Why competition law matters to health care quality

Competition law (encompassing both antitrust and consumer protection) is the forgotten stepchild of health care quality. This paper introduces readers to competition law and policy, describes its institutional features and analytic framework, surveys the ways in which competition law has influenced quality-based competition, and outlines some areas in need of further development. Competition law protects the competitive process--not individual competitors. It guides the structural features of the health care system and the conduct of providers as they navigate it. Competition law does not privilege quality over other competitive goals but honors consumers' preferences with respect to trade-offs among quality, price, and other attributes of goods and services.     

Health insurance and imperfect competition in the health care market

We show that when health care providers have market power and engage in Cournot competition, a competitive upstream health insurance market results in over-insurance and over-priced health care. Even though consumers and firms anticipate the price interactions between these two markets - the price set in one market affects the demand expressed in the other - Pareto improvements are possible. The results suggest a beneficial role for Government intervention, either in the insurance or the health care market.     

Public health care providers and market competition: the case of Finnish occupational health services

Background  

As reforms in publicly funded health systems rely heavily on competition, it is important to know if and how public providers react to competition. In many European countries, it is empirically difficult to study public providers in different markets, but in Finnish occupational health services, both public and private for-profit and non-profit providers co-exist. We studied possible differences in public providers’ performance (price, intensity of services, service mix—curative medical services/prevention, productivity and revenues) according to the competitiveness of the market.     

Why lower income mothers do not engage with the formal mental health care system: perceived barriers to care

Lower income mothers who bring their children for mental health services also have high rates of depression and anxiety, yet few seek help. Maternal and child mental health are intimately intertwined; thus, the distress of both is likely to continue if the mother's needs are unaddressed. Because mothers overcome numerous instrumental challenges to help their children, the authors identify potential perceptual barriers to mothers' help seeking. An ethnographic analysis of in-depth qualitative interviews with 127 distressed mothers suggests several critical perceptual factors. For example, mothers attributed their distress to external causes (e.g., poverty, negative life stressors), which they believed individually focused mental health services could not affect. Interviewees also anticipated negative ramifications for seeking care, including being labeled unfit mothers, and thus potentially losing custody of their children. The authors discuss the implications of these and other key themes for engaging lower income mothers and their children.     

The key role of health insurance in a cost-effective health care system. Towards regulated competition in the Dutch medical market.

The previous two sessions of this Symposium have dealt with incentives for cost-effective provider behaviour. Although incentive-reimbursement, which rewards the providers for delivery medical care in a cost-effective way, can be an important step towards a cost-effective health care system, it is not rewards the providers for delivering medical care in a cost-effective way, can be an important step towards a cost-effective health care system, it is not sufficient. As long as the insured consumers have both comprehensive health insurance coverage and freedom of choice of provider, providers will have great difficulty in resisting consumers' demand for ever more costly medical care, and politicians or other decision-makers will have great difficulty in restricting capacity and in preventing overcapacity. Fear of losing patients or voters might dominate. Therefore, in this session we shall focus on the key role of health insurance in a cost-effective health care system and on consumer incentives and insurer behaviour. If the consumers have a choice between several provider-insurer organizations. Although market forces do play an important role in a competitive health-care system, competition should not be confused with a "free market". Besides financial arrangements to protect the poor, pro-competitive regulation is needed to guarantee a "fair competition". Currently there is much consensus that the present Dutch health insurance system, in which 60% of the population is publicly insured and 40% is privately insured, should be replaced by a national health insurance scheme, which uniformly applies to the entire population. A few years ago, I made a proposal for such a scheme, which was based largely on the ideas of Ellwood, McClure, and Enthoven on competition between alternative delivery systems. The main features of this proposal will be discussed. In my opinion, the long-term prospects for regulated competition in the Dutch medical market seem rather favourable.