The right to die

2 acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, the Suicide Act of 1961 and the Abortion Act of 1967, have drastically altered doctor/patient relations as outlined in the Hippocratic oath. The major advantage of the Suicide Act is that the physician would be under no obligation to prevent a crime. However, 2 dilemmas involved with this aspect of the Suicide Act are: dealing with the relative slow death of the patient; and/or the possibility of the patient requesting the means to end his or her life. The latter of these 2 choices involves both a moral and a legal issue dealing with the patient's competent intentions. Concerning legislation dealing with abortion, several controversial issues have been raised over the reasons for abortions. Mental and physical defects are reasons which have been cited for abortions and neonate euthanasia. However, bills being currently debated in Parliament feel that it is not the decision of the courts to decide on behalf of a mentally or physically handicapped child whether or not they have the right to die.     

The right to life

For much of human history the idea of a right to life has not seemed self-evident. The credibility of the idea appears to depend on a particular kind of intuition concerning the nature of the world. In this paper, the kind of intuition involved is related to the idea of a covenant, illustrated by that of marriage. The paper concludes by suggesting that talk about responsibilities may be more fruitful than talk about rights.     

The right to refuse treatment is not a right to be killed.

It is widely accepted now that a patient's right to refuse treatment extends to circumstances in which the exercise of that right may lead to the patient's death. However, it is also often effectively assumed, without argument, that this implies a patient's right to request another agent to intervene so as to bring about his or her death, in a way which would render that agent guilty of murder in the absence of such a request. But the right to refuse treatment can, logically, have no such implication, and the mistaken supposition that it does conflates a right to die with a right to be killed. Confusion over this issue is brought out by an examination of conflicting opinion concerning the permissible termination of ventilation for mentally competent patients. A wider lesson may be drawn regarding the need for the ethical assessment of new forms of life-sustaining medical technology.     

A right to suicide does not entail a right to assisted death.

Many people believe that it is permissible for people who are suffering from terminal illnesses to commit suicide or even that such people have a right to commit suicide. Some have also argued that it follows that it is permissible for them, or that they have a right, to use the assistance of another person. First, I assume that it is permissible for a person to commit suicide and ask whether it follows that it is also permissible for the person to employ an agent to assist in the death. Second, I assume that people have a right to commit suicide and ask whether it follows that the right holders have a right to employ an agent to assist with the death. I argue that the permissibility of suicide does not by itself entail the permissibility of employing someone to assist in the suicide. I also argue that the right to commit suicide does not by itself entail the right to assisted death. Instead, what follows is that there is a right not to have unreasonable restrictions placed on the means by which one can exercise one's right to commit suicide. Whether a restriction is reasonable depends on the conclusion reached when one has weighed a number of policy considerations.     

The constitutional right to abortion

The fundamental issues of abortion according to Georgia state law are contained in this article. It puts forward questions of importance to health care professionals in the state of Georgia. It also provides answers to these questions in the context of future changes that would affect a woman's right to get an abortion. It shows how a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion if she wants one. It discusses the effects of the resent Webster decision on Roe v. Wade. It argues that Webster does not overrule Roe v. Wade, but that it clarifies 3 points of law concerning abortion. Whether or not Roe v. Wade is overturned will depend on the outcome of 3 cases currently before the Court. Currently the state of Georgia does not prohibit abortion if it is performed by a duly licensed physician, "bases upon his best clinical judgement that an abortion is necessary". Under a strict interpretation of Row v. Wade this law would be rules unconstitutional. Although in light of Webster it might stand. The author's final conclusion is to wait and see hoe the 3 cases mentioned above are decided before making further judgments.     

Post Ross procedure aortic right sinus of Valsalva fistula to right ventricle

Post Ross procedure complications have been limited predominantly to neoaortic valvular dilatation (10-30%) and insufficiency, right ventricular prosthetic deterioration or right ventricular pulmonary artery conduit obstruction. Arrhythmia has been documented to occur in a third of these patients. This is the first time that neoaortic right sinus of valsalva dissection and rupture to the right ventricle with a fistulous communication has occurred and been described, as far as the author is aware.     

麻醉签字中的知情同意权与特殊干涉权

随着社会的发展,人们的维权意识越来越强,医患之间矛盾和纠纷也日渐凸显出来,在我们麻醉工作中签署麻醉同意书是十分重要的环节,麻醉医师应当在最大限度维护患者利益的情况下落实知情同意权。     

The right to lesbian parenthood.

The author argues that the minority homosexual section of our population--a larger minority than, for example, the ethnic minorities section--is more often than not excluded by the 'helping professions' from the right to be parents. The author appeals to the lack of scientific data supporting such exclusion and asks that homosexual parents and their children receive the same care from our institutions as other parents and children. Some instances of lack of care are cited. The paper was presented to the 1983 annual conference of the London Medical Group, 'Human Rights in Medicine'.