A prospect of chemical disarmament: The 1993 chemical weapons convention is opened for signature

The Chemical Weapons Convention was signed by 129 states in Paris, 13–15 January 1993. Its negotiation at Geneva took 21 years; it will enter into force when 65 signatories have ratified it, but not earlier than 1995. Destruction of chemical weapons will be implemented over the following ten years. This paper examines some issues prominent in the later stages of negotiation (1991–92) and considers whether the Convention as concluded reaches a threshold of acceptability and what the signatory states need to do next. Issues highlighted include verification, entry into force, the ten‐year transition period, the destruction programme, and trade and development.     

色谱和质谱技术在神经性毒剂及其降解产物检测中的应用

依据化学武器公约的内容，对各类化学战荆和它们的降解产物的分析检测已成为毒剂核查的关键内容。本文综述了气相色谱、液相色谱及其与质谱联用技术在神经性毒荆和水解产物检测中的应用，评述了不同背景(水、土壤、血、尿等)下样品的处理方法和毒剂加合物的检测方法，以及近年来此领域的新技术和新进展。     

Fatal sarin poisoning in Syria 2013: forensic verification within an international laboratory network

During the United Nations fact-finding mission to investigate the alleged use of chemical warfare agents in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013, numerous tissues from a deceased female victim, who had displayed symptoms of cholinergic crisis, were collected. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) authorized two specialized laboratories in the Netherlands and Germany for forensic analysis of these samples. Diverse modern mass spectrometry (MS)-based procedures in combination with either liquid chromatography (LC) or gas chromatography (GC) separation were applied. A variety of biotransformation products of the nerve agent sarin was detected, including the hydrolysis product O-isopropyl methylphosphonic acid (IMPA) as well as covalent protein adducts with e.g., albumin and human butyrylcholinesterase (hBChE). IMPA was extracted after sample acidification by solid-phase extraction and directly analyzed by LC–tandem-MS with negative electrospray ionization (ESI). Protein adducts were found, either by fluoride-induced reactivation applying GC–MS techniques or by LC–MS-based detection after positive ESI for proteolyzed proteins yielding phosphonylated tyrosine residues or a specific phosphonylated hBChE-derived nonapeptide. These experimental results provided unambiguous evidence for a systemic intoxication and were the first proving the use of sarin in the ongoing bellicose conflict. This scenario underlines the requirement for qualified and specialized analytical laboratories to face repeated violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.     

Old dogs or new tricks: chemical warfare at the millennium

There were about 50,000 deaths from chemical agents in the First World War and 7,000 deaths in the Kurdish population of Iraq from mustard gas and nerve agents. Signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol forswore first use of chemical warfare, but were allowed to maintain stockpiles, and there were no sanctions against use. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, establishes timetables for declaration of current and past CW activity and destruction of stocks. The Convention allows inspection of suspect sites. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has been established to give effect to the CWC, which, as of June 1999, has 125 States Parties. Progress in reporting and destroying CW agents is described. It is essential that participation in the CWC becomes universal, but until this is the case monitoring by other agencies will be needed.     

Strength and conditioning in adolescent female athletes

Despite evidence that strength and conditioning (S&C) programs decrease injury risk and increase sport performance, young females are rarely offered S&C programs comparable to those of their male counterparts. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the current body of available literature regarding S&C in adolescent female athletes, describe potential benefits, and generate recommendations for S&C programs for female adolescent athletes. This systematic review was performed in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines. Systematic searches of the PubMed and Google Scholar databases were conducted using the following keywords: ‘female athletes,’ ‘injury prevention,’ ‘adolescent,’ ‘physical fitness,’ ‘strength,’ ‘female adolescent,’ and ‘conditioning.’ Studies included in this review evaluated the effectiveness of S&C protocols and/or the habits and attitudes of coaches and athletic trainers working with female adolescent athletes. Seven articles evaluating S&C programs for the adolescent female athlete were used as the basis for this systematic review. These articles described current protocols and/or factors that should be taken into account when designing S&C programs. The identified articles focused on improving the strength of adolescent female athletes, decreasing the risk of injury, and exposing female athletes to the benefits of S&C that are routinely afforded to their male counterparts. Despite the critical potential benefits of S&C training, such as improved landing mechanics, coaches and athletic trainers do not routinely implement S&C programs for female adolescent athletes. The lack of such programs is largely due to misconceptions surrounding female athletes, such as the perception that females fear bulking up. S&C programs for adolescent female athletes should incorporate stretching of the hip adductors, targeted hamstring, gluteal and quadriceps strengthening, and a synergistic adaptation model, which tailors training protocols to an athlete’s pubertal stage.     

Abstracts of papers on updated radiation effects,immunological effects of nuclear war,medical effects and future dangers of nuclear‐weapon tests

Biological weapons (BW), although outlawed under the 1925 Geneva Convention, were studied in World War II, but were not used except on a small scale by the Japanese in Manchuria. The UN Disarmament Commission in 1959 failed to have BW eliminated because of the absence of agreed international verification. The Pugwash movement carried out trial inspections of microbiological establishments and concluded in 1966 that verification was possible. A WHO assessment in 1969 on chemical and biological weapons was that the effects on civilian populations could be very damaging, but that BW would not be militarily useful except for sabotage. The Biological Weapons Convention (1972) renounced biological warfare but permits relevant research for defence. Research on BW has recently been increased by the USA which claims that the USSR is using genetic engineering for this purpose. Research relevant to BW should not be carried out secretly nor under military auspices.     

Online applied dual-use biosecurity education: a case study from the University of Bradford

Reflecting a consensus that emerged at the 2008 Meeting of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention on the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines; and in regard to the consensus on the importance of awareness raising and education and training programmes, and of the role that these can play in assisting in the implementation of the Convention, this paper highlights how novel online e-learning approaches can efficiently and effectively be deployed in building a sustainable worldwide capability in this much neglected area of education and training. It provides examples of the development and evolution of education and training resources, notes the importance of standing agenda items for the intersessional process of the BWC between the Seventh and Eight Review Conferences and the range of opportunities that therefore arise for States Party and civil society collaboration in building capacity and achieving sustainability in this area.     

Closing loopholes in the Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti-material agents.     

Verification of the biological weapons convention: what is needed?

The lack of transparency and verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is one factor behind the current weakening of the ban on biological weapons. Despite recent setbacks, governments need to fill the verification gap so that violations of the BWC can be detected and deterred. Continued talks on a strong verification mechanism for the BWC should aim for an open verification regime and one that is flexible enough to adapt to new technical and political circumstances. Effective monitoring of compliance with the BWC will require concerted effort by governments and civil society.     

Closing loopholes in the biological weapons convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti‐material agents.     

Biological weapons: An increasing threat

The background to the risk of biological warfare is examined with particular reference to recent developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering. The provisions of and problems with the Biological Weapons Convention are discussed, with particular reference to verification. The role of doctors and scientists in issues related to research on biological warfare are considered; they should do more to inform the general public and press for appropriate action.     

Bio-terrorism, human security and public health: can international law bring them together in an age of globalization?

Bio-terrorism, the use of a microorganism with the deliberate intent of causing infection, before and since the anthrax attacks in the United States in October 2001, has emerged as a real medical and public health threat. The link between bio-terrorism, human security and public health raises complex questions on the normative trajectories of international law, the mandates of international organizations, and global health governance. In May 2001, the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) passed a resolution entitled "Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and Response" which inter alia, urged WHO member states to participate actively in the verification and validation of surveillance data and information concerning health emergencies of international concern. This article explores the links between bio-terrorism, human security and public health, and investigates the effectiveness of international legal mechanisms that link them in an age of globalization of public health. The article explores the interaction of WHO's 'soft-law' approaches to global health security, and the 'moribund' negotiations of the verification and monitoring protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention 1972. Can international law link bio-terrorism, public health and human security? Does the WHO collaborate with other international organizations within and outside the United Nations system to develop effective legal and governance approaches to bio-terrorism and global health security? The article concludes that the globalization of public health threats like bio-terrorism requires globalized legal approaches.     

Detection of saxitoxin in counterterrorism using a commercial lateral flow immunoassay kit

The neurotoxin saxitoxin (STX) is registered in the list of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In preparation against potential terrorism by STX use, we investigated the performance of a commercially available rapid test kit for paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP), which is essentially a lateral flow immunoassay kit. Pink lines in the test and control zones appeared after 35 min and were observed by the naked eye and were recorded by a digital scanner. The competitive displacement of gold-labeled antitoxin analog antibody by STX in the test zone was quantitatively shown using the ratio of the intensity of the test zone line to that of control zone line. As the STX concentration increased, the intensity of the pink line in the test zone on the strip decreased. The limit of detection was defined as the STX concentration that gave a ratio half that of the STX blank test, and was calculated to be about 12 ng/ml. Various matrix components, such as wheat flour and the decontamination chemical hypochlorite, were examined for their effects on false positive and false negative results in the determination of STX by the PSP Rapid Test system.     

Some Reflections on nuclear proliferation

This paper looks forward to the 1995 review of the Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty in the light of recent steps toward nuclear disarmament, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There is an urgent need for a review of the non‐proliferation regime; the only final solution for the flaws of the NPT is the elimination of nuclear weapons.     

The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?

This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for--and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving--a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs).     

Primary,secondary, and tertiary prevention of genocidal weapons

For certain countries the availability of the technology and know‐how has turned the nuclear weapons option, as well as the possession of chemical and bacteriological weapons, into a threatened reality of the present.

Once a country embarks on a ‘solution’ such as this to its security problems, the countries in conflict with it are obliged to follow suit, thus accelerating the process of development and proliferation of similar weapons. Fear stimulates the creation of a spiral of false security that will inevitably result, if left to its ‘natural’ forces, in world‐wide destruction.

Nuclear war is examined here from an epidemiological viewpoint as a disease with two corresponding different possibilities: (a) the natural history of the disease, and (b) modifications produced by primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.

Medical responsibility has no alternative but to work for the prevention of the incurable consequences of nuclear war.     

The potential for abuse of genetics in militarily significant biological weapons

Concern has been expressed at successive Review Conferences of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) regarding the possible misuse of new biological knowledge; this article reviews some of these developments. Genetic manipulation, and genomics in particular, would modify existing pathogens and render previously harmless organisms pathogenic. Viruses could be modified as vectors to alter their pathogenicity in animals and man or act as carriers for genes or toxins. Plant pathogens, particularly fungi, could be modified as biological warfare agents against crops. An effective verification protocol for the BTWC is an essential part of the web of deterrence against these developments.     

The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?

This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for – and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving – a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs).     

蓖麻毒素检测方法研究进展

蓖麻毒素是一种从蓖麻子中分离的核糖体失活蛋白,其含量高,易于纯化。作为蛋白合成抑制剂,它可以通过吸入、食入及静脉注射等方式致人中毒,已被列入《禁止化学和生物武器公约》控制清单1之中。对于这一潜在的生化战剂,快速、灵敏的检测方法是预防中毒发生和中毒后医学救治的重要手段。理想的蓖麻毒素检测方法应具有高灵敏性、高特异性,并可对多种样品进行快速分析。本文综述了近年来蓖麻毒素检测方法的研究进展。     

Vertical nuclear proliferation

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.