Life insurance and genetic tests: Risks for insurers and society

The uncertainties surrounding the rapid advances being made in genetic testing and its subsequent use in the life insurance underwriting process has caused much consternation and apprehension throughout society and the insurance industry in recent years. The diagnostic and predictive power of genetic testing has introduced a new variable for insurers to select and classify applicants for life insurance. However, such use by insurers present many complex social, ethical and regulatory questions. This paper explores life insurers' use of genetic test results and the consequences for insurers should they be denied access to this actuarially relevant material. In addition, the risks posed for society from insurers' use of this information is analysed from the results of a survey and case study conducted in the Republic of Ireland in 2007. Given that the future use of genetic test results by life insurance companies depends heavily on public acceptance, it is important to understand reactions of the public, in relation to their risk perception and acceptance of this particular commercial use of genetic testing. To conclude, the paper briefly explores general international reaction to the risks posed by the use of genetic test results in underwriting life insurance applicants.     

Genetic testing and genetic discrimination: Public policy when insurance becomes “too expensive”

We examine public policy toward the use of genetic tests by insurers when a positive test makes actuarially fair insurance too expensive for some consumers. With state-dependent utility, consumers may decline actuarially fair insurance if the probability of becoming ill exceeds a threshold. In markets with adverse selection, a positive genetic test may cause all or some high risks to drop out of the market (complete and partial genetic discrimination, respectively). Full participation in the market by all consumers requires cross-subsidization. We show that the consent law and mandatory testing are equivalent. Under complete genetic discrimination, the duty to disclose is never Pareto dominated, but either the code of conduct or consent law can yield the same outcome. Under partial genetic discrimination, the duty to disclose is never Pareto dominated. However, partial genetic discrimination and cross-subsidization imply the information ban is noncomparable to the other policy alternatives.     

Supplementary insurance as a switching cost for basic health insurance: Empirical results from the Netherlands

Nearly everyone with a supplementary insurance (SI) in the Netherlands takes out the voluntary SI and the mandatory basic insurance (BI) from the same health insurer. Previous studies show that many high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost for BI. Because consumers’ current insurer provides them with a guaranteed renewability, SI is a switching cost if insurers apply selective underwriting to new applicants. Several changes in the Dutch health insurance market increased insurers’ incentives to counteract adverse selection for SI. Tools to do so are not only selective underwriting, but also risk rating and product differentiation. If all insurers use the latter tools without selective underwriting, SI is not a switching cost for BI. We investigated to what extent insurers used these tools in the periods 2006–2009 and 2014–2015. Only a few insurers applied selective underwriting: in 2015, 86% of insurers used open enrolment for all their SI products, and the other 14% did use open enrolment for their most common SI products. As measured by our indicators, the proportion of insurers applying risk rating or product differentiation did not increase in the periods considered. Due to the fear of reputation loss insurers may have used ‘less visible’ tools to counteract adverse selection that are indirect forms of risk rating and product differentiation and do not result in switching costs. So, although many high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost, most insurers apply open enrolment for SI. By providing information to high-risks about their switching opportunities, the government could increase consumer choice and thereby insurers’ incentives to invest in high-quality care for high-risks.     

Theory of health insurance

The conventional explanation for purchasing insurance is to transfer risk. Psychologists, however, have shown that this explanation does not match actual behavior. They find that people generally prefer the risk of no loss at all to the certainty of a smaller actuarially equivalent loss, a situation exactly opposite to the one represented by the purchase of insurance. Nevertheless, people do purchase insurance, so there must be an explanation other than risk transfer for purchasing it. Of the explanations so far advanced, however, none have yet developed a wide acceptance. Regardless of risk issues, people will be more likely to purchase insurance when the premium is low compared to the value of the coverage to the consumer. Moral hazard raises the premium, as does adverse selection. The presence of either makes the purchase of insurance less likely. With health insurance, the tax subsidy can reduce the effective premium to less than the actuarially fair cost of insurance. This would increase the likelihood that health insurance is purchased. Finally, because of the value we place on our health, we desire access to a full range of health care. Health insurance is often the only affordable way of gaining access to this care, given the high costs of many of these procedures.     

Spillover effects of supplementary on basic health insurance: evidence from the Netherlands

Like many other countries, the Netherlands has a health insurance system that combines mandatory basic insurance with voluntary supplementary insurance. Both types of insurance are founded on different principles. Since basic and supplementary insurance are sold by the same health insurers, both markets may interact. This paper examines to what extent basic and supplementary insurance are linked to each other and whether these links generate spillover effects of supplementary on basic insurance. Our analysis is based on an investigation into supplementary health insurance contracts, underwriting procedures and annual surveys among 1,700–2,100 respondents over the period 2006–2009. We find that health insurers increasingly use a variety of strategies to enforce a joint purchase of basic and supplementary health insurance. Despite incentives for health insurers to use supplementary insurance as a tool for risk selection in basic insurance, we find limited evidence of supplementary insurance being used this way. Only a minority of health insurers uses health questionnaires when people apply for supplementary coverage. Nevertheless, we find that an increasing proportion of high-risk individuals believe that insurers would not be willing to offer them another supplementary insurance contract. We discuss several strategies to prevent or to counteract the observed negative spillover effects of supplementary insurance.     

Premiums without benefits: waste and inefficiency in the commercial health insurance industry

The U.S. system of health insurance is wasteful and inefficient. For every dollar the commercial health insurance industry paid in claims in 1988, the industry spent 33.5 cents for administration, marketing, and other overhead expenses. Thus, not including profits, the commercial insurance industry spent 14 times as much on administration, overhead, and marketing per dollar of claims paid as did the Medicare system, and 11 times as much per dollar of claims paid as the Canadian national health system. Had an efficient public program such as Medicare or the Canadian system provided the same amount of benefits, consumers and businesses served by commercial insurers would have saved $13 billion. The sources of waste include excessive marketing costs and administrative costs bloated by discriminatory underwriting practices that segregate the profitable groups and individuals--people who are healthy, young, and in "safe" professions--from everyone else.     

Examining the existence of the underwriting cycle in managed care organizations

This article examines the existence of the underwriting or profitability cycle in the health insurance industry. Researchers have reported that a six-year cycle exists for health care insurers. That is, three years of profits then are followed by three years of losses. This article suggests that insurers react more quickly to losses and adjust their cost structures almost immediately. Health insurers react to both expected changes and current increases in the payoff ratio.     

More than half of individual health plans offer coverage that falls short of what can be sold through exchanges as of 2014

The Affordable Care Act creates state-based health exchanges that will begin acting as a market place for health insurance plans and consumers in 2014. This paper compares the financial protection offered by today's group and individual plans with the standards that will apply to insurance sold in state-based exchanges. Some states may apply these standards to all health insurance sold within the state. More than half of Americans who had individual insurance in 2010 were enrolled in plans that would not qualify as providing essential coverage under the rules of the exchanges in 2014. These people were enrolled in plans with an actuarial value below 60 percent, which means that the plans covered less than that proportion of the enrollees' health expenses. Many of today's individual health plans are below the "bronze" level, the lowest level of plan that can be sold through exchanges. In contrast, most group plans in 2010 had an actuarial benefit of 80-89 percent and would qualify as highly rated "gold" plans in the exchanges. To sell to ten million new buyers on the exchanges, insurers will need to redesign benefit packages. Combined with a ban on medical underwriting, the individual insurance market in a post-health reform world will sharply contrast with the market of past decades.     

Medical care use and selection in a social health insurance with an equalization fund: evidence from Colombia

This paper studies the relationship between health status and insurance participation, and between insurance status and medical use in the context of a social health insurance with an equalization fund (SHIEF). Under this system, revenues from a mandatory payroll tax are collected into a single pool (equalization fund) that reimburses for-profit insurance companies according to a capitated formula. Although competition should induce insurers to control costs without reducing the quality of service necessary to attract consumers, limitations in the capitation formula might induce insurers to select against bad risks, and limitations in the contribution system might induce more healthy individuals to evade enrollment. A three-equation model having social health insurance, private health insurance, and using medical services is estimated using a 1997 Colombian household survey. Consistent with similar studies, participation in SHIEF increases medical care use. On the other hand, the evidence on selection is somewhat mixed: individuals who report good health status are more likely to participate in SHIEF, while those without a chronic condition are less likely to participate in SHIEF.     

Universal access to health care: a practical perspective

Policy disconnected from economic reality is bad policy. Neither government financed health insurance nor an employer mandated health insurance approach are in the national interest. Higher national priorities compel a reallocation of resources from consumption to investment. This need not, however, cause an abandonment of efforts to deal with the problems of the uninsured and other health reforms. Successful health care reform is achievable provided it is responsive to higher priorities for economic growth. A strong economy and the production of wealth are indispensable to economic justice. Toward this end, a program of universal access is proposed whereby families and individuals are required to pay for their own health insurance up to a fixed percentage of disposable personal income before public payments kick in. Government's chief role is to establish a standard package of cost-effective benefits to be offered by all insurance carriers, the cost of which is approximately 40 percent less than conventional insurance coverage because of the elimination of reimbursement for clinically non-efficacious and cost-ineffective services. Public financing is relegated to a residual role in which subsidies are targeted on the needy. Much of the momentum for cost control is transferred to consumers and private insurers, both of whom acquire a vested interest in obtaining value for money. Uniform rules for underwriting, eligibility, and enrollment practices guard against socially harmful practices such as experience rating and exclusion of preexisting conditions. The household responsibility and equity plan described herein could free up as much as $90 billion or more for public investment in economic growth and national debt reduction while assuring access to health care regardless of ability to pay. Economic revitalization will be assisted by changes in household savings. With health care no longer a free good and government social programs concentrated on the truly needy, individual propensity to save will increase, thereby enlarging the pool of capital for financing investments in economic growth. Putting more responsibility for health care financing on households with an ability to pay also serves to reinforce and expand the work ethic. Privatizing responsibility by severing health insurance from the workplace connection improves the geographic and occupational mobility of labor, diminishes employer tendencies to discriminate against hiring the disabled and older employees, and eliminates a major source of labor unrest.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Deductibles in health insurance: can the actuarially fair premium reduction exceed the deductible?

The actuarially fair premium reduction in case of a deductible relative to full insurance is affected by: (1) out-of-pocket payments, (2) moral hazard, (3) administrative costs, and, in case of a voluntary deductible, (4) adverse selection. Both the partial effects and the total effect of these factors are analyzed. Moral hazard and adverse selection appear to have a substantial effect on the expected health care costs above a deductible but a small effect on the expected out-of-pocket expenditure. A premium model indicates that for a broad range of deductible amounts the actuarially fair premium reduction exceeds the deductible.     

Reforming health insurance in Argentina and Chile

The paper examines the recent reforms of health insurance in Chile and Argentina. These partially replace social health insurance with individual insurance administered through the private sector. In Chile, reforms in the early 1980s allowed private health insurance funds to compete for affiliates with the social health insurance system. In Argentina, reforms in the 1990s aim to open up the union-administered social insurance system to competition both internally and from private insurers. The paper outlines the specific articulation of social and individual health insurance produced by these reforms, and discusses the implications for health insurance coverage, inequalities in access to healthcare, and health expenditures.     

Making the normal deviant: the introduction of predictive medicine in life insurance

Over the past years, one of the most discussed topics in policy debates on genetics has been the use of genetic testing in insurance. Many of these debates have been rather speculative and abstract. In a recent contribution to this journal, Kaufert therefore urged for "a proper research agenda" to study the issue, arguing for the need of anthropological and sociological research of the insurance world. This article will make a start with this. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in two Belgium insurance companies, this study analyses the ways insurers account for predictive medicine (lifestyle, genetics) during underwriting. We demonstrate how insurers highlight predictive lifestyle health information and how this articulates with a fault based approach in underwriting. Individual responsibility for health risks becomes the golden standard for assessing one's fitness for membership of the insurance pool. Moreover, these developments imply a changed concept of "normal standard" in insurance, increasing the conditions to fulfil to be part of the insurance group. Predictive medicine constitutes new ground in the old debates about individual control, responsibility and blame for health. This goes to the heart of the basis for citizenship and how this articulates with membership--or, if you want, exclusion--of the insurance pool.     

Appeals court says AIDS caps by insurers do not violate ADA

A Chicago appeals court ruled that insurers can place arbitrary caps on AIDS-related benefits in individual health insurance policies without violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The divided three-judge panel of the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said the content of insurance products is not covered under the Title II public accommodations provisions of the ADA. The judges ruled that the Title III provision applies to access and use of facilities, and does not regulate products. This decision reverses a lower court ruling against Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. for discrimination against two policyholders for giving them inferior health coverage because they had HIV. Although the caps are not consistent with sound actuarial practice or State law, the court ruled the plaintiffs were not denied all benefits, just those associated with AIDS. The U.S. Department of Justice filed an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs, but the court rejected those arguments. A summary of the use of State law for possible remediation of the issue is provided. This ruling could spark a new round of AIDS caps.     

Pricing behaviour of nonprofit insurers in a weakly competitive social health insurance market

In this paper we examine the pricing behaviour of nonprofit health insurers in the Dutch social health insurance market. Since for-profit insurers were not allowed in this market, potential spillover effects from the presence of for-profit insurers on the behaviour of nonprofit insurers were absent. Using a panel data set for all health insurers operating in the Dutch social health insurance market over the period 1996-2004, we estimate a premium model to determine which factors explain the price setting behaviour of nonprofit health insurers. We find that financial stability rather than profit maximisation offers the best explanation for health plan pricing behaviour. In the presence of weak price competition, health insurers did not set premiums to maximize profits. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that regulations on financial reserves are needed to restrict premiums.     

Genetic screening,health care and the insurance industry

The potential use of genetic tests in insurance has raised concerns about discrimination and individuals losing access to health care either because of refusals to test for treatable diseases, or because test-positives cannot afford premiums. Governments have so far largely sought to restrict the use of genetic information by insurance companies. To date the number of tests available with significant actuarial value is limited. However, this is likely to change, raising more clearly the question as to whether the social costs of adverse selection outweigh the social costs of individuals not accessing health care for fear of the consequences of test information being used in insurance markets. In this contribution we set out the policy context and model the potential trade-offs between the losses faced by insurers from adverse selection by insurees (which will increase premiums reducing consumer welfare) and the detrimental health effects that may result from persons refusing to undergo tests that could identify treatable health conditions. It argues that the optimal public policy on genetic testing should reflect overall societal benefit, taking account of these trade-offs. Based on our model, the factors that influence the outcome include: the size of and value attached to the health gains from treatment; deterrent effects of a disclosure requirement on testing for health reasons; incidence of the disease; propensity of test-positives to adverse select; policy value adverse selectors buy in a non-disclosure environment; and price elasticity of demand for insurance. Our illustrative model can be used as a benchmark for developing other scenarios or incorporating real data in order to address the impact of different policies on disclosure and requirement to test.     

Health insurance and the demand for medical care

With rare exceptions the provision of actuarially fair health insurance tends to substantially increase the demand for medical care by redistributing income from the healthy to the sick. This suggests that previous studies which attribute all the extra demand for medical care to moral hazard effects may overestimate the efficiency costs of health insurance.     

The democratization of health in Mexico: financial innovations for universal coverage

In 2003, the Mexican Congress approved a reform establishing the Sistema de Protección Social en Salud [System of Social Protection in Health], whereby public funding for health is being increased by one percent of the 2003 gross domestic product over seven years to guarantee universal health insurance. Poor families that had been excluded from traditional social security can now enrol in a new public insurance scheme known as Seguro Popular [People’s Insurance], which assures legislated access to a comprehensive set of health-care entitlements. This paper describes the financial innovations behind the expansion of health-care coverage in Mexico to everyone and their effects. Evidence shows improvements in mobilization of additional public resources; availability of health infrastructure and drugs; service utilization; effective coverage; and financial protection. Future challenges are discussed, among them the need for additional public funding to extend access to costly interventions for non-communicable diseases not yet covered by the new insurance scheme, and to improve the technical quality of care and the responsiveness of the health system. Eventually, the progress achieved so far will have to be reflected in health outcomes, which will continue to be evaluated so that Mexico can meet the ultimate criterion of reform success: better health through equity, quality and fair financing.     

Prospects of gatekeeping in German social health insurance

From 2004, German social health insurers are bound by law to offer their insured a gatekeeping option. In return for renouncing direct access to specialist care, the insured can be granted bonus payments by their social health insurer. So far, experience with gatekeeping is very limited in Germany. In social health insurance, sickness funds are very reluctant to offer gatekeeping, although this was already legally possible before 2004. In the private health insurance sector, cost savings in gatekeeping tariffs are probably the result of self-selection of the insured rather than more cost-efficient provision of health care services. International experience does not prove that gatekeeping results in cost savings or a better patient–physician relationship. Although in countries with a strong primary care system there is a higher life expectancy, gatekeeping is not the only factor to bring about this effect. It is not to be expected that the new legislation will result in a major proliferation of gatekeeping options in German social health insurance. Either the gatekeeping options will not be attractive for the insured or sickness funds will use gatekeeping options as an instrument for risk selection.     

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN GERMANY: THE IGNORED RISK SELECTION PROBLEM

We investigate risk selection between public and private health insurance in Germany. With risk‐rated premiums in the private system and community‐rated premiums in the public system, advantageous selection in favor of private insurers is expected. Using 2000 to 2007 data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study (SOEP), we find such selection. While private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment, they profit from an increase in the probability to switch from private to public health insurance of those individuals who have experienced a negative health shock. To avoid distorted competition between the two branches of health care financing, risk‐adjusted transfers from private to public insurers should be instituted. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.