荷兰健康保险制度改革经验及启示

文章对荷兰健康保险制度改革的历史过程以及现状进行描述分析,总结荷兰健康保险制度改革的特点：建立基于管理型竞争的强制性私立健康保险;私立保险方竞争获得更多的参保人员;政府对保险方和提供者的行为进行监管并提供相关信息;建立了风险均等化制度,消除不同保险方的风险差异。荷兰健康保险制度改革为我国健康保险制度进一步完善提供一些借鉴：消除不同健康保险制度的差距,保障一致性;建立风险均等化制度,调整不同基金池间的风险;商业保险机构参与经办健康保险管理服务;加强医保第三方对供方行为的制约和监督。     

Managed competition and consumer price sensitivity in social health insurance

This paper examines whether the introduction of managed competition in Dutch social health insurance has resulted in effective price competition among insurance funds. We find evidence of limited price competition, which may be caused by low consumer price sensitivity. Using aggregate panel data from all insurance funds over the period 1996-1998, estimated premium elasticities of market share are -0.3 for compulsory coverage and -0.8 for supplementary coverage. These elasticities are much smaller than in managed competition settings in US group insurance. This may be explained by differences in switching experience and higher search costs associated with individual insurance.     

Low institutional trust in health insurers in Dutch health care

A central element of the 2006 health insurance reform in the Netherlands is strategic purchasing by health insurers. After a brief elaboration of the concept of trust this article discusses the trust of insured in the new purchasing role of health insurers. There are various indications of a trust problem or credible commitment problem in Dutch health care. Insured say to trust their own health insurer (specific trust) but also say to have little trust in the behaviour of health insurers in general(institutional trust). The article briefly explores four models to explain the trust problem: the lack-of information model, the anticompetition model, the pro-profession model and the political communication model. A critical analysis demonstrates that the 'objective ground' for low institutional trust is rather questionable. Low trust seems to be based more on perceptions than on the insurers' objective purchasing behaviour. The article ends with a discussion on some potential strategies to address the trust problem. Low institutional trust may be something insurers have to live with.     

Preferences and choices for care and health insurance

Legislation that came into effect in 2006 has dramatically altered the health insurance system in the Netherlands, placing greater emphasis on consumer choice and competition among insurers. The potential for such competition depends largely on consumer preferences for price and quality of service by insurers and quality of affiliated providers. This study provides initial evidence on the preferences of Dutch consumers and how they view trade-offs between various aspects of health insurance product design. A key feature of the analysis is that we compare the responses of high and low risk individuals, where risk is defined by the presence of a costly chronic condition. This contrast is critically important for understanding incentives facing insurers and for identifying potential unanticipated consequences of market competition. The results from our conjoint analysis suggest that not only high risk but also low risk individuals are willing to pay substantially more for insurance products that can be shown to provide better health outcomes. This suggests that insurance products that are more expensive and provide better quality of care may also attract low risk individuals. Therefore, development and dissemination of good, reliable and understandable health plan performance indicators may effectively reduce the problem of adverse selection.     

Price elasticities in the German Statutory Health Insurance market before and after the health care reform of 2009

This paper investigates the change in price elasticity of health insurance choice in Germany after a reform of health insurance contributions. Using a comprehensive data set of all sickness funds between 2004 and 2013, price elasticities are calculated both before and after the reform for the entire market. The general price elasticity is found to be increased more than 4-fold from −0.81 prior to the reform to −3.53 after the reform. By introducing a new kind of health insurance contribution the reform seemingly increased the price elasticity of insured individuals to a more appropriate level under the given market parameters. However, further unintended consequences of the new contribution scheme were massive losses of market share for the more expensive sickness funds and therefore an undivided focus on pricing as the primary competitive element to the detriment of quality.     

Employer contribution and premium growth in health insurance

We study whether employer premium contribution schemes could impact the pricing behavior of health plans and contribute to rising premiums. Using 1991–2011 data before and after a 1999 premium subsidy policy change in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), we find that the employer premium contribution scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the employer's premium contribution to that plan. Both incentives are found to contribute to premium growth. Counterfactual simulation shows that average premium would have been 10% less than observed and the federal government would have saved 15% per year on its premium contribution had the subsidy policy change not occurred in the FEHBP. We discuss the potential of similar incentives in other government-subsidized insurance systems such as the Medicare Part D and the Health Insurance Marketplace under the Affordable Care Act.     

The relation between selective contracting and healthcare expenditures in private health insurance plans in the United States

Many healthcare systems, including The Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, have incorporated elements of managed competition, whereby insurers compete for enrollees in a marketplace organized or facilitated by a government or governing entity. In these countries, managed competition was introduced with the idea that the system would contain cost growth while maximizing value for consumers and employers. An important mechanism to control costs is selective contracting: the process of contracting providers into a network and offer insurance packages with varying levels of provider coverage. In these systems, enrollees are expected to choose lower cost plans which offer access to only contracted providers in the network. The questions is, however, if restricting provider choice leads to reduced healthcare expenditures.In the United States, enrollees often have a choice between plans with restricted networks of providers and plans that offer more provider choice, where care outside the contracted network of providers is (partly) covered. The purpose of this study is to understand whether insurance plans with restrictions on provider access in the United States have reduced healthcare expenditures and to identify the mechanism by which that reduction occurred. We used data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally representative sample of families and individuals. We estimated expenditures for enrollees in restricted network plans using two-part models and generalized linear models. We found that restricted network plans, on average, save $761 per enrollee.Our results suggest that cost savings due to restricted network plans are largely a result of price reductions rather than utilization reductions, although both play a role in cost savings. When introducing reforms shifting from a supply‐oriented to a demand‐oriented health care system, these findings might be worth considering by other countries.     

The influence of supplementary health insurance on switching behaviour: evidence from Swiss data

This paper focuses on the switching behaviour of enrolees in the Swiss basic health insurance system. Even though the new Federal Law on Social Health Insurance (LAMal) was implemented in 1996 to promote competition among health insurers in basic insurance, there is limited evidence of premium convergence within cantons. This indicates that competition has not been effective so far, and reveals some inertia among consumers who seem reluctant to switch to less expensive funds. We investigate one possible barrier to switching behaviour, namely the influence of supplementary insurance. We use survey data on health plan choice (a sample of 1943 individuals whose switching behaviours were observed between 1997 and 2000) as well as administrative data relative to all insurance companies that operated in the 26 Swiss cantons between 1996 and 2005. The decision to switch and the decision to subscribe to a supplementary contract are jointly estimated. Our findings show that holding a supplementary insurance contract substantially decreases the propensity to switch. However, there is no negative impact of supplementary insurance on switching when the individual assesses his/her health as ‘very good’. Our results give empirical support to one possible mechanism through which supplementary insurance might influence switching decisions: given that subscribing to basic and supplementary contracts with two different insurers may induce some administrative costs for the subscriber, holding supplementary insurance acts as a barrier to switch if customers who consider themselves ‘bad risks’ also believe that insurers reject applications for supplementary insurance on these grounds. In comparison with previous research, our main contribution is to offer a possible explanation for consumer inertia. Our analysis illustrates how consumer choice for one's basic health plan interacts with the decision to subscribe to supplementary insurance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Elasticities of market shares and social health insurance choice in Germany: a dynamic panel data approach

In 1996, free choice of health insurers was introduced to the German social health insurance system. One objective was to increase efficiency through competition. A crucial precondition for effective competition among health insurers is that consumers search for lower-priced health insurers. We test this hypothesis by estimating the price elasticities of insurers' market shares. We use unique panel data and specify a dynamic panel model to explain changes in market shares. Estimation results suggest that short-run price elasticities are smaller than previously found by other studies. In the long-run, however, estimation results suggest substantial price effects.     

Health insurance and imperfect competition in the health care market

We show that when health care providers have market power and engage in Cournot competition, a competitive upstream health insurance market results in over-insurance and over-priced health care. Even though consumers and firms anticipate the price interactions between these two markets - the price set in one market affects the demand expressed in the other - Pareto improvements are possible. The results suggest a beneficial role for Government intervention, either in the insurance or the health care market.     

Consumer choice of social health insurance in managed competition

Objective To promote managed competition in Dutch health insurance, the insured are now able to change health insurers. They can choose a health insurer with a low flat‐rate premium, the best supplementary insurance and/or the best service. As we do not know why people prefer one health insurer to another, we investigated their reasons for selecting their health insurer and assessed the importance of the supplementary benefit package and the flat‐rate premium. Methods A self‐administered questionnaire was completed by 468 of a total of 884 (52.9%). Data were compared among three groups. The first group comprised those who left one health insurer for another (exit). The second group had joined the health insurer (entry) and the third group comprised those who did not switch (stayers). Results Those in the entry group were statistically significantly less satisfied with their former insurance organization than those in the other groups (exit and stayers) with the insurance organization under investigation. They were also less satisfied than the other groups in respect of the flat‐rate premium. Those in the exit group were younger and seemed to be in better health. In general, the insured were only aware of small differences between health insurance funds and the three groups did not differ from each other in this respect. About a quarter of the entry group reported the flat‐rate premium as a reason for selecting a particular health insurance fund. However, the most frequently reported reason, for both exit and entry, was the benefit package of the supplementary insurance. Conclusions In the absence of clear differences between insurance organizations, the advantages of managed competition maybe too difficult to achieve.     

Switching benefits and costs in competitive health insurance markets: A conceptual framework and empirical evidence from the Netherlands

Competitive health insurance markets will only enhance cost-containment, efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness if all consumers feel free to easily switch insurer. Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their perceived switching costs. We developed a conceptual framework with potential switching benefits and costs in competitive health insurance markets. Moreover, we used a questionnaire among Dutch consumers (1091 respondents) to empirically examine the relevance of the different switching benefits and costs in consumers’ decision to (not) switch insurer. Price, insurers’ service quality, insurers’ contracted provider network, the benefits of supplementary insurance, and welcome gifts are potential switching benefits. Transaction costs, learning costs, ‘benefit loss’ costs, uncertainty costs, the costs of (not) switching provider, and sunk costs are potential switching costs. In 2013 most Dutch consumers switched insurer because of (1) price and (2) benefits of supplementary insurance. Nearly half of the non-switchers – and particularly unhealthy consumers – mentioned one of the switching costs as their main reason for not switching. Because unhealthy consumers feel not free to easily switch insurer, insurers have reduced incentives to invest in high-quality care for them. Therefore, policymakers should develop strategies to increase consumer choice.     

The adequacy of household survey data for evaluating the nongroup health insurance market

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the accuracy of household survey estimates of the size and composition of the nonelderly population covered by nongroup health insurance. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Health insurance enrollment statistics reported to New Jersey insurance regulators. Household data from the following sources: the 2002 Current Population Survey (CPS)-March Demographic Supplement, the 1997 and 1999 National Surveys of America's Families (NSAF), the 2001 New Jersey Family Health Survey (NJFHS), a 2002 survey of known nongroup health insurance enrollees, a small 2004 survey testing alternative health insurance question wording. STUDY DESIGN: To assess the extent of bias in estimates of the size of the nongroup health insurance market in New Jersey, enrollment trends are compared between official enrollment statistics reported by insurance carriers to state insurance regulators with estimates from three general population household surveys. Next, to evaluate possible bias in the demographic and socioeconomic composition of the New Jersey nongroup market, distributions of characteristics of the enrolled population are contrasted among general household surveys and a survey of known nongroup subscribers. Finally, based on inferences drawn from these comparisons, alternative health insurance question wording was developed and tested in a local survey to test the potential for misreporting enrollment in nongroup coverage in a low-income population. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Data for nonelderly New Jersey residents from the 2002 CPS (n=5,028) and the 1997 and 1999 NSAF (n=6,467 and 7,272, respectively) were obtained from public sources. The 2001 NJFHS (n=5,580 nonelderly) was conducted for a sample drawn by random digit dialing and employed computer-assisted telephone interviews and trained, professional interviewers. Sampling weights are used to adjust for under-coverage of households without telephones and other factors. In addition, a modified version of the NJFHS was administered to a 2002 sample of known nongroup subscribers (n=1,398) using the same field methods. These lists were provided by four of the five largest New Jersey nongroup insurance carriers, which represented 95 percent of all nongroup enrollees in the state. Finally, a modified version of the NJFHS questionnaire was fielded using similar methods as part of a local health survey in New Brunswick, New Jersey, in 2004 (n=1,460 nonelderly). PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: General household sample surveys, including the widely used CPS, yield substantially higher estimates of nongroup enrollment compared with administrative totals and yield estimates of the characteristics of the nongroup population that vary greatly from a survey of known nongroup subscribers. A small survey testing a question about source of payment for direct-purchased coverage suggests than many public coverage enrollees report nongroup coverage. CONCLUSIONS: Nongroup health insurance has been subject to more than a decade of reform and is of continuing policy interest. Comparisons of unique data from a survey of known nongroup subscribers and administrative sources to household surveys strongly suggest that the latter overstates the number and misrepresent the composition of the nongroup population. Research on the nongroup market using available sources should be interpreted cautiously and survey methods should be reexamined.     

The effect of report cards on consumer choice in the health insurance market

We test the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the HMO market. Federal employees were provided with report cards on a limited basis in 1995 and then on a widespread basis in 1996. Exploiting this natural experiment, we find that subjective measures of quality and coverage influence plan choices, after controlling for plan premiums, expected out of pocket expenses and service coverages. The effect is stronger within a small sample of new hires compared to a larger sample of existing federal employees. We also find evidence that report cards increase the price elasticity of demand for health insurance.     

Imperfect risk adjustment,risk preferences,and sorting in competitive health insurance markets

I develop a model of insurer price-setting and consumer welfare under risk-adjustment, a policy commonly used to combat inefficient sorting due to adverse selection in health insurance markets. I use the model to illustrate graphically that risk-adjustment causes health plan prices to be based on costs not predicted by the risk-adjustment model (“residual costs”) rather than total costs, either weakening or exacerbating selection problems depending on the correlation between demand and costs predicted by the risk-adjustment model. I then use a structural model to estimate the welfare consequences of risk-adjustment, finding a welfare gain of over $600 per person-year.     

Willingness to pay for health insurance: An analysis of the potential market for new low-cost health insurance products in Namibia

This study analyzes the willingness to pay for health insurance and hence the potential market for new low-cost health insurance product in Namibia, using the double bounded contingent valuation (DBCV) method. The findings suggest that 87 percent of the uninsured respondents are willing to join the proposed health insurance scheme and on average are willing to insure 3.2 individuals (around 90 percent of the average family size). On average respondents are willing to pay NAD 48 per capita per month and respondents in the poorest income quintile are willing to pay up to 11.4 percent of their income. This implies that private voluntary health insurance schemes, in addition to the potential for protecting the poor against the negative financial shock of illness, may be able to serve as a reliable income flow for health care providers in this setting.     

Minimum generosity levels in a competitive health insurance market

An important condition for optimal health insurance is that the level of health care coverage is inversely related to the elasticity of demand. We show that this condition is not satisfied for voluntary deductibles in the Netherlands, which are optional deductibles on top of the mandatory deductible introduced by the Dutch government. We find that low-risk types, that mainly choose voluntary deductibles, have a lower elasticity of demand than high-risk types. Moreover, we show that voluntary deductibles introduce equity problems as it results in non-trivial cross subsidies from high-risk to low-risk types. Capping the level of voluntary deductibles (imposing minimum generosity) is likely to be welfare enhancing in the Netherlands.     

The effect of physician and health plan market concentration on prices in commercial health insurance markets

The objective of this paper is to describe the market structure of health plans (HPs) and physician organizations (POs) in California, a state with high levels of managed care penetration and selective contracting. First we calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) concentration indices for HPs and POs in 42 California counties. We then estimate a multivariable regression model to examine the relationship between concentration measures and the prices paid by HPs to POs. Price data is from Medstat MarketScan databases. The findings show that any California counties exhibit what the Department of Justice would consider high HHI concentration measures, in excess of 1,800. More than three quarters of California counties exhibit HP concentration indices over 1,800, and 83% of counties have PO concentration levels in excess of 1,800. Half of the study counties exhibited PO concentration levels in excess of 3,600, compared to only 24% for plans. Multivariate price models suggest that PO concentration is associated with higher physician prices (p < or = 0.05), whereas HP concentration does not appear to be significantly associated with higher outpatient commercial payer prices.     

Spousal labor market effects from government health insurance: Evidence from a veterans affairs expansion

Measuring the total impact of health insurance receipt on household labor supply is important in an era of increased access to publicly provided and subsidized insurance. Although government expansion of health insurance to older workers leads to direct labor supply reductions for recipients, there may be spillover effects on the labor supply of uncovered spouses. While the most basic model predicts a decrease in overall household work hours, financial incentives such as credit constraints, target income levels, and the need for own health insurance suggest that spousal labor supply might increase. In contrast, complementarities of spousal leisure would predict a decrease in labor supply for both spouses. Utilizing a mid-1990s expansion of health insurance for U.S. veterans, we provide evidence on the effects of public insurance availability on the labor supply of spouses. Using data from the Current Population Survey and Health and Retirement Study, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to compare the labor market behavior of the wives of older male veterans and non-veterans before and after the VA health benefits expansion. Although husbands’ labor supply decreases, wives’ labor supply increases, suggesting that financial incentives dominate complementarities of spousal leisure. This effect is strongest for wives with lower education levels and lower levels of household wealth and those who were not previously employed full-time. These findings have implications for government programs such as Medicare and Social Security and the Affordable Care Act.