Subsidies to employee health insurance premiums and the health insurance market

One approach to covering the uninsured that is frequently advocated by policy-makers is subsidizing the employee portion of employer-provided health insurance premiums. But, since the vast majority of those offered employer-provided health insurance already take it up, such an approach is only appealing if there is a very high takeup elasticity among those who are offered and uninsured. Moreover, if plan choice decisions are price elastic, then such subsidies can at the same time increase health care costs by inducing selection of more expensive plans. We study an excellent example of such subsidies: the introduction of pre-tax premiums for postal employees in 1994, and then for the remaining federal employees in 2000. We do so using a census of personnel records for all federal employees from 1991 through 2002. We find that there is a very small elasticity of insurance takeup with respect to its after-tax price, and a modest elasticity of plan choice. Our results suggest that the federal government did little to improve insurance coverage, but much to increase health care expenditures, through this policy change.     

Will Choice‐Based Reform Work for Medicare? Evidence from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program

OBJECTIVE:. To examine the effect of premiums and benefits on the health plan choices of older enrollees who choose Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) health plans as their primary payer. DATA SOURCES: Administrative enrollment data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and plan premiums and benefits data taken from the Checkbook Guide to health plans. STUDY DESIGN: We estimate individual plan choice models where the choice of health plan is a function of out-of-pocket premium, actuarial value, plan attributes, and individual characteristics. Plan attributes include plan structure (fee-for-service/preferred provider organization, point-of-service, or health maintenance organization), drug benefit structure, and whether or not the plan covers other types of spending such as dental services and diabetic supplies. The models are estimated by conditional logit. Our study focuses on three populations that currently choose FEHBP as their primary health care coverage and are similar to the Medicare population: current employees and retirees who are approaching the age of Medicare eligibility (ages 60-64) and current federal employees age 65+. Current employees age 65+ are eligible for Medicare, but their FEHBP plan is their primary payer. Retirees and employees 60-64 are not yet eligible for Medicare but are similar in many respects to recently age-eligible Medicare beneficiaries. We also estimate our model for current employees age 55 and younger as a comparison group. DATA COLLECTION METHODS: We select a random sample of retirees and employees age 60-64, as well as all current employees age 65+, from the OPM administrative database for the calendar year 2001. The plan choices available to each person are determined by the plans participating in their metropolitan statistical area. We match plan premium and attribute information from the Checkbook Guide to each plan in the enrollee's list of choices. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We find that current workers 65+, 60-64, and non-Medicare eligible retirees are sensitive to variation in plan premiums. The premium elasticities for these groups are similar in magnitude to those of the age 55 and under employee group. Older workers and retirees not yet eligible for Medicare are willing to pay a substantial amount for plans with open provider networks. The willingness to pay for open networks is significantly greater for these groups than for younger employees. Willingness to pay for open network plans varies significantly by income, but varies little by age within group. CONCLUSIONS: Our finding that older workers and non-Medicare eligible retirees are sensitive to plan premiums suggests that choice-based reform of Medicare would lead to cost-conscious choices by Medicare beneficiaries. However, our finding that these groups are willing to pay more for open network plans than younger employees suggest that higher risk individuals may migrate toward higher benefit, higher cost plans. Our findings on the relationship between income and willingness to pay for open network plans suggest that means testing is a viable reform for lowering Medicare program costs.     

Plan choice,health insurance cost and premium sharing

We develop a model of premium sharing for firms that offer multiple insurance plans. We assume that firms offer one low quality plan and one high quality plan. Under the assumption of wage rigidities we found that the employee's contribution to each plan is an increasing function of that plan's premium. The effect of the other plan's premium is ambiguous. We test our hypothesis using data from the Employer Health Benefit Survey. Restricting the analysis to firms that offer both HMO and PPO plans, we measure the amount of the premium passed on to employees in response to a change in both premiums. We find evidence of large and positive effects of the increase in the plan's premium on the amount of the premium passed on to employees. The effect of the alternative plan's premium is negative but statistically significant only for the PPO plans.     

Simulating the effects of employer contributions on adverse selection and health plan choice.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the effect of employer contribution policy and adverse selection on employees' health plan choices. STUDY DESIGN: Microsimulation methods to predict employees' choices between two health plan options and to track changes in those choices over time. The simulation predicts choice given premiums, healthcare spending by enrollees in each plan, and premiums for the next period. DATA SOURCES: The simulation model is based on behavioral relationships originally estimated from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). The model has been updated and recalibrated. The data processed in the simulation are from the 1993 Current Population Employee Benefits Supplement sample. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: A higher fraction of employees choose a high-cost, high-benefit plan if employers contribute a proportional share of the premium or adjust their contribution for risk selection than if employees pay the full cost difference out-of-pocket. When employees pay the full cost difference, the extent of adverse selection can be substantial, which leads to a collapse in the market for the high-cost plan. CONCLUSIONS: Adverse selection can undermine the managed competition strategy, indicating the importance of good risk adjusters. A fixed employer contribution policy can encourage selection of more efficient plans. Ironically, however, it can also further adverse selection in the absence of risk adjusters.     

Did the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate increase premiums?

We investigate the impact of the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate on insurance premiums. The expansion of dependent coverage under the ACA allows young adults to remain on their parent's private health insurance plans until the age of 26. We find that the mandate has led to a 2.5–2.8 percent increase in premiums for health insurance plans that cover children, relative to single-coverage plans. We are able to conclude that employers did not pass on the entire premium increase to employees through higher required plan contributions.     

Integrating risk adjustment and enrollee premiums in health plan payment

In two important health policy contexts – private plans in Medicare and the new state-run “Exchanges” created as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) – plan payments come from two sources: risk-adjusted payments from a Regulator and premiums charged to individual enrollees. This paper derives principles for integrating risk-adjusted payments and premium policy in individual health insurance markets based on fitting total plan payments to health plan costs per person as closely as possible. A least squares regression including both health status and variables used in premiums reveals the weights a Regulator should put on risk adjusters when markets determine premiums. We apply the methods to an Exchange-eligible population drawn from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).     

Employee Choice of Consumer-Driven Health Insurance in a Multiplan, Multiproduct Setting

Objective. To determine who chooses a Consumer-Driven Health Plan (CDHP) in a multiplan, multiproduct setting, and, specifically, whether the CDHP attracts the sicker employees in a company's risk pool.
Study Design. We estimated a health plan choice equation for employees of the University of Minnesota, who had a choice in 2002 of a CDHP and three other health plans—a traditional health maintenance organization (HMO), a preferred provider organization (PPO), and a tiered network product based on care systems. Data from an employee survey were matched to information from the university's payroll system.
Principal Findings. Chronic illness of the employee or family members had no effect on choice of the CDHP, but such employees tended to choose the PPO. The employee's age was not related to CDHP choice. Higher-income employees chose the CDHP, as well as those who preferred health plans with a national provider panel that includes their physician in the panel. Employees tended to choose plans with lower out-of-pocket premiums, and surprisingly, employees with a chronic health condition themselves or in their family were more price-sensitive.
Conclusions. This study provides the first evidence on who chooses a CDHP in a multiplan, multiproduct setting. The CDHP was not chosen disproportionately by the young and healthy, but it did attract the wealthy and those who found the availability of providers more appealing. Low out-of-pocket premiums are important features of health plans and in this setting, low premiums appeal to those who are less healthy.     

Determinants of the use of health plan information in formulating health plan selection decisions

This study seeks to identify the impact of information on employees' health plan selection decision-making. Surveys were administered to 1,722 Federal employees working in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) enrolled in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). This study focuses on the enrollees' access to and use of three types of health plan information: print information issued by the Federal government (in particular, The Guide to Federal Employees Health Benefit Plans), print information issued by the health plans, and web-based information. Literature from health plans was utilized to a greater degree than The Guide. Web-based information was the least accessed and used. Major positive predictors of the use of health plan information from any source were: race, time in Federal employment, whether the employee was considering a plan change, employees with less time in current plan, employees who search for information to make decisions, and spouses' health status. Younger and more-educated employees were more likely to access web-based information. Implications for management, policy, and future research are discussed.     

Defined-contribution health insurance products: development and prospects

Defined-contribution health insurance products have received considerable recent attention, stimulated by double-digit increases in health plan premiums and employers' desire to get their employees more involved in health care purchasing decisions. Existing products typically feature a consumer health spending account, a major medical or other insurance policy, and the use of the Internet to support consumer decision making. They vary in their use of provider networks, provider payment approaches, the specific design of spending accounts, marketing strategies, and infrastructure investment. The companies producing these products are now at a critical juncture. They could grow rapidly over the next few years, be acquired by existing health plans, or fail if they do not deliver on their promises.     

Switching costs, price sensitivity and health plan choice

We investigate the extent to which sensitivity to health plan premiums differs across individuals according to characteristics related to the cost of switching plans. Our results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity related to expected health care costs: younger, healthier employees are between two and four times more sensitive to price than employees who are older and who have been recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer. We also find evidence of status quo bias: estimated premium elasticities are significantly higher for new hires than for incumbent employees. Simulations combining our results with actuarial data illustrate the cost implications of risk-related differences in price elasticity.     

Determinants of the Use of Health Plan Information in Formulating Health Plan Selection Decisions

Abstract

This study seeks to identify the impact of information on employees' health plan selection decision-making. Surveys were administered to 1,722 Federal employees working in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) enrolled in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). This study focuses on the enrollees' access to and use of three types of health plan information: print information issued by the Federal government (in particular, The Guide to Federal Employees Health Benefit Plans), print information issued by the health plans, and web-based information. Literature from health plans was utilized to a greater degree than The Guide. Web-based information was the least accessed and used. Major positive predictors of the use of health plan information from any source were: race, time in Federal employment, whether the employee was considering a plan change, employees with less time in current plan, employees who search for information to make decisions, and spouses' health status. Younger and more-educated employees were more likely to access web-based information. Implications for management, policy, and future research are discussed.     

Federal employees health program experiences lack of competition in some areas, raising cost concerns for exchange plans

The Affordable Care Act calls for creation of health insurance exchanges designed to provide private health insurance plan choices. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program is a national model that to some extent resembles the planned exchanges. Both offer plans at the state level but are also overseen by the federal government. We examined the availability of plans and enrollment levels in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program throughout the United States in 2010. We found that although plans were widely available, enrollment was concentrated in plans owned by just a few organizations, typically Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans. Enrollment was more concentrated in rural areas, which may reflect historical patterns of enrollment or lack of provider networks. Average biweekly premiums for an individual were lowest ($58.48) in counties where competition was extremely high, rising to $65.13 where competition was extremely low. To make certain that coverage sold through exchanges is affordable, policy makers may need to pay attention to areas where there is little plan competition and take steps through risk-adjustment policies or other measures to narrow differences in premiums and out-of-pocket expenses for consumers.     

Self-insurance in times of growing and retreating managed care

This paper examines trends in self-insurance and in the content of self-insured plans from 1993 to 2001. The percentage of employees enrolled in self-insured plans fell during these years. Much of the decrease was attributable to the decline of indemnity insurance and the rise of HMO and point-of-service plan enrollment. If the product mix had remained constant throughout these years, self-insured enrollment would have grown between 1993 and 1996 and then declined to its current 50 percent level. As a result of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the use of preexisting condition clauses declined dramatically in self-insured plans. Self-insured and purchased plans cost similar amounts and provide similar benefits. Cost sharing is somewhat lower in self-insured PPO plans. During periods of rapid inflation, premiums increase more slowly for self-insured than for fully insured plans.     

Consumer determinants of the use of health plan information in plan selection.

One of the major issues in achieving optimum levels of performance in health-care markets is to enhance consumer understanding of their health plan choices in order to facilitate the expansion of 'high-value' health plans at the expense of 'low-value' health plans. The Federal government offers employees many choices of health plans and provides large amounts of information on all of these options through (1) comparative written health plan information, (2) information from the health plans themselves, and (3) comparative health plan information on the Internet. The present study examines the degree to which 1722 Federal employees in the Department of Health and Human Services utilized health plan information from the above three sources in making their annual health plan selection. Results indicate that most employees (64%) used at least one information source, with written information from health plans the most common (53%), followed by comparative written information in The Guide (32%) and the Internet (16%). Those employees who regularly search for information prior to making an important purchase, those with a short time in their current plan, those with family coverage, Whites, African-Americans, and men were all more likely to use health plan information to make their annual choice. The Internet was accessed more often by younger and higher paid employees. Implications for policy and future research are discussed.     

Employer contribution and premium growth in health insurance

We study whether employer premium contribution schemes could impact the pricing behavior of health plans and contribute to rising premiums. Using 1991–2011 data before and after a 1999 premium subsidy policy change in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), we find that the employer premium contribution scheme has a differential impact on health plan pricing based on two market incentives: 1) consumers are less price sensitive when they only need to pay part of the premium increase, and 2) each health plan has an incentive to increase the employer's premium contribution to that plan. Both incentives are found to contribute to premium growth. Counterfactual simulation shows that average premium would have been 10% less than observed and the federal government would have saved 15% per year on its premium contribution had the subsidy policy change not occurred in the FEHBP. We discuss the potential of similar incentives in other government-subsidized insurance systems such as the Medicare Part D and the Health Insurance Marketplace under the Affordable Care Act.     

Competition and new technology

Most real medical spending growth is accounted for by beneficial but costly new technology. This paper argues that a missing dimension of our concepts of competition among health plans is a focus on their policy toward new technology. In principle, plans could choose to move rapidly or slowly, inclusively or selectively, toward adopting new technologies, broadly defined. These policies would affect the rates of growth of their premiums, and consumers could choose among plans depending on both the technology policy and premium growth. Legal impediments, physician resistance, and membership turnover are all possible obstacles. Further thought should be given to making technology policy an explicit dimension of plan competition.     

Growth of consumer-directed health plans to one-half of all employer-sponsored insurance could save $57 billion annually

Enrollment is increasing in consumer-directed health insurance plans, which feature high deductibles and a personal health care savings account. We project that an increase in market share of these plans--from the current level of 13 percent of employer-sponsored insurance to 50 percent--could reduce annual health care spending by about $57 billion. That decrease would be the equivalent of a 4 percent decline in total health care spending for the nonelderly. However, such growth in consumer-directed plan enrollment also has the potential to reduce the use of recommended health care services, as well as to increase premiums for traditional health insurance plans, as healthier individuals drop traditional coverage and enroll in consumer-directed plans. In this article we explore options that policy makers and employers facing these challenges should consider, including more refined plan designs and decision support systems to promote recommended services.