Environmental ethics

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) held the first meeting on environmental ethics sponsored by the Scientific Advisory Panel and Board on 10-11 December 1998 in Arlington, Virginia (1). The report from the meeting will more completely inform scientists and the community of current issues. This editorial should serve as an initial brief of this meeting [which was held on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the United Nations on 10 December 1948)].     

Analysing ethics

Health Care Analysis -     

Analysing ethics

Conclusion I cannot be certain what people have in mind when they wish to expose medical students to ethics, but if what I have said so far is sound, then they ought not to mean moral philosophy alone. The moral life of medicine and the moral life in general have certainly given rise to rules of thumb, guidelines and principles which summarise our sentiments about interactions within that life. However, the substance of that life is human vulnerability and our responses to it. This is not to say that the theories found in moral philosophy are not a rich terrain for intellectual ingenuity, they are, but there is no reason whatever to believe that their study sharpens moral sensitivity.Sensitivity to human vulnerability is the dimension which medical ethics education should seek to explore. One reason is that medical practice is at the hard edge of moral practice, and the character of the practitioners is one of our major concerns as consumers of health care.My conclusion is easy enough to state. Many have started the business of medical ethics on the assumption that moral philosophy has an applied correlate. This has proven to be a chimera. Let's have the courage to admit that a promising research project has petered out and start to look for a more plausible one. Perhaps we could start by looking for good narratives of suffering, of living under adversity, and of caring for the suffering.     

Scepticism about the virtue ethics approach to nursing ethics

Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue ethics in nursing because normative rivals (such as utilitarians) can say as much; and the teleology distinctive of virtue ethics does not transpose to a professional context, such as nursing. Next, scepticism is argued for by responding to various attempts to secure a role for virtue ethics in nursing. The upshot is that virtue ethics is best left where it belongs – in personal moral life, not professional ethics – and nursing ethics is best done by taking other approaches.     

The business of ethics. Hospitals need to focus on managerial ethics as much as clinical ethics

Business ethics begins with the recognition of the various values and "goods" involved in judgements of what to do. Four key values are individual rights, individual self-interest, the company's best interest, and the public good. Often a company has to choose which of these goals or values should be subordinated to another. Business ethics, then, must clarify priorities among these values and establish priority principles to resolve conflicts. One approach to contemporary business ethics emphasizes personal integrity, focusing on conflicts of interest; another approach stresses social responsibility, focusing on the effect of company policy on groups and individuals in society. In business, most of the attention to conflicts of interest focuses on the conflict between employee self-interest and the firm's interest. Healthcare organizations may need to focus on potential conflicts between the patient's interest and the institution's or physician's interest. Physician referrals and pharmaceutical companies' marketing practices are two areas with potential conflicts. Not-for-profit organizations have been quicker than the business world to acknowledge social responsibility. In many ways, however, the social impact of healthcare policies and decisions has not been as carefully considered as it should be. Institutionalizing deliberation about clinical ethical issues has helped to raise awareness about the ethical dimensions of medical care. It would also be useful to institutionalize attention to business ethics in healthcare.     

Furthering the sceptical case against virtue ethics in nursing ethics

In a recent article in this journal I presented a sceptical argument about the current prominence of virtue ethics in nursing ethics. Daniel Putman has responded with a defence of the relevance of virtue in nursing. The present article continues this discussion by clarifying, defending, and expanding the sceptical argument. I start by emphasizing some features of the sceptical case, including assumptions about the nature of sceptical arguments, and about the character of both virtue ethics and nursing ethics. Then I respond to objections of Putman's such as that, according to virtue ethics, virtue is relevant to the whole of a human life, including one's behaviour in a professional context; and that eudaimonia should be central in explaining and motivating a nurse's decision to enter the profession. Having argued that these objections are not compelling, I go on to discuss an interesting recent attempt to reassert the role of virtue ethics in the ethics of professions, including nursing. This centres on whether role‐specific obligations – e.g. the obligations that arise for a moral agent qua lawyer or mother – can be accommodated in a virtue ethics approach. Sean Cordell has argued that the difficulty of accommodating role‐specific obligations results in an ‘institution‐shaped gap’ in virtue ethics. He suggests a way of meeting this difficulty that appeals to the ergon of institutions. I endorse the negative point that role‐specific obligations elude virtue ethics, but argue that the appeal to the ergon of institutions is unsuccessful. The upshot is further support for scepticism about the virtue ethics approach to nursing ethics. I end by gesturing to some of the advantages of a sceptical view of virtue ethics in nursing ethics.