Are those who subscribe to the view that early embryos are persons irrational and inconsistent? A reply to Brock

Dan Brock has asserted that those who claim that the early embryo has full moral status are not consistent, and that the rationality of such a position is dubious when it is adopted from a religious perspective. I argue that both claims are flawed. Starting with the second claim, which is grounded in Brock's moral abstolutist position, I argue that Brock has provided no argument on why the religious position should be less rational than the secular position. With regard to the first claim, I argue that those who hold the view that the early embryo has full moral status can be consistent even if they do not oppose sexual reproduction, even if they do not grieve as much over the loss of embryos as over the loss of other humans, even if they prefer to save one child instead of 100 embryos in the event of fire, and even if they do not accept racism and sexism.     

体外受精——胚胎移植中剩余胚胎去向的伦理思考

随着体外受精-胚胎移植技术不断发展和普及推广,在技术应用过程中出现了大量的剩余胚胎。剩余胚胎的去向日益成为医疗机构面临的一个亟须关心的问题,对剩余胚胎如何处置引发了一系列伦理和法律方面的争议。从生命伦理学角度出发,阐述了剩余胚胎的产生和去向,并就剩余胚胎处置中涉及的伦理和法律问题进行了分析和探讨。     

Creating and sacrificing embryos for stem cells

The compromise position that accepts the use and derivation of stem cells from spare in vitro fertilisation embryos but opposes the creation of embryos for these purposes is a very weak ethical position. This paper argues that whatever the basis is on which defenders of this viewpoint accord intrinsic value to the embryo, once they accept the creation and sacrifice of embryos to benefit infertile people with a child-wish, they do not have a sound moral argument to condemn the creation and sacrifice of embryos to benefit ill and injured people.     

俗世生命伦理视域下对胚胎道德地位之本土化辨析

西方社会主要是围绕人类和位格人的关系对人类胚胎道德地位进行讨论。在中国本土化语境下，胚胎不是真正意义上的人，人工流产可以得到辩护，但考虑其潜能性和关系性价值，胚胎具有有限的道德地位。在对待胚胎问题上，不是通过强调胚胎的道德地位来保护胚胎，而是采用人道主义的角度去尊重胚胎，对人工流产进行合适的控制。     

Human embryonic stem cell research debates: a confucian argument

Human embryonic stem cell research can bring about major biomedical breakthroughs and thus contribute enormously to human welfare, yet it raises serious moral problems because it involves using human embryos for experiment. The "moral status of the human embryo" remains the core of such debates. Three different positions regarding the moral status of the human embryo can be categorised: the "all" position, the "none" position, and the "gradualist" position.The author proposes that the "gradualist" position is more plausible than the other two positions. Confucius's moral principle of jen, which proposes a unique theory of "love of gradation", and the principle of yi, which advocates "due treatment for persons", are then explored. The author then argues that our moral obligations to do good to other living organisms, persons, and our families are different.Putting together the "gradualist" position on the human embryo, and Confucius's theories of "love of gradation" and "due treatment for persons", the author concludes that the early embryo has less ethical significance than the later fetus and adult human. The moral obligation we have toward persons is clearer and stronger than that which we have toward human embryos. Embryo research is justifiable if it brings enormous welfare to human persons that cannot be otherwise achieved. The "love of gradation" requires us, however, to extend love and respect towards other entities according to their different status. We should therefore be very cautious in using human embryos for research, acknowledging the gradualist nature of their moral status.     

Stem cell research on other worlds, or why embryos do not have a right to life

Anxieties about the creation and destruction of human embryos for the purpose of scientific research on embryonic stem cells have given a new urgency to the question of whether embryos have moral rights. This article uses a thought experiment involving two possible worlds, somewhat removed from our own in the space of possibilities, to shed light on whether early embryos have such rights as a right not to be destroyed or discarded (a "right to life"). It is argued that early embryos do not have meaningful interests or any moral rights. Accordingly, claims about the moral rights of embryos do not justify restrictions on stem cell research.     

Fertilisation and moral status: a scientific perspective.

The debate about the moral status of the embryo has gained new impetus because of the advances in reproductive technology that have made early human embryo experimentation a possibility, and because of the public concern that this arouses. Several philosophical arguments claiming that fertilisation is the event that accords moral status to the embryo were initially formulated in the context of the abortion debate. Were they formulated with sufficient precision to account for the scientific facts as we now understand them? Or do these arguments need modification? Aspects of three arguments for moral status being acquired at fertilisation are examined in relation to current scientific knowledge, highlighting the reasons why such arguments, at present, seem to provide an inadequate basis for the determination of moral status.     

Ethical and legal issues in therapeutic cloning and the study of stem cells

Therapeutic cloning is a new technology with great medical potential, particularly in the area of transplantation medicine. It involves the transfer of the nucleus of a patient's cell into an enucleated donor oocyte for the purpose of generating an embryo. This embryo is allowed to grow until the blastocyst stage, at which time stem cells can be obtained and differentiated into the tissue needed. Stem cells can also be obtained from adult tissues, as they seem to have sufficient plasticity to use for the stated purpose. A literature review was performed, and it is clear that the main controversy regarding the use of stem cells is the origin. Few people would object to their use if obtained from adult tissues; however, many oppose harvesting them from embryos in the blastocyst stage regardless of whether 1) they are obtained from surplus embryos donated by couples after assisted reproductive techniques, or 2) they are specially manufactured for research purposes. The central reason is the consideration that embryos should be treated as full humans from the moment of fertilization. This argument is also at the bottom of an older discussion regarding the validity of abortion. There is no consensus at the present time in this regard, and it is unlikely one will be forthcoming in the future. Arguments on both sides of the issue are presented, but emphasis is made on the need for using this technology for research purposes because of its potential value as a therapeutic tool.     

Ethics and embryos.

In this paper we argue that the human form should be seen to exist, in a longitudinal way, throughout the continuum of human growth and development. This entails that the moral value of that form, which we link analytically to the adult, interacting, social and rational being, attaches to all phases of human life to some extent. Having established this we discuss the consequences it has for the moral status of the human embryo. We then apply this argument, and the resulting moral status, to the area of reproductive technology. In doing this we show that there are certain regulations and controls which ought to apply to the use of these infertility treatments.     

Research on human embryos--a justification.

The philosophical debate surrounding the moral status of the embryo has reached the public arena. The author of this paper examines some of the common arguments against embryo experimentation, including an influential article by Professor Ian Kennedy. He concludes that these arguments do not succeed in demonstrating that the intentional creation of embryos for research purposes is wrong, unless they also succeed in demonstrating that contemporary liberal abortion laws are also wrong. The author also criticises the conclusions of the Warnock Report, and suggests that the reasons for permitting embryo research must be given a wider public audience.     

The human embryo in the Christian tradition: a reconsideration

Recent claims that the Christian tradition justifies destructive research on human embryos have drawn upon an article by the late Professor Gordon Dunstan which appeared in this journal in 1984. Despite its undoubted influence, this article was flawed and seriously misrepresented the tradition of Christian reflection on the moral status of the human embryo.     

The person, the soul, and genetic engineering

Argument about the ethical possibility of the therapeutic use of embryonic stem cells depends critically on the evaluation of the moral status of the very early embryo. Some assert that at the blastocyst stage it is only potentially human, not yet possessing the full ethical status of personhood, while others assert that from its formation the embryo possesses all the moral rights of a human person. It is shown that a decision on this issue is closely related to how human nature is to be understood. The idea of a person as a dual combination of body and spirit correlates naturally with the assertion of absolute personhood from conception, while an idea of human psychosomatic unity encourages a development picture in which the embryo only grows gradually into personhood. The latter view is seen to be encouraged by new advances in science which emphasise the importance of the concept of information in the discussion of complex systems. Other ethical issues related to human genetics are also briefly reviewed.     

The Warnock report

Warnock's article is based on a lecture she delivered at a St. Catherine's College seminar, and Gaffin summarizes the discussion that followed. Warnock focuses on the second part of the report of the committee she chaired, namely the recommendations to the British government regarding limits to and statutory regulation of research on human embryos. She summarizes the arguments of the proponents and opponents, centering on the moral status of the embryo, the benefits to medicine of embryo research, and the possible erosion of the constraints recommended by the committee. The audience discussion revealed concerns about the status of the embryo and the danger that public suspicion of scientific research could result in support for proposed legislation that would prohibit all research on embryos and in vitro fertilization.     

Informed consent for stem cell research in the public sector

Asking progenitors of spare embryos to donate them for use in stem cell research presents a number of complex issues, especially given the general lack of regulation of fertility medicine and the lack of public consensus on the moral status of the embryo. Particular issues include the timing of the request for donation and whether both men and women must always give consent for the use of their embryos for research. If thoughtful attention is given to these matters, there need be no ethical impediment to requesting the use of spare embryos for stem cell research.     

Deprivations, futures and the wrongness of killing.

In my essay, Why abortion is immoral, I criticised discussions of the morality of abortion in which the crucial issue is whether fetuses are human beings or whether fetuses are persons. Both argument strategies are inadequate because they rely on indefensible assumptions. Why should being a human being or being a person make a moral difference? I argued that the correct account of the morality of abortion should be based upon a defensible account of why killing children and adults is wrong. I claimed that what makes killing us wrong is that our premature deaths deprive us of our futures of value, that is, the goods of life we would have experienced had we survived. This account of the wrongness of killing explains why killing is one of the worst of crimes and how killing greatly harms the victim. It coheres with the attitudes of those with cancer or HIV facing premature death. It explains why we believe it is wrong to kill infants (as personhood theories do not). It does not entail that it wrongs a human being to end her life if she is in persistent vegetative state or if her future must consist only of unbearable physical suffering and she wants to die (as sanctity of human life theories do not). This account of the wrongness of killing implies (with some defensible additional assumptions) that abortion is immoral because we were fetuses once and we know those fetuses had futures of value. Mark Brown claims that this potential future of value account is unsound because it implies that we have welfare rights to what we need to stay alive that most people would reject. I argue that Brown is incorrect in two ways: a welfare right to what we need to stay alive is not directly implied by my account and, in addition, most of us do believe that dependent human beings have substantial welfare rights to what they need to stay alive. Brown argues that depriving us of a future of value of which we have mental representations both is a better explanation of the wrongness of killing and does not imply that abortion is immoral. I reply that (a) if Brown's arguments against my view were sound, those arguments could be easily adapted to show that his view is unsound as well and (b) Brown's view is both ambiguous and unsound on any interpretation. The most popular class of pro-choice argument strategies appeals to the view that some or all fetuses lack either a mental state or function or a capacity for a mental state or function necessary for possession of the right to life. Desires, interests, sentience, various concepts, moral agency, and rationality have all been suggested as candidates for this crucial mental role. Brown's analysis is one member of this class of strategies. I believe that it is possible to show that none of these strategies is reasonable. However, there are so many of these strategies that the required argument demands something more like a book and less like a short essay. The argument of the following essay is a piece of this larger argument.     

Medical futility and physician discretion

Some patients have no chance of surviving if not treated, but very little chance if treated. A number of medical ethicists and physicians have argued that treatment in such cases is medically futile and a matter of physician discretion. This paper critically examines that position. According to Howard Brody and others, a judgment of medical futility is a purely technical matter, which physicians are uniquely qualified to make. Although Brody later retracted these claims, he held to the view that physicians need not consult the patient or his family to determine their values before deciding not to treat. This is because professional integrity dictates that treatment should not be undertaken. The argument for this claim is that medicine is a profession and a social practice, and thus capable of breaches of professional integrity. Underlying professional integrity are two moral principles, one concerning harm, the other fraud. According to Brody both point to the fact that when the odds of survival are very low treatment is a violation of professional integrity. The details of this skeletal argument are exposed and explained, and the full argument is criticised. On a number of counts, it is found wanting. If anything, professional integrity points to the opposite conclusion.     

The moral status of embryos.

In a recent discussion of human in vitro fertilisation, Kuhse and Singer argue that it is legitimate to destroy unwanted embryos. Their argument fails: it involves at least two and possibly three logical fallacies. If the destruction of embryos is to be justified an alternative argument will have to be found.     

How reproductive and regenerative medicine meet in a Chinese fertility clinic. Interviews with women about the donation of embryos to stem cell research

The social interface between reproductive medicine and embryonic stem cell research has been investigated in a pilot study at a large IVF clinic in central China. Methods included observation, interviews with hospital personnel, and five in-depth qualitative interviews with women who underwent IVF and who were asked for their consent to the donation of embryos for use in medical (in fact human embryonic stem cell) research. This paper reports, and discusses from an ethical perspective, the results of an analysis of these interviews. The participants talked of extreme social pressure to become pregnant. Once they had a baby, 'spare' embryos lost practical significance due to the Chinese one-child policy. In the context of decision making about donating embryos to research, the women used the clinical distinctions between 'good and bad quality' embryos and also between frozen and transferred embryos, as guiding moral distinctions. In the absence of concrete information about what sort of research their embryos should be used for, the women interviewed either refused consent (for fear that the embryo would be given to another couple) or accepted, expressing motives of solidarity with other women in a similar situation. This reveals that they filled the knowledge gap with an image of research improving fertility treatment.     

A future like ours revisited

It is claimed by the future like ours anti-abortion argument that since killing adult humans is wrong because it deprives them of a future of value and the fetus has a future of value, killing fetuses is wrong in the same way that killing adult human beings is wrong. In The morality of abortion and the deprivation of futures (this journal, April 2000) I argued that the persuasive power of this argument rests upon an equivocation on the term "future of value". If the expression means "a potential future of value" then the moral claim is implausible because people do not in general have rights to what they need to fulfill their potential; if the expression means "self-represented future of value" then the argument fails because the fetus does not represent its future. Under no interpretation is the argument sound. In Deprivations, futures and the wrongness of killing (this journal, December 2001) Donald Marquis, author of the future like ours argument, responds at length to this objection. In the present essay the focus of the debate shifts to the proper interpretation of the right not to be killed. Donald Marquis argues that this liberty right entails the welfare right to the means necessary to sustain life; I argue that the right not to be killed does not entail unlimited welfare rights. On Marquis's view, the right not to be killed confers upon the fetus the right to whatever it takes to sustain life; on the view I defend, the right not to be killed does not confer upon the fetus or anyone else the right to another person's body. On Marquis's view, abortion is almost never permissible; on my view abortion is almost always permissible.     

通过小鼠动情期的确定制作含有早胚石蜡切片

目的：采用石蜡切片技术制作早期胚胎切片模型。方法：根据阴道脱落细胞检测法确定动情期最佳受孕时间,通过体内受精方法获得小鼠早期胚胎,采用石蜡切片技术制作早期胚胎切片模型。结果：将受孕小鼠断颈处死取各期胚胎,制作含有早胚石蜡切片。结论：本实验组为进一步对早期胚胎发育的研究提供了技术基础。