets was successful in excluding PCMV. Use of PCMV-free cardiac porcine xenografts in baboons resulted in prolonged graft survival and prevented consumptive coagulopathy in all recipients. CONCLUSIONS: The use of PCMV-free cardiac grafts is beneficial in reducing the direct effects of PCMV activation in the graft (tissue damage) and the indirect effects of PCMV activation in the recipient (consumptive coagulopathy).     

Retroviral Restriction Factors and Infectious Risk in Xenotransplantation

The clinical application of xenotransplantation poses immunologic, ethical, and microbiologic challenges. Significant progress has been made in the investigation of each of these areas. Among concerns regarding infectious risks for human xenograft recipients is the identification in swine of infectious agents including porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV) that are capable of replication in some human cell lines. PERV replication has, however, been difficult to demonstrate in primate‐derived cell lines and in preclinical studies of non‐human primates receiving porcine xenografts. Endogenous ‘retroviral restriction factors’ are intracellular proteins and components of the innate immune system that act at various steps in retroviral replication. Recent studies suggest that some of these factors may have applications in the management of endogenous retroviruses in xenotransplantation. The risks of PERV infection and the potential role of retroviral restriction factors in xenotransplantation are reviewed in detail.     

Safety of xenotransplantation: screening the donor pig and the recipient

Introduction: Xenotransplantation using pig cells and tissues may be associated with the transmission of porcine microorganisms including bacteria, parasites, fungi and viruses to the human recipient and may result in zoonones. Porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) represent a special risk since PERV‐A and PERV‐B are present in the genome of all pigs and infect human cells. PERV‐C is not present in all pigs and does not infect human cells. However, recombinants between PERV‐A and PERV‐C have been observed in normal pigs characterised by higher replication rates compared with PERV‐A, and they are also able to infect human cells (1). Methods: In the past years numerous assays based on the PCR technology have been developed to screen for the prevalence and expression of PERV and other porcine microorganisms in the donor pig (2). Whereas most microorganisms may be eliminated by designated pathogen‐free breeding, PERVs cannot be removed this way. In addition, assays have been developed to analyse the recipient for the transmission of PERV and other microorganisms, either using PCR methods or immunological assays to detect an antibody production as a result of infection (3). Results: Using these assays, no transmission of PERV as well as of other porcine microorganisms has been observed in first preclinical and clinical xenotransplantations or animal infection experiments. This was especially true for the first clinical transplantation of pig islet cells approved by the New Zealand government (4). Until now there is no susceptible animal model to study PERV transmission and transplantations of porcine cells or organs to non‐human primates as they are associated with limitations concerning the safety aspect, which do not allow transmitting the negative findings to humans (5). Different experimental approaches are under development to reduce the probability of PERV transmission, e.g. the generation of transgenic pigs expressing PERV‐specific siRNA inhibiting PERV expression by RNA interference (6), genotypic selection of pigs with a low prevalence and expression of PERV and neutralising antibodies against the envelope proteins inhibiting PERV infection (7). Conclusion: Investigations of the last years resulted in highly sensitive and specific methods to study PERV and other microorganisms in donor pigs and human recipients of xenotransplants. These methods showed absence of PERV transmission in all investigated cases, both in more than 200 human xenotransplant recipients, mostly recipients of cellular xenotransplants, as well as in non‐human primates and small animals. New technologies under development may further decrease the probability of transmission. References: 1. Denner J. Recombinant porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV‐A/C): A new risk for xenotransplantation? Arch Virol 2008; 153: 1421–1426. 2. Kaulitz D, Mihica D, Dorna J, Costa MR, Petersen B, Niemann H, TÖnjes RR, Denner J. Development of sensitive methods for detection of porcine endogenous retrovirus‐C (PERV‐C) in the genome of pigs J Virol Methods 2011; 175(1): 60–65. 3. Denner, J. Infectious risk in xenotransplantation – what post‐transplant screening for the human recipient? Xenotransplantation 2011; 18(3): 151–157. 4. Wynyard S, Garkavenko O, Nathu D, Denner J, Elliott R. Microbiological safety of the first clinical pig islet xenotransplantation trial in New Zealand, submitted. 5. Mattiuzzo G, Takeuchi Y. Suboptimal porcine endogenous retrovirus infection in non‐human primate cells: implication for preclinical xenotransplantation. PLoS One 2010; 5(10): e13203. 6. Semaan M, Kaulitz D, Petersen B, Niemann H, Denner J. Long‐term effects of PERV‐specific RNA interference in transgenic pigs. Xenotransplantation 2012; 19(2): 112–21. 7. Kaulitz D, Fiebig U, Eschricht M, Wurzbacher C, Kurth R, Denner J. Generation of neutralising antibodies against porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs). Virology 2011; 411(1): 78–86.     

Pig endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation

Xenotransplantation of porcine organs might provide an unlimited source of donor organs to treat endstage organ failure diseases in humans. However, pigs harbour retroviruses with unknown pathogenic potential as an integral part of their genome. While until recently the risk of interspecies transmission of these porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV) during xenotransplantation has been thought to be negligible, several reports on infection of human cells in vitro and spread of PERV from transplanted porcine islets in murine model systems have somewhat challenged this view. Here, we compile available data on PERV biology and diagnostics, and discuss the significance of the results with regard to the safety of clinical xenotransplantation.     

Infectious risk and retroviral restriction factors in xenotransplantation

The clinical application of xenotransplantation evokes immunological and microbiological as well as virological challenges. Porcine pathogens that do not show any symptoms in their natural host could exhibit a risk of fatal infections to humans. The presence of pig infectious agents including zoonotic and dissimilar agents should be reduced by specific pathogen free (spf) breeding of donor animals. However, the genetic information of porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV) is integrated in the pig genome and can not be eradicated by spf breeding. The concerns about PERV for human xenograft recipients are based on data of in vitro replication of PERV in some human cell lines. So far, viral replication of PERV has been difficult to demonstrate in non‐human primate cell lines and in preclinical studies of non‐human primates receiving porcine xenografts, respectively. In this regard, natural and effective mechanisms of human and porcine cells counteracting productive infections caused by PERV are important to investigate. Intracellular proteins and components of the innate immune system including endogenous “antiretroviral restriction factors” act at various steps in retroviral replication. The cellular front is composed by several constitutively expressed genes which prevent or suppress retroviral infections. Some of these factors such as members of the tripartite motif (TRIM) and the apolipoprotein B mRNA‐editing polypeptide (APOBEC) families as well as tetherin and zinc‐finger antiviral protein (ZAP) could be useful in the management of PERV in xenotransplantation. The risks of infection and the potential role of antiretroviral restriction factors in xenotransplantation are presented in detail.     

Porcine pathogens and xenotransplantation: PERV and beyond!

Concerns regarding the transmission of potentially zoonotic porcine viruses via a xenotransplant have prompted a significant number of studies on methods to eliminate or prevent expression and transmission of these viruses. The main focus of these studies, to date, has been the porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV); PERV is a genetically acquired element and present in the genome of all swine. This situation is problematic as it cannot simply be eliminated from swine by using methods currently employed to exclude exogenous pathogens in barrier facilities. As such, alternative strategies have been sought to circumvent the potential risk of PERV expression and transmission via a xenotransplant, however, there are other existing and emerging pathogens of concern that should be addressed when using this novel technology in vivo. Zoonotic porcine viruses have been identified that require specific diagnostic methods to confirm their absence. Animal husbandry and the exclusion of pathogens from SPF herds for use in xenotransplantation have been widely discussed and a number of organizations have issued guidelines on the screening for infectious agents. Although these recommendations on monitoring protocol and the identification of adventitious agents are clear, there is no comprehensive list of pathogens to be excluded from these animals that can be applied to all centres carrying out xenotransplantation. Currently, SPF animals used for research purposes are monitored for specific pathogens as defined by local guidelines, and may not be tested for all pathogens relevant to xenotransplantation. As recent data has indicated the potential for certain porcine pathogens to cross the species barrier, it is clear that xenotransplantation is a unique situation which may require us to address a more comprehensive panel of microorganisms than is currently recommended for SPF animals. This presentation will discuss data on the presence of pathogens in pigs, other than PERV, that may cause concern during the clinical application of xenotransplantation and the issues regarding the potential transfer of new zoonotic microorganisms.     

Absence of PERV specific humoral immune response in baboons after transplantation of porcine cells or organs

Xenotransplantation of pig organs seems a promising way of overcoming the prevailing limitation on allotransplantation due to donor numbers. However, as porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) can infect human cells in vitro, there is substantial concern regarding the risk of a PERV infection in xenogeneic transplant recipients. Cultured porcine endothelial cells, stimulated peripheral blood mononuclear cells, and pancreatic islet cells can release PERV infectious for human cells in vitro, but it is currently unknown whether PERV is released in vivo, whether these viral particles can infect the transplant recipient, and whether they are pathogenic. In a retrospective study 15 immunosuppressed baboons were tested for a specific immune response against PERV after transplantation of porcine endothelial cells, mononuclear blood cells, and lungs. Anti-PERV antibody expression was analyzed with peptide-based, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays and highly sensitive Western Blot assays. This xenotransplantation study using nonhuman primates found no evidence of PERV specific humoral immune response. Our data suggest that no productive PERV infection and no continuous PERV release takes place in the nonhuman primates analyzed in this study.     

Porcine cytomegalovirus in pigs being bred for xenograft organs: progress towards control

Clark DA, Fryer JFL, Tucker AW, McArdle PD, Hughes AE, Emery VC, Griffiths PD. Porcine cytomegalovirus in pigs being bred for xenograft organs: progress towards control. Xenotransplantation 2003; 10: 142–148. © Blackwell Munksgaard, 2003
In human medicine, human cytomegalovirus (HCMV) is readily transmitted by organ transplant causing end-organ disease and triggering graft rejection in recipients. Because of a chronic shortage of human organs, pigs transgenic for human complement control proteins are being considered as potential donors. Such xenotransplantation raises concerns about the potential zoonotic transmission of viruses including porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV), an endemic infection of pigs. Similar to HCMV and PCMV transmission is thought to occur in utero and perinatally. We used quantitative polymerase chain reaction to examine the prevalence, organ distribution and viral load of PCMV in human decay accelerating factor (CD55) transgenic pigs. In animals reared under conventional farm conditions, virus was identified in a wide range of organs including potential xenografts (liver, kidney and heart). The spleen was PCMV DNA positive in all infected pigs. Examination of foetal spleens failed to identify evidence of transplacental infection and prospective monitoring of two litters showed that infection occurred in the postnatal period. This transmission was prevented by hysterotomy derivation and barrier rearing. Our findings demonstrate that PCMV could be eradicated from pig herds being bred for xenotransplantation and argue that the spleen from donor animals should be examined as part of quality control procedures if clinical trials proceed.     

Prevention of infection in xenotransplantation: Designated pathogen-free swine in the safety equation

Post-transplantation infections are common. In immunosuppressed human xenograft recipients, infection is most likely to be due to the same pathogens seen in human allotransplantation. However, organisms derived from swine and transmitted with xenografts have the potential to cause novel infections in xenograft recipients. The specific organisms likely to cause infection or “xenosis” are unknown but are postulated to be like those causing infection in allograft recipients. On this basis, theoretical exclusion criteria have been developed to guide the development of source animal herds. Herds developed based on the exclusion of potential human pathogens have been termed “designated pathogen-free” (DPF). Lists of potential pathogens will require revision with changing epidemiology of infection in swine worldwide and clinical experience. Development of new microbiological assays is required both for animal screening and in clinical diagnosis should infections occur. Genetic modifications of swine have the potential to eliminate certain infectious agents such as the porcine endogenous retrovirus; infectious complications of such modifications have not been observed. Unexpected, off target effects of genetic modifications require further study. Monitoring for infection in asymptomatic recipients is important to define infectious risks which are unknown in the absence of clinical trials data. Advanced microbiological techniques may be applied to diagnose and prevent infection in xenograft recipients.     

Early weaning of piglets fails to exclude porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus

BACKGROUND: Xenotransplantation using pigs as source species carries a risk for the activation of latent herpesviruses from the porcine donor and potential transmission to the recipient. In pig-to-baboon xenotransplantation, activation of porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV) has been associated with xenograft injury and an increased incidence of consumptive coagulopathy and graft loss. Activation of porcine lymphotropic herpesvirus (PLHV)-1 was not observed in pig-to-baboon solid organ xenotransplantation, but was associated with a syndrome of post-transplantation lymphoproliferative disorder (PTLD) after allogeneic stem cell transplantation in pigs. MATERIAL and METHODS: Early weaning of piglets was used to try to reduce the viral burden of xenograft donors. This consisted of separating the piglets of a litter from the sow within the first 2 weeks after birth and raising them in isolation from the remaining herd. RESULTS: We have previously demonstrated that PCMV could be excluded from source animals by early weaning of piglets. However, early weaning failed to exclude PLHV-1 from source pigs. CONCLUSIONS: This disparity between PCMV and PLHV-1 reflects differing pathogenesis of infection of these herpesviruses. New approaches will be needed to exclude PLHV-1 from pig colonies.     

Is porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV) transmission still relevant?

Xenotransplantation using porcine cells or organs may be associated with the risk of transmission of zoonotic microorganisms. Porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) pose a potentially high risk because they are integrated into the genome of all pigs and PERV-A and PERV-B at least, which are present in all pigs, can infect human cells. However, PERV transmission could not be demonstrated in the first recipients of clinical xenotransplantation or after numerous experimental pig-to-non-human primate transplantations. In addition, inoculation of immunosuppressed small animals and non-human primates failed to result in demonstrable PERV infection. Nevertheless, strategies to reduce the possible danger of PERV transmission to humans, however low, could be of benefit for the large-scale clinical use of porcine xenotransplants. One strategy is to select pigs free of PERV-C, thereby preventing recombination with PERV-A. A second strategy involves the selection of animals that express only very low levels of PERV-A and PERV-B. To this end, sensitive and specific methods have been developed to allow the distribution and expression of PERV to be analyzed. A third strategy is to develop a vaccine capable of protecting against PERV transmission. Finally, a fourth strategy is based on the inhibition of PERV expression by RNA interference. Using PERV-specific short hairpin RNA (shRNA) and retroviral vectors, inhibition of PERV expression in primary pig cells was demonstrated and transgenic pigs were generated that show reduced PERV expression in all tissues analyzed. Intensive work is required to improve and to combine these strategies to further decrease the putative risk of PERV transmission following xenotransplantation.     

Productive infection of primary human endothelial cells by pig endogenous retrovirus (PERV)

Abstract: The potential risk of viral transmission in the setting of xenotransplantation has gained major attention. Different porcine cell types have been shown to release retroviral particles, which are infectious for human cell lines in vitro. However, there are only a few data on whether PERV (pig endogenous retrovirus) is able to infect primary human cells. In this study we have analyzed endothelial cells, vascular fibroblasts, mesangial cells, mononuclear cells, hematopoetic stem cells and bone marrow stromal cells for PERV transmission. We now provide evidence for primary human endothelial cells, vascular fibroblasts, and mesangial cells to be susceptible to PERV transmission. PERV infection was productive in endothelial cells and mesangial cells. Our data confirm and extend former reports concerning the PERV infection of human cells. The PERV infection of different primary human cells represents further significant evidence for a viral risk during xenotransplantation. In this context, special attention should be directed towards productive infection of human endothelial cells: in the setting of xenotransplantation this cell type will have close contact with porcine cells and PERV particles.     

Emerging infectious diseases and xenotransplantation

A total of 335 infectious diseases was reported in the global human population between 1940 and 2004, the majority of which were caused by zoonotic pathogens [ 1 ]. Although viral pathogens constitute only 25%, some have spread worldwide with most starting from Central Africa. These include human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) causing acquired immunodeficiency syndromes (AIDS), chikungunya virus and West Nile virus, which also cause severe diseases in humans. HIV‐1 and HIV‐2, for example, are the result of trans‐species transmission from non‐human primates [ 2 ] to humans sometime in the last century. The spread of two henipaviruses causing fatal diseases in horses, pigs and humans has been observed in Asia and Australia, and although these viruses represent transspecies transmissions from bats, secondary transmissions from pigs to humans have also occurred. These and many other examples of emerging infectious diseases call for strong safety considerations in the field of xenotransplantation. Whereas known viruses can easily be eliminated from donor pigs, strategies should be developed to detect new zoonotic pathogens. In addition, all pigs carry porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) in their genome. Two of these, PERV‐A and PERV‐B, as wells as recombinant PERV‐A/C are able to infect human cells. The greatest threat appears to come from the recombinant PERV‐A/C viruses as they appear to have an increased infectivity [ 3 , 4 ]. An increase in PERV expression was not observed in multitransgenic pigs expressing DAF, TRAIL and HLAE, generated to prevent immune rejection [ 5 ]. Our laboratory has developed a variety of strategies to prevent PERV transmission following xenotransplantation: (i) selection of animals that do not harbour PERV‐C genomes in order to prevent recombination, (ii) selection of PERV‐A and PERV‐B low‐producers [ 6 ], (iii) development of an antiviral vaccine to protect xenotransplant recipients [ 7 ] and (iv) generation of transgenic pigs in which PERV expression is inhibited via RNA interference. Inhibition of PERV expression using either synthetic small interfering (si) RNA or short hairpin (sh) RNA was demonstrated in PERV infected human cells [ 8 ], in primary pig cells [ 9 ] and in all transgenic piglets born [ 10 ]. A second generation of pigs expressing PERV‐specific siRNA is now under study and experiments have been started to introduce multiple shRNA. Supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG, DE729/4.     

Miniature swine as organ donors for man: Strategies for prevention of xenotransplant-associated infections

Abstract: Xenotransplantation could potentially overcome limitations in organ transplantation resulting from a shortage of donor organs. Transplantation from miniature swine raises concerns over the potential introduction of new infectious agents into humans. These "direct zoonotic infections" or "xenoses" derived from swine fall into four categories: (1) microbial agents known to cause infection in humans (traditional zoonoses);(2) "species specific" organisms restricted to infection of the donor xenograft tissues by the absence of receptors or other factors needed for growth in human cells;(3) organisms of broad "host range" capable of infection of tissues outside the xenograft in the immunocompromised transplant recipient;and (4) organisms, such as retroviruses, of unknown quantity and with unmeasured capacity for causing disease in humans. The behavior of donor-derived xenoses in immunocompromised xenotransplant recipients cannot be predicted. The ability of human-derived microbial agents to infect porcine xenografts, and the capacity of the human immune system to inhibit such infections, also merit investigation. Experimental assessment of the infectious disease risks associated with xenotransplantation is important and practical.     

The production of transgenic pigs for potential use in clinical xenotransplantation: microbiological evaluation

Debate over the infection hazards of pig-to-human xenotransplantation has focused mainly on the porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERV). However, hazards of exogenous infectious agents possibly associated with the xenograft have also been evaluated (Xenotransplantation 2000; 7: 143). We report the results of a health monitoring program demonstrating the exclusion of more than 80 potential pathogens from nine cohorts of pigs reared in a high welfare bioexclusion facility as potential xenograft source animals. A dynamic bacterial flora of pigs reared under barrier conditions was characterized, emphasizing the significance of monitoring for multiresistant antimicrobial sensitivity patterns. Evidence was found for exclusion of two commonly residual exogenous viruses, porcine cytomegalovirus and porcine lymphotropic herpesviruses, among a proportion of the cohorts tested. Finally, there was histopathological evidence for low grade pneumonitis among sentinel pigs, likely to have been associated with the use of quaternary ammonium disinfectants during the production process, indicating a need for review of toxicology data for disinfectant agents used in such bioexclusion systems. Intensive health monitoring programs, based upon regularly updated recommendations from the microbiological research community, will enable significant reductions in the potential hazards associated with pig-to-human xenotransplantation.