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In early 1976, the novel A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1) influenza virus caused severe respiratory illness in 13 soldiers with 1 death at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Since A/New Jersey was similar to the 1918–1919 pandemic virus, rapid outbreak assessment and enhanced surveillance were initiated. A/New Jersey virus was detected only from January 19 to February 9 and did not spread beyond Fort Dix. A/Victoria/75 (H3N2) spread simultaneously, also caused illness, and persisted until March. Up to 230 soldiers were infected with the A/New Jersey virus. Rapid recognition of A/New Jersey, swift outbreak assessment, and enhanced surveillance resulted from excellent collaboration between Fort Dix, New Jersey Department of Health, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and Center for Disease Control personnel. Despite efforts to define the events at Fort Dix, many questions remain unanswered, including the following: Where did A/New Jersey come from? Why did transmission stop?Key words: Influenza, military, respiratory disease, swine, perspectiveRevisiting events surrounding the 1976 swine influenza A (H1N1) outbreak may assist those planning for the rapid identification and characterization of threatening contemporary viruses, like avian influenza A (H5N1) (1). The severity of the 1918 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and evidence for a cycle of pandemics aroused concern that the 1918 disaster could recur (2,3). Following the 1918 pandemic, H1N1 strains circulated until the "Asian" influenza A (H2N2) pandemic in 1957 (3). When in early 1976, cases of influenza in soldiers, mostly recruits, at Fort Dix, New Jersey, were associated with isolation of influenza A (H1N1) serotypes (which in 1976 were labeled Hsw1N1), an intense investigation followed (4).Of 19,000 people at Fort Dix in January 1976, ≈32% were recruits (basic trainees) (4). Recruits reported to Fort Dix for 7 weeks of initial training through the basic training reception center, where they lived and were processed into the Army during an intense 3 days of examinations, administrative procedures, and indoctrination. At the reception center, training unit cohorts were formed. Recruits were grouped into 50-member units (platoons) and organized into companies of 4 platoons each. Units formed by week''s end moved from the reception center to the basic training quarters. To prevent respiratory illnesses, recruits were isolated in their company areas for 2 weeks and restricted to the military post for 4 weeks (4). Platoon members had close contact with other platoon members, less contact with other platoons in their company, and even less contact with other companies.On arrival, recruits received the 1975–1976 influenza vaccine (A/Port Chalmers/1/73 [H3N2], A/Scotland/840/74 [H3N2], and B/Hong Kong/15/72) (4). Other soldiers reported directly to advanced training programs of 4 to 12 weeks at Fort Dix immediately after basic training at Fort Dix or elsewhere. These soldiers received influenza vaccinations in basic training. Civilian employees and soldiers'' families were offered vaccine, but only an estimated <40% accepted (4).Training stopped over the Christmas–New Year''s holidays and resumed on January 5, 1976, with an influx of new trainees. The weather was cold (wind chill factors of 0° to –43°F), and the reception center was crowded (4). Resumption of training was associated with an explosive febrile respiratory disease outbreak involving new arrivals and others. Throat swabs were collected from a sample of hospitalized soldiers with this syndrome. On January 23, the Fort Dix preventive medicine physician learned of 2 isolations of adenovirus type 21 and suspected an adenovirus outbreak (4). He notified the county health department and the New Jersey (NJ) Department of Health of the outbreak (4). On January 28, an NJ Department of Health official consulted with the military physician and suggested that the explosive, widespread outbreak could be influenza (4). Over the next 2 days, 19 specimens were delivered to the state laboratory and 7 A/Victoria-like viruses and 3 unknown hemagglutinating agents were identified (4). Specimens were flown to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, on February 6, where a fourth unknown agent was found (4).On February 2, Fort Dix and NJ Department of Health personnel arranged for virologic studies of deaths possibly caused by influenza (4). Tracheal swabs taken on February 5 from a recruit who died on February 4 yielded a fifth unknown agent on February 9. By February 10, laboratory evidence had confirmed that a novel influenza strain was circulating at Fort Dix and that 2 different influenza strains were causing disease. By February 13, all 5 unknown strains were identified as swine influenza A (Hsw1N1). The possibility of laboratory contamination was evaluated (4). No known swine influenza A strains were present in the NJ Department of Health Virus Laboratory before the Fort Dix outbreak. Additionally, all unknown Fort Dix viruses were independently isolated from original specimens at CDC and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), Washington, DC. Also, 2 patients with novel virus isolates had convalescent-phase, homologous, hemagglutination-inhibition (HAI) antibody titers of 1:40–1:80, consistent with recent infections. The new influenza strain had been independently identified in 3 different laboratories and supporting serologic evidence developed within 15 days after the original specimens were collected (4).
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Table
Key events in the swine influenza A (Hsw1N1) outbreak, Fort Dix, NJDate (1976) | Event |
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January 5 | After the holidays, basic training resumed at Fort Dix, NJ; a sudden, dramatic outbreak of acute respiratory disease followed the influx of new recruit trainees (4). |
January 19 | Earliest hospitalization of a Fort Dix soldier with acute respiratory disease attributed to swine influenza A (Hsw1N1) (identified retrospectively by serologic tests) (7,14) |
January 21 | Influenza A/Victoria (H3N2) identified away from Fort Dix in NJ civilians (4) |
January 23 | Fort Dix received reports of adenovirus type 21 isolations from soldiers ill with respiratory disease and reported the outbreak to the local and state health departments (4) |
January 28 | A NJ Department of Health official suggested the Fort Dix outbreak may be due to influenza and offered to process specimens for virus isolation (4) |
January 29–30 | 19 specimens sent to NJ Department of Health in 2 shipments (4) |
February 2–3 | NJ Department of Health identified 4 isolates of H3N2-like viruses and 2 unknown hemagglutinating agents in 8 specimens sent on January 29. Fort Dix and NJ Department of Health arranged for the study of deaths possibly due to influenza. NJ Department of Health identified 3 H3N2-like viruses and a third unknown hemagglutinating agent in 11 specimens sent on January 30 (4). |
February 4 | Fort Dix soldier died with acute respiratory disease (4). |
February 5 | Tracheal specimens from the soldier who died on February 4 were sent to NJ Department of Health (4). |
February 6 | NJ Department of Health sent the Fort Dix specimens to Center for Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta, GA; CDC identified a fourth unknown hemagglutinating agent in the Fort Dix specimens (4). |
February 9 | Specimens from the soldier who died on February 4 yielded a fifth unknown hemagglutinating agent (4). Last hospitalization of an identified Fort Dix soldier with febrile, acute respiratory disease attributed to swine influenza A (Hsw1N1) (identified retrospectively by serologic tests) (7,14). |
February 10 | Laboratory evidence supported 2 influenza type A strains circulating on Fort Dix; 1 was a radically new strain. Prospective surveillance for cases in the areas around Fort Dix was initiated; only cases of H3N2 were found (4). |
February 13 | Review of laboratory data and information found that all 5 unknown agents were swine influenza A strains (later named A/New Jersey [Hsw1N1]); 3 laboratories independently identified the swine virus from original specimens (serologic data supporting swine influenza A virus infection was later obtained from 2 survivors with A/New Jersey isolates) (4). |
February 14–16 | Initial planning meeting between CDC, NJ Department of Health, Fort Dix, and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research personnel was held in Atlanta, GA. Prospective case finding was initiated at Fort Dix; H3N2 was isolated; Hsw1N1 was not isolated (7). Retrospective case finding was initiated by serologic study of stored serum specimens from Fort Dix soldiers who had been hospitalized for acute respiratory disease; 8 new cases of disease due to Hsw1N1 were identified with hospitalization dates between January 19 and February 9 (7,14). |
February 22–24 | Prospective case finding was again conducted at Fort Dix; H3N2 virus was isolated but not Hsw1N1 (7). |
February 27 | Thirty-nine new recruits entering Fort Dix February 21–27 gave blood samples after arrival and 5 weeks later; serologic studies were consistent with influenza immunization but not spread of H3N2 virus. None had a titer rise to Hsw1N1 (11). |
March 19 | Prospective surveillance identified the last case of influenza in the areas around Fort Dix; only H3N2 viruses were identified outside of Fort Dix (4). |
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Bruce S. Pyenson Claudia I. Henschke David F. Yankelevitz Rowena Yip Ellynne Dec 《American Health & Drug Benefits》2014,7(5):272-282
Background
By a wide margin, lung cancer is the most significant cause of cancer death in the United States and worldwide. The incidence of lung cancer increases with age, and Medicare beneficiaries are often at increased risk. Because of its demonstrated effectiveness in reducing mortality, lung cancer screening with low-dose computed tomography (LDCT) imaging will be covered without cost-sharing starting January 1, 2015, by nongrandfathered commercial plans. Medicare is considering coverage for lung cancer screening.Objective
To estimate the cost and cost-effectiveness (ie, cost per life-year saved) of LDCT lung cancer screening of the Medicare population at high risk for lung cancer.Methods
Medicare costs, enrollment, and demographics were used for this study; they were derived from the 2012 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) beneficiary files and were forecast to 2014 based on CMS and US Census Bureau projections. Standard life and health actuarial techniques were used to calculate the cost and cost-effectiveness of lung cancer screening. The cost, incidence rates, mortality rates, and other parameters chosen by the authors were taken from actual Medicare data, and the modeled screenings are consistent with Medicare processes and procedures.Results
Approximately 4.9 million high-risk Medicare beneficiaries would meet criteria for lung cancer screening in 2014. Without screening, Medicare patients newly diagnosed with lung cancer have an average life expectancy of approximately 3 years. Based on our analysis, the average annual cost of LDCT lung cancer screening in Medicare is estimated to be $241 per person screened. LDCT screening for lung cancer in Medicare beneficiaries aged 55 to 80 years with a history of ≥30 pack-years of smoking and who had smoked within 15 years is low cost, at approximately $1 per member per month. This assumes that 50% of these patients were screened. Such screening is also highly cost-effective, at <$19,000 per life-year saved.Conclusion
If all eligible Medicare beneficiaries had been screened and treated consistently from age 55 years, approximately 358,134 additional individuals with current or past lung cancer would be alive in 2014. LDCT screening is a low-cost and cost-effective strategy that fits well within the standard Medicare benefit, including its claims payment and quality monitoring.Lung cancer is a lethal disease that claims the lives of more people in the United States annually than the next 4 most lethal cancers combined, which are, in order, colon, breast, pancreas, and prostate cancers.1,2 In the United States, an estimated 224,210 people will be diagnosed with lung cancer, and an estimated 159,260 people will die of the disease in 2014.3 The incidence of lung cancer increases with age,4 and the risk increases with the cumulative effects of past smoking. Millions of Medicare beneficiaries are at significant risk.5On December 31, 2013, lung cancer screening using low-dose computed tomography (LDCT) was rated as a level “B” recommendation by the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF),6 a panel of independent experts convened by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to evaluate the strength of evidence and the balance of benefits and harms of preventive services.7 The USPSTF recommendation applies to people aged 55 to 80 years with a history of heavy smoking.6 LDCT is an imaging technology that enables 3-dimensional visualization of internal body structures, including the lungs, using low doses of radiation.Under the Affordable Care Act, the “B” recommendation means that LDCT lung cancer screening must be covered without cost-sharing by qualified health plans starting January 1, 2015.6,8 Qualified health plans include commercial insurance and self-insured benefit plans, with the exclusion of grandfathered plans. Several private insurers have initiated LDCT screening coverage in advance of the 2015 requirement.9 Furthermore, versions of the USPSTF recommendations have been adopted essentially by every major academic body with an interest in lung cancer, including the National Comprehensive Cancer Network, American Association for Thoracic Surgery, American College of Radiology, Society of Thoracic Surgeons, International Association for the Study of Lung Cancer, American College of Chest Physicians, and the American Cancer Society.Medicare has begun a national coverage analysis to determine whether LDCT lung cancer screening meets its criteria for coverage, which includes whether screening is reasonable and necessary for early detection, whether the service has an “A” or a “B” recommendation by the USPSTF, and whether screening is appropriate for Medicare beneficiaries.High doses of radiation can be harmful. LDCT can be performed at very low doses of <0.7 mSv per procedure10 by comparison, the annual natural background radiation in New York City (sea level) is 3 mSv. LDCT technology refinements and protocol optimization have translated into patient benefits, supporting the detection of ever-smaller lung cancers, reducing the rate of surgical procedures, and providing higher cure rates.11–14Advances in LDCT technology, promising results from nonrandomized trials,14 and unchanged survival statistics over the previous 30 years, led to the implementation of the National Lung Screening Trial (NLST), the most expensive and one of the largest randomized screening trials ever sponsored by the National Cancer Institute.13 The trial of 53,454 people aged 55 to 74 years at high risk for lung cancer was conducted to determine whether LDCT screening could reduce mortality from lung cancer. Participants in this 2-arm US study received 3 annual screenings with either an LDCT or a chest x-ray. Based on the study protocol, the trial was stopped when findings demonstrated a relative reduction of 20% in lung cancer mortality in the LDCT arm versus the chest x-ray arm.13Observational data and epidemiologic arguments for breast cancer also suggest that additional rounds of screening would reduce lung cancer mortality by much more than 20%.15–22 Other large studies have shown that computed tomography (CT) screening is associated with a high proportion (much higher than 70%) of the lung cancer diagnoses being early stage15–17,21 compared with 15% in the national data.23 Long-term survival rates of approximately 80% have been reported for patients with lung cancer who are diagnosed by CT screening12,15,16 compared with a 16.8% 5-year survival rate from the national data.23KEY POINTS
- ▸ Lung cancer is the leading cause of cancer death in the United States and worldwide.
- ▸ Because the risk increases with age and with a history of smoking, some Medicare beneficiaries are at high risk for this type of cancer.
- ▸ Low-dose computed tomography (LDCT) has been shown to reduce mortality from lung cancer by more than 20%.
- ▸ Under healthcare reform, LDCT must be covered without cost-sharing by nongrandfathered commercial health plans beginning in 2015.
- ▸ Based on this new analysis, LDCT screening of high-risk Medicare beneficiaries is cost-effective and will cost approximately $1 per member per month.
- ▸ The average annual cost of such a screening policy is estimated to be $241 for a Medicare beneficiary screened.
- ▸ Given all causes of mortality, without screening, Medicare patients newly diagnosed with lung cancer have an average of 3 years life expectancy.
- ▸ With screening, these patients would have an additional 4 years of additional life expectancy incremental to the life expectancy without screening.
- ▸ If all eligible beneficiaries had been screened and treated consistently from age 55 years, approximately 358,134 additional individuals with current or past lung cancer would be alive in 2014.
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Michael K. Wong Xufang Wang Maruit J. Chulikavit Zhimei Liu 《American Health & Drug Benefits》2013,6(5):275-286
Background
In 2006, the economic burden of metastatic renal cell carcinoma (mRCC) was estimated to be up to $1.6 billion worldwide and has since grown annually. With the continuing increase of the economic burden of this disease in the United States, there is a growing need for economic analyses to guide treatment and policy decisions for this patient population.Objective
To evaluate available comparative economic data on targeted therapies for patients with mRCC who have failed first-line targeted therapies.Method
A broad and comprehensive literature review was conducted of US-based studies between January 1, 2005, and February 11, 2013, evaluating comparative economic evidence for targeted agents that are used as second-line therapy or beyond. Based on the specific search parameters that focused on cost-effectiveness and economic comparisons between vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF)/VEGF receptor (VEGFr) inhibitors and mammalian target of rapamycin (mTOR) inhibitors, only 7 relevant, US-based economic evaluations were found appropriate for inclusion in the analysis. All authors, who are experts in the health economics and outcomes research field, reviewed the search results. Studies of interest were those with a targeted agent, VEGF/VEGFr or mTOR inhibitor, in at least 1 study arm.Discussion
As a group, targeted therapies were found to be cost-effective options in treating patients with refractory mRCC in the United States. Oral therapies showed an economic advantage over intravenous agents, presumably because oral therapies have a lower impact on outpatient resources. Based on 3 studies, everolimus has been shown to have an economic advantage over temsirolimus and to be cost-effective compared with sorafenib. No economic comparison between everolimus and axitinib, the only 2 drugs with a National Comprehensive Cancer Network category 1 recommendation for use after the failure of VEGFr tyrosine kinase inhibitors, is available.Conclusion
The limited and heterogeneous sum of the currently available economic evidence does not allow firm conclusions to be drawn about the most cost-effective targeted treatment option in the second-line setting and beyond in patients with mRCC. It is hoped that ongoing head-to-head therapeutic trials and biomarker studies will help improve the economic efficiency of these expensive agents.Renal cell carcinoma (RCC) comprises 92% of all kidney cancers and has a poor prognosis, with approximately 10% of patients with metastatic disease surviving beyond 5 years.1 In 2006, the economic burden of metastatic RCC (mRCC) was estimated to be up to $1.6 billion worldwide and has since grown annually.2 A recent review reported that the economic burden of RCC in the United States ranges from $600 million to $5.19 billion, with annual per-patient medical costs of between $16,488 and $43,805.3 Furthermore, these costs will likely increase with the expanded use of targeted agents, based on a 2011 pharmacoeconomic analysis showing that the annual costs to treat patients with RCC receiving these agents are 3- to 4-fold greater than the costs to treat patients who are not receiving targeted therapies.4 In addition, the incidence and prevalence of RCC are rising, in part because of improved and earlier detection, and because of increases in related risk factors, such as hypertension, diabetes, and obesity.5–7KEY POINTS
- ▸ The growing economic burden of renal cell carcinoma (RCC) in the United States indicates the need for economic analyses of current therapies to guide treatment decisions for this disease.
- ▸ This article is based on a comprehensive review of 7 studies that were identified within the search criteria for US-based economic data related to targeted therapies for metastatic RCC (mRCC) after failure of first-line therapies.
- ▸ Targeted therapies were shown to be cost-effective for the treatment of refractory mRCC.
- ▸ Oral therapies showed an economic advantage over intravenous agents, presumably because of their lower impact on outpatient resources.
- ▸ No economic comparison is yet available for the only 2 drugs (ie, everolimus and axitinib) with an NCCN category 1 recommendation for use after a vascular endothelial growth factor receptor TKI.
- ▸ Ongoing head-to-head therapeutic trials and biomarker studies may help to improve the economic efficiency of targeted treatments in the second-line setting and beyond for mRCC.
Table 1
Targeted Agents Approved for RCC and Pivotal Phase 3 Clinical TrialsDrug, route of administration, approval date | RCC indication | Design of pivotal trial | PFs in the overall population of pivotal trial |
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Sorafenib, oral11 December 20, 2005 | Advanced RCC | TARGET: randomized, double-blind study of sorafenib (n = 451) vs placebo (n = 452) in patients treated with 1 previous systemic therapy (primarily cytokines)18 |
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Sunitinib, oral12 February 2, 2007 | Advanced RCC | Randomized, open-label study of sunitinib (n = 375) vs IFN-α (n = 375) in treatment-naive patients19 |
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Temsirolimus, IV13 May 30, 2007 | Advanced RCC | ARCC: randomized, open-label study of temsirolimus (n = 209) vs IFN-α (n = 207) vs temsirolimus + IFN-α (n = 210) in treatment-naive patients with ≥3 of 6 predictors of short survival20 |
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Everolimus, oral14 March 30, 2009 | RCC therapy after failure of treatment with sunitinib or sorafenib | RECORD-1: randomized, double-blind study of everolimus (n = 277) vs placebo (n = 139) in patients previously treated with sunitinib and/or sorafenib21 |
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Bevacizumab, IV, plus IFN-α, SC15 August 3, 2009 | Metastatic RCC with IFN-α | AVOREN: randomized, double-blind study of bevacizumab + IFN-α (n = 327) vs placebo + IFN-α (n = 322) in treatment-naive patients22 |
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CALGB 90206: randomized, open-label study of bevacizumab + IFN-α (n = 369) vs IFN-α (n = 363) in treatment-naive patients23 |
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Pazopanib, oral16 October 19, 2009 | Adults for first-line treatment of advanced RCC and for patients who have received previous cytokine therapy for advanced disease | Randomized, double-blind study of pazopanib (n = 290) vs placebo (n = 145) in treatment-naive and cytokine-pretreated patients24 |
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Axitinib, oral17 January 27, 2012 | Treatment of RCC after failure of 1 previous systemic therapy | AXIS: randomized, open-label study of axitinib (n = 361) vs sorafenib (n = 362) in patients treated with 1 previous systemic therapy25 |
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Table 2
NCCN Treatment Guidelines for mRCC, by Phase 3 EvidenceSetting | Category 1 evidence | |
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Treatment naïve | Good or intermediate riska | Sunitinib Pazopanib Bevacizumab + IFN-α |
Poor riska | Temsirolimus | |
Previously treated | Previous cytokine | Sorafenib Sunitinib Pazopanib Axitinibb |
Previous tyrosine kinase inhibitor | Everolimus Axitinibb | |
Previous mTOR inhibitor | Unknown |
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Aucha Prachanronarong 《American Health & Drug Benefits》2008,1(7):22-26
On August 22, 2006, President Bush issued an Executive Order calling on all federal agencies and those who do healthcare business with the government to engage in collaborative efforts to incorporate the 4 cornerstones of value-driven healthcare: health information technology standards, quality standards, price standards, and incentives. The Department of Health and Human Services has embarked on a campaign to make these 4 cornerstones a reality by encouraging the public and private sectors to work collaboratively at the local level. In support of this campaign, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services launched a project in late 2006 that leverages local collaboratives as a means to explore a national approach to physician performance measurement. This project, which is known as the Better Quality Information to Improve Care for Medicare Beneficiaries Project, aims to test methods to aggregate Medicare administrative data with data from commercial health plans and, in some cases, Medicaid, in 6 local collaboratives to calculate and report quality measures for physician groups and for some individual physicians.On August 22, 2006, President Bush issued an Executive Order—Promoting Quality and Efficient Health Care in Federal Government Administered or Sponsored Health Care Programs—calling on all federal agencies and those who do healthcare business with the government to engage in collaborative efforts to incorporate the cornerstones of value-driven healthcare (1:
Open in a separate windowHIT indicates health information technology.Source: Reference 1.
Table 1
The 4 Cornerstones of Value-Driven HealthcareInteroperable HIT |
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Measure and publish quality information |
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Measure and publish price information |
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Promote quality and efficiency of care |
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- Interoperable health information technology
- Measure and publish quality information
- Measure and publish price information
- Promote quality and efficiency of care.
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Neisseria meningitidis carriage was compared in swab specimens of nasopharynx, tonsils, and saliva taken from 258 students. We found a higher yield in nasopharyngeal than in tonsillar swabs (32% vs. 19%, p<0.001). Low prevalence of carriage in saliva swabs (one swab [0.4%]) suggests that low levels of salivary contact are unlikely to transmit meningococci.Invasive meningococcal disease has a high case-fatality rate and an immediate risk of further cases among household contacts. Public health measures therefore include prompt identification of contacts for chemoprophylaxis (1). One question that commonly arises is whether salivary contact through sharing cups or glasses is an indication for prophylaxis, but the evidence base to inform an answer is weak, and national guidelines are inconsistent (1,2). Although saliva is thought to inhibit meningococcal growth (3), carriage rates in saliva are not known, and swabs to detect carriage are usually taken from tonsils or nasopharynx (4–6). We compared meningococcal isolation rates in swabs of saliva (front of mouth), tonsils, and nasopharynx.We recruited volunteers among students from two colleges in Hereford, England. After giving written consent, students completed a short questionnaire on age, sex, smoking, recent antimicrobial drug use, and meningococcal vaccine status. Three sterile, dry, cotton-tipped swabs were used to take samples from each volunteer: one from the nasopharynx (through the mouth and swept up behind the uvula), one from both tonsils, and one swab of saliva between the lower gum and lips. Swabs were plated directly onto a selective culture medium primarily designed for the isolation of pathogenic Neisseria species (modified New York City base containing vancomycin, colistin, and trimethoprim), prepared by Taunton Media Services, UK (7). The plates were transported to Hereford Public Health Laboratory, where they were spread once from the primary inoculum and incubated in 7% CO2 at 37°C for 48 h. Putative Neisseria species isolated were sent to the Meningococcal Reference Unit, Manchester Public Health Laboratory, for Neisseria meningitidis confirmation and serologic phenotypic characterization. Data were entered into the computer using Excel (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA). Carriage rates by site were compared with McNemar’s test and by risk factor using chi-square tests. Ethical approval was obtained from the Public Health Laboratory Service Ethics Committee and Herefordshire District Ethics Committee.Of the 258 participants, 90 (35%) were identified as carrying Neisseria meningitidis from one or more sites. The site with the highest yield was the nasopharynx (32.2%), whereas tonsillar carriage was 19.4% (Site of swab One site positive Two sites positive Three sites positive Total positive Overall carriage % Nasopharynx
39
44
0
83
32.2
Tonsils
6
44
0
50
19.4
Saliva 1 0 0 1 0.4