The Influence of Limiting Instructions on Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence

Most jury instructions are issued after all the evidence has been presented in a trial; however, some are given during the trial. When gruesome photographs form part of the evidence in criminal culpability proceedings, the judge will usually instruct jurors to be dispassionate in examining the evidence. This study investigated whether time of presentation affects the ability of limiting instructions to cure the potentially prejudicial effects of gruesome photographic evidence by measuring the emotions, cognitions and verdicts of 108 mock jurors in a simulated murder trial. Pre-instructed participants processed evidence in the defendant's favour and rendered significantly fewer convictions than did post-instructed participants and those who received no limiting instructions. Gruesome photographs did not bias processing of other items in evidence or verdicts, although they elicited significantly greater victim compassion and crime negativity than did neutral photographs. Results suggest that jury instructions are more conducive to compliance when presented early in the evidence-processing task than when presented late.     

The Effects of Evidence,Coherence and Credentials on Jury Decision-Making in Child Sexual Abuse Trials

Expert testimony is being used increasingly in child sexual assault cases. This study extended a prior study that examined factors related to expert testimony (evidence strength, coherence and credentials of the expert) on ratings of guilt and overall verdict. Specifically, we replicated our prior study but with two modifications: we used community samples as opposed to university students, and participants made their decisions in groups of 12 (as in the case of juries where one decision represents the overall group) rather than having participants decide and submit their verdicts and guilt ratings individually. Consistent with the prior (less ecologically valid) study, credentials of the expert had negligible impact. Evidence that was high in strength elicited a relatively high guilt rating even when the testimony was low in coherence. Further, it appears that when participants deliberate in a group (as in the case of juries) they are more conservative in their judgements (i.e., they are less likely to give a guilty verdict) compared to individual jurors who make their decisions alone. These findings suggest that caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions about the generalisability of prior research findings where participants did not engage in group deliberation.     

The Effect on Mock-Juror Decision-Making of Power-of-Speech Within Eyewitness Testimony and Types of Scientific Evidence

This study examined whether manipulating power-of-speech within eyewitness testimony (EWT) and the type of scientific evidence (deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] or fingerprint) had an effect on mock-juror decision-making. A between-participants design was utilised with jury-eligible participants randomly assigned to one of eight online experimental conditions. Participants were presented with a scenario followed by one type of scientific evidence and EWT. After each piece of evidence, participants made judgements of the probability of defendant guilt, judgement confidence and evidence strength. Lastly, participants chose a verdict and, if applicable, a sentence length. It was found that although powerful EWT was rated as more indicative of guilt (and indeed stronger than powerless EWT), only scientific evidence type affected the final verdicts with DNA evidence being associated with a greater number of guilty verdicts. Results suggest a biasing effect of DNA that outweighs the effect of other types of evidence including EWT.     

Faces of glory: the left-cheek posing bias for medallists of Brazilian jiu-jitsu competitions

Laboratory studies have shown that people tend to show the left side of their face when asked to broadly express emotions, while they tend to show the right side when asked to hide emotions. Because emotions are expressed more intensely in the left side of the face, it is hypothesized that an individual’s intention to express or hide emotions biases the direction of lateral facial poses. The present study tested this hypothesis using photographic portraits of individuals experiencing emotional events in a naturalistic setting: the reception of medals in Brazilian jiu-jitsu competitions. Portrait photographs of Brazilian jiu-jitsu competitors were sourced online (N?=?460) and were rated by two independent raters in terms of posing direction, emotional expression, and medal colour. Gold and silver medallists showed their left cheeks to the camera for commemorative photographs taken immediately after the medal ceremony. Positive emotions were expressed more often for gold medallists than silver ones. The left-cheek posing bias observed in the present study supports the hypothesis that the intended purpose of expressing or hiding emotions determines the direction of lateral posing biases, and extends the laboratory findings to situations in the real world.     

The Impact of State and Trait Anger on Processing of Evidential Inconsistencies

The courtroom can be an emotional place, and these emotions may impact on a juror's ability to process and evaluate evidence. This study investigated the effects of mock-jurors’ state and trait anger on the detection of evidential inconsistencies. Community members eligible for jury duty (N = 123) were randomly assigned to hear one of four audio trials differing in evidence consistency and emotion-inducing content. State anger increased endorsement of guilty verdicts, and angry mock-jurors were more careful processors of evidence, detecting more inconsistencies and recalling significantly more trial details. The results lend support to motivational theories of emotional influence on information processing.     

Emotional processing in obsessive-compulsive disorder

The aim of the present study was to investigate whether there are differences in emotional processing among people with obsessive–compulsive disorder, using Lang's dimensional model of emotions. A total of 22 individuals with obsessive–compulsive disorder participated in the study and were compared to a control group (n = 25). All participants assessed a set of photographs with emotional content (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant, and with obsessive–compulsive content) using the Self-Assessment Manikin pictorial scales for rating emotional valence (pleasant/unpleasant), arousal (calm/aroused) and dominance (controlling/controlled). The results show significant differences in the processing of emotional images among individuals with obsessive–compulsive disorder and the high predictive value of dominance for diagnosis.     

When jurors’ moral judgments result in jury nullification: moral outrage at the law as a mediator of euthanasia attitudes on verdicts

In a mock-trial study, jurors read evidence about a doctor who had killed a terminally ill patient at the patient’s request. We tested whether instructing jurors about jury nullification (ie jurors’ power to return a not-guilty verdict even when legal guilt is beyond doubt, often because the law would result in unjust convictions) would exacerbate the effect of pre-trial euthanasia attitudes on their verdicts – compared to standard, pattern jury instructions. We also hypothesized that anti-euthanasia pre-trial attitudes would result in moral outrage at the defendant and higher conviction rates, but pro-euthanasia attitudes would prompt feelings of moral outrage at the law and lower conviction rates. Moderated mediation analyses revealed that nullification instructions bolstered the effect of attitudes on verdicts by encouraging jurors to rely on their feelings of moral outrage toward the defendant. Jurors’ moral outrage toward the law mediated the effect of attitudes on verdicts regardless of nullification instructions.     

CORONER'S VERDICTS IN THE ELDERLY: A SUICIDE OR AN OPEN VERDICT?

Objectives. To identify variables, other than legal definitions, that may have influenced North Cheshire's Coroner in returning a verdict of ‘suicide’ or an ‘open verdict’ on unexpected deaths of the elderly. Design. Retrospective review of all coroner's verdicts in North Cheshire during a 5-year period 1989–1993. Material. Forty-seven ‘suicide’ and ‘open verdict’ deaths in North Cheshire between 1989 and 1993 as defined in ICD classification ‘E’ codes E950–E959 and E980–E989, respectively, that were returned on the deceased aged 65 and above who died within North Cheshire. Findings. Logistic regression analysis suggests that the Coroner's decision may be influenced by: intimation of intent, psychiatric history and method of death. Sex of the deceased, history of attempted suicide, social setting and history of alcohol problems did not appear significantly associated with coroner's verdict. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Facial emotion recognition in schizophrenia: intensity effects and error pattern

OBJECTIVE: The authors used color photographs of emotional and neutral expressions to investigate recognition patterns of five universal emotions in schizophrenia. METHOD: Twenty-eight stable outpatients with schizophrenia (19 men and nine women) and 61 healthy subjects (29 men and 32 women) completed an emotion discrimination test that presented mild and extreme intensities of happy, sad, angry, fearful, disgusted, and neutral faces, balanced for gender and ethnicity. Analyses evaluated accuracy of identifying emotions as a function of intensity, diagnosis, and gender of poser and rater. RESULTS: Patients performed worse than comparison subjects on recognition of all emotions and neutral faces combined, including mild and extreme expressions. For specific emotions, patients performed worse on recognition of fearful, disgusted, and neutral expressions. For all emotions except disgust, recognition of extreme intensity was better than recognition of mild intensity. However, patients showed less benefit from increased intensity for all emotions combined, and the difference was most pronounced for fear. Thus, patients were more impaired than healthy comparison subjects in identifying high-intensity expressions, even though this was an easier task than identifying low-intensity expressions. In the comparison of patterns of errors, patients and healthy subjects differed only in misattributions of neutral expressions; patients overattributed disgusted expressions and underattributed happy expressions. CONCLUSIONS: Patients with schizophrenia were impaired in overall emotion recognition, particularly fear and disgust, and did not benefit from increased emotional intensity. Error patterns indicate that patients misidentified neutral cues as negatively valenced.     

The guilty but mentally ill verdict: a review and conceptual analysis of intent and impact

The purpose of this article is to review the law and literature involving the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict to provide a clear conceptual examination of the actual intent and impact of the verdict. Such an examination may help to clarify continuing debates and confusion about the nature of GBMI and its success in addressing perceived problems with insanity acquittals. This review suggests that the actual intentions of the GBMI verdict are associated with minimal and largely unsuccessful results. In addition, the typical absence of treatment for defendants found GBMI appears unsurprising given that the provision of treatment for mentally ill offenders is not a legal intention of the GBMI verdict. Finally, the introduction of the GBMI verdict has had unintended negative consequences that include increased confusion among jurors and the legal profession and possible increased occurrence of inappropriate verdicts. In conclusion, significant problems can be noted with regard to both the intent and impact of the GBMI verdict.     

Advanced Parkinson disease patients have impairment in prosody processing

Background: The ability to recognize and interpret emotions in others is a crucial prerequisite of adequate social behavior. Impairments in emotion processing have been reported from the early stages of Parkinson’s disease (PD). This study aims to characterize emotion recognition in advanced Parkinson’s disease (APD) candidates for deep-brain stimulation and to compare emotion recognition abilities in visual and auditory domains. Method: APD patients, defined as those with levodopa-induced motor complications (N = 42), and healthy controls (N = 43) matched by gender, age, and educational level, undertook the Comprehensive Affect Testing System (CATS), a battery that evaluates recognition of seven basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust, and neutral) on facial expressions and four emotions on prosody (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear). APD patients were assessed during the “ON” state. Group performance was compared with independent-samples t tests. Results: Compared to controls, APD had significantly lower scores on the discrimination and naming of emotions in prosody, and visual discrimination of neutral faces, but no significant differences in visual emotional tasks. Conclusion: The contrasting performance in emotional processing between visual and auditory stimuli suggests that APD candidates for surgery have either a selective difficulty in recognizing emotions in prosody or a general defect in prosody processing. Studies investigating early-stage PD, and the effect of subcortical lesions in prosody processing, favor the latter interpretation. Further research is needed to understand these deficits in emotional prosody recognition and their possible contribution to later behavioral or neuropsychiatric manifestations of PD.     

Impact of group training on emotion recognition in individuals with a learning disability

The present paper outlines the impact of group training on the emotion recognition of six individuals with a moderate learning disability. The accuracy of identifying emotions depicted by line drawings and photographs with and without an emotional context was examined before and after group training. The results indicated that there was a significant overall increase in accuracy in identifying emotions following group training. In addition, a significant increase was found in the ability to correctly label emotions depicted by line drawings typically used in symbol‐based communication systems. The implications of the results are discussed.     

What Evidence Matters to Jurors? The Prevalence and Importance of Different Homicide Trial Evidence to Mock Jurors

The present research explores how important different trial evidence is to mock jurors’ decisions. Study 1 surveys legal professionals to determine what evidence is common at homicide trials. Study 2 utilizes the list of evidence generated in Study 1 to ask mock jurors to report how important each piece of evidence would be in deciding their verdicts. The results indicate that DNA is most important to mock jurors, followed by fingerprints, the weapon, video records, crime-scene photos, gunshot residue, bodily secretions, video confession, testimony from a forensic expert, and eyewitness testimony. Study 3 utilizes a different methodology wherein mock jurors were presented with folders labeled with different evidence and asked to choose the piece of evidence they wanted to learn more about first, second, and so on. The results from Study 3 indicate again that DNA evidence is most important to mock jurors, followed by video confession evidence, eyewitness testimony, and fingerprint evidence. Implications are discussed.     

Jury decision-making: the impact of engagement and perceived threat on verdict decisions

The present study examined the role of political orientation and task engagement in juror decision-making. The study was conducted as a 2 (mode: laboratory versus online) × 2 (role: juror, observer) × 3 (evidence: admissible, inadmissible, control) between-subjects experiment, with participants (N?=?157) recruited from a mid-sized Australian university. Findings supported our predictions that political conservatism is associated with convictions, and that university students endorse a wide range of political orientations. Participants who were more engaged in the study perceived more threat in the defendant, and threat, in turn, led to higher conviction rates; furthermore, the effect of participation mode on verdict decisions was completely mediated by perceptions of the threat posed by the defendant. Findings are discussed in terms of their implications for jury decision-making research and its relevance to actual juror decisions.     

Verdict spotting: investigating the effects of juror bias,evidence anchors and verdict system in jurors

The Scottish verdict of not proven represents a second acquittal verdict which is not legally defined. Existing research into the influence of the not proven verdict on jury decision making is modest. The main aim of the current study was therefore to investigate the influence of verdict systems (two vs three) on juror decision making. The effect of pre-trial bias and evidence anchors on juror judgements were also examined. One-hundred and twenty-eight mock jurors listened to two homicide vignettes and were asked to rate their belief of guilt of the accused and to give a verdict in both trials. The results suggest that pre-trial bias was a significant predictor of both verdict choice and belief of guilt, whereas evidence anchors were not a significant predictor of either. Finally, both guilty and not guilty verdicts were given with increased frequency in the two-verdict system when compared to the three-verdict system. Key words: anchoring and adjustment, decision science, heuristics, juror decision-making, not proven verdict, pre-trial biases, verdict systems

The legal system’s principles were developed based on logical, philosophical ideas (Basu, 2006), such as everyone deserving the right to a fair trial. However, research has demonstrated that pre-existing biases and intuitive decision processes may have an effect on how jurors make decisions (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Estrada-Reynolds et al., 2015); thus, jurors may not be rational, fair agents. The incorporation of such bias within juror decision processes may undermine the legal system’s ability to provide justice to society. The current research therefore investigated the effects of pre-trial biases and initial evidence anchors (i.e. a piece of information that has a disproportionate influence on an individual’s decision processes) on juror decisions across different verdict-systems, with perceived ‘strong’ (e.g. DNA, forensic science evidence) versus ‘weak’ (e.g. ambiguous information, secondary confessions) evidence anchors (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996).In addition to legal principles, such as the right to a fair trial, two separate verdict systems have evolved in the UK. The Scottish legal system has three verdict options, allowing jurors to choose between giving a guilty, a not guilty or a not proven verdict. The unique not proven verdict has not been legally defined (Duff, 1999), but has the same legal implications as a not guilty verdict. However, it has been suggested by Curley et al. (2019) that the not proven verdict represents a belief from a juror that the accused/defendant is probably guilty but there was not enough evidence to convict. Further, a large study examining 969 Scottish jurors (see Ormston et al., 2019) demonstrated that there was confusion about how the not proven verdict differed from not guilty. The rest of the UK utilises a two-verdict system where only the verdicts of guilty and not guilty are available to jurors. Jurisdictions in the United States of America, New Zealand and Australia also utilise the two-verdict system that originated in England. Such differences across the nations of the UK means that it is difficult to generalise previous research on the effects of pre-trial biases from the Anglo-American system to the Scottish system.The current study therefore moves beyond individual juror characteristics and cognitive processes by also considering structural aspects of a trial: whether two-verdict versus three-verdict options would affect verdict decisions or considerations of guilt. The current study is, to the authors’ best knowledge, the first paper that investigates the effects of individual differences, cognitive structures and varying legal jurisdictions in unison.

Pre-trial biasesJuror judgements can be biased by extra-legal factors, such as previous experience of fictional forensic/legal television shows, a victim’s gender and a victim’s attractiveness (Maeder et al., 2015; Tyler, 2006; Williams et al., 2008). Previous research has found that pre-trial biases can be used to predict verdict choice in jurors (Lecci & Myers, 2008, 2009). Further, many models of juror decision-making – such as the information integration model (Ostrom et al., 1978), Bayesian models (Marshall & Wise, 1975) and the story model (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992) – have incorporated prior beliefs, since it is well documented that prior beliefs can have an impact on final juror judgements (Lecci & Myers, 2008).The story model has been the most dominant model in the juror decision-making literature for almost 30 years. This model suggests that jurors create narratives based on the evidence in a trial, pre-trial knowledge relating to similar crimes/trials and heuristic-based knowledge of what makes a story complete (Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Willmott et al., 2018). In addition, pre-trial biases can influence the stories that jurors create (Willmott et al., 2018). Jurors select a story based on certainty principles (coverage, coherence and uniqueness). Uniqueness will explain some of the juror’s confidence in their story, with jurors being less confident in stories that are not unique. Verdicts that best align with a story are then chosen (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992). Furthermore, pre-trial biases are likely to influence story construction and verdict outcome (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992; Willmott et al., 2018).The adversarial system of law may increase the influence that pre-trial biases have on jurors. This is because in the adversarial system, two different narratives are presented to the jury, thus creating an ambiguous decision context, where bias dominates (Arkes & Mellers, 2002; De La Fuente et al., 2003; Kaplan & Miller, 1978). Further, scientific evidence, legalese, the possibility of multiple charges (i.e. a defendant facing charges for both homicide and armed robbery) and different verdict systems make the courtroom a complex place for a juror (Greene & Loftus, 1985; Schklar & Diamond, 1999; Severance & Loftus, 1982). This complexity may reduce the cognitive effort that jurors are able or willing to provide, which may increase the likelihood of jurors relying on pre-trial biases when making a decision.One route to complexity within a jury trial lies in the comprehension and availability of different verdict choices. As previously mentioned, verdict options are not unified across the various legal systems in the UK, and the differences between seemingly similar verdict options are not always clear. Standard guidance for Scottish criminal procedure states that the not proven verdict’s meaning should not be defined or described to juries (Ormston et al., 2019). However, the not proven verdict does have the same legal consequences as the not guilty verdict (Ormston et al., 2019). Ambiguity relating to the definition of a verdict or the differences between verdicts may also increase the influence that pre-trial biases play in the courtroom. Currently, the majority of the research conducted on the effects that pre-trial biases have on juror verdicts have focused on the two-verdict system. This means it is currently unknown how pre-trial biases influence juror decisions in the Scottish three-verdict system.There are many possible factors that could lead to pre-trial biases. Rather than attempting to summarise or investigate every possible pre-trial bias, the current research will only utilise the pre-trial bias score as measured by the Lecci and Myers (2008) Pre-trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ); see Materials for discussion of the constructs in this questionnaire.Anchoring and adjustmentTversky and Kahneman (1974) were the first to study the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This heuristic occurs because human decision makers have limited cognitive capacity and tend to use initial pieces of information as anchors, particularly in complex environments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, decision makers do not sufficiently adjust from these anchors when integrating subsequent information in a decision-making process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This means that decision makers who use the anchoring and adjustment heuristic deviate from normative models of decision-making. Since the interpretation of novel cues is biased towards the initial anchor it is unlikely that a rational decision will be reached (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).Epley and Gilovich (2006) proposed that individuals use the anchoring and adjustment heuristic when the decision-making environment is uncertain. They suggested that in self-generated anchoring experiments, where the anchor is generated by the participants and not provided by the experimenter, individuals knew that the anchor they produced was incorrect, but they believed that their anchor was a good enough starting point (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Epley and Gilovich found that individuals who had a low cognitive load, and were therefore more able to process information efficiently, were able to adjust more suitably and to a greater extent from their existing anchors. This is because the less cognitive effort one is motivated or willing to expend on a certain task, the less likely one is to adjust rationally; thus, promoting heuristic and/or biased decision-making (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Simon, 1956).In a mock case where a woman sued her health-maintenance organisation for their potential involvement in her developing ovarian cancer, Chapman and Bornstein (1996) suggested that the anchoring and adjustment heuristic could be applied to juror decision-making. They found that the strength of an evidence anchor (i.e. a piece of evidence used as an anchor) had an impact on liability judgements made during the case. Jurors who were shown strong evidence anchors (high chance of prescribed pill causing cancer) were more likely to perceive the defendant as liable than those shown weak evidence anchors (low chance of prescribed pill causing cancer). Jurors who were shown strong evidence anchors also perceived the defendant to be more to blame for the plaintiff’s injuries. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic has also been shown to influence both judges and jurors when estimating financial penalties in civil cases (Greene & Bornstein, 2003, 2013; Guthrie et al., 2002; Orr & Guthrie, 2005). The current study therefore extends on the research of Chapman and Bornstein by testing whether evidence anchors (strong-first vs. weak-first) influence juror decision-making in criminal trials.Three- versus two-verdict systemScotland’s three-verdict system, with its additional verdict of not proven, originated in the 18^th century (Barbato, 2004). This verdict system came to be as in the late 17th century Scottish jurors were only allowed to find individual factual allegations proven or not proven rather than to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, which was a question for the judge to answer based on those findings (Barbato, 2004). However, in the 18^th century, jurors were allowed, once more, to give verdicts that indicated the guilt (guilty and not guilty) of the accused. Despite the reintroduction of guilty and not guilty verdicts, the not proven verdict came to be used by jurors as a general verdict (Barbato, 2004), thus birthing the Scottish three-verdict system.Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the not proven verdict, in 2015–2016, of the 7806 people acquitted in Scottish courts 1173 were given the not proven verdict (Scottish Government, 2021). Scepticism towards the not proven verdict has lasted for centuries, with Sir Walter Scott christening the not proven verdict as ‘the bastard verdict’ because of its lack of legitimacy. More recently, Miss M (who successfully sued a man after a criminal trial found him not proven of rape) has been campaigning for the removal of the not proven verdict (BBC News, 2019). Her campaign was based on the fact that the not proven verdict is used disproportionately often in rape trials (Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2011). One reasoning for this may be that the availability of two acquittal verdicts may increase the chances of truly guilty individuals being acquitted (Rape Crisis Scotland, 2019).Four previous publications/reports have investigated the effects that the not proven verdict may have on juror/jury decision-making in an attempt to understand how jurors interpret said verdict. Research has shown that the availability of the not proven verdict is likely to influence the frequency by which guilty and not guilty verdicts are given. Smithson et al. (2007) found in murder trials that the introduction of the not proven verdict decreased the number of not guilty verdicts given. Since the Smithson et al. study, Hope et al. (2008) and Curley et al. (2019) have found similar results in sexual assault and murder trials, respectively. Further, there seems to be consensus in the literature that the not proven verdict decreases the number of not guilty verdicts given by jurors. Ormston et al. (2019) found that the availability of the not proven verdict led to a significantly lower number of guilty verdicts being given by jurors in physical assault trials. Such effects have not been seen as consistently, but the findings of Ormston et al. may have emerged because of the more realistic nature of the trial stimuli they used when compared to those in previous experimental investigations. Furthermore, research has shown that the structure of the legal environment (number of verdicts available) may influence the verdict choices of jurors (Ormston et al., 2019).The way that jurors interpret the not proven verdict may be a key factor that influences juror decisions and consequently affects the frequency at which not guilty and guilty verdicts are made. Jurors seem to interpret the not proven verdict as a middling verdict, where they may perceive the accused as guilty but are not sure beyond reasonable doubt (Curley et al., 2019, 2021). Therefore, jurors who are just shy of reasonable doubt in a two-verdict system may be forced to return a not guilty verdict, but in Scotland, they can show their scepticism relating to the innocence of the accused and the Crown’s case through returning a not proven verdict (Jackson, 1998). This reasoning may, therefore, explain why the availability of the not proven verdict may reduce the number of not guilty verdicts that jurors return. Further, research suggests that accused individuals who are given the not proven (over a not guilty) verdict are likely to face worse social sanctions in the community (Hope et al., 2008), highlighting the importance of testing the influence of the three-verdict system on not guilty verdict returns.Legal professionals may view legal standards such as beyond reasonable doubt as objective benchmarks, meaning that conviction frequencies should not be influenced by the number of acquittal verdicts that are available (one versus two; Hope et al., 2008; Jackson, 1998). However, there are a number of reasons that can be given for the findings of Ormston et al. (2019; i.e. fewer guilty verdicts in a three-verdict system). First, the option of not proven may direct the attention of jurors to the potential weaknesses of the evidence presented (Hope et al., 2008; McKenzie, 1985); there is more focus on the proof provided rather than on the factual guilt of the accused (Jackson, 1998). Second, due to the asymmetric dominance effect, jurors may give fewer guilty verdicts as the addition of another option (i.e. adding a not proven verdict to a guilty and not guilty verdict set) may ‘increase the proportion of alternative choices from the original set’ (Hope et al., 2008, p. 242). Finally, the three-verdict system may trigger a compromise effect (Hope et al., 2008; Simonson & Tversky, 1992), whereby the existence of the not proven verdict makes jurors perceive guilty and not guilty verdicts as exaggerated extremes, and the not proven verdict as a realistic option in the middle (i.e. a compromise). This compromise effect may then decrease the chances of jurors choosing guilty or not guilty verdicts when compared to jurors who do not have the not proven verdict available to them (Hope et al., 2008). This potential reduction in convictions has been cited by Hope et al. (2008) as a potential positive as it may decrease the chances of jurors picking incorrect guilty verdicts, and thus saving the Crown financially in relation to compensation claims.In addition, Ormston et al. (2019) found that the availability of the not proven verdict did not significantly influence other factors such as (a) deliberation length, (b) juror participation, (c) accuracy of legal issue discussions and (d) the number of issues raised relating to the evidence. Furthermore, the influence that the not proven verdict may have on juror decision-making may be context- and crime-type dependent.Previous investigations on juror decision-making in Scotland have focused mostly on Scottish specific issues (e.g. not proven verdict) and largely ignored factors that influence jurors all over the world (e.g. pre-trial biases). Further, in previous mock juror studies conducted in Scotland, the Scottish not proven verdict and its effects on juror/jury decision processes has been studied either on its own or alongside other unique aspects of Scots law (e.g. 15-person jury). Commonly studied factors that may influence juror decision-making (i.e. pre-trial biases) are therefore typically removed from experimental investigations of Scottish juror decisions. Therefore, the current study aims to add to the handful of publications that exist in the literature by investigating how pre-trial bias influences jurors in both the two- and three-verdict systems.Research aims and questionsThe aim of this research is to investigate how pre-trial biases, evidence anchors and verdict systems influence juror perceptions of the defendant/accused and decision outcomes. Juror perceptions of the defendant were measured by collecting likelihood of guilt scores after the presentation of each piece of information using a visual analogue scale (see Figure 1). Decision outcomes were measured through asking participants to state their final verdict once they had heard all of the evidence.Open in a separate windowFigure 1.Visual analogue scale measuring the belief in guilt score.HypothesesThe hypotheses were:

H₁. Pre-trial bias will be a significant predictor of the verdict that is given.The more biased towards the prosecution jurors are, the more likely they will be to give a guilty verdict.H₂. Evidence anchor will be a significant predictor of the verdict that is given. Strong-first evidence anchors will lead to a higher frequency of guilty verdicts. H₃. Verdict systems will be a significant predictor of the verdict that is given. The two-verdict system will lead to a higher frequency of not guilty verdicts. This hypothesis is derived from the majority of the literature suggesting that the availability of the not proven verdict significantly reduces the frequency by which the not guilty verdict is given (similar findings have not been as consistent with guilty verdicts). H₄. Pre-trial bias will be a significant predictor of the final belief of guilt score.The more biased towards the prosecution jurors are, the higher the final belief of guilt score will be.H_5. Evidence anchor will be a significant predictor of the final belief of guilt score.Strong first evidence anchors will lead to higher final belief of guilt scores.

No hypotheses were generated for potential interactions between verdict system, pre-trial bias and evidence anchors, since no such interactions have been observed in previous research.     

Effects of lesion variables and emotion type on the perception of facial emotion.

The purpose of this study was to consider the effects of valence, motoric direction (i.e., approach/withdrawal), and arousal on the perception of facial emotion in patients with unilateral cortical lesions. We also examined the influence of lesion side, site, and size on emotional perception. Subjects were 30 right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) and 30 left-hemisphere-damaged (LHD) male patients with focal lesions restricted primarily to the frontal, temporal, or parietal lobe. Patient groups were comparable on demographic and clinical neurological variables. Subjects were tested for their ability to match photographs of four facial emotional expressions: happiness, sadness, fear, and anger. Overall, RHD patients were significantly more impaired than LHD patients in perceiving facial emotion. Lesion side, but not site, was associated with motoric direction and valence dimensions. RHD patients had specific deficits relative to LHD patients in processing negative and withdrawal emotions; there were no group differences for positive/approach emotions. Lesion size was not significantly correlated with accuracy of emotional perception.     

Juror knowledge and attitudes regarding mental illness verdicts

We begin with a brief overview of the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) and Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdicts in the United States and then report on a study of qualified jurors (n=96) in which we examined jurors' understanding and attitudes about mental illness verdicts and the disposition of mentally ill defendants. Results indicate that although the jury pool was highly educated, only 4.2 percent of jurors could correctly identify both the definitions and dispositions of defendants found NGRI and GBMI. Jurors with lower educational levels were less likely to identify the dispositional outcome of a GBMI verdict (p<.05). Eighty-four percent of respondents believed that juries should be informed of dispositional outcome before deciding a verdict. Also, 68.4 percent of jurors erroneously believed that a defendant found GBMI could not receive the death penalty. Among jurors who correctly identified the definition of GBMI, those with lower educational levels were more punitive in their attitudes toward disposition of the GBMI defendants, believing they should eventually be sent to prison (p<.05).