Can premium differentiation counteract adverse selection in the Dutch supplementary health insurance? A simulation study

Most health insurers in the Netherlands apply community-rating and open enrolment for supplementary health insurance, although it is offered at a free market. Theoretically, this should result in adverse selection. There are four indications that adverse selection indeed has started to occur on the Dutch supplementary insurance market. The goal of this paper is to analyze whether premium differentiation would be able to counteract adverse selection. We do this by simulating the uptake and premium development of supplementary insurance over 25 years using data on healthcare expenses and background characteristics from 110,261 insured. For the simulation of adverse selection, it is assumed that only insured for whom supplementary insurance is expected not to be beneficial will consider opting out of the insurance. Therefore, we calculate for each insured the financial profitability (by making assumptions about the consumer’s expected claims and the premium set by the insurer), the individual’s risk attitude and the probability to opt out or opt in. The simulation results show that adverse selection might result in a substantial decline in insurance uptake. Additionally, the simulations show that if insurers were to differentiate their premium to 28 age and gender groups, adverse selection could be modestly counteracted. Finally, this paper shows that if insurers would apply highly refined risk-rating, adverse selection for this type of supplementary insurance could be counteracted completely.     

Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: an empirical study

If premiums for health insurance are not risk related, there exists a consumer information surplus that may result in adverse selection. Our results indicate that insurers can greatly reduce this surplus by risk-adjusting the premium. We conclude that there need not be any substantial unavoidable consumer information surplus if consumers can choose whether to take a deductible for a one- or two-year health insurance contract with otherwise identical benefits. Therefore, adverse selection need not be a problem in a competitive insurance market with risk-adjusted premiums or vouchers and with such a consumer choice of health plan.     

A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it,the lower your premium?

Adverse selection regarding a voluntary deductible (VD) in health insurance implies that insured only opt for a VD if they expect no (or few) healthcare expenses. This paper investigates two potential strategies to reduce adverse selection: (1) differentiating the premium to the duration of the contract for which the VD holds (ex-ante approach) and (2) differentiating the premium to the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD (ex-post approach). It can be hypothesized that premiums will decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD, providing an incentive to insured to opt for a deductible also in (incidental) years they expect relatively high expenses. To test this hypothesis, we examine which premium patterns would occur under these strategies using data on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of over 750,000 insured from 6 years. Our results show that, under the assumptions made, only without risk equalization the premiums could decrease with the duration of the contract or the number of years for which insured have opted for a VD. With (sophisticated) risk equalization, decreasing premiums seem unfeasible, both under the ex-ante and ex-post approach. Given these findings, we are sceptical about the feasibility of these strategies to counteract adverse selection.     

The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection

This paper analyzes the welfare economics of three arrangements for purchasing health insurance: competitive markets in which consumers are free to choose among options with different levels of coverage and prices; systems with compulsory partial pooling which permit private firms to sell supplementary coverage; and government-run pools that purchase comprehensive coverage at a single price for all consumers. Competitive insurance markets are assumed to face the problem of ‘adverse selection’. This refers to a situation in which the insurer cannot observe characteristics of individuals that affect the cost of insurance and that are known to the individuals. Competitive markets with adverse selection are not efficient because low risks cannot purchase comprehensive insurance coverage. However, government-run pools with comprehensive coverage are an inefficient solution to the problem of adverse selection. Compulsory partial coverage may represent an attractive alternative to both competitive markets and comprehensive pools. We discover two situations when government intervention of this type will succeed: when there are not many high risks in the population, and when the risk types are similar. We discuss the implications of these results for health insurance programs in several countries. Our results also have implications for the allocation of public funds for disease-prevention projects. A project targeted at high risks will produce external benefits for low risks, even though they are not directly affected by the program. However, a successful project might eliminate the market for private insurance; in this case the government should consider mandating partial insurance coverage.Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spillover effects of supplementary on basic health insurance: evidence from the Netherlands

Like many other countries, the Netherlands has a health insurance system that combines mandatory basic insurance with voluntary supplementary insurance. Both types of insurance are founded on different principles. Since basic and supplementary insurance are sold by the same health insurers, both markets may interact. This paper examines to what extent basic and supplementary insurance are linked to each other and whether these links generate spillover effects of supplementary on basic insurance. Our analysis is based on an investigation into supplementary health insurance contracts, underwriting procedures and annual surveys among 1,700–2,100 respondents over the period 2006–2009. We find that health insurers increasingly use a variety of strategies to enforce a joint purchase of basic and supplementary health insurance. Despite incentives for health insurers to use supplementary insurance as a tool for risk selection in basic insurance, we find limited evidence of supplementary insurance being used this way. Only a minority of health insurers uses health questionnaires when people apply for supplementary coverage. Nevertheless, we find that an increasing proportion of high-risk individuals believe that insurers would not be willing to offer them another supplementary insurance contract. We discuss several strategies to prevent or to counteract the observed negative spillover effects of supplementary insurance.     

A model to decompose the performance of supplementary private health insurance markets

For an individual insurance firm offering supplementary private health insurance, a model is developed to decompose market performance in terms of insurer profits. For the individual contract, the model specifies the conditions under which adverse selection, cream skimming, and moral hazard occur, shows the impact of information on contracting, and the profit contribution. Contracts are determined by comparing willingness to pay for insurance with the individual's risk position, and information on both sides of the market. Finally, performance is aggregated up to the total market. The model provides a framework to explain the attractiveness of supplementary markets to insurers.     

Premium subsidies for health insurance: excessive coverage vs. adverse selection

The tax subsidy for employment-related health insurance can lead to excessive coverage and excessive spending on medical care. Yet, the potential also exists for adverse selection to result in the opposite problem-insufficient coverage and underconsumption of medical care. This paper uses the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (R-S) to show that a simple linear premium subsidy can correct market failure due to adverse selection. The optimal linear subsidy balances welfare losses from excessive coverage against welfare gains from reduced adverse selection. Indeed, a capped premium subsidy may mitigate adverse selection without creating incentives for excessive coverage.     

Switching costs in competitive health insurance markets: The role of insurers' pricing strategies

Our article deals with pricing strategies in Swiss health insurance markets and focuses on the relationship between basic and supplementary insurance. We analyzed how firms' pricing strategies (i.e., pricing of basic and supplementary products) can create switching costs in basic health insurance markets, thereby preventing competition in basic insurance from working properly. More specifically, using unique market and survey data, we investigated whether firms use bundling strategies or supplementary products as low‐price products to attract and retain basic insurance consumers. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze these pricing strategies in the context of insurance/health insurance. We found no evidence of bundling in the Swiss setting. We did however observe that firms used low‐price supplementary products that contributed to lock in consumers. A majority of firms offered at least one of such product at a low price. None offered low‐price products in both basic and supplementary markets. Low‐price insurance products differed across firms. When buying a low‐price supplementary product, consumers always bought their basic contract from the same firm. Furthermore, those who opted for low‐price supplementary products were less likely to declare an intention to switch basic insurance firms in the near future. This result was true for all risk category levels.     

Incentive-compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums

Theoretical models of guaranteed renewable insurance display front-loaded premium schedules. Such schedules both cover lifetime total claims of low-risk and high-risk individuals and provide an incentive for those who remain low-risk to continue to purchase the policy. Questions have been raised of whether actual individual insurance markets in the US approximate the behavior predicted by these models, both because young consumers may not be able to "afford" front-loading and because insurers may behave strategically in ways that erode the value of protection against risk reclassification. In this paper, the optimal competitive age-based premium schedule for a benchmark guaranteed renewable health insurance policy is estimated using medical expenditure data. Several factors are shown to reduce the amount of front-loading necessary. Indeed, the resulting optimal premium path increases with age. Actual premium paths exhibited by purchasers of individual insurance are close to the optimal renewable schedule we estimate. Finally, consumer utility associated with the feature is examined.     

An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings: an MSA example

This paper outlines a feasible employee premium contribution policy, which would reduce the inefficiency associated with adverse selection when a limited coverage insurance policy is offered alongside a more generous policy. The "efficient premium contribution" is defined and is shown to lead to an efficient allocation across plans of persons who differ by risk, but it may also redistribute against higher risks. A simulation of the additional option of a catastrophic health plan (CHP) accompanied by a medical savings account (MSA) is presented. The efficiency gains from adding the MSA/catastrophic health insurance plan (CHP) option are positive but small, and the adverse consequences for high risks under an efficient employee premium are also small.     

The Mandatory Health Insurance System in Chile: Explaining the Choice between Public and Private Insurance

In Chile, dependent workers and retirees are mandated by law to purchase health insurance, and can choose between private and public health insurance. This paper studies the determinants of the choice of health insurance. Earnings are generally considered the key factor in this choice, and we confirm this, but find that other factors are also important. It is particularly interesting to analyze how the individual's characteristics interact with the design of the system to influence choice. Worse health, as signaled by age or sex (e.g., older people or women in reproductive ages), results in adverse selection against the public health insurance system. This is due to the lack of risk adjustment of the public health insurance's premium. Hence, Chile's risk selection problem is, at least in part, due to the design of the Chilean public insurance system.     

Access to coverage for high-risks in a competitive individual health insurance market: via premium rate restrictions or risk-adjusted premium subsidies?

A competitive market for individual health insurance tends to risk-adjusted premiums. Premium rate restrictions are often considered a tool to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals in such a market. However, such regulation induces selection which may have several adverse effects. As an alternative approach we consider risk-adjusted premium subsidies. Empirical results of simulated premium models and subsidy formulae are presented. It is shown that sufficiently adjusted subsidies eliminate the need for premium rate restrictions and consequently avoid their adverse effects. Therefore, the subsidy approach is the preferred strategy to increase access to coverage for high-risk individuals.     

Theory of health insurance

The conventional explanation for purchasing insurance is to transfer risk. Psychologists, however, have shown that this explanation does not match actual behavior. They find that people generally prefer the risk of no loss at all to the certainty of a smaller actuarially equivalent loss, a situation exactly opposite to the one represented by the purchase of insurance. Nevertheless, people do purchase insurance, so there must be an explanation other than risk transfer for purchasing it. Of the explanations so far advanced, however, none have yet developed a wide acceptance. Regardless of risk issues, people will be more likely to purchase insurance when the premium is low compared to the value of the coverage to the consumer. Moral hazard raises the premium, as does adverse selection. The presence of either makes the purchase of insurance less likely. With health insurance, the tax subsidy can reduce the effective premium to less than the actuarially fair cost of insurance. This would increase the likelihood that health insurance is purchased. Finally, because of the value we place on our health, we desire access to a full range of health care. Health insurance is often the only affordable way of gaining access to this care, given the high costs of many of these procedures.     

Simulating the effects of employer contributions on adverse selection and health plan choice.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the effect of employer contribution policy and adverse selection on employees' health plan choices. STUDY DESIGN: Microsimulation methods to predict employees' choices between two health plan options and to track changes in those choices over time. The simulation predicts choice given premiums, healthcare spending by enrollees in each plan, and premiums for the next period. DATA SOURCES: The simulation model is based on behavioral relationships originally estimated from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The model has been updated and recalibrated. The data processed in the simulation are from the 1993 Current Population Employee Benefits Supplement sample. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: A higher fraction of employees choose a high-cost, high-benefit plan if employers contribute a proportional share of the premium or adjust their contribution for risk selection than if employees pay the full cost difference out-of-pocket. When employees pay the full cost difference, the extent of adverse selection can be substantial, which leads to a collapse in the market for the high-cost plan. CONCLUSIONS: Adverse selection can undermine the managed competition strategy, indicating the importance of good risk adjusters. A fixed employer contribution policy can encourage selection of more efficient plans. Ironically, however, it can also further adverse selection in the absence of risk adjusters.     

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and wealth effects in the Medigap insurance market

Using data from a longitudinal study of the recently retired we attempt to separate the moral hazard effect of Medicare supplementary (Medigap) insurance on health care expenditures from the adverse selection effect of poor health on Medigap coverage. We find evidence of adverse selection, but its magnitude is unlikely to create serious efficiency problems. Taking adverse selection into account reduces the estimate of the moral hazard effect. In addition, we find a strong positive wealth effect on the demand for supplementary insurance.     

Deductibles in health insurance: can the actuarially fair premium reduction exceed the deductible?

The actuarially fair premium reduction in case of a deductible relative to full insurance is affected by: (1) out-of-pocket payments, (2) moral hazard, (3) administrative costs, and, in case of a voluntary deductible, (4) adverse selection. Both the partial effects and the total effect of these factors are analyzed. Moral hazard and adverse selection appear to have a substantial effect on the expected health care costs above a deductible but a small effect on the expected out-of-pocket expenditure. A premium model indicates that for a broad range of deductible amounts the actuarially fair premium reduction exceeds the deductible.     

Consumer choice of social health insurance in managed competition

Objective To promote managed competition in Dutch health insurance, the insured are now able to change health insurers. They can choose a health insurer with a low flat‐rate premium, the best supplementary insurance and/or the best service. As we do not know why people prefer one health insurer to another, we investigated their reasons for selecting their health insurer and assessed the importance of the supplementary benefit package and the flat‐rate premium. Methods A self‐administered questionnaire was completed by 468 of a total of 884 (52.9%). Data were compared among three groups. The first group comprised those who left one health insurer for another (exit). The second group had joined the health insurer (entry) and the third group comprised those who did not switch (stayers). Results Those in the entry group were statistically significantly less satisfied with their former insurance organization than those in the other groups (exit and stayers) with the insurance organization under investigation. They were also less satisfied than the other groups in respect of the flat‐rate premium. Those in the exit group were younger and seemed to be in better health. In general, the insured were only aware of small differences between health insurance funds and the three groups did not differ from each other in this respect. About a quarter of the entry group reported the flat‐rate premium as a reason for selecting a particular health insurance fund. However, the most frequently reported reason, for both exit and entry, was the benefit package of the supplementary insurance. Conclusions In the absence of clear differences between insurance organizations, the advantages of managed competition maybe too difficult to achieve.     

The potential premium range of risk-rating in competitive markets for supplementary health insurance

In this paper, we simulate several scenarios of the potential premium range for voluntary (supplementary) health insurance, covering benefits which might be excluded from mandatory health insurance (MI). Our findings show that, by adding risk-factors, the minimum premium decreases and the maximum increases. The magnitude of the premium range is especially substantial for benefits such as medical devices and drugs. When removing benefits from MI policymakers should be aware of the implications for the potential reduction of affordability of voluntary health insurance coverage in a competitive market.      

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated. Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as ‘very good’. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves ‘bad risks’ also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.