Return of premium term life: is it for real?

Physicians who feel they are wasting their money in paying premiums for a typical 30-year-level term life insurance policy may find help in a return-of-premium term life insurance policy. Premiums are higher, but all the money is refunded at the end of the term if the policyholder has not died. Estimates are that 93 percent of policyholders outlive the term of their life insurance.     

Estimation of a hedonic pricing model for Medigap insurance

OBJECTIVE: This paper uses a unique database to examine premiums paid by beneficiaries for Medigap supplemental coverage. Average premiums charged by insurers are reported, as well as premiums by enrollee age and gender, and additional policy characteristics. Marginal prices for Medigap benefits are estimated using hedonic price regressions. In addition, the paper considers how additional policy characteristics and geographic differences in the use and cost of medical care affect premiums. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: A comprehensive database on premiums paid by beneficiaries for newly issued Medigap policies in the year 2000 along with state-level characteristics. STUDY DESIGN: Hedonic pricing equations are used to estimate implicit prices for Medigap benefits. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services contracted for the creation of a detailed database on Medigap premiums. Data were collected in three stages. First, letters were sent directly to insurers requesting premium data. Second, letters were directly to state insurance commissioner's offices requesting premium data. Last, each state insurance commissioner's office was visited to collect missing data. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: With the exceptions of the part B deductible and drug benefit, Medigap supplemental insurance is priced consistent with the actuarial value of benefits offered under the standardized plans. Premiums vary substantially based on rating method, whether the policy is guaranteed issue, Medigap Select, or explicitly for smokers. Premiums increase with enrollee age, but do not vary between men and women. The relationship between premiums and enrollee age varies across rating methods. Attained-age policies show the strongest relationship between age and premiums, while community-rated premiums, by definition, do not vary with age. Medigap supplemental insurance premiums are higher in states with poorer health, greater utilization, and greater managed care penetration. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the high cost, Medigap plans are generally priced in accordance with the actuarial value of benefits. The primary exception is the drug benefit, which appears to be subject to substantial adverse selection. Benefits such as the part B deductible and at-home recovery benefit offer little value to consumers. Several states require insurers to community rate premiums. Such regulation has important implications for premiums, and research needs to consider the impact of such regulation on the Medigap market.     

Labor supply effects of long‐term care reform in Germany

Many informal caregivers are of working age, facing the double burden of providing care and working. Negative labor supply effects can severely reduce the comparative cost advantage of informal over formal care arrangements. When designing long‐term care (LTC) policies, it is crucial to understand the effects not only on health outcomes but also on labor supply behavior of informal caregivers. We evaluate labor supply reactions to the introduction of the German long‐term care insurance in 1995 using a difference‐in‐differences approach. The long‐term care insurance changes the caregivers' trade‐off between labor supply and care provision. The aim of the reform was to strengthen informal care arrangements. We find a strong negative labor supply effect for men but not for women. We argue that the LTC benefits increased incentives for older men to leave the labor market. The results reveal a trade‐off for policy makers that is important for future reforms—in particular for countries that mainly base their LTC system on informal care.     

Integrating smoking control policies into employee benefits: a survey of large California corporations.

OBJECTIVES. Public health policy promotes the use of risk-rating health insurance and payment for smoking cessation as economic incentives to encourage smoking cessation. This study was undertaken to learn more about the adoption of these policies in large corporations. METHODS. A random sample survey of 280 private California corporations with more than 500 employees was undertaken to document the prevalence of policies integrating smoking control into employee benefit designs. RESULTS. Only 8.6% of large corporations had ever considered risk-rating health insurance premiums using smoking status and only 2.15% had implemented a risk-rating policy. Nearly 20% of the companies offered health insurance plans that covered smoking cessation services. Subsidization or payment for smoking cessation outside health insurance was provided by over 37% of the companies surveyed, and 87% had adopted formal work-site smoking policies. CONCLUSION. Benefit policies that provide financial support to smokers to participate in smoking cessation services are much more prevalent and are viewed more positively by the benefits managers in large corporations than are policies to risk-rate health insurance premiums on the basis of smoking.     

Reconsidering the role of private health funds in Australia: a dynamic model

In recent years the private sector has played a more important role in the funding and provision of Australian hospital care as a consequence of federal government policies aimed at increasing participation in private health insurance (health funds). These policies include tax incentives, a 30% rebate on premiums and lifetime community rating (premiums set by age). While these policies have improved the short-term profitability of the private sector, its long-term success is not certain. This is because negotiations between health funds and private hospitals are often myopic, the nature of the insurance product may be inefficient, and there is a general lack of academic research on the private sector. This paper highlights the importance of the relationship between health funds and private hospitals in ensuring the long-term viability of the industry. It uses a simple overlapping generations model to demonstrate that it is not only the price that health funds pay that impacts on the capital value of hospitals, but also it is important how they structure their policies and attract individuals. The model demonstrates the potential benefits of implementing health insurance based on intertemporal transfers of funds rather than the current cross-subsidization. Such a policy would see health funds become an important store of capital. Also highlighted are the difficulties of discussing fundamental changes to the health care system. While recent health care reforms have been described as driven by ideology rather than evidence, in the Australian context there is little evidence on which to base policy. Researchers need to be more proactive in their consideration and evaluation of alternative health care policies. Through quality research on the private sector, academics can better guide policy makers at the national and institutional level.     

Long-term care insurance and public policy: an analysis of obstacles to utilization

This article investigates the phenomenon of long-term care insurance and the policy environment in which it has evolved. Further discussion focuses on the obstacles that may exist to wide acceptance of long-term care insurance by those who derive the most benefit from the protection it could provide. The authors review the role of employers and the advantages of long-term care insurance as an employee benefit as compared to individual policies.     

Subsidies to employee health insurance premiums and the health insurance market

One approach to covering the uninsured that is frequently advocated by policy-makers is subsidizing the employee portion of employer-provided health insurance premiums. But, since the vast majority of those offered employer-provided health insurance already take it up, such an approach is only appealing if there is a very high takeup elasticity among those who are offered and uninsured. Moreover, if plan choice decisions are price elastic, then such subsidies can at the same time increase health care costs by inducing selection of more expensive plans. We study an excellent example of such subsidies: the introduction of pre-tax premiums for postal employees in 1994, and then for the remaining federal employees in 2000. We do so using a census of personnel records for all federal employees from 1991 through 2002. We find that there is a very small elasticity of insurance takeup with respect to its after-tax price, and a modest elasticity of plan choice. Our results suggest that the federal government did little to improve insurance coverage, but much to increase health care expenditures, through this policy change.     

Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition

Paying insurers risk-adjusted prices for covering different individuals can correct selection incentives and induce the market to provide optimal insurance policies. To calculate the optimal risk-adjusted prices we need to know (a) what the optimal policies are; (b) how much they cost; and (c) how competitive the market is. We examine these issues in a model with spatial heterogeneity and adverse selection. Market equilibrium is characterized, and delivery of the socially optimal insurance policies is possible, as long as providers are paid risk-adjusted fees for each individual they serve. When the payment can be made on the basis of an individual's risk, it should be sufficient to cover the expected cost of the socially optimal policy for that person, plus a mark-up. If payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal, the optimal risk-based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation, identified by Glazer and McGuire [Glazer, J., McGuire, T., 2000. Optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums: an application to managed care.     

The fundamentals of liability insurance: physician and organization perspectives

Professional liability insurance is critical to physicians to protect their assets. Current medical practice reveals that most physicians will experience an allegation of negligence during their medical practice lifetime. Professional liability insurance is a contract between the physician and the insurance company. Physicians must understand the contract to identify the correct policy for their medical practice, to have appropriate coverage for the assumed risks, and to pay premiums that are reasonable within the marketplace. Prudent physicians should understand their duties and rights, as outlined in the liability contract, and the duties and rights of the insurance company. It is imperative for physicians to understand when the policy affords them a right to defend an allegation of negligence and when they must settle, by the structure of the contract. Physicians must understand the issues surrounding settlement and judgment reporting to the National Practitioner Data Bank. Last, physicians need to understand how a physician organization handles professional liability insurance.     

Stemming the risk of capitated contracts: what providers should consider when buying stop loss insurance

Whether an organization decides to purchase stop loss insurance from an HMO or a stop loss specialist, the decision-makers should read and understand each proposal. This information is best obtained by working with a qualified insurance expert who understands stop loss insurance and managed care and health care contracting practices. The stop loss carrier's overall commitment to the organization purchasing its policy should be to provide the best possible service and protection against the financial consequences of catastrophic claims.     

The changing profile of the elderly: effects on future long-term care needs and financing.

Simulation techniques are used to analyze the changing profile of the elderly from 1990 to 2030. The results show that the future demand for long-term care services is likely to be greater than many realize. Increases in the number of elderly who are 85 years of age and older, who have health limitations, or who live alone are likely to outpace the general increase in the elderly population. Although there will be a very large group of elderly at risk, their economic status will be better than that of today's elderly population. The percentage of elderly who can afford insurance premiums for broad long-term care coverage will increase in the future, but most older Americans probably will not be able to afford insurance. Although policies that reduce the cost and encourage the purchase of long-term care insurance could help to expand coverage, a large long-term care financing gap is likely to remain for the future elderly population.     

Ownership and average premiums for Medicare supplementary insurance policies

This article describes private supplementary health insurance holdings and average premiums paid by Medicare enrollees. Data were collected as part of the 1992 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). Data show the number of persons with insurance and average premiums paid by type of insurance held--individually purchased policies, employer-sponsored policies, or both. Distributions are shown for a variety of demographic, socioeconomic, and health status variables. Primary findings include: Seventy-eight percent of Medicare beneficiaries have private supplementary insurance; 25 percent of those with private insurance hold more than one policy. The average premium paid for private insurance in 1992 was $914.     

Explaining lapse in long-term care insurance markets

Expansion of private long-term care insurance (LTCI) is often posited as a potential mechanism to finance long-term care (LTC) for a growing elderly population in the US. One largely ignored issue is lapse or cancellation of policies. Individuals who let a LTCI policy lapse face resumed risk of LTC expenditures while suffering the financial loss of premiums paid. The motivation for lapse has been poorly understood, though some have hypothesized that improvements in health risk may be responsible. We use 1996-2006 Health and Retirement Study data from 3974 respondents who report having private LTCI to estimate baseline and dynamic predictors of lapse and test for ex post adverse selection. Individuals who lapse are generally poorer, less educated, less healthy, and more likely to be racial and ethnic minorities than those who retain their policies. Changes in health status play a relatively small role in lapse, and we find little evidence for adverse selection associated with lapse. We conclude that lapse of LTCI is more an issue of finances and alternatives than a reassessment of health risk. Because lapse rates are highest among the least healthy individuals, lapse should be considered explicitly in efforts to expand the LTCI market.     

The 'graying' of group health insurance

We examine differential declines in private insurance by income and age. We show that older, higher-income people in working families are more likely to retain private coverage as premiums rise, and we project these effects on future coverage rates. The analysis suggests that trends are leading to the "graying" of the employment-based health insurance system, where older, higher-income people get private health insurance, and others increasingly have public coverage or go without. These changes raise questions about the private health care system's ability to pool health risks. Population aging could interact with rising premiums and place additional pressure on an already strained employment-based health insurance system.     

The effect of owning private long-term care insurance policies on out-of-pocket costs.

This article examines the effect of owning long-term care insurance policies on the amount of out-of-pocket costs incurred by the elderly during their nursing home stays, and the importance of different policy features and restrictions. Data were drawn from the 1985 National Nursing Home Survey, and from copies of long-term care insurance policies collected from 11 leading companies during the spring and summer of 1988. The study results show a great deal of uncertainty concerning amounts the policies are likely to pay toward nursing home stays. This implies that the policies collected did not adequately fulfill one of the primary purposes of insurance: a reduction in risk and uncertainty. To examine whether rapid policy changes in recent years have made a difference, we assessed each of seven policy features and found that the two most important restrictions in long-term care insurance policies are prior hospitalization and level-of-care requirements. Recently, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) recommended that states prohibit the sale of policies containing these restrictions. Our findings confirm the wisdom of this recommendation. We did find, however, that two other policy restrictions--policy maximums and lack of inflation adjustment--are problematic. We recommend that the NAIC expand its model regulations to require that policy maximums be a minimum of four years, and that some form of inflation protection be incorporated into policy benefit structures.     

Genetic screening,health care and the insurance industry

The potential use of genetic tests in insurance has raised concerns about discrimination and individuals losing access to health care either because of refusals to test for treatable diseases, or because test-positives cannot afford premiums. Governments have so far largely sought to restrict the use of genetic information by insurance companies. To date the number of tests available with significant actuarial value is limited. However, this is likely to change, raising more clearly the question as to whether the social costs of adverse selection outweigh the social costs of individuals not accessing health care for fear of the consequences of test information being used in insurance markets. In this contribution we set out the policy context and model the potential trade-offs between the losses faced by insurers from adverse selection by insurees (which will increase premiums reducing consumer welfare) and the detrimental health effects that may result from persons refusing to undergo tests that could identify treatable health conditions. It argues that the optimal public policy on genetic testing should reflect overall societal benefit, taking account of these trade-offs. Based on our model, the factors that influence the outcome include: the size of and value attached to the health gains from treatment; deterrent effects of a disclosure requirement on testing for health reasons; incidence of the disease; propensity of test-positives to adverse select; policy value adverse selectors buy in a non-disclosure environment; and price elasticity of demand for insurance. Our illustrative model can be used as a benchmark for developing other scenarios or incorporating real data in order to address the impact of different policies on disclosure and requirement to test.     

The distribution of net benefits under the National Health Insurance programme in Taiwan

The redistributive effects of a social insurance programme are determined by how the programme is paid for-who pays and how much do they pay?-and how the benefits are distributed. As a result, the redistributive effects of a social health insurance programme should be evaluated on the basis of its net benefit-the difference between benefits and payment. Among the rich body of empirical analysis on equity in health care financing, however, most studies have relied on partial analysis, assessing equity by source of financing while ignoring the benefit side, or looking at equity in benefits but ignoring the funding side. Either approach risks misleading findings. In this study, therefore, the primary objective was to assess the distribution of net benefits across income groups under Taiwan's National Health Insurance (NHI) programme. This study observed a nationally representative sample of 74 012 NHI enrolees from 1996 to 2000. The unique NHI databases in Taiwan provide comprehensive enrolment and utilization information, and allowed linkage to each enrolee's income tax files. In addition to crude estimates, two-part models and ordinary least-square models were used to adjust inpatient and outpatient benefits for health care needs (age, sex, major disease status and physical disability). After adjusting for health care needs, the distribution of net benefits showed an apparent pro-poor pattern, with the lowest income group receiving the highest net benefits (NT$3353) and the top income group receiving the lowest net benefits (-NT$3072) in 1996. Although a clear pro-poor pattern was observed among those enrolees who paid wage-based premiums, this vertically equitable pattern was less evident among the enrolees who paid fixed premiums. Overall, a trend of increasing net benefits was observed in all income groups between 1996 and 2000, and all the NHI enrolees can be considered better off over time. In addition to contributing to the limited literature on equity in net benefits, the study provides an important policy reference to developing countries with large underground economies and relatively small populations of regular wage-earners as it indicates that using fixed premiums as a major financing scheme may pose a serious equity concern and policy challenge.     

Is German long-term care insurance a model for the United States?

German long-term care insurance, implemented in 1995, significantly extends the coverage of care-related risks. Given the similarities of German and U.S. institutional features, the German social insurance approach has been put forward as a possible model for long-term care in the United States. Using a political economy framework, the authors conducted a policy analysis that compares the main shortfalls of long-term care (LTC) provision in the United States and Germany, examines the responses provided by LTC insurance in Germany, and relates them to broader trends and proposals for change in welfare policy in both countries. German LTC insurance includes a high degree of consumer direction and compensation and protection for informal caregivers; it supports the extension of community-based services. Its shortfalls include the continued split between health and LTC insurance. In both countries, decentralization and institutional and financial fragmentation are some of the characteristics responsible for the failure to promote egalitarian social policy and substantially expand social protection to family- and care-related risks. The German LTC program is a good model for the United States. With a social insurance approach to LTC, costs are spread across the largest possible risk pool. Major goals that can be reached with such a program include establishment of universal entitlements to LTC benefits, consumer choice, and equitability and uniformity.     

Long-term care insurance demand limited by beliefs about needs, concerns about insurers, and care available from family

In spite of the high costs and major financial risks involved in long-term care, the majority of older Americans do not own long-term care insurance. We conducted a survey designed to learn more about the role of the following four broad factors in affecting the demand for long-term care insurance: preferences and beliefs, such as notions about the likelihood that one will become disabled; substitutes for insurance, such as savings that could be spent on long-term care; substitutes for formal care, such as care provided by family members; and features of the private market, such as concerns about the high costs of coverage. We found evidence that each of these factors was important in explaining low demand for long-term care insurance. For example, people who believed they might need long-term care were more likely to purchase long-term care coverage. People who had alternative ways to pay for care, such as through savings, or those who could use unpaid care from family members, were less likely to purchase insurance. Features of the private market, such as people's lack of trust in insurers and the high cost of coverage, made people less likely to buy long-term care insurance. We conclude that policy interventions designed to address only one factor limiting the purchase of long-term care insurance are unlikely to dramatically increase demand for long-term care insurance.     

Risk pooling and regulation: policy and reality in today's individual health insurance market

Analysis of new data on the relationship between and premiums and coverage in the individual insurance market and health risk shows that actual premiums paid for individual insurance are much less than proportional to risk, and risk levels have a small effect on obtaining coverage. States limiting risk rating in individual insurance display lower premiums for high risks than other states, but such rate regulation leads to an increase in the total number of uninsured people. The effect on risk pooling is small because of the large amount of risk pooling in unregulated individual insurance.