"Primum non nocere" and the principle of non-maleficence

The physician's duty of "primum non nocere," or avoiding harm to the patient, has often been given moral priority over other duties in discussions of medical ethics. In this article in a British Medical Journal series written for nonphilosophers on the philosophical foundations of medical ethics, Gillon takes issue with the prominence given the obligation of nonmaleficence over that of beneficence. He argues that risking harm is often necessary to obtain therapeutic benefit, and that always giving nonmaleficence priority over beneficence in clinical decision making results in "therapeutic nihilism." These two important principles should counterbalance one another in medical care, with due respect for patient autonomy.     

How should doctors approach patients? A Confucian reflection on personhood

The modern doctor-patient relationship displays a patient-centred, mutual-participation characteristic rather than the former active-passive or guidance-cooperation models in terms of medical decision making. Respecting the wishes of patients, amounting to more than mere concern for their welfare, has become the feature central to certain modern bioethics theories. A group of ethical principles such as respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice has been proposed by bioethicists and widely adopted by many medical societies as an ethical guide to how doctors, in their daily practice, should treat their patients. However, seeing patients as persons who are rational, self-conscious beings capable of valuing their own lives, and who are consequently entitled to the liberty and rights to choose for themselves, is in general the backbone of Western bioethical principles. Since Confucian philosophy has long been a representative of the East-Asia cultural tradition and Confucian bioethics has recently been developed as a theory of applied ethics, examining Confucius's idea of "persons" may shed some light on the current bioethical debates. Confucius's concept of persons, which is best interpreted via his theories of "chun-tze", (the morally ideal person) encapsulating a two-dimensional approach, (the "autonomous person" and the "relational person"), provides a more comprehensive model regarding what a person is and how he/she should be treated. This two-dimensional approach sees a person not only as a rational, autonomous agent but also as a relational, altruistic identity whose self actualisation involves incessant participating in and promoting of the welfare of his fellow persons. Hence this may balance the current bioethical trend whereby "respect for autonomy" often triumphs.     

Resurrecting autonomy during resuscitation--the concept of professional substituted judgment.

The urgency of the resuscitation and the impaired ability of the patient to make a reasonable autonomous decision both conspire against adequate consideration of the principles of medical ethics. Informed consent is usually not possible for these reasons and this leads many to consider that consent is not required for resuscitation, because resuscitation brings benefit and prevents harm and because the patient is not in a position to give or withhold consent. However, consent for resuscitation is required and the common models employed for this purpose are presumed consent or consent from a patient proxy. However, if we are to honour the principles of respect for patient autonomy, as well as beneficence and non-maleficence, when starting and continuing resuscitation we must try and achieve the best balance between benefit and harm from the patient''s perspective. The concept of professional substituted judgment involves the resuscitators gathering as much information about the patient as they possibly can, including any previously expressed attitudes towards such a situation, and combining this with their acquired professional knowledge of the likely benefits and harms of the resuscitation endeavour and then exercising their moral imagination, imagining themselves as the patient, and asking "would I want this treatment?" By employing professional substituted judgment resuscitators should recognise when the balance of benefit and harm becomes unfavourable from the patient''s perspective and at this point they have a moral obligation to withdraw resuscitation as they can no longer presume the patient''s consent. In this way the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and respect for patient autonomy are more favourably balanced than under other resuscitation decision making processes.     

What sort of bioethical values are the evidence-based medicine and the GRADE approaches willing to deal with?

The concept of evidence-based medicine (EBM) has been invented by physicians mostly from English Canada, mostly from McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. The term EBM first appeared in the biomedical literature in 1991 in an article written by a prominent member of this group-Gordon Guyatt from McMaster University. The inventors of EBM have also created the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluations (GRADE) working group, which is a prominent international organisation whose main purpose is to develop evidence-based clinical practice guidelines (CPGs). CPGs that are based on the GRADE approach are becoming increasingly adopted worldwide, in particular by many professional or governmental organisations. This group of thinkers being thus identified, we have retrieved and read many of their publications in order to try and understand how they intend to incorporate bioethical values into their concept. The author of this little essay did also spend a few years on the internet as an active member of the GRADE group discussion list. The observations thus gathered suggest that although some of the inventors of EBM, at least Gordon Guyatt, wish to incorporate core principles of biomedical ethics into their concept (ie, non-malevolence, beneficence and maybe to a lesser extent respect for autonomy, and justice), some clarifications are still necessary in order to better understand how they intend to more explicitly incorporate bioethical values into their concept and, perhaps more importantly, into evidence-based CPGs.     

Ethics needs principles--four can encompass the rest--and respect for autonomy should be "first among equals"

It is hypothesised and argued that "the four principles of medical ethics" can explain and justify, alone or in combination, all the substantive and universalisable claims of medical ethics and probably of ethics more generally. A request is renewed for falsification of this hypothesis showing reason to reject any one of the principles or to require any additional principle(s) that can't be explained by one or some combination of the four principles. This approach is argued to be compatible with a wide variety of moral theories that are often themselves mutually incompatible. It affords a way forward in the context of intercultural ethics, that treads the delicate path between moral relativism and moral imperialism. Reasons are given for regarding the principle of respect for autonomy as "first among equals", not least because it is a necessary component of aspects of the other three. A plea is made for bioethicists to celebrate the approach as a basis for global moral ecumenism rather than mistakenly perceiving and denigrating it as an attempt at global moral imperialism.     

Comments on an obstructed death -- a case conference revisited: commentary 1

The paper comments on Scott Dunbar's "An obstructed death and medical ethics," arguing contra Dunbar that we should not view truth-telling to the terminally ill as primarily governed by principles of veracity and respect for autonomy. All such rules are of limited value in medical ethics. We should instead turn to an ethics deriving from the centrality of moral relationships and virtues. A brief analysis of the connections between moral relationships and moral rules is offered. Such an ethics would lower the value that philosophical fashion places on truth-telling and autonomy and leave decisions about truth-telling and the terminally ill more dependent on the circumstances of particular cases.     

Ethical dilemmas in forensic psychiatry: two illustrative cases

One approach to the analysis of ethical dilemmas in medical practice uses the "four principles plus scope" approach. These principles are: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, along with concern for their scope of application. However, conflicts between the different principles are commonplace in psychiatric practice, especially in forensic psychiatry, where duties to patients often conflict with duties to third parties such as the public. This article seeks to highlight some of the specific ethical dilemmas encountered in forensic psychiatry: the excessive use of segregation for the protection of others, the ethics of using mechanical restraint when clinically beneficial and the use of physical treatment without consent. We argue that justice, as a principle, should be paramount in forensic psychiatry, and that there is a need for a more specific code of ethics to cover specialised areas of medicine like forensic psychiatry. This code should specify that in cases of conflict between different principles, justice should gain precedence over the other principles.     

Ancient Chinese medical ethics and the four principles of biomedical ethics.

The four principles approach to biomedical ethics (4PBE) has, since the 1970s, been increasingly developed as a universal bioethics method. Despite its wide acceptance and popularity, the 4PBE has received many challenges to its cross-cultural plausibility. This paper first specifies the principles and characteristics of ancient Chinese medical ethics (ACME), then makes a comparison between ACME and the 4PBE with a view to testing out the 4PBE's cross-cultural plausibility when applied to one particular but very extensive and prominent cultural context. The result shows that the concepts of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice are clearly identifiable in ACME. Yet, being influenced by certain socio-cultural factors, those applying the 4PBE in Chinese society may tend to adopt a "beneficence-oriented", rather than an "autonomy-oriented" approach, which, in general, is dissimilar to the practice of contemporary Western bioethics, where "autonomy often triumphs".     

Doctors and patients

Gillon outlines some prima facie moral duties of physicians to patients that have emerged from his previous articles in a series on philosophical medical ethics. These duties follow from four general ethical principles--respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice--plus the self-imposed supererogatory duty of medical beneficence. From these principles the author derives such duties as providing adequate information and advice on treatment options, encouraging patient participation leading to informed decisions, maintaining competence and exposing incompetence, admitting errors, disclosing personal medico-moral standards, and acknowledging that other interests may occasionally supersede those of the individual patient. Gillon concludes that, where self interest conflicts with medical beneficence, the claim of medicine as a profession requires that the patient's interests take priority.     

Beneficence: doing good for others

Gillon's essay on beneficence is one in a series of British Medical Journal articles on philosophical medical ethics. The duty of beneficence, or doing good for others, figures more prominently in medicine than in most other professions. As important as beneficence is in the physician patient relationship, however, it must be tempered by respect for the patient's autonomy; by the duty of nonmaleficence, or of doing no harm; and by a concern for justice, especially in the allocation of scarce medical resources.     

Justice and allocation of medical resources

In one of a series of short articles on philosophical medical ethics, Gillon examines the principle of justice as it applies to adjudicating competing claims for the distribution of scarce medical resources. He describes Aristotle's theory of justice--with its demands of formal equity, impartiality, and fairness--and then considers various substantive criteria that have been proposed to justify choosing among competing candidates for scarce resources. In the absence of an acceptable way to give consistent moral priority to any of the criteria, he concludes, practical systems should be set up to resolve conflicts by taking into account the fundamental moral values of respect for autonomy, beneficence, and nonmaleficence while incorporating Aristotle's formal principle of justice.     

When four principles are too many: a commentary

This commentary briefly argues that the four prima facie principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice enable a clinician (and anybody else) to make ethical sense of the author's proposed reliance on professional guidance and rules, on law, on professional integrity and on best interests, and to subject them all to ethical analysis and criticism based on widely acceptable basic prima facie moral obligations; and also to confront new situations in the light of those acceptable principles.     

The best possible child

Julian Savulescu argues for two principles of reproductive ethics: reproductive autonomy and procreative beneficence, where the principle of procreative beneficence is conceptualised in terms of a duty to have the child, of the possible children that could be had, who will have the best opportunity of the best life. Were it to be accepted, this principle would have significant implications for the ethics of reproductive choice and, in particular, for the use of prenatal testing and other reproductive technologies for the avoidance of disability, and for enhancement. In this paper, it is argued that this principle should be rejected, and it is concluded that while potential parents do have important obligations in relation to the foreseeable lives of their future children, these obligations are not best captured in terms of a duty to have the child with the best opportunity of the best life.     

Telling the truth and medical ethics

Gillon discusses the conflicting moral implications of the principles of respect for autonomy and of beneficence and non-maleficence when telling patients the truth about their illnesses and treatments. The case for nondisclosure is usually based on three major arguments: that doctors' Hippocratic obligations to benefit and not harm their patients take precedence over not deceiving them; that the range of possible conditions and prognoses makes it difficult for physicians to know the full truth or for patients to comprehend it; and that patients do not wish to be told dire news. Gillon rejects each of these arguments, contending that avoiding deceit is a basic moral norm that can be defended from utilitarian as well as deontological points of view. With regard to the argument concerning patient attitudes, he recommends that pilot studies be done, asking patients what their preferences are at the time they register with a doctor or hospital.     

Marginally effective medical care: ethical analysis of issues in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)

Outcomes from cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) remain distressingly poor. Overuse of CPR is attributable to unrealistic expectations, unintended consequences of existing policies and failure to honour patient refusal of CPR. We analyzed the CPR outcomes literature using the bioethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice and developed a proposal for selective use of CPR. Beneficence supports use of CPR when most effective. Non-maleficence argues against performing CPR when the outcomes are harmful or usage inappropriate. Additionally, policies which usurp good clinical judgment and moral responsibility, thereby contributing to inappropriate CPR usage, should be considered maleficent. Autonomy restricts CPR use when refused but cannot create a right to CPR. Justice requires that we define which medical interventions contribute sufficiently to health and happiness that they should be made universally available. This ordering is necessary whether one believes in the utilitarian standard or wishes medical care to be universally available on fairness grounds. Low-yield CPR fails justice criteria. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be performed when justified by the extensive outcomes literature; not performed when not desired by the patient or not indicated; and performed infrequently when relatively contraindicated.     

In defence of moral imperialism: four equal and universal prima facie principles

Raanan Gillon is a noted defender of the four principles approach to healthcare ethics. His general position has always been that these principles are to be considered to be both universal and prima facie in nature. In recent work, however, he has made two claims that seem to present difficulties for this view. His first claim is that one of these four principles, respect for autonomy, has a special position in relation to the others: he holds that it is first among equals. We argue that this claim makes little sense if the principles are to retain their prima facie nature. His second claim is that cultural variation can play an independent normative role in the construction of our moral judgments. This, he argues, enables us to occupy a middle ground between what he sees as the twin pitfalls of moral relativism and (what he calls) moral imperialism. We argue that there is no such middle ground, and while Gillon ultimately seems committed to relativism, it is some form of moral imperialism (in the form of moral objectivism) that will provide the only satisfactory construal of the four principles as prima facie universal moral principles.     

Medical ethics for children: applying the four principles to paediatrics

I will argue that there are difficulties with the application of the four principles approach to incompetent children. The most important principle - respect for autonomy - is not directly applicable to incompetent children and the most appropriate modification of the principle for them is not clear. The principle of beneficence - that one should act in the child's interests - is complicated by difficulties in assessing what a child's interests are and to which standard of interests those choosing for children should be held. A further problem with the four principles approach is that parental authority does not follow clearly from the four principles.     

Determining the common morality's norms in the sixth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics

Tom Beauchamp and James Childress have always maintained that their four principles approach (otherwise known as principlism) is a globally applicable framework for biomedical ethics. This claim is grounded in their belief that the principles of respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice form part of a 'common morality', or collection of very general norms to which everyone who is committed to morality subscribes. The difficulty, however, has always been how to demonstrate, at least in the absence of a full-blooded analysis of the concept of morality, whether the four principles are foundational, and so globally applicable, in this way. In the recently published sixth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, an imaginative and non-question-begging empirical method of determining the common morality's norms is suggested. In this paper, I outline this method, before arguing that it is difficult to see how it might be thought to achieve its purpose.     

Confidentiality

The principle of medical confidentiality is described as a venerable moral obligation of medical ethics. It has been defended by utilitarians and deontologists alike, not as a moral end in itself, but as a means to a desirable end such as the general welfare, respect for autonomy, or respect for privacy. Neither philosophers nor codes of medical ethics consider confidentiality to be an "absolute" principle. Great Britain's General Medical Council recognizes eight legitimate exceptions to the rule of confidentiality, among them patient consent, the "best interests" of the patient, statutory obligations, and medical research that has been approved by a "recognized ethical committee." Gillon discusses the ethical justifications for these various exceptions, rejecting appeals to medical paternalism or the benefits of medical research as general grounds for not soliciting patient consent.     

Concepts of "person" and "liberty," and their implications to our fading notions of autonomy

It is commonly held that respect for autonomy is one of the most important principles in medical ethics. However, there are a number of interpretations as to what that respect actually entails in practice and a number of constraints have been suggested even on our self-regarding choices. These limits are often justified in the name of autonomy. In this paper, it is argued that these different interpretations can be explained and understood by looking at the discussion from the viewpoints of positive and negative liberty and the various notions of a "person" that lay beneath. It will be shown how all the appeals to positive liberty presuppose a particular value system and are therefore problematic in multicultural societies.